



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines


Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:


- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>







Marion R. Kirkwood, April 1

D  
A  
NO





















# The Hornbook Series

**Of elementary treatises on all the principal subjects of the law. The special features of these books are as follows:**

- 1. A succinct statement of leading principles in black-letter type.**
- 2. A more extended commentary, elucidating the principles.**
- 3. Notes and authorities.**

**Published in regular octavo form, and sold at the uniform price of  
\$3.75 per volume, including delivery.**

**Bound in American Law Buckram.**

- 
- 1. Norton on Bills and Notes. (3d Ed.)**
  - 2. Clark on Criminal Law. (2d Ed.)**
  - 3. Shipman on Common-Law Pleading. (2d Ed.)**
  - 4. Clark on Contracts. (2d Ed.)**
  - 5. Black on Constitutional Law. (2d Ed.)**
  - 6. Fetter on Equity.**
  - 7. Clark on Criminal Procedure.**
  - 8. Tiffany on Sales. (2d Ed.)**
  - 9. Glenn on International Law.**
  - 10. Jaggard on Torts. (2 vols.)**
  - 11. Black on Interpretation of Laws.**
  - 12. Hale on Bailments and Carriers.**
  - 13. Smith on Elementary Law.**
  - 14. Hale on Damages.**
  - 15. Hopkins on Real Property.**
  - 16. Hale on Torts.**
  - 17. Tiffany on Persons and Domestic Relations. (2d Ed.)**
  - 18. Crosswell on Executors and Administrators.**
  - 19. Clark on Corporations. (2d Ed.)**
  - 20. George on Partnership.**
  - 21. Shipman on Equity Pleading.**
  - 22. McKelvey on Evidence. (2d Ed.)**
  - 23. Barrows on Negligence.**
  - 24. Hughes on Admiralty.**
  - 25. Eaton on Equity.**
  - 26. Tiffany on Principal and Agent.**
  - 27. Gardner on Wills.**
  - 28. Vance on Insurance.**
  - 29. Ingersoll on Public Corporations.**
  - 30. Hughes on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure.**
  - 31. Childs on Suretyship and Guaranty.**
  - 32. Costigan on American Mining Law.**

**In preparation: Handbooks of the law on other subjects to be announced later.**

**Published and for sale by  
WEST PUBLISHING CO., ST. PAUL, MINN.**

**HAND-BOOK**  
**OF THE**  
**LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES**

**By CHARLES P. NORTON**  
**Lecturer on Bills and Notes in the Buffalo Law School**

**THIRD EDITION**  
**WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING THE NEGOTIABLE**  
**INSTRUMENTS LAW**

**By FRANCIS B. TIFFANY**

**ST. PAUL, MINN.**  
**WEST PUBLISHING CO.**

**1900**

Copyright, 1898,  
BY  
WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY.

---

Copyright, 1895,  
BY  
WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY.

---

Copyright, 1900,  
BY  
WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY.

---

L 6756

NOV 22 1932

Y8A8U1 0807A12

# PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.

---

In preparing a new edition of Mr. Norton's book, it has been deemed advisable to print as an appendix the Negotiable Instruments Law, which has already been adopted in fifteen states, as well as in the District of Columbia. It is obvious that even an elementary book upon Bills and Notes must contain references to this law, which, while it is, in the main, declaratory in its effect, settles some doubtful points, and necessarily changes rules in many jurisdictions upon points concerning which a conflict of laws existed. The text of the law as printed in the appendix is that of the New York act, such few modifications as have been made by the various states being mentioned in the notes. The law is also valuable to the student, even in states which have not adopted it, as furnishing a concise statement of rules, which for the most part are of universal application; and for this reason the editor has throughout the book, in the footnotes, inserted references to the appropriate sections of the law, at the same time pointing out any changes effected by them. Much new matter has been incorporated, and this has necessitated some alteration of the former text.

At the suggestion of many teachers, the publishers have adopted the device of printing in bold type in the footnotes and text the names of all cases there cited which are to be found in certain of the collections of leading and illustrative cases on Bills and Notes in use in the law schools. The cases so printed are to be found in Ames' Cases on the Law of Bills and Notes, Huffcut's Negotiable Instruments, and Johnson's Elements of the Law of Negotiable Contracts (second edition).

The present editor wishes to express his great obligation to Prof. Ames, whose Index and Summary at the end of the cases, unquestionably the most important contribution to the subject that has been made in America, he has constantly consulted; and to Prof. Huffcut, whose Negotiable Instruments is an invaluable commentary upon the Negotiable Instruments Law.

F. B. T.

St. Paul, August 31, 1900.





# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

---

## CHAPTER I.

### OF NEGOTIABILITY SO FAR AS IT RELATES TO BILLS AND NOTES.

Section	Page
1. Origin of Negotiability.....	1-8
2-7. Distinction between Assignability and Negotiability.....	9-14
8-9. Indicia of Negotiability.....	14-17
10. Purpose of Negotiability.....	17-18
11. Payment by Negotiable Instrument.....	19-21

## CHAPTER II.

### OF NEGOTIABLE BILLS AND NOTES, AND THEIR FORMAL AND ESSENTIAL REQUISITES.

12. Definition and Forms of Bills of Exchange.....	22-25
13. Definition and Form of Note.....	25-26
14. Essentials of Bill or Note.....	26
15. Order Contained in Bill.....	27-29
16. Promise Contained in Note.....	29-31
17-20. Certainty as to the Terms of the Order or Promise.....	31-42
21-25. Payment of Money Only.....	42-53
26-30. Specification of Parties.....	54-63
31-33. Capacity of Parties.....	63-65
34. Authority of Agent.....	65-66
35-37. Delivery of Instruments.....	67-71
38. Date .....	72-73
39. Value Received.....	73-75
40. Days of Grace.....	75-77

## CHAPTER III.

### ACOEPTANCE OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

41. Definition .....	78-81
42-45. Acceptance According to Tenor.....	82-85
46. Who may Accept.....	86-88

Section	Page
47. Delivery .....	88-89
48-49. Forms and Varieties of Acceptance.....	89-93
50. Implied Acceptance.....	93-95
51-52. Acceptance on Separate Paper.....	95-99
53. Parol Acceptance of a Bill.....	99-101
54-54a. Acceptance for Honor or Supra Protest.....	101-103
55. Time Allowed for Acceptance.....	103-104

## CHAPTER IV.

### INDORSEMENT.

56. Definition .....	105
57. Formal Requisites.....	105-110
58-59. Indorsement in Blank.....	110-115
60-61. Special Indorsement.....	116-119
62-64. Indorsement without Recourse, Conditional and Restrictive Indorsement .....	119-127
65. Nature of Indorsement.....	128-131
66. Requisites of Indorsement.....	131-137
67-68. Irregular Indorsements.....	138-143

## CHAPTER V.

### OF THE NATURE OF THE LIABILITIES OF THE PARTIES.

69. Acceptor and Maker.....	144-145
70. Facts which the Acceptor Admits.....	146-150
71. Facts which the Acceptor does not Admit.....	151-152
72-73. Acceptor Supra Protest.....	152-156
74-76. Drawer and Indorser.....	156-159
77. Undertaking of Drawer.....	159-162
78. Warranties of Indorser.....	162-166
79. Warranties of Indorser without Recourse—Of Transferror by Delivery .....	167-170
80. Damages against the Acceptor, Maker, Drawer, and Indors- ers upon the Bill or Note and upon the Warranties.....	170-176
81-83. Accommodation Parties and Persons Accommodated.....	176-183
83a-83b. Conflict of Laws.....	183-190

**CHAPTER VI.****TRANSFER.**

<b>Section</b>	<b>Page</b>
84. Definition .....	191-192
85. Validity between Immediate Parties.....	192-195
86. Methods of Transfer.....	196
87. By Assignment.....	196-198
88. By Operation of Law.....	198-200
88a-89. By Negotiation.....	200
90-90a. Negotiation by Indorsement.....	200-204
91. By Delivery.....	204-206
92. Overdue Paper.....	207-212
92a. Right to Sue.....	212-215

**CHAPTER VII.****DEFENSES COMMONLY INTERPOSED AGAINST A PURCHASER FOR  
VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE.**

93. Real and Personal Defenses.....	216-218
94-107. Real Defenses.....	218-260
108-121. Personal Defenses.....	260-308

**CHAPTER VIII.****PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE.**

122. What Constitutes.....	309-310
123-124. Value .....	310-317
125-127. Notice .....	317-326
128-131. Presumption and Burden of Proof—Order of Proof.....	327-335

**CHAPTER IX.****PRESENTMENT AND NOTICE OF DISHONOR.**

132. In General.....	336-337
133-140. Presentment .....	337-359
141-144. By Whom and to Whom Made—Effect of Failure to Pre- sent and Protest.....	360-371
145-146. Notice of Dishonor.....	372-393
147-147b. Excuses for Failure to Present or Give Notice.....	394-403

**CHAPTER X.****CHECKS.**

<b>Section</b>		<b>Page</b>
148-150.	In General.....	404-408
151.	Checks as Negotiable Instruments.....	408-411
152-154.	Presentment and Notice of Dishonor—Effect of Delay.....	412-417
155.	Rights of Holder against Bank.....	418-419
156-159.	Certification and Acceptance of Checks.....	419-427
160.	Failure of Bank to Honor Check.....	427-429

**APPENDIX.****NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.**

(Pages 431-489.)

# **HAND-BOOK**

**OF**

# **NEGOTIABLE BILLS AND NOTES**

**THIRD EDITION.**

---

## **CHAPTER I.**

### **OF NEGOTIABILITY SO FAR AS IT RELATES TO BILLS AND NOTES.**

- 1. Origin of Negotiability.**
- 2-7. Distinction between Assignability and Negotiability.**
- 8-9. Indicia of Negotiability.**
- 10. Purpose of Negotiability.**
- 11. Payment by Negotiable Instrument.**

### **ORIGIN OF NEGOTIABILITY.**

**1. The negotiability of bills of exchange and promissory notes originated in the custom of merchants. The statute of Anne, which is declaratory of the common law, established the negotiability of promissory notes.**

**The law, looking at bills of exchange and promissory notes as a circulating medium, divides them into two classes—negotiable instruments and non-negotiable instruments. Negotiability is not necessary to the form or substance of a promissory note or bill of exchange.<sup>1</sup> Non-negotiable instruments are little more than**

<sup>1</sup> **Michigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred, 9 Wall. 544; Wells v. Brigham, 6 Cush. 6; DOWNING v. BACKENSTOES, 3 Calnes (N. Y.) 137; PRESIDENT, ETC., OF TURNPIKE ROAD v. HURTIN, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 217; KIMBALL v. NEG.BILLS.—1**

evidences of indebtedness. In their transfer, the law treats them in most respects as ordinary choses in action, and subject to the general rules touching assignments. For negotiable instruments, on the other hand, in their most common form of bills and notes, the law has endeavored to construct a system of rules which shall protect persons who take them as a circulating medium, and which it is the purpose of this treatise to point out.<sup>2</sup>

*Custom of Merchants—Law Merchant.*

While the historical source of the negotiability of both bills of exchange and promissory notes is the custom of merchants, which in time came to be recognized and enforced by the courts, the negotiability of promissory notes was not set upon a firm basis until it had obtained the sanction of parliament. Notes were first recognized by the courts, and then refused recognition. Their negotiability was established in 1705 by the statute of 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, §§ 1-3.

The custom of merchants means a body of usages and rules relating to trade, which grew up among merchants, and were adopted into the law by the courts. In English law it is as old as Magna Charta, and it is recognized in the statutes of the Plantagenets and the Tudors,<sup>3</sup> though its substantial adoption into the law took place much later. Originally it distinguished the contracts of foreign merchants from the contracts of ordinary individuals, construing them not according to the principles of the common law, but according to the usages of trade.<sup>4</sup> This custom of regulating dealings between native and foreign merchants was extended to dealings between native merchants, but was confined to the persons of merchants, as apart from those pursuing other vocations.<sup>5</sup> It was not until 1666 that courts declared that "the

HUNTINGTON, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 675; HALL v. FARMER, 5 Denio (N. Y.) 484.

<sup>2</sup> For a discussion of the origin, history, and purpose of negotiable instruments, see GOODWIN v. ROBARTS, L. R. 10 Exch. 337, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Magna Charta, c. 30; Acton Burnel de Mercatoribus, 11 Edw. I.; the Statute of Merchants, 13 Edw. I. See, also, 27 Edw. III. cc. 19, 20. See, also, 18 Edw. VI. c. 10, 34 Hen. VIII., cited in Brown, Abr. tit. "Customs," p. 59.

<sup>4</sup> Co. Litt. 182; 2 Inst. 404; VANHEATH v. TURNER (Mich. Term) Winch, 24.

<sup>5</sup> Eaglechilde's Case, Het. 167; Litt. 363.

law of merchants is the law of the land, and the custom is good enough generally for any man, without naming him merchant.”<sup>6</sup>

Of the many customs of merchants, there were two which were especially the subject of judicial interpretation. They were those concerning instruments which related to the remittance of money from one place to another, and in which credit was used as a means of liquidating indebtedness,—instruments, in short, which are now called “bills of exchange” and “promissory notes.” Of these, bills, and particularly foreign bills, are by far the more ancient. Anderson, in his *History of Commerce*,<sup>7</sup> speaks of one granted by the Emperor Barbarossa to the city of Hamburg in the year 1189. “I remember,” said Chief Justice Holt,<sup>8</sup> “when actions upon inland bills of exchange did first begin; and there they laid a particular custom between London and Bristol, and it was an action against the acceptor. The defendant’s counsel would put them to prove the custom, at which Hale, C. J., who tried it, laughed, and said they had a hopeful case of it. And in my Lord North’s time it was said that the custom in that case was part of the common law of England, and these actions since became frequent, as the trade of the nation did increase, and all the difference between foreign bills and inland bills is that foreign bills must be protested before a public notary before the drawer can be charged, but inland bills need no protest.” Between inland bills and promissory notes at first there was no distinction. Both were called indifferently bills of exchange.<sup>9</sup> The law considered a promissory note in the light of a bill of exchange drawn by a man upon himself, and accepted at the time of drawing.<sup>10</sup> And it is worthy of remark that the statement accepted by the text writers, and repeated again and

<sup>6</sup> *Woodward v. Rowe*, 2 Keb. 105, 132. See, also, *Anon.*, Hardr. 485 Mich. Term, 20 Car. II. (1688) believed to be MILTON’S CASE, vide 1 Mod. 286; *Carter v. Downish* (1 W. & M., anno 1688) Show. 127. See, also, complete review of the cases on this subject in the reporter’s note to *Mandeville v. Riddle*, 1 Cranch, 290.

<sup>7</sup> 1 And. Com. p. 171.

<sup>8</sup> *BULLER v. CRIPS*, 6 Mod. 29.

<sup>9</sup> *GRANT v. VAUGHAN*, 3 Burrows, 1525, 1 W. Bl. 488; *Edgar v. Chut*, 1 Keb. 592, 636; *Horton v. Coggs* (Mich. Term, 2 W. & M. 6, anno 1683) 3 Lev. 299.

<sup>10</sup> *Marius*, in his *Advice*, p. 3; *Lev. Bills & N.*, p. 22; *Kyd, Bills*, p. 2.



again in the cases, that a promissory note was never within the custom of merchants, is incorrect.<sup>10</sup> It was as much a mercantile instrument as a bill of exchange. It was introduced under the custom of merchants, and it was therefore, up to the time of the famous dispute between Lord Holt and the merchants which led to the enactment of the statute of Anne, a negotiable instrument. "The reason of making the statute of Anne," says Lord Hardwicke,<sup>11</sup> "arose from some determinations in the beginning of her reign by Holt, Chief Justice, that no action could be maintained on a promissory note nor declaration thereupon."<sup>12</sup> In these decisions Lord Holt denounced promissory notes as "only an invention of the goldsmiths in Lombard street." He declared that "to allow such a note to carry any lien [obligation] with it were to turn a piece of paper, which is in law but evidence of a parol contract, into a specialty."<sup>\*</sup> And, in defiance of established rules, Lord Holt refused to allow to promissory notes the privilege of negotiability.

*Text of Statute of Anne.*

At this juncture, in confirmation of the ancient rule, and to meet the rule established by Lord Holt, the statute of Anne was enacted. It is so important, and so often referred to hereafter, that space is given to it. Its most important provisions are as follows:

<sup>10</sup> *Hill v. Lewis*, 1 Salk. 132; *WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS* (viz. Pasch. Term, 5 W. & M., anno 1692) Carth. 269; *BROMWICH v. LLOYD*, 2 Lutw. 503.

<sup>11</sup> *WALMSLEY v. CHILD* (anno 1749) 1 Ves. Sr. 346.

<sup>12</sup> *CLERK v. MARTIN*, 1 Salk. 129, 2 Ld. Raymond, 757; *Potter v. Pearson*, 2 Ld. Raym. 759.

\* "The term 'specialty' is applied to an instrument which becomes effective by the mere fact of its formal execution. There are two classes of specialty contracts in the English law,—common-law specialties and mercantile specialties. The first class includes bonds and covenants,—i. e. instruments under seal; the second class includes bills and notes, and policies of insurance, and possibly other mercantile instruments. There is a prevalent notion, traceable to an opinion given in the house of lords in 1778, in the case of *Rann v. Hughes*, 7 Term R. 350, note, that only contracts under seal can be specialties; all other contracts, whether written or oral, being merely simple contracts. The fallacy of this notion is easily demonstrable by an examination of the resemblances between bills and notes and instruments under seal, on the one hand, and the differences between bills and notes and simple contracts on the other hand, in those points in which specialties and simple contracts most strikingly differ from each other." 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 872.

“Whereas, it hath been held that notes in writing, signed by the party who makes the same, whereby such party promises to pay unto any other person, or his order, any sum therein mentioned, are not assignable or indorsable over, within the custom of merchants, to any other person; and that the person to whom the sum of money mentioned in such note is payable cannot maintain an action by the custom of merchants, against the person who first made and signed the same; and that any person to whom such note shall be assigned, indorsed, or made payable could not, within the said custom of merchants, maintain any action upon such note against the person who first drew and signed the same: Therefore, to the intent to encourage trade and commerce, which will be much advanced if such notes shall have the same effect as inland bills of exchange, and shall be negotiated in like manner, be it enacted, that all notes in writing whereby any person shall promise to pay to any other person, his order or unto bearer any sum of money mentioned in the note shall be taken and construed to be payable to any such person to whom the same shall be payable; and also every such note shall be assignable or indorsable over in the same manner as inland bills of exchange are according to the custom of merchants; and that the person to whom such sum of money is payable may maintain an action for the same as he might do upon an inland bill of exchange made, or drawn, according to the custom of merchants; and that any person to whom such note is indorsed, or assigned, or the money therein mentioned ordered to be paid by indorsement thereon, may maintain his action for such sum of money either against the person who signed the note, or against any of the persons that indorsed the same, in like manner as in cases of inland bills of exchange.” Thus by the statute of Anne the negotiability of notes was established. Its principles have been followed and generally embodied in the statutes of the various states of the Union. And in the many cases which arise with reference to the negotiability of instruments in forms of notes, the point is to determine whether they were such as were within the purview of the statute of Anne, or of the statutes of the various states which have embodied the principles of the statute of Anne.

*Construction of Statute of Anne—Non-negotiable Notes.*

The statute of Anne, at the hands of the courts, has been construed with great latitude, a latitude in fact which renders some-

what inconsistent and irreconcilable the theories of negotiable and non-negotiable instruments. The English courts after its enactment looked upon it as a remedial statute, as it undoubtedly was. But by a line of cases which seem to go beyond the utmost limits of its evident intendment, the courts also declared that non-negotiable notes came within the statute's provisions.<sup>13</sup> A payee, they decided, could maintain an action within the statute against the maker, by which was meant only that the payee could declare upon the note, under the statute, instead of declaring upon the consideration or transaction which led to its being given. This interpretation, which in its inception was possibly an adaptation of an artificial system of pleading to business needs, has resulted in confusion. In New York,<sup>14</sup> for instance, it seems to be the view of the courts that non-negotiable notes differ from negotiable ones only in two main particulars. One is that the indorser is regarded as a maker or guarantor, and not as a simple indorser; the other that the equities between the parties are not a subject of set-off when the instrument is transferred to a bona fide purchaser for value before maturity. Therefore in New York the general rule of contracts, that there cannot be a recovery upon them without proof of consideration, does not obtain with non-negotiable instruments, and the non-negotiable promise to pay money is itself presumption of a consideration.<sup>15</sup> So, too, in Massachusetts, where, although the statute of Anne has never been enacted, its doctrines are regarded as declaratory of the common law,<sup>16</sup> the early English rule is followed.<sup>17</sup> The courts of

<sup>13</sup> *Kyd, Exch.* (1790) 65; *SMITH v. KENDALL*, 6 Term R. 123; 1 Esp. N. P. 231; *Burchell v. Slocock*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1545; *MILLER v. BIDDLE*, 13 Law T. (N. S.) 334.

<sup>14</sup> *Maule v. Crawford*, 14 Hun, 193; *Lee v. Swift*, 1 Denio, 565; *Barrick v. Austin*, 21 Barb. 241.

<sup>15</sup> *PRESIDENT, ETC., OF TURNPIKE ROAD v. HURTIN*, 9 Johns. 217; *KIMBALL v. HUNTINGTON*, 10 Wend. 675; *Paine v. Noelke*, 53 How. Prac. 273; 3 Kent. Comm. 77; *CARNWRIGHT v. GRAY*, 127 N. Y. 92, 27 N. E. 835. The New York statute, which was a substantial re-enactment of the statute of Anne, has been replaced by Neg. Inst. L. § 320, by which the law in this respect, it seems, has been changed.

<sup>16</sup> *Richards v. Barlow*, 140 Mass. 218, 6 N. E. 68.

<sup>17</sup> *TOWNSEND v. DERBY*, 3 Metc. 363; *DEAN v. CARRUTH*, 108 Mass. 242. But in Massachusetts, in case of disputed consideration, the burden of

Connecticut, however, have adopted a different rule.<sup>18</sup> With them, where the note is not negotiable, it is a mere contract between the original parties, not intended for transfer, and a consideration must be shown. This is more consistent with the original intention of the statute. For one of the most marked distinctions between the custom of merchants and the rules of common law was in reference to the assignment of contract rights. The custom of merchants aimed to shut out equities from following transfer. According to that custom, want of consideration was no defense to an instrument in the hands of a bona fide holder, and hence, by way of corollary, came the doctrine that an expression of consideration in the instrument itself was wholly unnecessary. But this was confined to negotiable instruments. It did not include non-negotiable ones.

*Non-negotiable Bills and Notes.*

Negotiability is not essential to the validity of a bill of exchange, and although it be payable to a designated person, and not to order or to bearer, it imports consideration, and in an action by the payee consideration need not be averred or proved.\* If, however, the instrument lacks any of the essential qualities of a bill of exchange,—for example, if it be drawn upon a particular fund, or be payable in another medium than money,—no presumption of consideration arises.<sup>19</sup> Such instruments are, in general, mere assignments or orders. A number of important distinctions between them and negotiable bills are to be pointed out: A person suing the acceptor must show funds in the acceptor's hands to pay,<sup>20</sup> for the agreement is not an acceptance, but a mere promise to pay, and must be based upon a sufficient consideration.<sup>21</sup> The acceptor cannot be sued upon the

proof is on the plaintiff. *Perley v. Perley*, 144 Mass. 104, 10 N. E. 726; *Simpson v. Davis*, 119 Mass. 269. But see *Neg. Inst. L. § 320*.

<sup>18</sup> *EDGERTON v. EDGERTON*, 8 Conn. 6; *BRISTOL v. WARNER*, 19 Conn. 7; *Daniels*, *Neg. Inst. § 162*; *Pars. Bills & N. 227*.

\* *JOSSELYN v. LACIER*, 10 Mod. 294; *AVERETT v. BOOKER*, 15 Grat. (Va.) 163; *Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co. v. Caldwell*, 98 Ind. 245; *Arnold v. Sprague*, 34 Vt. 402; *Daniel*, *Neg. Inst. § 161*; 4 *Am. & Eng. Enc. Law*, 187.

<sup>19</sup> *Ranbitschek v. Blank*, 80 N. Y. 479; *AVERETT v. BOOKER*, *supra*; *Wells v. Brigham*, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 6; *Atkinson v. Manka*, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 691.

<sup>20</sup> *MUNGER v. SHANNON*, 61 N. Y. 251.

<sup>21</sup> *Atkinson v. Manka*, 1 Cow. 691.

bill, but upon the promise to pay evidenced by the acceptance. The acceptor is under no general liability to pay the bill in the first instance. Non-negotiable bills are assignments in the sense that they are directions to appropriate and hold the property specified in them to the use of a third person. The third person has them thus assigned to him, and this whether they consist of the whole or part of the fund, and whether assented to or not by the drawee, as long as the drawee had notice of it.<sup>22</sup> They are treated as moneys or property held by the drawee for another.<sup>23</sup>

There are some features which non-negotiable bills and non-negotiable notes also have in common. When transferred, it is by operation of the theory of assignment, and not of indorsement,<sup>24</sup> and the fact of possession of either the bill or note is not evidence of such title that its mere production upon a trial is *prima facie* evidence of a right to recover. And, lastly, title to either a non-negotiable bill or note is subject to every equity. Under the strict common-law rule the indorsee of a bill or note, in its terms not negotiable, may sue his immediate indorser in his own name, but he can only sue the maker or remote indorser in the name of the original payee, except where special statute otherwise provides. The indorser of paper not negotiable is only responsible to parties not immediate where he especially contracts to be so, being treated as guarantor or maker. And, lastly, an indorser of either cannot insist on demand and notice as a condition precedent.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>22</sup> *Morton v. Naylor*, 1 Hill, 583; *Mandeville v. Welch*, 5 Wheat. 277; *ROW v. DAWSON*, 1 Ves. Sr. 331; *Lett v. Morris*, 4 Sim. 607; *BRILL v. TUTTLE*, 81 N. Y. 457; *EHRICHS v. DE MILL*, 75 N. Y. 370; *Robbins v. Bacon*, 3 Greenl. (Me.) 346; *Bank of Commerce v. Bogy*, 44 Mo. 18.

<sup>23</sup> *Lowery v. Steward*, 25 N. Y. 239, 243.

<sup>24</sup> An assignment, as applied to bills and notes, is the transfer, by writing, of an interest therein. *Franklin v. Twogood*, 18 Iowa, 515.

<sup>25</sup> *Richards v. Warring*, 4 Abb. Dec. 50; *McMULLEN v. RAFFERTY*, 89 N. Y. 456; *CROMWELL v. HEWITT*, 40 N. Y. 491; *STORY v. LAMB*, 52 Mich. 525, 18 N. W. 248; *Shinn v. Fredericks*, 56 Ill. 439; *Rabberman v. Muehlhausen*, 3 Ill. App. 326.

**DISTINCTION BETWEEN ASSIGNABILITY AND NEGOTIABILITY.**

**2. Assignability pertains to contracts in general.**

**3. An assignment is the legal method of transferring property or rights evidenced by contract.**

**4. It is an impracticable method, as regards a circulating medium, because:**

**(a) Title created by assignment, as against the debtor, is not complete without notice to the debtor.**

**(b) No subsequent purchaser of the property or right can acquire better title than that of his immediate assignor.**

**5. Negotiability pertains to a special class of contracts.**

**6-7. Negotiability facilitates their transfer as a circulating medium, because:**

**(a) The bona fide purchaser for value is presumed to be the true owner, and has good title.**

**(b) Transfer is effected by indorsement or delivery.**

**(c) In general, a consideration for the contractual relation is conclusively presumed as between parties not immediate.**

We purpose here to state briefly the fundamental reasons why negotiable bills and notes could not readily be transferred as a circulating medium under the rules governing the transfer of ordinary choses in action. The rights evidenced or created by ordinary contractual obligations are almost always a kind of property, having in themselves a value measured in law by the damages assessable upon their breach. This property may at this stage of the law pass from person to person just as any other property does. But there are well-settled rules governing such transfer, which are the outgrowth and mingling of early doctrines of the courts of common law and of equity, and at which the student must glance to understand the rules themselves. To this must also be added the statement that statutes, from time to time, have been largely instrumental in moulding these doctrines of common law and of

equity into the form which the theory of assignment of choses in action presents at the present time.

*Assignment.*

It was probably the common-law rule in the first instance that no assignee of the benefits of a contract could sue for and recover them. The primitive view was, in the first place, that the contract created a strictly personal obligation between the creditor and the debtor, and also that the assignment of choses in action would increase litigation,—a reason which led the courts to set their faces resolutely against it.<sup>26</sup> And whether from reasons of business expediency, or because they were influenced by equitable doctrines, is not clear, but the courts of common law at an early day modified this rule into one that for a long time prevailed, namely, that an assignment of a contract might be made, but the assignee must sue for its benefit in the name of the assignor or his representatives. The theory was that the courts of common law would so far take cognizance of equitable rights created by the assignment that the name of the assignor might be used as a trustee of the benefits of the contract for the benefit of the assignee.<sup>27</sup> This doctrine has been generally modified by statutes, the commonest ones, in the United States, being the provisions of the various Codes,—that “every action must be prosecuted by the real party in interest,” and that the “transfer of every claim or demand passes an interest which the transferee may enforce by an action in his own name, as the transferrer might have done.” With courts of equity, it is true, the rule was different. For in equity, from immemorial times, the assignment of a chose in action or of the benefits under a contract has been permitted, and the assignee could maintain a suit in equity in his own name.<sup>28</sup> But, however salutary the operation of this equitable rule might have been in some phases of the enforcement of contract rights, it could have had little influence with bills and notes. Cases arising upon them came within the cognizance of the courts of common law. And there are cases to show that even when the as-

<sup>26</sup> Pol. Cont. 207; *Beecher v. Buckingham*, 18 Conn. 110.

<sup>27</sup> *Calster v. Eccles*, 1 Ld. Raym. 683; *McWILLIAM v. WEBB*, 32 Iowa, 577; *Halloran v. Whitcomb*, 43 Vt. 306; *Fay v. Guynon*, 131 Mass. 81.

<sup>28</sup> *Smith v. Brittain*, 3 Ired. Eq. (N. J.) 347; *TIBBETS v. GERRISH*, 25 N. H. 41.



signed non-negotiable promise was to pay a sum of money to the promisee, or to bearer, or to order, or where, by any other form of words, the instrument purported to be made assignable, even then the holder could not sue in his own name, but only in that of his assignor.<sup>29</sup> This objection, inasmuch as it related only to the form of action, was not of vital importance. Yet were it the rule that the transferees of negotiable instruments must sue in the name of their transferrers, it would certainly clog their circulation, since it would complicate and render less certain the recovery of judgments upon them.

There were other rules relating to the transfer of ordinary contracts, governing alike courts of common law and equity, which were of greater practical importance. The first is the doctrine of notice. The rule governing assignment, as stated in the principal text, is that title by assignment, as against the debtor, is not complete without notice to him. As the result of this rule, follows the one that a debtor who performs his contract to the original creditor, without notice of any assignment by the creditor to another person, is released from his obligation under it.<sup>30</sup> An illustration of this principle is a well-known case where a bond and mortgage had been given, and assigned by various intermediate assignments, not recorded until some nine years afterwards. At that time the mortgage was attempted to be foreclosed by the true owner. In the meantime the mortgagor had made various payments upon the mortgage, and finally had paid it up in full to the original mortgagee, some three years before the foreclosure. These payments, on the mortgagor's part, were made without notice or knowledge of the assignments. And upon these facts it was held that the mortgagor was to be protected, and would even have been protected if the assignments had been recorded, because notice must be given or brought home to the mortgagor not to pay the original mortgagee, else payments to such mortgagee on account of the mortgage are

<sup>29</sup> COOLIDGE v. RUGGLES, 15 Mass. 887; CLARK v. KING, 2 Mass. 524; Weidler v. Kauffman, 14 Ohio, 455; Jones v. Carter, 8 Q. B. 134.

<sup>30</sup> Judson v. Corcoran, 17 How. 612; VAN BUSKIRK v. INSURANCE CO., 14 Conn. 141; Smith v. Ewer, 22 Pa. St. 116; MERCHANTS' AND MECHANICS' BANK v. HEWETT, 8 Iowa, 93; Winberry v. Koonce, 83 N. C. 351; Hobson v. Stevenson, 1 Tenn. Ch. 203; Richards v. Griggs, 16 Mo. 416.



perfectly valid.<sup>81</sup> This is the logical outgrowth of the theory of assignment, as explained in the English case of *Stocks v. Dobson*.<sup>82</sup> "The debtor," said the court, "is liable at law to the assignor of the debt, and at law must pay the assignor if the assignor sues in respect of it. If so, it follows that he may pay without suit. The payment of the debtor to the assignor discharges the debt at law. The assignee has no legal right, and can only sue in the assignor's name. How can he sue if the debt has been paid? The law, therefore, has required notice to be given to the debtor of the assignment, in order to perfect the title of the assignee."

There is another feature of assignments to be considered. It is true that the courts in many of the states at the present day will decline to examine into the consideration of the assignment of an ordinary contract, holding that a payment of it by the debtor to the person who holds the rights under a valid assignment will release the debtor from his liability.<sup>83</sup> But it was probably the common-law rule, and certainly the equity rule, that an assignment would not be supported unless consideration had been given by the assignee.<sup>84</sup>

### *Negotiability.*

The rules in regard to negotiability are in sharp contrast with these principles governing assignments. If a negotiable bill or note is made payable to bearer, or indorsed in blank, the debtor is prima facie protected in payments made to the person who has the instrument in his possession.<sup>85</sup> The person having the instrument in his possession is, under such circumstances, presumed to own it, and to have a legal right to it.<sup>86</sup> A purchaser in good faith from one who has stolen it

<sup>81</sup> *Van Keuren v. Corkins*, 66 N. Y. 77.

<sup>82</sup> *Stocks v. Dobson*, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 15.

<sup>83</sup> *Sheridan v. Mayor, etc.*, 68 N. Y. 30; *Burnett v. Gwynne*, 2 Abb. Prac. 79; *Stone v. Frost*, 61 N. Y. 614; *Allen v. Brown*, 44 N. Y. 228; *Durgin v. Ireland*, 14 N. Y. 322.

<sup>84</sup> *Anson*, Cont. p. 222.

<sup>85</sup> *Pettee v. Prout*, 3 Gray, 502; *Way v. Richardson*, Id. 412; *Garvin v. Wiswell*, 83 Ill. 215; *Jewett v. Cook*, 81 Ill. 260; *COLLINS v. GILBERT*, 94 U. S. 753; *Rubey v. Culbertson*, 35 Iowa, 264; *Ecton v. Halan*, 20 Kan. 452; *Wells v. Schoonover*, 9 Helsk. 806.

<sup>86</sup> *Wilson Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Spears*, 50 Mich. 534, 15 N. W. 894; *First Nat. Bank v. Sollenberger*, 1 Lancast. Law Rev. 75.

acquires a valid title.<sup>87</sup> If these were not the rules every bank or merchant who took the instrument, and gave money or value for it, would be compelled to make inquiries, and also give notice of ownership of the instrument to all prior parties, in order to prevent the instrument being paid to some one else. Several results would inevitably flow from these conditions. Business men would decline to take such trouble. This friction would check the circulation of bills and notes, and destroy their effectiveness as a quasi money. And thus, so far as negotiable bills and notes could aid it, credit would no longer be as good as cash in the commercial markets of the world.

*Equities between Prior Parties.*

The last and perhaps most important distinction made between the transfers of non-negotiable contracts and those of negotiable bills and notes is that in case of the former the assignee takes subject to the equities or defenses existing between the prior parties, while the bona fide holder of a negotiable instrument may disregard these equities, and recover upon suit the full amount called for by the instrument he buys. According to the Honorable Theodore Dwight,<sup>88</sup> the assignee of a non-negotiable contract takes subject, not only to the equities existing between the original parties, but also must always abide the case of the person from whom he buys. The holder of a chose in action cannot alienate anything but the beneficial interest he possesses.<sup>89</sup> It is a question of power or capacity to transfer to another, and that capacity is to be exactly measured by his own rights. This is undoubtedly the law in England and in New York, though in many of the states of the Union the great authority of Chief Justice Kent has prevailed to limit the equities to those existing between the original parties, and does not extend them to those existing in favor of third parties. The technical or theoret-

<sup>87</sup> *Spooner v. Holmes*, 102 Mass. 503; *Birdsall v. Russell*, 29 N. Y. 220; *EVERTSON v. BANK*, 66 N. Y. 14. See, also, post, p. 111.

<sup>88</sup> *Trustees of Union College v. Wheeler*, 61 N. Y. 88.

<sup>89</sup> *WARNER v. WHITTAKER*, 6 Mich. 133; *Seligman v. Ten Eyck's Estate*, 49 Mich. 104, 13 N. W. 377; *Shotwell v. Webb*, 23 Miss. 375; *Howell v. Medler*, 41 Mich. 641, 2 N. W. 911; *Ayres v. Campbell*, 9 Iowa, 213; *TIMMS v. SHANNON*, 19 Md. 296; *State Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Roberts*, 31 Pa. St. 438; *Cary v. Bancroft*, 14 Pick. 315; *Harwood v. Jones*, 10 Gill. & J. 404; *Scott v. Schreeve*, 12 Wheat. 605.

ical reason of the rule is that given by Judge Story.<sup>40</sup> "Every assignment of a chose in action is considered in equity as in its nature amounting to a declaration of trust and to an agreement to permit the assignee to make use of the name of the assignor in order to recover the debt, or to reduce the property into possession." This theory leads to the conclusion that the action by the assignee must be precisely commensurate with that of the assignor, as it must be in his name, and on the supposition that, for the purposes of the action, he is still the owner.

### INDICIA OF NEGOTIABILITY.

8. The instrument must contain express words of negotiability, although there is no set form of such expression. It is enough if the intention of the parties to make it negotiable can be fairly construed from the terms of the contract.

9. The usual form of making an instrument negotiable is making it payable either

- (a) To order, or
- (b) To bearer.<sup>41</sup>

It is the purpose of these sections to explain what form of words, when they occur in an order or promise to pay money, makes that order or promise a negotiable one; or, in other words, what are the indicia of negotiability. As has been said, negotiability is the peculiar theory of the law merchant, and the law merchant has as its source the usages of trade, which have been recognized and formulated into rules of law by the courts, and sometimes declared, and even modified, by statute.

The first question, then, is, what indicia are declared by the statutes to confer negotiability upon orders or promises to pay money? These indicia consist in the first place in certain words or phrases created by and appearing in the statute itself. The statute of Anne, for example, declares, in words, that "all notes whereby one

<sup>40</sup> Story, Eq. Jur. § 1040.

<sup>41</sup> McMULLEN v. RAFFERTY, 89 N. Y. 456; CROMWELL v. HEWITT, 40 N. Y. 491.

doth promise to pay to any other person, his order, or unto bearer, shall be assignable or indorsable over as inland bills of exchange, according to the custom of merchants.”<sup>42</sup>

In very many states these words of the statute of Anne, or words quite similar to them, have been re-enacted. In some states, in addition to the foregoing phrases, specified in the statute of Anne, peculiar phrases are essential to negotiability. In some states negotiability has been limited to notes containing the words “without defalcation and discount.”<sup>43</sup> In Alabama<sup>44</sup> only bills of exchange and promissory notes payable in money at a bank, or private banking house, or other place of payment expressed, are made negotiable, and governed by the law merchant; other contracts in writing being assignable subject to defenses.<sup>45</sup> In Indiana<sup>46</sup> promissory notes, to be negotiable independent of equities, must be payable to order or bearer at a bank in Indiana. In Kentucky<sup>47</sup> only such promissory notes as are made payable and negotiable at a bank incorporated by the state law, and are indorsed and discounted by such bank or some other bank in Kentucky, are negotiable like foreign bills of exchange; all other bills and notes are assignable subject to defenses.<sup>48</sup> And to determine whether an instrument contains the quality of negotiability, we must first turn to the statute of the state, and, if there appear upon the face of the instrument the phrases authorized by the statute, then, other things being equal, the instrument is negotiable. And, as appears hereafter, except in the case of a restrictive indorsement, an instrument once stamped by the original parties with the character of negotiability in most cases cannot be deprived of this characteristic, but remains so despite the subsequent agreement or conduct of the parties transferring it.

<sup>42</sup> GOODWIN v. ROBARTS, L. R. 10 Exch. 337, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 3. See Neg. Inst. L. § 20.

<sup>43</sup> See Rand. Com. Paper, § 86.

<sup>44</sup> Code, §§ 1756, 1757.

<sup>45</sup> See OATES v. BANK, 100 U. S. 239.

<sup>46</sup> Horner's Rev. St. § 5506.

<sup>47</sup> St. § 483.

<sup>48</sup> St. § 474. It is impossible in a work of this character to enumerate or discuss the various statutory provisions peculiar to different states. They are collected in Rand. Com. Paper, §§ 96, 128, 174. In many states such provisions

While it is unquestioned that bills and notes, correct in other respects, drawn in the words of the statutes, are negotiable, those words are not the only forms of words which will confer negotiability. Some express words are, however, necessary to confer this quality. A note in words,<sup>49</sup> "8 months after date, we promise to pay G. H. \$275, for value received," was held not a negotiable note, because the statute directed words of negotiability. But the true reason is that laid down by Lord Holt,<sup>50</sup> given in a case where the words "or his order" were omitted from a bill. "And the chief justice did agree that the indorsement of this bill did not make him that drew the bill chargeable to the indorsee, for the words 'or his order' did give authority to assign it by indorsement, and it is an agreement by the first drawer that he would answer it to the assignee."

What words will then be deemed by the courts to confer negotiability? "Whether the parties to an instrument can give it a negotiable character, with all the incidents pertaining to negotiable paper, when it is not in terms within the class of instruments known to the law as 'negotiable,' may be questioned," says Allen, J., in *EVERTSON v. NATIONAL BANK*.<sup>51</sup> But, however this may be with instruments intended to be other than orders or promises for the payment of money alone, still it is probably the rule that, in the instruments governed by the rules of the law merchant, any words in a bill or note whence it can be inferred that the person making it intended it to be negotiable, will give it a transferable quality against that person.<sup>52</sup>

have been repealed by enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law. See section.20 et seq.

<sup>49</sup> *Maule v. Crawford*, 14 Hun (N. Y.) 193. See, also, *ROBINSON v. BROWN*, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 128; *Fernon v. Farmer*, 1 Har. (Del.) 32; *Yingling v. Kohlhas*, 18 Md. 148; *Barriere v. Nairac*, 2 Dall. 249; *Whitwell v. Winslow*, 134 Mass. 843; *American Exch. Bank v. Blanchard*, 7 Allen, 333; *Fawsett v. National Life Ins. Co.*, 97 Ill. 11; *Lowy v. Andreas*, 20 Ill. App. 521.

<sup>50</sup> *Hill v. Lewis*, 1 Salk. 132.

<sup>51</sup> 66 N. Y. 18. See, also, *CROUCH v. CREDIT FONCIER OF ENGLAND*, L. R. 8 Q. B. 374; *HASEY v. SUGAR CO.*, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 193; *Robinson v. Wilkinson*, 38 Mich. 299; *Almy v. Winslow*, 126 Mass. 842; *Grinnell v. Baxter*, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 386; *DAGGETT v. DAGGETT*, 124 Mass. 149; *Judson v. Gookwin*, 37 Ill. 286.

<sup>52</sup> *U. S. v. White*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 59; *GIBSON v. MINET*, 1 H. BL. 569; *MECHANICS' BANK v. STRAITON*, 3 Abb. Dec. (N. Y.) 269.

This is probably the better rule, although it was the former English rule that, unless a bill or note be payable to order or to bearer, it was not negotiable. The interest of the parties should, and probably would, override the form of words, and if the court can determine from the words used that, as a matter of fact, it was the intention of both of the parties, the one to assume the rights of a holder of a negotiable instrument, and the other to incur the liabilities of a party thereto, and the instrument in other essential respects contains the elements of a negotiable bill or note, the instrument would probably be treated as negotiable although formally incorrect.

### PURPOSE OF NEGOTIABILITY.

10. Negotiable bills and notes in some respects play the part of money in business affairs. The fundamental purpose of negotiability is to endow them with all qualities necessary for a limited commercial medium.<sup>53</sup>

Bills and notes have become, under the development which they have undergone in the courts of England and America, a sort of money, —a medium of exchange possessing the advantages of a perfectly flexible paper currency.<sup>54</sup> The rules which the courts have worked out all point largely to one end,—the protection of the bona fide holder so far as that is consistent with justice to the other parties to the instrument. It is necessary, as we shall hereafter see, that the order or promise contained in a bill or note should be definite, so that the person receiving it in exchange for merchandise or other value may know that he is receiving a right that is equivalent to value; that it should be for money only, because, from a commercial as distinguished from an economic standard, money is the only thing in business whose

<sup>53</sup> Illustration of the use of a negotiable instrument as a circulating medium: If A and B are in England, and C in Jamaica be indebted to A £1,000, and B be going to Jamaica, he may pay A this £1,000 and take a bill of exchange drawn by A in England upon C in Jamaica. B, on his way to Jamaica, may be paid the £1,000 for the bill by D in New York, and indorse it to him; D may be paid for the bill £1,000 by E in Charleston, and indorse it to him; and E will collect the money of C, to whom it is presented for acceptance, in Jamaica, and who accepts it.

See *RUSSELL v. WHIPPLE*, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 536; *Durgin v. Bartol*, 64 Me. 473; *GOODWIN v. ROBARTS*, L. R. 10 Exch. 337, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 3.

<sup>54</sup> Bills of exchange and promissory notes are representatives of money, cir-  
NEG.BILLS.—2

value does not fluctuate. And so, through the entire system, in laying down their rules, the courts have asked themselves these questions: Is the application of the rule just for all parties, and, all things being considered, the most expedient for commerce? And, second, is the rule such that a person taking the bill or note in exchange for something of value will be protected in the enforcement of the bill or note, as a legal right, if it is not paid? This idea once understood by the student, the scattered and seemingly irrelevant rules become consecutive parts of a consistent theory.

Probably the primary object of negotiability is to give to bills or notes the effect which money, in the shape of government bills or notes, plays in commercial transactions. These last are an unquestioned medium of payment for debts, or for the transfer of property or rights. They are such an unquestioned medium because the credit or solvency of the government, which has caused them to be issued, is behind them. It is the distinct promise of a whole nation to exchange for the bill or note itself, in precious metal, a sum of money intrinsically worth its face.

A man's credit is rated at the amount of property or valuable rights he has or can procure. He makes this credit available in his bill or note because his credit is its guaranty of future payment. The elements of credit may be either his earning capacity or the accumulated property he owns. Business men rely upon these as the source of probable future payment. And so the merchant sells goods, and the bank discounts for the seller the buyer's note or draft. And business men who have no property in cash are by means of credit enabled to conduct and carry to completion business and commercial enterprises. Other business men will take these promises of men of undoubted credit, and treat them as cash. Thus we see bills and notes going from hand to hand in the commercial markets, and credit taking the part of money in commercial transactions. And here, perhaps, as a part of this theory of negotiability, it is well to show how far and under what circumstances courts have treated negotiable instruments as liquidation of indebtedness.

colating in the commercial world as such. *FRIEDLANDER v. RAILWAY CO.*, 9 Sup. Ct. 570, 130 U. S. 416; *Id.*, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 11. For a comparison of the English, or banking or currency, theory of bills of exchange with the French, or mercantile, theory, see Chalm. Bills & N. (3d Ed.) introduction.



**PAYMENT BY NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.**

**11. The common rules regarding a negotiable instrument as a medium of payment are as follows:**

- (a) Where a negotiable instrument to which the debtor is a party as drawer, acceptor, maker, or indorser is received for a debt, whether precedent or contemporaneous, in the absence of agreement to the contrary a presumption arises in most jurisdictions that the instrument is received in conditional, and not in absolute, payment.**
- (b) Where a negotiable instrument to which the debtor is not a party is received for a debt, in the absence of agreement to the contrary a presumption arises in most jurisdictions that the instrument is received in conditional payment if the debt was precedent; but that it is received in absolute payment if the debt be contemporaneous.**

Whether a payment by bill or note is absolute (that is, in extinguishment of the debt) or conditional (that is, in extinguishment of the debt only on condition that the bill or note be paid at maturity) is to be determined by the intention of the parties; and if their intention has been expressed, or can be gathered from the circumstances, it will always govern. But, in the absence of agreement, express or implied, certain presumptions as to the intention of the parties have become established. It is said on high authority that in refusing to hold that acceptance of a bill or note, as in case of acceptance of an instrument under seal, works an extinguishment and merger of the debt in the new security, the courts have failed to give full effect to the custom of merchants.<sup>55</sup> Certain it is that for lack of a guiding principle the courts have been led into hopeless confusion in their efforts to arrive at the presumed intention of debtors and creditors. It is believed, however, that the preponderance, if not the weight, of authority will be found to support the rules stated in the principal text.

<sup>55</sup> 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 874.



Proceeding upon the theory that bills and notes in this respect are not specialties, but simple contracts, and because a simple executory contract is not extinguished by acceptance of another, it is generally held that, in the absence of agreement to that effect, acceptance of a bill or note of the debtor on account of the debt does not extinguish it. Yet the taking of the bill or note is not without effect upon the right of the creditor to enforce his debt. His remedy for its enforcement is suspended; but, if the bill or note is dishonored, his right to sue on the original debt revives. In other words, the presumption arises that the payment is conditional.<sup>56</sup> So, where a bill or note of the debtor is accepted on account of a contemporaneous debt,—as upon a sale of goods,—the same presumption, though perhaps with even less reason, is held to arise.<sup>57</sup> The same rule prevails where the debtor gives on account of a precedent debt the bill or note of a third person, whether the paper be indorsed by the debtor or be simply payable to bearer, and without the debtor's indorsement.<sup>58</sup> Where, however, the debtor gives the bill or note of a third person on account of a contemporaneous debt, a distinction is drawn between paper indorsed by the debtor and paper payable to bearer, or indorsed in blank by the payee or drawee, but without the indorsement or guaranty of the debtor. In the first case the general rule holds good, such paper being regarded in the same light as a bill or note to which the debtor was an original party;<sup>59</sup> but in the second case the usual presumption is reversed, and the creditor is presumed to accept the paper in absolute

<sup>56</sup> CLARK v. MUNDAL, 1 Salk. 124; Richardson v. Rickman, cited in 5 Term R. 517; PRICE v. PRICE, 16 Mees. & W. 232; Bank of United States v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 82; Lewis v. Davisson, 29 Grat. 266; McLaren v. Hall, 26 Iowa, 298; Archibald v. Argall, 53 Ill. 307; Logan v. Attix, 7 Iowa, 77; Jones v. Shawhan, 4 Watts & S. 261; Lee v. Green, 83 Ala. 491, 3 South. 785; McGuire v. Bidwell, 64 Tex. 43; Henry v. Conley, 48 Ark. 271, 33 S. W. 181; Hopkins v. Detwiler, 25 W. Va. 748; Selby v. McCullough, 26 Mo. App. 67; Riverside Iron-Works v. Hall, 64 Mich. 168, 31 N. W. 152; Gelb v. Reynolds, 35 Minn. 331, 28 N. W. 923; Merrick v. Boury, 4 Ohio St. 60; Cole v. Sackett, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 516.

<sup>57</sup> Sheehy v. Mandeville, 6 Cranch, 253. See Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1261.

<sup>58</sup> WARD v. EVANS, 2 Ld. Raym. 928; Ex parte BLACKBURN, 10 Ves. 204; Downey v. Hicks, 14 How. 249; Gallagher v. Roberts, 2 Wash. C. C. 191, Fed. Cas. No. 5,195; Noel v. Murray, 13 N. Y. 167; Gordon v. Price, 32 N. C. 388; McGinn v. Holmes, 2 Watts (Pa.) 121; Dougal v. Cowles, 5 Day (Conn.) 511; Slocumb v. Holmes, 1 How. (Miss.) 139; Case v. Hall, 5 Mo. 59.

<sup>59</sup> Monroe v. Hoff, 5 Denio (N. Y.) 360; Shriner v. Keller, 25 Pa. St. 61.

payment.<sup>60</sup> "I am of the opinion, and always was," said Lord Holt, "notwithstanding the noise and cry that it is the use of Lombard street, that the acceptance of such a note [the note of a third person, payable to bearer] is not actual payment. Taking a note for goods sold is payment, because it was part of the original contract; but paper is no payment where it was a precedent debt. For when such a note is given in payment, it is always to be taken under this condition: to be payment if the money be paid thereon in convenient time."<sup>61</sup> These various presumptions, since they rest on the presumed intention of the parties, may all be rebutted by evidence showing a different intention on their part. In some jurisdictions, on the other hand, the ordinary rule is reversed, and, where a promissory note or bill of exchange is given on account of indebtedness, the payment is presumed to be absolute, though this presumption may be rebutted.<sup>62</sup>

The rule that a bill or note is presumed to be merely conditional payment is, of course, applicable where the instrument is accepted in renewal of one already due, which is not surrendered.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>60</sup> *WARD v. EVANS*, 2 Ld. Raym. 928, per Holt, C. J.; *CLARK v. MUNDAL*, 1 Salk. 124; 12 Mod. 203; *BANK OF ENGLAND v. NEWMAN*, 1 Ld. Raym. 442; *Whitbeck v. Van Ness*, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 409; *Gibson v. Tobey*, 46 N. Y. 637; *Blacknall v. Waterman*, 5 R. I. 43.

<sup>61</sup> *WARD v. EVANS*, *supra*.

<sup>62</sup> *Fowler v. Bush*, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 230; *Ely v. James*, 123 Mass. 44; *O'Connor v. Hurley*, 147 Mass. 149, 16 N. E. 764; *Gooding v. Morgan*, 37 Me. 419; *Collamer v. Langdon*, 29 Vt. 32; *Olvey v. Jackson*, 106 Ind. 286, 4 N. E. 149.

<sup>63</sup> *Bishop v. Rowe*, 3 Maule & S. 362; *Cumber v. Wane*, 1 Strange, 426; *Woods v. Woods*, 127 Mass. 141; *East River Bank v. Butterworth*, 45 Barb. 476.

## CHAPTER II.

## OF NEGOTIABLE BILLS AND NOTES, AND THEIR FORMAL AND ESSENTIAL REQUISITES.

- 12. Definition and Forms of Bills of Exchange.
- 13. Definition and Form of Note.
- 14. Essentials of Bill or Note.
- 15. Order Contained in Bill.
- 16. Promise Contained in Note.
- 17-20. Certainty as to the Terms of the Order or Promise.
- 21-25. Payment of Money Only.
- 26-30. Specification of Parties.
- 31-33. Capacity of Parties.
- 34. Authority of Agent.
- 35-37. Delivery of Instruments.
- 38. Date.
- 39. Value Received.
- 40. Days of Grace.

## DEFINITION AND FORMS OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

12. A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing upon one person by another for the payment of a sum of money absolutely and at all events.<sup>1</sup>

Bills of exchange are classified as foreign bills and inland bills.

The following is a common form of foreign bill of exchange in a set:

Buffalo, N. Y., U. S. A., June 15, 1891.

**First.** Exchange for London  $\text{£}$

Thirty days after sight of this  $\text{£}$  First of Exchange (Second and

Third Unpaid) pay to the order of JOHN SMITH Five Hun-

dred Pounds Sterling, value received, and charge the same to

account of **THOMAS ROBINSON.**

To Baring Bros. & Co.  $\text{£}$

London, Eng.

<sup>1</sup> This definition is that of Judge Chalmers (Bills & N. art. 1). See Neg. Inst. L. § 210. The student is recommended, however, to fix in his mind rather the

Buffalo, N. Y., U. S. A., June 15, 1891.

Second.

Exchange for London.

Thirty days after sight of this Second of Exchange (First and Third Unpaid) pay to the order of JOHN SMITH Five Hundred Pounds Sterling, value received, and charge the same to account of

THOMAS ROBINSON.

To Baring Bros. & Co.,

London, Eng.

Buffalo, N. Y., U. S. A., June 15, 1891.

Third.

Exchange for London.

Thirty days after sight of this Third of Exchange (First and Second Unpaid) pay to the order of JOHN SMITH Five Hundred Pounds Sterling, value received, and charge the same to account of

THOMAS ROBINSON.

To Baring Bros. & Co.,

London, Eng.

The following is a usual form of an inland bill:

\$500.00.

Thirty days after sight pay to the order of JOHN SMITH Five Hundred Dollars, value received, and charge to account of

THOMAS ROBINSON.

To Baring Bros. & Co.,

New York City.

Buffalo, June 15, 1891.

Baring Bros. & Co.

The parties to the foregoing bill are technically termed: (a) The drawer, or the party who orders the payment of the money in the bill, e. g. Thomas Robinson. (b) The drawee or the party to whom the order is directed, e. g. Baring Bros. (c.) The acceptor, or the drawee when he has assented to the order, and thus become the principal debtor on the bill, e. g. Baring Bros. (d) The payee, or the party in whose favor the order is made, e. g. John Smith. These are the parties to the bill in its origin. There are also subsequent parties: (e) The holder, or the person having legal possession of the bill, who, when it is negotiable, may recover the amount of the same. This term includes payee, indorsee, and bearer. (f) The indorser, or one who directs the amount of the bill to be paid to a person in the indorsement named, or to his order or to bearer. (g)

statement of the essential elements of bills as given in section 14, than the formulated definition.

The indorsee, or one who makes title to the bill through the indorsement.

A bill of exchange is usually called among business men a "draft." When duly accepted, it is called an "acceptance."

Under the English law, bills drawn or payable abroad, or, until quite recent times, drawn in England and payable in Scotland or Ireland, or vice versa, were foreign bills. Bills drawn and payable either in England or Wales were inland bills. In the United States the general rule is that a bill drawn in one state and payable in another is a foreign bill,<sup>2</sup> the theory being that the several states, retaining in themselves the power to make local business regulations and laws, are thus far separate and independent sovereignties, and to be so viewed in the decision of points involved in the law merchant. Aside from these local regulations, the principal difference in the United States between the foreign and inland bill is that to charge the drawer and indorsers the former on dishonor requires protest by a notary public, the latter does not.<sup>3</sup> In the case of international foreign bills, a further usage of long standing has existed, arising from the difficulty of communication in former times between different nations and the danger of loss in transmission. It is to draw the bill in a set of three or four parts, each a counter-

<sup>2</sup> *Halliday v. McDougall*, 20 Wend. 81, 22 Wend. 264; *COMMERCIAL BANK v. VARNUM*, 49 N. Y. 269; *DICKINS v. BEAL*, 10 Pet. 572; *Bank of United States v. Daniel*, 12 Pet. 32; *Phoenix Bank v. Hussey*, 12 Pick. 483; *Grimshaw v. Bender*, 6 Mass. 157; *Barclay v. Minchin*, Id. 162. Unless the contrary appears on the face of the bill, it will be deemed an inland bill. Where a bill was drawn and dated in Philadelphia, and payable and delivered in London, held that the drawer was liable in damages to the holder as on a bill drawn and delivered in Philadelphia. *LENNIG v. RALSTON*, 23 Pa. St. 137. And a bill dated and payable in Illinois was held, even between the original parties, an inland bill, though drawn and delivered in Wisconsin, such being the agreement as shown by the face of the instrument. *Strawbridge v. Robinson*, 5 Gilman (Ill.) 472. That the bill was drawn or is payable in another country or state must distinctly appear. Thus a bill dated at Dublin or New Orleans would be presumed in New York, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to be an inland bill, the courts not taking judicial notice of the divisions of foreign states. *Kearney v. King*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 301; *Riggin v. Collier*, 6 Mo. 568; *Yale v. Ward's Ex'r*, 30 Tex. 17. See Neg. Inst. L. § 213.

<sup>3</sup> *Union Bank v. Hyde*, 6 Wheat. 572; *BURKE v. McKAY*, 2 How. 66; *Young v. Bryan*, 6 Wheat. 146. See collated cases, footnote to *Wood's Byles, Bills & N.* p. 261.

part of the other, except that in each part of the set is incorporated a condition that that particular bill shall be payable only provided all the others remain unpaid. This condition operates as a notice to the acceptor to accept and pay but one bill, and he and the drawer are liable upon but one bill; for it is well-settled law that a payment of one of a set operates as a discharge of the rest. The whole set collectively is deemed to amount to but one bill.<sup>4</sup> The rule that a payee or subsequent indorser, who indorses two or more parts of a bill to separate indorseees, is liable on indorsement to each separate indorsee operates as a check to the improper circulation of the bill.<sup>5</sup> The transferrer is bound to pass over upon transfer all parts of the bill in his possession, and thus the circulation of these instruments may be effected with safety.\*

#### DEFINITION AND FORM OF NOTE.

**13. A promissory note is an unconditional written promise, signed but not sealed† by the maker, to pay absolutely and at all events a sum certain in money, either to the bearer or to a person therein designated or to his order.<sup>6</sup>**

\* 3 Kent, Comm. 109; Wells v. Whitehead, 15 Wend. 527; Durkin v. Cranton, 7 Johns. 442. See DOWNES v. CHURCH, 13 Pet. 205.

\* HOLDSWORTH v. HUNTER, 10 Barn. & C. 449. So, if the drawee accepts more than one part, he is liable on each to a bona fide holder. Id.

\* Pinard v. Klockmann, 3 Best & S. 388, 32 Law J. Q. B. 82. See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 310-315.

† A bill or note loses its negotiable character if under seal. CLARK v. MANUFACTURING CO., 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 256; MUSE v. DANTZLER, 85 Ala. 361, 5 South. 178; BROWN v. JORDHAL, 32 Minn. 135, 19 N. W. 650; Talbott v. Suit, 68 Md. 443, 13 Atl. 356; D. M. OSBORNE & CO. v. HUBBARD, 20 Or. 318, 25 Pac. 1021. This rule has generally been held inapplicable to bills and notes of corporations. Jackson v. Myers, 43 Md. 452; WEEKS v. ESLER, 143 N. Y. 374, 38 N. E. 377; Central Nat. Bank v. Railroad Co., 5 S. C. 156; In re Imperial Land Co., L. R. 11 Eq. 498. In some states by statute the presence of a seal is declared to have no effect on the character of the instrument. See Neg. Inst. L. § 25, subd. 4, to this effect. See Rand. Com. Paper, §§ 70-74.

\* Chalm. Bills & N. art. 271; Edw. Bills & N. § 134; Byles, Bills (Wood's Ed.) p. 41; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 28; Neg. Inst. L. § 320. The student is here recommended to fix in his mind rather the statement of the essential elements of a note than the formulated definition.

**A common form of note is:**

New York.	\$500.00.	Buffalo, June 15, 1891.
	Thirty days after date I promise to pay to the order of JOHN SMITH Five Hundred Dollars, value received, at Bank of Buffalo.	
		THOMAS ROBINSON.

The parties to the foregoing note are technically termed:

- (a) **MAKER**—The person who signs the note and makes the promise; e. g. (Thomas Robinson.)
- (b) **PAYEE**—The person in whose favor the promise contained in the note is made; e. g. (John Smith.)

The foregoing are parties to the note in its origin. There are also subsequent parties. They are: .

- (a) **HOLDER**—The person having legal possession of the instrument, who, when it is negotiable, may recover the amount of same. This term includes payee, indorsee, and bearer.
- (b) **INDORSER**—One who directs the amount of the bill or note to be paid to a person in the indorsement named, or to his order, or to bearer.
- (c) **INDORSEE**—One who makes title to the instrument through the order specified in the indorsement.

#### **ESSENTIALS OF BILL OR NOTE.\***

**14. To be a negotiable bill of exchange or promissory note, the instrument must have the following essential characteristics:**

- (a) The bill must contain an order.
- (b) The note must contain a promise.
- (c) The order or promise must be unconditional.
- (d) It must be an absolute order or promise for the payment of money alone.
- (e) The amount of money must be certain.
- (f) The time of payment must be a time certain to arrive.
- (g) The instrument must be specific as to all its parties.
- (h) The instrument must be delivered.

\* See Neg. Inst. L. § 20.

## ORDER CONTAINED IN BILL.

**15. An order means any form of words implying a right on the part of the drawer to command, and a corresponding duty on the part of the drawee to make, the payment specified.**

Our purpose here is to illustrate the difference between a mandatory form of words directing payment and a mere request. The theory of a bill of exchange is that the drawer has funds in the hands of the drawee, which he orders or directs to be delivered or paid over to the payee or indorsee of the bill.<sup>7</sup> Hence, where the instrument is so written as to show that the drawer has or attempts to exercise no right to order the money paid, it is not a bill of exchange.<sup>8</sup> To determine whether or not the instrument is so written is, of course, a question purely of the construction of the instrument. Parol evidence cannot be admitted, since, if the bill is to operate as money, the instrument must be pronounced to be a bill or not according to its face. The point to be determined is whether the terms of the instrument, on the one hand, leave compliance or refusal optional, or, on the other hand, amount to an imperative direction. In the former case it is a mere request; in the latter it is a demand, with which the drawee must in common honesty comply, and amounts to the order which is a necessary constituent of a bill of exchange.

We may perhaps make this distinction more clear if we show it as it is laid down in the cases. Among the earliest ones on the point are **BUFF v. WEBB**<sup>9</sup> and **LITTLE v. SLACKFORD**.<sup>10</sup> In **Little v. Slackford**, construing the words, "Please to let the bearer have seven

<sup>7</sup> For a distinction between checks and bills of exchange, see **MORRISON v. BAILEY**, 5 Ohio St. 13; Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 40. Certificates of deposit are, in legal effect, promissory notes. **TRIPP v. CURTENIUS**, 36 Mich. 494; Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 38. As holding a bank pass book to be nonnegotiable, see **McCaskill v. Connecticut Sav. Bank**, 60 Conn. 300, 22 Atl. 568; Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 35. Bills of lading are quasi negotiable instruments, transferable by indorsement and delivery. **SHAW v. RAILROAD CO.**, 101 U. S. 557; Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 42.

<sup>8</sup> Edw. Bills & N. § 187; Chit. Bills, p. 154; **Luff v. Pope**, 5 Hill, 413.

<sup>9</sup> 1 Esp. 129 (before Lord Kenyon in 1794).

<sup>10</sup> **Moody & M.** 171 (before Tenterden, C. J., in 1828).



pounds, and place it to my account, and you will oblige your humble servant, R. Slackford," Lord Tenterden said: "The fair meaning is, 'You will oblige me by doing it.'" In *Ruff v. Webb* the words were: "Mr. B will much oblige Mr. A by paying C or order." Lord Kenyon said it was a bill of exchange, because it was an order to pay money.<sup>11</sup> This case is a strong illustration of construction of words of courtesy as importing an order, but there was nothing in the language used that could not be explained on the score of courtesy. In the former case, on the other hand, the words "Please to let the bearer have" amounted to a mere request for a favor. As the latter case indicates, the fact that the order is expressed in polite words does not impair its mandatory effect. They may seem a request, yet be in fact an order. Indeed, the presumption is against their being a request, and the courts generally seek to construe the instrument as an order.<sup>12</sup> And, in order to displace the construction that the instrument is a bill, it would seem to require that the language necessarily imported a favor, and was not meant as mere words of civility.<sup>13</sup>

Nor is mere authority to pay equivalent to an order. Thus, in *HAMILTON v. SPOTTISWOODE*,<sup>14</sup> where the words were, "We hereby authorize you to pay on our account to the order of C," Baron Parke said: "Here is only an option to pay or not; therefore this document is not a bill of exchange, but only a warranty, in case the defendant paid."<sup>15</sup> And in *RUSSELL v. POWELL*,<sup>16</sup> where J M assigned to the plaintiff a share in the estate of T H, deceased, in

<sup>11</sup> See, also, *ELLISON v. COLLINGRIDGE*, 9 C. B. 570, where "credit in cash" was held equivalent to "pay." In *KING v. ELLOR*, 1 Leach, 323, it was held that the terms of the following order did not import any compulsion on the part of the drawee to pay, but was simply a request: "Please to send £10 by the bearer, as I am so ill I cannot wait upon you." An account, with an order accompanying, from the creditor to the debtor, that the latter should pay the account to O. & Sons, was held not to be a bill. *NORRIS v. SOLOMON*, 2 Moody & R. 266. But see *HOYT v. LYNCH*, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 328.

<sup>12</sup> Story, Bills & N. § 33; *WHEATLEY v. STROBE*, 12 Cal. 92; *SPURGIN v. MCPHEETERS*, 42 Ind. 527.

<sup>13</sup> *HOYT v. LYNCH*, 2 Sandf. 328.

<sup>14</sup> 4 Exch. 200.

<sup>15</sup> *KING v. ELLOR*, 1 Leach, 323; *Willoughby's Case*, 2 East, P. C. 582, 936.

<sup>16</sup> 14 Mees. & W. 418.

the following instrument: "To the executors of T H, deceased--Gents: We do hereby authorize and require you to pay to Mr. Geo. Powell, or his order, £250, being the amount directed by the order of the 29th of July last [an order of court] to be paid to our order. J M,"—it was pointed out that the executors need or need not pay this sum, according to the condition of the estate in their hands, and therefore this was not a bill of exchange.

#### PROMISE CONTAINED IN NOTE.

**16. A promise means any form of words from which an intent of the maker to pay can be construed.**

A mere admission that a debt is due, which can be treated on a trial only as so much proof tending to establish a debt, is a very different thing from the promise required for a promissory note. A promissory note is a new obligation, and not simply evidence of an old obligation. An acknowledgment of indebtedness is evidence of an old obligation, but creates no new obligation.<sup>17</sup> In such terms as "Due C, \$100, value received;" "I O U \$100;"<sup>18</sup> "I acknowledge the within note to be just and due,"<sup>19</sup>—there is no liability that is new, assumed by the persons who signed these instruments. They are mere memoranda relating to a financial transaction, without any implication in words of a promise to pay.

The courts go to the extreme limit to support a note in finding a promise to pay. Thus, in the words, "I do acknowledge myself to be indebted to A in £50, to be paid on demand,"<sup>20</sup> the words "to be

<sup>17</sup> In the case of *HYNE v. DEWDNEY*, which was for money lent, it was held that time of payment should be mentioned in a note, and that an instrument lacking such mention of time was nothing more than an acknowledgment that the money had been paid. 21 Law J. Q. B. 278. To the same effect, see *TAYLOR v. STEELE*, *infra*. By a very recent decision in New York the court of appeals has repudiated this doctrine, and held that an acknowledgment of indebtedness implies a promise to pay. *HEGEMAN v. MOON*, 131 N. Y. 482, 80 N. E. 487.

<sup>18</sup> *CURRIER v. LOCKWOOD*, 40 Conn. 349; *GAY v. ROOKE*, 151 Mass. 115, 23 N. E. 835; *FISHER v. LESLIE*, 1 Esp. 426; *Hyne v. Dewdney*, 21 Law J. 278.

<sup>19</sup> *GRAY v. BOWDEN*, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 282.

<sup>20</sup> *CASBORNE v. DUTTON*, Selw. N. P. 829; *KIMBALL v. HUNTINGTON*, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 675.

paid" were deemed a promise to pay; and the words, "I O U £20, to be paid on the 22d inst.," were held to import a promise for a similar reason.<sup>21</sup> So the words "John Mason, 14th Feb., 1836, borrowed of Ann Mason, his sister, the sum of £14 in cash as per loan, in promise of payment of which I am truly thankful for, and shall never be forgotten by me, John Mason, your affectionate brother," were held to constitute a promise,<sup>22</sup> because they expressly stated an advance of a loan of money, which the court thought was impliedly undertaken to be paid. The expressions of gratitude were in this case treated as mere redundancy. In the expression: "Good to C, or order, for \$30, borrowed money,"<sup>23</sup> the words of negotiability necessarily imported a promise. So, also, the expression, "Due A, \$94, on demand," because the words "on demand" can only be of meaning with the words "to be paid" inserted.<sup>24</sup> In some jurisdictions there are, it is true, decisions holding that the word "due" imports such a promise;<sup>25</sup> and in other jurisdictions, decisions treating duebills as promissory notes. But this is against the weight of authority, and not to be supported on principle. The true question before the court in construction should be the intention of the signer, to be gathered from any form of words in the instrument itself, to assume and pay as a distinctly new obligation.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>21</sup> BROOKS v. ELKINS, 2 Mees. & W. 74.

<sup>22</sup> ELLIS v. MASON, 7 Dowl. 598.

<sup>23</sup> FRANKLIN v. MARCH, 6 N. H. 364. A promise "to be accountable" to M. "or order" held sufficient. MORRIS v. LEE, 1 Strange, 629. So of the words "Due L R, or bearer, one day from date, \$200." RUSSELL v. WHIPPLE, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 536. An instrument containing an order to credit P, or order, in cash, was held a bill. ELLISON v. COLLINGRIDGE, 9 C. B. 570. See, also, Schmitz v. Mining Co., 8 S. D. 544, 67 N. W. 618; HUSSEY v. WINSLOW, 59 Me. 170.

<sup>24</sup> SMITH v. ALLEN, 5 Day (Conn.) 337. In this case, which was an action of assumpsit on the following instrument: "Due John Allen 94 dollars, 91 cents, on demand,"—it was held that the words "on demand," following an acknowledgment of debt, and signed by the debtor, import such a promise to pay as to constitute the writing a note.

<sup>25</sup> JACQUIN v. WARREN, 40 Ill. 459; Anderson v. Pearce, 36 Ark. 293; ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. v. BANK, 47 Ark. 545, 1 S. W. 704; BRADY v. CHANDLER, 31 Mo. 28; LEE v. BALCOM, 9 Colo. 216, 11 Pac. 74.

<sup>26</sup> In BLOCK v. BELL an instrument which ran, "On demand, I promise to pay A. B., or bearer, the sum of £15, for value received," was not signed at the

A consideration of the decisions from which the foregoing instances are taken will clearly outline the theory that I O U's or acknowledgments of indebtedness cannot be made the foundations of commercial instruments. They can only be classified in law as admissions, and have weight as evidence.<sup>27</sup>

### CERTAINTY AS TO THE TERMS OF THE ORDER OR PROMISE.

**17. A bill or note must be payable absolutely and at a time certain.<sup>28</sup>**

**EXCEPTIONS—(a) If the instrument be payable upon the happening of an event which is certain to happen, though the time when it will happen be uncertain, the instrument is negotiable.**

foot, but was addressed in the margin to B., who wrote across it "Accepted," with his signature. It was held that the signature acted as an adoption of the promise, and that the instrument was a promissory note. 1 Moody & R. 149. See, also, *PETO v. REYNOLDS*, 9 Exch. 410. An order without drawee, however, is not only incomplete as a bill, but for want of a promise is insufficient as a note. *FORWARD v. THOMPSON*, 12 U. C. Q. B. 103. But see *ALMY v. WINSLOW*, 126 Mass. 342. In *TAYLOR v. STEELE* an action was brought on the following instrument: "Received from Mrs. Barbara Taylor the sum of £170, for value received, for which I promise to pay at the rate of £5 per cent. from the above date." The following opinion was delivered by Parke, B.: "This document is not a promissory note, because it contains no promise to pay the principal, but only the interest. \* \* \* I agree that an actual promise is not necessary if there are words in the instrument from which a promise to pay can be collected." 16 Mees. & W. (1847) 665. A certificate of deposit payable to order after a certain time, with interest, is held to be a negotiable promissory note. *MILLER v. AUSTEN*, 13 How. 218; *BANK OF ORLEANS v. MERRILL*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 295. In an action of assumpsit on the following instrument: "Due A. & B. \$17.14. Value received. X. Y.,"—the doctrine laid down in *Smith v. Allen*, *supra*, was followed, and it was held that the words "value received" were not equivalent to "on demand," and that, to constitute an instrument a promissory note, there must be an express, as distinguished from an implied, promise. *CURRIER v. LOCKWOOD*, 40 Conn. 349.

<sup>27</sup> *FISHER v. LESLIE*, 1 Esp. 426.

<sup>28</sup> A promissory note payable "on or before" a day named is certain as to time, and is negotiable. *MATTISON v. MARKS*, 31 Mich. 421; *Johns. Cas. Bills & N.* 22. See, also, note 43, *post*.

(b) Bills and notes are subject to the implied conditions of presentment and notice of dishonor.

18. The instrument must not be payable out of any particular fund.

**DISTINCTION**—Indicating to a drawee a source or fund out of which he may be reimbursed is not charging payment upon a particular fund.

19. The following are absolute promises to pay money, and are negotiable instruments:

**Instruments payable**

(a) On demand, or

(b) At sight, or on a fixed period after sight, or one in which no time is expressed, which is equivalent to an instrument payable on demand.

20. An instrument payable in installments, even though it provides that upon non-payment of an installment the whole becomes due, is a negotiable instrument.

### *Certainty in General.*

Our purpose here is to explain why a negotiable instrument cannot be conditional in its terms, but must be absolute upon its face.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> It is a necessary quality of negotiable paper that it should be simple, certain, unconditional, and not subject to any contingencies. *CITIZENS' NAT. BANK v. PIOLLET*, 126 Pa. St. 194, 17 Atl. 603; *Johns. Cas. Bills & N.* 18. To the same effect, see *SMITH v. BOHEME*, Gilb. Ch. 93. A note payable to A. or order "on demand, on the return of this certificate, and my guarantee of his note to his brother," was held not to be good, as its payment depended upon the happening of a contingency. *SMILIE v. STEVENS*, 39 Vt. 315. In *WHITE v. CUSHING*, 88 Me. 339, 34 Atl. 164, an order addressed to a savings bank, in form "Pay L or order \$120, and charge to my account on book No. —," and containing on its face below the signature the words, "The bank book of the depositor must accompany this order," was held not negotiable, because payable only on production of the book. See, also, *Iron City Nat. Bank v. McCord*, 139 Pa. St. 52, 21 Atl. 143. In *ALEXANDER v. THOMAS* an order to pay "90 days after sight, or when realized," etc. (meaning when in funds for the purpose), was held to be dependent on a contingency which might never happen, and therefore not a good bill. 16 Q. B. 333. A promise to pay "in 1½ yrs. or sooner, at the option of the mortgagor, \* \* \* with interest to be paid during said term and for such further time as said principal sum or any part thereof

Generally speaking, certainty is one of the first essentials of a circulating medium. If conditions written upon the face of negotiable instruments were to be permitted, then every holder would necessarily be charged with notice of the conditions. And to be in a position to assert his equities, he would be bound to show that he had used all diligence to ascertain whether the condition had been fulfilled. And, the very essence of business paper being that it shall pass freely from hand to hand, to allow such an ingredient in the theory of negotiability would be an absurdity.

In the leading case of *GIBSON v. MINET*,<sup>30</sup> the theory is explained thus: "The title of a bearer is self-evident. The title of an indorsee appears by the indorsement itself. Everything which is necessary to be known in order that it may be seen whether a writing is a bill of exchange, and as such, by the custom of merchants, partakes of the nature of a specialty, and creates a debt or duty by its own proper force, appears at once by inspection of the writing. The wit of man cannot devise anything better calculated for circulation. The value of the writing, the assignable quality of it, the particular mode of assigning it, are created and determined in the original frame and constitution of the instrument itself; and the party to whom the bill of exchange is tendered has only to read it, need look no further, and has nothing to do with any private history that may belong to it. The policy which instituted this simple instrument demands that the simplicity of it should be protected, and that it should never be entangled in the infinitely complicated transactions of particular individuals into whose hands it may come."

*Illustration of Uncertainty as to Event.*

Some of the instances of the rule requiring certainty, commonly cited, and important to mention because of the distinction which is drawn with regard to them, are that class of orders and promises where it is uncertain from the inspection of the instrument that the

shall remain unpaid," was held not to be a good note, by reason of its not being a promise to pay a fixed sum of money at a definite time. *STULTS v. SILVA*, 119 Mass. 137. See, also, *Way v. Smith*, 111 Mass. 523; *Sloan v. McCarty*, 134 Mass. 245; *Baird v. Underwood*, 74 Ill. 176; *Meyers v. Phillips*, 72 Ill. 460; *Smentek v. Coonhauser*, 17 Ill. App. 266; *FLEURY v. TUFTS*, 25 Ill. App. 101; *POST v. RAILWAY CO.*, 171 Pa. St. 615, 83 Atl. 362.

<sup>30</sup> 1 H. Bl. 618.

day or event of payment is ever to arrive.<sup>31</sup> The case of **BEARDESLEY v. BALDWIN**<sup>32</sup> is an example. That was a promise to pay money so many days "after the defendant should marry." This is briefly reported as not being negotiable within the statute. Another instance is **BRAHAM v. BUBB**,<sup>33</sup> which was a promise to pay "four years after date, if I am then living." Abbott, C. J., said: "It is contingent whether the note will ever be payable, for, if the maker should die within the four years, no payment is to be made."<sup>34</sup> These will perhaps suffice to illustrate the point that such instruments contain a promise so indefinite that, for business purposes, it hardly amounts to a promise at all.<sup>35</sup> It can certainly have no defi-

<sup>31</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 23.

<sup>32</sup> 2 Strange, 1151.

<sup>33</sup> MS. Trin. Term, 1826, Middlesex (cited in Chitty, Bills, \*135, note).

<sup>34</sup> **RICHARDSON v. MARTYR**, 25 Law T. 64; *De Wald's Estate*, 13 Phila. (Pa.) 251.

<sup>35</sup> In **RICHARDSON v. MARTYR** it was held that, where demand on a note must be made during the lifetime of the payee, the undertaking was conditional, and did not, therefore, constitute a promissory note. 25 Law T. 64. Where a note was given on a condition that, should a dispute arise between certain parties about the subject for which the note was given, said note should be void, it was held that the instrument was not negotiable, since the party taking was compelled to inquire as to an extrinsic fact, and therefore took only a contingent benefit. **HARTLEY v. WILKINSON**, 4 Maule & S. 25. Where the words were, "I undertake to pay to R J the sum of £6 for a suit of clothes ordered by D P," it was held that the promise was to pay for the goods only if supplied, and hence that the instrument was not a note. **JARVIS v. WILKINS**, 7 Mees. & W. 410. On the other hand, in an action on a note given "in consideration of foregoing and forbearing an action at law \* \* \* for damages ascertained \* \* \*," it was held that, as it appeared on its face that the consideration was executed, the note was payable in all events, and the promise was sufficient. **Shenton v. James**, 5 Q. B. 199. A written promise to pay a certain amount of money as soon as K. shall come of age was held not to constitute a promissory note, and this, too, regardless of the fact that K. did in fact attain his majority. **KELLEY v. HEMMINGWAY**, 13 Ill. 604. In an action upon an order payable if terms mentioned in letters of the drawer should be complied with, it was held that there could be no recovery, although by the acceptance a compliance was admitted. The writing was not a bill when drawn, by reason of the contingency, and could not subsequently become so. **KINGSTON v. LONG**, 4 DOUG. 9; Bayley, Bills (6th Ed.) 16. In **APPLEBY v. BIDDOLPH**—an action on a note in these words: "I promise to pay \* \* \* if my brother doth not pay it within such a time"—judgment



nite value. Hence the reason of the rule that such instruments are non-negotiable, because uncertain. It would be unwise, from a business point of view, to allow such conditions to be incorporated in instruments which are to serve as a circulating medium.<sup>36</sup>

*Certainty as to Event, Uncertainty as to Time.*

The rule laid down by the courts that no order or promise from the terms of which it is manifestly uncertain that the money will ever be paid can be a negotiable instrument, is undoubtedly wise. As much cannot be said for the rule laid down in contradistinction to it, in another aspect of this same point. Where the time of payment is certain to arrive, although the precise time be uncertain, the courts consider the element of uncertainty which destroys negotiability to be eliminated.<sup>37</sup> This rule originated in two cases, followed in other jurisdictions, but of doubtful authority to-day in England, the jurisdiction of their origin.<sup>38</sup> These cases are *ANDREWS v. FRANKLIN*<sup>39</sup> and *COLEHAN v. COOKE*.<sup>40</sup> The instrument in *ANDREWS v. FRANKLIN* was a promise to pay within two months after a certain ship was paid off, and was held to be negotiable as a note because paying off the ship was a thing of a public nature, and certain to arrive. In *COLEHAN v. COOKE* the instrument was a promise to pay ten days after the death of the maker's father,—an event also certain to arrive. In this last case Lord Chief Justice Willes said: That a note, to be within the statute of Anne, need be

was arrested after verdict on the ground that the drawer might be the debtor only upon a contingency. Cited in 8 Mod. 363. A note containing a memorandum that "It is the understanding it will be renewed at maturity," since the obligation depended on whether the maker chose to pay or give a new note, held not negotiable. *Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Plollet*, 126 Pa. St. 194, 17 Atl. 603.

<sup>36</sup> *Corbett v. State*, 24 Ga. 287; *HUSBAND v. EPLING*, 81 Ill. 172; *PEARSON v. GARRETT*, 4 Mod. 242; *PALMER v. PRATT*, 2 Bing. 185; *COOLIDGE v. RUGGLES*, 15 Mass. 387; *DE FOREST v. FRARY*, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 151; *Grant v. Wood*, 12 Gray (Mass.) 220; *Sloan v. McCarty*, 134 Mass. 245; *BROOKS v. HARGREAVES*, 21 Mich. 255.

<sup>37</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 23.

<sup>38</sup> See 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 831, citing *ALEXANDER v. THOMAS*, 16 Q. B. 333, and *MACARTHUR v. FULLARTON*, Mor. Dict. 1408.

<sup>39</sup> 1 Strange, 24.

<sup>40</sup> Willes, 393. "After my death date" held a time certain. *SHAW v. CAMP*, 160 Ill. 425, 43 N. E. 608; *Cridder v. Shelby* (C. C.) 95 Fed. 212.



only an express promise to pay to another or his order, or to bearer, "but as to the time of payment, the act is silent"; that there was no limited time beyond which if bills of exchange were made payable they were not good; and that "if a bill of exchange be made payable at never so distant a day, if it be a day that must come, it is no objection to the bill." This is probably the generally accepted doctrine at the present day. Says Judge Pierpoint in *CAPRON v. CAPRON*:<sup>41</sup> "As long as the payment is certain, and the uncertainty is only as to the length of time to be given, this uncertainty the law makes certain by giving a reasonable time after the time prescribed to make payment." This decision was rendered upon a note in terms: "I promise to pay A B, or bearer, \$75, one year from date, with interest annually; and, if there is not enough realized by good management in one year, to have more time to pay." So in *COTA v. BUCK*,<sup>42</sup> a note to be paid "in the course of the season now coming" was negotiable because the date of payment must come by mere lapse of time.<sup>43</sup> Professor Ames makes a most apposite criticism of the foregoing rule. "Nothing," says he, "could be more inconsistent with the negotiability of a bill or note than that the holder should have to be continually on the alert to ascertain the precise day when

<sup>41</sup> 44 Vt. 412. In the case of *SMITHERS v. JUNKER* it was held that a note made payable at the convenience of the maker, in the following language: "For value received, I promise to pay to S. F. S. \$2,048.25, payable at my convenience, upon this express condition: that I am to be the sole judge of such convenience and time of payment,"—is payable within a reasonable time. 41 Fed. 101; Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 21. A note to become due at maker's death held not invalid. *Beatty's Estate v. Western College*, 177 Ill. 280, 52 N. E. 432.

<sup>42</sup> 7 Metc. (Mass.) 588. But see *MILLER v. POAGE*, 56 Iowa, 96, 8 N. W. 799, where an order in the following form: "One year after date I promise to pay to A or order \$100. \* \* \* If this agent does not sell enough in one year, one more is granted,"—was held not negotiable. The court construed the note as payable only out of a particular fund until expiration of two years, and nonnegotiable, because not negotiable when issued.

<sup>43</sup> *WORKS v. HERSHEY*, 35 Iowa, 340; *Goodloe v. Taylor*, 10 N. C. 458; *Kiskadden v. Allen*, 7 Colo. 206, 3 Pac. 221; *MATTISON v. MARKS*, 31 Mich. 421; *First Nat. Bank v. Skeen*, 29 Mo. App. 119; *ERNST v. STECKMAN*, 74 Pa. St. 13; *WALKER v. WOOLLEN*, 54 Ind. 164. In the case of *JORDAN v. TATE* it was held that "the negotiable character of a promissory note is not affected by the fact that it was made payable, by its terms, on or before a future day therein named." 19 Ohio St. 586; *Beatty's Estate v. Western College*, 177 Ill. 280, 52 N. E. 432. But see *STULTS v. SILVA*, *supra*, note 29.

they should become payable, in order to charge the drawer or indorser. Furthermore, it is impossible to attach a definite value to anything so speculative in its nature as an obligation payable, as in *Colehan v. Cooke*, so many days after the death of J S.”<sup>44</sup>

*Payment out of Particular Fund.*

There is another class of common business instruments which the courts have deemed obnoxious to the rule requiring bills and notes to be payable absolutely. They are those where a person, for value, has sought to transfer some particular property or right by an instrument which has much the form of a bill or note. They empower the payee to collect moneys of the drawer or maker, which are coming from some particular fund or source. They are not orders or promises to pay in any event.<sup>45</sup> Thus in *JENNEY v. HERLE*<sup>46</sup> the court said: “It would be very mischievous to make such notes as these, which are but appointments, bills of exchange; for, at that rate, if a tradesman applies to a gentleman for money for his bill, says the gentleman, ‘I will direct my steward to pay you,’ and writes to him, ‘Pay to J. S. the money mentioned in this bill out of the rents in your hands.’ The steward has no rents in his hands. It can never be imagined the gentleman should be liable to be sued upon this as upon a bill of exchange.” And the court accordingly refused to consider the instrument before them a bill of exchange, and considered it a “bare appointment to pay money out of a particular fund.” The modern doctrine is the same. In *MUNGER v. SHANNON*<sup>47</sup> the question was concerning this instrument: “Mr. Shannon: You will please pay to W. & H. the amount of \$2,000, and deduct the same from my share of profits of our partnership.” This was formally accepted. Dwight, C., said of this:<sup>48</sup> “A bill must be drawn on the general credit of the drawer, though it is no objec-

<sup>44</sup> 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. p. 831.

<sup>45</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 22.

<sup>46</sup> 2 Ld. Raym. 1361, and see *DAWKES v. LORD DE LORANE*, 3 Wils. 207, 2 W. Bl. 782; *CARLOS v. FANCOURT*, 5 Term R. 482; *Griffin v. Weatherby*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 753; *Morton v. Naylor*, 1 Hill, 583; *Gallery v. Prindle*, 14 Barb. 186; *Wadlington v. Covert*, 51 Miss. 631; *Bayerque v. City of San Francisco*, 1 McAll. 175, Fed. Cas. No. 1,137.

<sup>47</sup> 61 N. Y. 251.

<sup>48</sup> 61 N. Y. 255.

tion, when so drawn, that a particular fund is specified from which the drawee is reimbursed. The true test is whether the drawee is confined to the particular fund, or whether, though a particular fund is mentioned, the drawee may charge the bill up to the general account of the drawer if the designated fund turn out to be insufficient. It must appear that the bill of exchange is drawn on the general credit of the drawer.<sup>49</sup> It must carry with it the personal credit of the drawer, not confined to any fund. It is upon the credit of a person's hand as on the hand of the drawer, the indorser, or the person who negotiates it." Instances of the above principle are an order of A upon B to pay a certain sum in the words "on account of brick work done,"<sup>50</sup> or "out of money in his hands belonging to me,"<sup>51</sup> or when the paper was expressed as payable "for value received in stock ale brewing vessels,"<sup>52</sup> or "out of the rents,"<sup>53</sup> or "out of growing substance,"<sup>54</sup> or "out of the net proceeds of certain ore,"<sup>55</sup> or "out of a certain claim."<sup>56</sup> Thus a negotiable instrument must be guarantied by the whole credit of the parties. It is to be their note of hand. It must be their promise to pay absolutely and at all events.<sup>57</sup> The instruments we have mentioned would be

<sup>49</sup> *DAWKES v. LORD DE LORANE*, 3 Wils. 213; *JOSSELYN v. LACIER*, 10 Mod. 294.

<sup>50</sup> *Pitman v. Breckenridge*, 3 Grat. 127.

<sup>51</sup> *AVERETT v. BOOKER*, 15 Grat. (Va.) 165.

<sup>52</sup> *CLARKE v. PERCIVAL*, 2 Barn. & Adol. 660.

<sup>53</sup> 1 Pars. Bills & N. 43.

<sup>54</sup> *JOSSELYN v. LACIER*, *supra*.

<sup>55</sup> Thus it was held that a written promise to pay a certain amount at a time agreed upon, the means of payment to be derived from ores which were to be dug subsequent to the promise, did not comply with the requisites of a promissory note. There is in such an agreement a want of that certainty of payment necessary in a negotiable instrument. *WORDEN v. DODGE*, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 159.

<sup>56</sup> *BRILL v. TUTTLE*, 81 N. Y. 457; *Ehrichs v. De Mill*, 75 N. Y. 371, and list of authorities collated, 1 Ames, Bills & N., note p. 29.

<sup>57</sup> In an action on a promise to pay, where there was certainty as to payor, payee, and amount and date, it was held that the words, "as per memorandum of agreement," did not, of themselves, make the promise conditional, but it was upon the defendant to prove that such was their effect. *JURY v. BARKER*, El., Bl. & El. 459. In this connection, see, also, *LOVELL v. HILL*, 6 Car. & P. 238, and *JARVIS v. WILKINS*, 7 Mees. & W. 410; *RICHARDSON v. CARPENTER*, 46 N. Y. 661.

effectuated, but they would be effectuated as equitable assignments, and not as negotiable instruments. They are in effect mere transfers of single rights, and not instruments fitted to circulate as a medium based upon the entire credit of all the parties.

The mere fact, however, that a particular fund is referred to in an instrument does not make it payable out of the fund.<sup>58</sup> There is a wide difference between instruments drawn payable out of a particular fund and instruments referring to a particular fund from which the drawee may reimburse himself. The former, as has been said, are mere equitable assignments pro tanto of the funds mentioned.<sup>59</sup> And the drawee, when he has had notice of the delivery of the order to the payee, is bound to apply the fund, as it accrues, to the payment of the order, and to no other purpose. But if an order be made generally upon the drawee to be paid by him in the first instance on the credit of the drawer and without regard to the source from which the money used for its payment is obtained, the designation by the drawer of a particular fund out of which the drawee is subsequently to reimburse himself for such payment or a particular account to which it is to be charged will not convert the order into an assignment of the fund.<sup>60</sup> It must so appear in the order, to have that effect. And the order must contain either an express or implied direction to pay therefrom, and not otherwise. In the absence of express words, it is a question of construction whether the fund in question is referred to as a measure of liability or means of reimbursement.<sup>61</sup> Where the words themselves used are ambiguous, the rules we have already given apply.<sup>62</sup> Where there are no express words, then the fact that the ordinary language of a draft is used implies an intention to make the order negotiable. And this implication overrides the implication that it was intended as an equitable assignment.<sup>63</sup> It is the duty of the drawer plainly

<sup>58</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 22.

<sup>59</sup> *Lewis v. Berry*, 64 Barb. 593; *Parker v. City of Syracuse*, 31 N. Y. 376; *Alger v. Scott*, 54 N. Y. 14; *Risley v. Smith*, 64 N. Y. 576; *EHRICHS v. DE MILL*, 75 N. Y. 370; *BRILL v. TUTTLE*, 81 N. Y. 457; *REDMAN v. ADAMS*, 51 Me. 429.

<sup>60</sup> *MACLEED v. SNEE*, 2 Strange, 762; *BRILL v. TUTTLE*, 81 N. Y. 457.

<sup>61</sup> *SCHMITTLER v. SIMON*, 101 N. Y. 554, 5 N. E. 452.

<sup>62</sup> See page 32, *supra*.

<sup>63</sup> *SCHMITTLER v. SIMON*, 101 N. Y. 554, 5 N. E. 452.

to limit payment to a particular fund, if he intends so to limit it. If he omits to do this, or if the words used are obscure, ambiguous, or uncertain, the courts assume that the instrument was intended to be a bill of exchange.<sup>64</sup>

*Payment on Demand or at Sight.*

Instruments payable on demand<sup>65</sup> or at sight are payable absolutely, because the holder, at his option, may fix the liability of the maker.<sup>66</sup> The purchaser may thus know exactly what to pay for them when he discounts them. They have a clear, definite value in the market, and are thus negotiable.<sup>67</sup> They were drawn at first with the evident purpose that the holders might for their own convenience fix the liability by presentment or demand, whenever they chose. Such a rule, however, would have been a hardship to the drawer, maker, or parties already liable upon the instrument. Therefore, said the courts, such presentation or demand must be made within a reasonable time.<sup>68</sup> The terms "on demand," or "at sight," are construed as not meaning a term of credit, because an unanswerable question would be raised, as to the period of that credit. And, therefore, in cases of such instruments, and of instruments containing phrases similar to them, such as "payable when demanded,"<sup>69</sup> or

<sup>64</sup> An instrument in the following language: "Mr. I. B. O. & Co.: Please pay C. A. C. \$100.90, and take the same out of our share of the grain,"—is a valid bill of exchange. *CORBETT v. CLARK*, 45 Wis. 403; *Johns. Cas. Bills & N.* 28. A request to the drawee to pay to a certain person a certain amount of money "as my quarterly half pay, to be due from 24th of June to 27th of September next," was held to constitute a bill of exchange, since "the mention of the half pay was only by way of direction how he should reimburse himself, but the money was still to be advanced on the credit of the person." *MACLEED v. SNEE*, 2 Strange, 762; *SPROAT v. MATTHEWS*, 1 Term R. 182; *REDMAN v. ADAMS*, 51 Me. 429; *SPURGIN v. MCPHEETERS*, 42 Ind. 527.

<sup>65</sup> *WORKS v. HERSHEY*, 35 Iowa, 340.

<sup>66</sup> See *Neg. Inst. L.* § 20, subd. 3; *Id.* § 26.

<sup>67</sup> *SHENTON v. JAMES*, 5 Q. B. 199.

<sup>68</sup> As to what is a reasonable time, post, p. 344.

<sup>69</sup> *Bowman v. McChesney*, 22 Grat. 609. A promise made in writing to pay a certain amount on demand, "giving six months' notice for the same," was held to be a good note in the case of *WALKER v. ROBERTS*, Car. & M. 590; *HALL v. TOBY*, 110 Pa. St. 318, 1 Atl. 369.

"on call," or "when called for,"<sup>70</sup> all of which mean the same thing, it is the duty of the holder to make the presentation within a reasonable time. Similar methods of construction were employed where the instrument failed to express any time of payment at all. In such cases it was reasoned that the instrument would become due some time, and where the parties themselves failed to fix any time, the law fixed one for them, which was immediately. Thus instruments which failed to contain an expression of the time of payment were deemed equivalent to instruments payable on demand,<sup>71</sup> and the rules we have heretofore given applied to them.<sup>72</sup>

### *Payment in Installments.*

It remains to notice instruments payable in installments. An instrument may be payable in installments due at specified times;<sup>73</sup> or it may be payable in installments due at specified times, the whole sum to become due on the default in the payment of any installment. And either clause, the latter, however, with what seems a lack of appreciation of sound business methods, the courts declare to be proper for a negotiable instrument.<sup>74</sup> From a business point of

<sup>70</sup> *CROSSMORE v. PAGE*, 73 Cal. 213, 14 Pac. 787, *DIXON v. NUTTALL*, 1 Crompt., M. & R. 307.

<sup>71</sup> A note specifying no time of payment is in legal effect payable on demand. This is so even though it provides for interest. *First Nat. Bank v. Price*, 52 Iowa, 570, 3 N. W. 639; *Johns. Cas. Bills & N.* 19. "The conclusion of the law is that, where no time of payment is specified in a note, it is payable immediately." Per Curiam, in *HERRICK v. BENNETT*, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 374. *LIBBY v. MIKELBORG*, 28 Minn. 38, 8 N. W. 903. In *PAGE v. COOK*, 164 Mass. 116, 41 N. E. 115, a note in form, "On demand, after date, I promise to pay \* \* \* \$500, payable when payor and payee mutually agree," was construed as meaning that it was payable when the payor ought reasonably to have agreed; that is, within a reasonable time. See *Neg. Inst. L. § 26*, subd. 2; *McLeod v. Hunter*, 61 N. Y. Supp. 73, 29 Misc. Rep. 558 (under section 26).

<sup>72</sup> When an instrument is issued, accepted, or indorsed when overdue, it is, as against the person accepting, issuing, or indorsing, payable on demand. *BASSENHORST v. WILBY*, 45 Ohio St. 333, 13 N. E. 75; *Smith v. Caro*, 9 Or. 278. See *Neg. Inst. L. § 26*.

<sup>73</sup> *RIKER v. MANUFACTURING CO.*, 14 R. I. 402.

<sup>74</sup> *CARLON v. KENEALY*, 12 Mees. & W. 139. In this case the note was to become immediately payable on default in payment of the first installment. There was a special demurrer on the ground that, since the second installment was payable by way of condition and penalty, the note was not negotiable.

view, a man may as well give one piece of paper payable in several installments as divide up the principal indebtedness and give separate instruments for it. But there is a great difference between such an instrument and one which may become wholly due, at the payee's option, by reason of a default at any one of a series of times. Instruments of the last class are open to the criticism that they are uncertain in amount, as well as in time of payment of installments subsequent to the first; but in spite of these considerations their negotiability is firmly established.<sup>75</sup>

#### **PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY.**

**21. The instrument must be for payment in money only.**

**22. A negotiable instrument must be for the payment of money without connected promise, whether disjunctive or conjunctive, for the performance of some other act.**

**23. (a) A negotiable instrument may contain an additional agreement, which is not of the essence of the order or promise, but is merely incidental or collateral to it.**

**24. (b) A negotiable instrument may give the holder an option between payment of money and some other thing.**

**25. The amount of money to be paid must be certain.**

**EXCEPTIONS—(a) That the instrument is payable with interest does not destroy its negotiability.**

**(b) That the instrument is payable with current exchange does not destroy its negotiability.**

The following was a portion of the opinion of the court: "It is not a contingency; it depends on the act of the maker himself; and, on his default, it becomes a promissory note for the whole amount." *Roberts v. Snow*, 27 Neb. 425, 43 N. W. 241. *MILLER v. BIDDLE*, 13 Law T. (N. S.) 334. This was an action upon a promissory note, not made payable to order or bearer, and payable by installments, with a condition that if any installment were not duly paid the whole sum should become due immediately. In accordance with the case of *CARLON v. KENEALY*, *supra*, the instrument was held negotiable, though Pollock, C. B., dissented. *Goshen & M. Turnpike Road v. Hurtin*, 9 Johns. 217; *Washington Co. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller*, 26 Vt. 77; *WILSON v. CAMPBELL*, 110 Mich. 580, 68 N. W. 278; *CHICAGO RY. EQUIPMENT CO. v. BANK*, 136 U. S. 268, 10 Sup. Ct. 999.

<sup>75</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 21.



*Definition of "Money."*

Bills and notes, being representatives of money, must be payable in money.<sup>76</sup> "Money," within this rule, means whatever may be used as legal tender for payment of debts at the place where the bill or note is payable. In the United States what is legal tender is determined by the "Legal Tender Acts."<sup>77</sup> Where there are several kinds of legal tender, as gold, silver, and notes, a bill or note may be made payable in either.<sup>78</sup> But all other kinds of currency, whether coin or paper, are in law but "collateral commodities, like ingots or diamonds, which, though they might be received, and be in fact equivalent to money, are yet but goods and chattels,"<sup>79</sup> or mere choses in action. For this reason an instrument which possesses all the other requisites of a bill or note is not such if the medium of payment be limited to what is not "money."<sup>80</sup> It is true that there is

<sup>76</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 20, subd. 2. Cf. § 220.

<sup>77</sup> Rev. St. U. S. §§ 3584-3590.

<sup>78</sup> CHRYSLER v. RENOIS, 43 N. Y. 209.

<sup>79</sup> THOMPSON v. SLOAN, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 71, per Cowen, J.

<sup>80</sup> Common terms which have been held excluded within the above rule are "funds current," "current money," "currency," "current funds," "current bank paper," "current bank bills," "common currency," "notes receivable in bank," "currency of Missouri," "current bank notes," "bank notes," "New York funds," "Arkansas money," "foreign bills," "Pennsylvania bank bills," "Mississippi bank notes," "specie." IRVINE v. LOWRY, 14 Pet. 293; Hasbrook v. Palmer, 2 McLean, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 6,188; Fry v. Reusseau, 3 McLean, 106, Fed. Cas. No. 5,141; Hawkins v. Watkins, 5 Ark. 481; JONES v. FALES, 4 Mass. 245; Young v. Adams, 6 Mass. 182; Leiber v. Goodrich, 5 Cow. 186; State v. Corpening, 10 Ired. 58; Besancon v. Shirley, 9 Smedes & M. 457; Collins v. Lincoln, 11 Vt. 268; Campbell v. Welster, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 30; Breckinridge v. Ralls, 4 T. B. Mon. 533; Simpson v. Moulden, 3 Cold. 429; FIRST NAT. BANK v. SLETTE, 67 Minn. 425, 69 N. W. 1148 ("payable by New York exchange"). In REX v. WILCOX, Bailey, Bills (6th Ed.) 11, an instrument payable "in cash or Bank of England notes" was held not to be a note. Prof. Ames points out a fact which has sometimes been overlooked in reference to this case,—that it was decided prior to the statutes making Bank of England notes legal tender. 1 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. p. 39, note 2. In GRAY v. WORDEN, 29 U. C. Q. B. 539, it was held that an instrument payable in "Canada bills" was not a note, notwithstanding a statute making such bills legal tender. The court said: "It may be that a person can make a promissory note payable in a particular coin, as in gold or silver, because they are respectively money and specie; but I think he cannot make it payable in Canada bills, because



great conflict among the decisions upon this point, and some courts have held,<sup>81</sup> while other courts have denied,<sup>82</sup> that instruments were negotiable which were payable in "current funds" or "currency," or where other like expressions were used. Some courts have even held negotiable instruments in which the language used could not by any possible construction be deemed to designate legal tender.<sup>83</sup> It is to be borne in mind, however, that the construction of the instrument is for the court, and that courts have frequently differed in their construction, often in the light of local usage of particular words; thus holding variously that identical expressions did or did not amount to a designation of legal tender, while agreeing that the instrument, to be negotiable, must be payable in that medium.<sup>84</sup> Thus it has been held by the supreme court of the United States that a check payable "in current funds" is negotiable. Field, J., they are not money or specie. They have no intrinsic value, as coin has; they represent only, and are the signs of, value. 'Money itself is a commodity; it is not a sign; it is the thing signified.' McCulloch, *Polit. Econ.* 135." But this opinion, as Prof. Ames points out (2 *Cas. Bills & N.* 829), "however sound in political economy, is unsound in law."

<sup>81</sup> *Telford v. Patton*, 144 Ill. 611. 33 N. E. 1119; *Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Brown*, 45 Ohio St. 39, 11 N. E. 799; *BUTLER v. PAINE*, 8 Minn. 324 (Gil. 284); *PHELPS v. TOWN*, 14 Mich. 374; *LAIRD v. STATE*, 61 Md. 309.

<sup>82</sup> *Platt v. Bank*, 17 Wis. 222; *WRIGHT v. HART*, 44 Pa. St. 454; *HUSE v. HAMBLIN*, 29 Iowa, 501; *Mobile Bank v. Brown*, 42 Ala. 108.

<sup>83</sup> "York state bills or specie." *Keith v. Jones*, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 120. A note payable "in the bank notes current in the city of New York,"—on the ground that it is confined to bank paper of known cash value. *Judah v. Harris*, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 144. "Current Ohio bank notes." *SWETLAND v. CREIGH*, 15 Ohio, 118.

<sup>84</sup> A note payable in Tennessee money. It was held that such a note was, to all legal intents, payable in gold or silver. "The case is different where it is payable in Tennessee bank notes." *SEARCY v. VANCE*, Mart. & Y. (Tenn.) 225. With reference to the apparent irreconcilability of some of the cases, Mr. Wood makes the following explanation: "It will be seen, upon examination of the cases, that many of them are not so irreconcilable as at first sight they may appear. Many of them construe the words 'current money, New York funds,' etc., used in bills and notes, to mean lawful gold and silver coin of the United States. A contract for the payment of a certain sum in bank notes or other paper currency may or may not be equivalent to that sum in specie. The extent of the obligation depends on the meaning which usage affixes to the terms at the time the contract was made." *Byles, Bills* (Wood's Notes) p. 95.

said: "Within a few years, commencing with the first issue in this country of notes declared to have the quality of legal tender, it has been a common practice of drawers of bills of exchange or checks, or makers of promissory notes, to indicate whether the same are to be paid in gold or silver or in such notes; and the term 'current funds' has been used to designate any of these, all being current, and declared by positive enactment to be legal tender. It was intended to cover whatever was receivable and current by law as money, whether in the form of notes or coin. Thus construed, we do not think the negotiability of the paper in question was impaired by the insertion of these words." <sup>85</sup>

*Payment in Property Other than Money.*

The real reason for the requirement that negotiable instruments must be payable in money obviously is that money is the one standard of value in actual business. All other commodities may rise and fall in value, but in theory, at least, money always measures this rise and fall, and remains the same. The chattel which is used as a means of payment may fluctuate in value. Thus, "a note payable in neat cattle," <sup>86</sup> a promise to pay "in a good horse, to be worth \$80.00, and goods out of store amounting to \$20.00," <sup>87</sup>—are non-negotiable. These instruments are special contracts for delivery of chattels, and not negotiable instruments.<sup>88</sup> The damages recoverable upon them are held to be in some states the actual value of the articles on the day stipulated for payment;<sup>89</sup> but in New York,<sup>90</sup>

<sup>85</sup> *BULL v. BANK*, 123 U. S. 105, 8 Sup. Ct. 62. Neg. Inst. L. § 25, provides that the validity and negotiable character of the instrument are not affected by the fact that it designates a particular kind of current money in which payment is to be made.

<sup>86</sup> *JEROME v. WHITNEY*, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 322.

<sup>87</sup> *THOMAS v. ROOSA*, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 461. For other authorities, see Byles, Bills (Wood's Notes) p. 95.

<sup>88</sup> *Matthews v. Houghton*, 11 Me. 377; *Rhodes v. Lindley*, Ohio Cond. R. 465; *Lawrence v. Dougherty*, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 435; *AUERBACH v. PRITCHETT*, 58 Ala. 451; *Smith v. Boheme*, 1 Chit. Jr. Bills, 234; *CLARK v. KING*, 2 Mass. 524; *Gushee v. Eddy*, 11 Gray (Mass.) 502. In *QUINBY v. MERRITT* it was held that a written agreement to pay the equivalent of a certain sum in labor did not constitute a promissory note. 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 439.

<sup>89</sup> *McDonald v. Hodge*, 5 Hayw. (Tenn.) 85; *Edgar v. Boles*, 11 Serg. & R. 445; *McGehee v. Posey*, 42 Ala. 330.

<sup>90</sup> *Pinney v. Gleason*, 5 Wend. 393. Vermont, Connecticut, and Ohio have

although it is admitted that these contracts are merely for the delivery of specific articles, yet when the words were, "To pay J. P. \$79.50, Aug. 1st, 1822, in salt, at 14s. per bbl.," it was held that it was intended at the time of making the contract to receive the goods instead of money, and that the goods had, therefore, a fixed value, which must be treated as the measure of damages. In other respects, the debtor must seek his creditor to perform the contract as is the usual rule. If the chattels are ponderous, the maker of the note must seek the payee, and see where he will receive them.

*Payment in Foreign Money.*

There is one apparent deviation from the rule, which it is important to notice. Where a bill or note is expressed in money of a foreign denomination, it is still negotiable.<sup>91</sup> The courts, under the statutes of the United States,<sup>92</sup> will take judicial notice of the fact that the value of foreign coin, as expressed in the money of account in the United States, shall be that of the pure metal of such coin of standard value; and that the value of the standard coin of the various nations of the world in circulation is estimated annually by the directors of the mint, and proclaimed on the first day of January by the secretary of the treasury. These foreign denomina-

a similar rule. *Culver v. Robinson*, 3 Day (Conn.) 68; *Perry v. Smith*, 22 Vt. 301.

<sup>91</sup> "A note payable in pounds, shillings, and pence, made in any country, is but another mode of expressing the amount in dollars and cents, and it is so understood judicially." *THOMPSON v. SLOAN*, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 71, per Cowen, J. An instrument whereby the maker promised to pay "one thousand Mexican silver dollars" was held to be a note. *Hogue v. Williamson*, 85 Tex. 553, 22 S. W. 580. Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 58, criticising the language of Cowen, J., supra, says: "Intention, to be gathered from the face of the paper, according to fixed rules, is the test of negotiability, and we do not see how the idea of its possessing a negotiable quality is excluded by the mere fact the denomination of foreign money is not set out;" citing *BLACK v. WARD*, 27 Mich. 193, where it was held that a note made in Michigan and payable in Canada in "Canada currency" was payable in money, and negotiable. Compare *St. Stephen Branch Ry. Co. v. Black*, 2 Hann. 139, where an instrument promising to pay "three hundred and seventy-one dollars, payable in U. S. currency," was held to be a note. It was said that "U. S. currency" meant money of the United States, and the instrument was construed as being "for payment of three hundred and seventy-one dollars of the United States."

<sup>92</sup> Rev. St. § 3564.

tions therefore can always be paid in our own coin of equivalent value, to which it is always reduced on a recovery.<sup>93</sup> In an action upon such an instrument the course is to prove the value of the sum expressed in our own tenderable coin, because the instrument can be construed by the courts to be payable in no other.<sup>94</sup> In the calculation of this sum there is to be added the item called "exchange." This means the difference in value in the same amount of money in different countries. Thus, in the illustration in the footnote to section 10, if there were more debts due from England to Jamaica than from Jamaica to England, the demand in England for bills on Jamaica would be greater than the demand in Jamaica for bills on England. Hence, in England, it would be more expensive to procure a bill on Jamaica than it would be, in Jamaica, to procure a bill on England. Thus B, in England, would be obliged to pay A something for the debt C, in Jamaica, owes to A, in England, because the other English debtors would willingly pay something to avoid the risk and expense of transmitting money to discharge their debts. And thus B must pay A something in addition for the draft which A sells him, and which A could otherwise sell in the open market. This something is the amount which it will cost to replace the £1,000 in England in Jamaica, or which the right to a sum of money due in Jamaica will produce in money in England. The rate of exchange depends upon the balance of trade with England; and if it is excessive, and is sufficient to pay the expense of exporting the precious metals, gold will be sent in preference to bills of exchange purchased at the current rate.<sup>95</sup> This item, as has been said, is to be added, and the courts construe the instrument to mean, where it is drawn in one country and payable in another, and the amount is expressed in the money of the former, that the amount must be calculated according to the rate of exchange on the day the instrument is payable.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>93</sup> 2 Chit. Bills (Am. Ed. 1839) 615, 616; *DEBERRY v. DARNELL*, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 451.

<sup>94</sup> *THOMPSON v. SLOAN*, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 71; Bayley, Bills (Am. Ed. 1836) 28.

<sup>95</sup> *Schermerhorn v. Talman*, 14 N. Y. 93, page 136.

<sup>96</sup> *Grant v. Healey*, 3 Sumn. 523, Fed. Cas. No. 5,696; *Smith v. Shaw*, 2 Wash. C. C. 167, Fed. Cas. No. 13,107; *Lee v. Wilcocks*, 5 Serg. & R. 48;

*Performance of Other Acts in Addition to Payment of Money.*

The reasons already given have guided the courts in laying down the rule that the order or promise must not be for the payment of money and the performance of some other act.<sup>97</sup> The authority generally quoted on this point is *Martin v. Chauntry*.<sup>98</sup> This instrument was a note "to deliver up horses and a wharf, and pay money." It was held not to be a note within the statute of Anne; for, said Baron Parke in a later case,<sup>99</sup> to constitute a promissory note the promise must be to pay a sum certain and nothing else.<sup>100</sup> The reason for this is that to ingraft a special agreement upon a general promise to pay money would be at once to defeat its practical usefulness as a quasi money. Professor Ames, with his usual force, points out the objections: "One could be indorsed, the other would have to be assigned. In some jurisdictions the action could be brought by the indorsee in his own name, but as assignee he could only sue in the name of his assignor. In the case of the negotiable instrument being in the hands of a bona fide holder, no defense of fraud or latent equity would avail; in case of the holder as assignee, all would avail."

*Terms Collateral or Incidental to Order or Promise.*

But while an instrument which incorporates with the order or promise to pay an agreement to do some other act is not a bill or note, it is possible, without destroying the negotiability of a bill or note, to annex to it an agreement which relates to it, but which is merely incidental. The point to determine is whether such agreement is a part of or necessary to the fulfillment of the promise or order. If it is not, it does not destroy the instrument's negotiability.<sup>101</sup> The case commonly referred to as the leading authority is *WISE v. CHARLTON*.<sup>102</sup> This was a promise to pay to J. or

*Bank of Missouri v. Wright*, 10 Mo. 719; *Scott v. Bevan*, 2 Barn. & Adol. 78; *Cash v. Kennion*, 11 Ves. 314.

<sup>97</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 24.

<sup>98</sup> 2 Strange, 1271.

<sup>99</sup> *FOLLETT v. MOORE*, 4 Exch. 416.

<sup>100</sup> *COOK v. SATTERLEE*, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 108; *Fletcher v. Thompson*, 55 N. H. 308; *First Nat. Bank v. Carson*, 60 Mich. 433, 27 N. W. 589.

<sup>101</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 24, subd. 1.

<sup>102</sup> 4 Adol. & E. 786. The fact that a note contains a contract as to collateral security, and provides the means for converting the security, will not

order £125, and contained the added words, "And I have deposited in his hands title deeds \* \* \* as a collateral security." It was contended that the right to transfer the deeds was not negotiable, while the right to transfer the note was, but the court held that the memorandum of security was not imported into the main agreement, which was to pay money. Examples of this rule are memoranda upon the face of an instrument showing for what consideration it was given,<sup>103</sup> as that it "is secured according to the condition of a certain mortgage,"<sup>104</sup> or that "it was given in consideration of a patent right."<sup>105</sup> In New York the leading case is *LEONARD v. MASON*.<sup>106</sup> There the draft was: "Levi Mason, Esq.: Please pay the above note, and hold it against me in our settlement." The court said the reference in the note was merely to ascertain the amount, and "retaining the note as a voucher is no more the performance of another act besides the payment of the money than the retaining the order itself for the same purpose." *HODGES v. SHULER*<sup>107</sup> is also noteworthy. There the promise was to pay to S. or order \$1,000, with interest, payable as per attached interest warrants, "or, upon the surrender of this note, together with the interest warrants, not due to the treasurer [of the maker] \* \* \*, he [the treasurer] shall issue to the holder thereof ten shares in the capital stock," etc. There were thus two courses open to the holder of the instrument, but not to the maker. His promise for the payment of a sum of money was unconditional. He might not pay in money or in stock, but the holder might, at his option, surrender the note and take the stock, thus deprive it of its negotiable property. The persons indorsing such instruments undoubtedly intend to stand in the position, and to incur the liabilities, of indorsers of commercial paper. *ARNOLD v. RAILROAD CO.*, 5 Duer (N. Y.) 207. See, also, *Towne v. Rice*, 122 Mass. 67; *VALLEY NAT. BANK v. CROWELL*, 148 Pa. St. 284, 23 Atl. 1068.

<sup>103</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 22, subd. 2. Section 22, subd. 2, and section 23, subd. 2, are not applicable to a conditional sale note, whereby ownership of the thing sold remains in the seller, and the buyer is given the right to acquire it by performing conditions; and such instrument is not a negotiable note. *Third Nat. Bank v. Spring*, 59 N. Y. Supp. 794, 28 Misc. Rep. 9.

<sup>104</sup> *Hereth v. Meyer*, 33 Ind. 511; *Mott v. Havana Nat. Bank*, 22 Hun, 354.

<sup>105</sup> *Tassey v. Church*, 4 Watts & S. 141; *SIEGEL v. BANK*, 131 Ill. 569, 23 N. E. 417.

<sup>106</sup> 1 Wend. 522.

<sup>107</sup> 22 N. Y. 114.

NEG.BILLS.—4

in no wise compromising the right of any holder to collect the full amount of money called for by the instrument. The stipulation concerning the stock was an incident to the note, not of the essence of the promise to pay money.<sup>108</sup>

*Payment in Alternative.*

This test determines also the negotiability of that large class of instruments payable in the alternative which are deemed by the courts absolute promises for the payment of money.<sup>109</sup> Such are options between payment of money and the delivery of some other thing.<sup>110</sup> The courts declare that "the instrument is no less an absolute promise for the payment of money because it vests the holder with the option to take payment in something else than money." The reason is that the maker or party on whose credit the instrument circulates is absolutely bound, and bound, moreover, to pay money alone. As long as this is the obligation of the promisor, it would be inexpedient to deny the instrument the immunities of negotiability because of stipulations which are beneficial, and perhaps may add to its value. These stipulations vest in the promisee or person who discounts the bill or note the option whether he will enforce them or not. The maker, in every event, is bound absolutely to pay money.

*Power to Confess Judgment—Waiver of Exemptions—Payment of Attorney's Fees.*

In conformity with the rule that a mere incidental agreement, which is collateral to the order or promise to pay, does not render it non-negotiable, it is generally, though by no means universally,

<sup>108</sup> Oatman v. Taylor, 29 N. Y. 649; Willoughby v. Comstock, 3 Hill, 389; Fairchild v. Railroad Co., 15 N. Y. 337. Clause authorizing payee bank to appropriate on note money which maker might have in bank on deposit or otherwise, held not to destroy negotiability. Louisville Banking Co. v. Gray (Ala.) 26 South. 205.

<sup>109</sup> Kirk v. Insurance Co., 39 Wis. 138; Heard v. Bank, 8 Neb. 16. See Neg. Inst. L. § 24, subd. 4.

<sup>110</sup> OWEN v. BARNUM, 2 Gilman (Ill.) 461; PRESTON v. WHITNEY, 23 Mich. 260; Dennett v. Goodwin, 32 Me. 44. In HOSSTATTER v. WILSON it was held that a note promising to pay at a certain time in money (or in goods on demand) was a good promissory note. The maker has no election to do otherwise than to pay money, though the holder may elect to take goods. 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 307.



held that an instrument is none the less negotiable because it contains provisions, to take effect if it is not paid at maturity, (1) authorizing the holder to confess judgment for the maker;<sup>111</sup> or (2) waiving defenses, or the benefit of stay or exemption laws;<sup>112</sup> or (3) promising to pay costs of collection and attorney's fees.<sup>113</sup> It was said by Gibson, C. J., in a case which held that a power to confess judgment, and waiver of stay of execution and appraisement, rendered a note non-negotiable, that "a negotiable bill or note is a courier without luggage," and that "the parties could not have intended to impress a commercial character on the note, dragging after it, as it would, a train of special provisions, which would materially impede its circulation."<sup>114</sup> But in answer to this objection it has been well said that such provisions do not impede, but aid, the circulation. While in answer to another objection, which has been urged, that a provision for payment of costs and attorney's fees renders uncertain the amount to be paid, it is a sufficient answer that, the amount payable at maturity being certain, a promise to pay an additional, even if uncertain, amount in case of non-payment at maturity, after which time the instrument necessarily ceases to be negotiable, does not impair its negotiability.<sup>115</sup>

<sup>111</sup> OSBORN v. HAWLEY, 19 Ohio, 130. OVERTON v. TYLER, 3 Pa. St. 346, contra. See Neg. Inst. L. § 24, subd. 2.

<sup>112</sup> ZIMMERMAN v. ANDERSON, 67 Pa. St. 421 (distinguishing OVERTON v. TYLER, supra); FIRST NAT BANK v. SLAUGHTER, 98 Ala. 602, 14 South. 545. See Neg. Inst. L. § 24, subd. 3.

<sup>113</sup> SPERRY v. HERR, 32 Iowa, 184; FIRST NAT. BANK v. SLAUGHTER, supra; STAPLETON v. BANKING CO., 95 Ga. 802, 23 S. E. 81; DORSEY v. WOLFF, 142 Ill. 589, 32 N. E. 495; BROOKS v. HARGREAVES, 21 Mich. 254; Fralick v. Norton, 2 Mich. 130; First Nat. Bank v. Carson, 60 Mich. 432, 27 N. W. 589; Goodwin v. Goodwin, 65 Ill. 497; GILLILAN v. MYERS, 31 Ill. 525; Kingsbury v. Wall, 68 Ill. 311; Miller v. Stone Co., 1 Ill. App. 273; Hubbard v. Moseley, 11 Gray (Mass.) 170; COSTELO v. CROWELL, 127 Mass. 293; JONES v. RADATZ, 27 Minn. 240, 6 N. W. 800; Johnston Harvester Co. v. Clark, 30 Minn. 308, 15 N. W. 252. FIRST NAT. BANK v. LARSEN, 60 Wis. 203, 19 N. W. 67, contra. See Neg. Inst. L. § 21, subd. 5.

<sup>114</sup> OVERTON v. TYLER, supra.

<sup>115</sup> Mr. Daniel points out (Neg. Inst. [4th Ed.] § 62) that the cases concerning the validity of stipulations for payment of attorney's fees are of four classes: (1) Those which sustain their validity, as well as the negotiability of the instrument (SPERRY v. HERR, supra); (2) those which sustain the validity of



*Certainty as to Amount of Money.*

The last of the series of principles referring to the payment of money is that the order or promise must be for the payment of a definite sum of money.<sup>116</sup> By this is meant that it must specify exactly the sum of money to which it relates. It would be useless in the operations of discount if the purchaser were obliged to have reference to extrinsic facts or to other documents, to ascertain its value. And accordingly, in the leading case upon the point,<sup>117</sup> where the instrument was in form to pay £65, "and also all other sums which may be due," Lord Ellenborough declared that since the total sum was not specified, and could not be ascertained otherwise than by reference to books to ascertain the amount due, and the whole constituted one entire promise, and could not be divided into parts, the instrument was too indefinite to be a promissory note. And the courts, in cases of orders or promises to pay "whatever sums you may collect,"<sup>118</sup> or "the demands of a sick club,"<sup>119</sup> or like indefinite amounts, have wisely denied to them the privilege of negotiability. This rule does not, however, exclude from negotiability paper with such terms as "with interest,"<sup>120</sup> or "with current ex-

the stipulation, but not the negotiability of the instrument (Johnston Harvester Co. v. Clark, *supra*); (3) those which deny the validity of the stipulation, but sustain the negotiability of the instrument (GILMORE v. HIRST, 56 Kan. 626, 44 Pac. 603, stipulation for attorney's fee illegal by statute); (4) those which hold the stipulation void, and deny the negotiability of the instrument (BULLOCK v. TAYLOR, 39 Mich. 137). In some states stipulations for payment of attorney's fees are declared illegal by statute.

<sup>116</sup> Cushman v. Haynes, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 132; PHILADELPHIA BANK v. NEWKIRK, 2 Miles, 442; DODGE v. EMERSON, 34 Me. 96; Jones v. Simpson, 2 Barn. & C. 318; CLARKE v. PERCIVAL, 3 Barn. & Adol. 660; Aurey v. Fearnside, 4 Mees. & W. 168. An obligation to pay "either £225 sterling or \$1,000 lawful money of the United States of America, to wit, £225 sterling if the principal and interest are payable in London, and \$1,000 lawful money of the United States of America if the principal and interest are payable in New York," is not negotiable. PARSONS v. JACKSON, 99 U. S. 434. See Neg. Inst. L. § 20, subd. 2.

<sup>117</sup> SMITH v. NIGHTINGALE, 2 Starkle, 375.

<sup>118</sup> Legro v. Staples, 16 Me. 252.

<sup>119</sup> Bolton v. Dugdale, 4 Barn. & Adol. 619.

<sup>120</sup> A provision for a higher rate of interest in case of nonpayment at maturity does not impair the negotiability. SMITH v. CRANE, 33 Minn. 144, 22

change.”<sup>121</sup> The canon of construction is, “*Id certum est quod certum reddi potest.*” And in such instruments the mere inspection of the paper itself enables the holder, by an almost mechanical computation, to ascertain just what sum is due upon it at any given time. And therefore such instruments may be deemed to specify a given sum of money as definitely as though they had stated the interest or the exchange in figures themselves.<sup>122</sup> Of course it may be urged, and in fact, by text writers,<sup>123</sup> has been urged, that an instrument payable with current exchange is invalid because the fluctuations in the rate of exchange make it impossible to ascertain the amount payable when the bill is issued, and because proving the meaning of “with current exchange” necessitates evidence outside of the instrument. But these views thus taken are rather of the letter of the law than of its spirit. The law merchant is the result of the custom of merchants, and the statute of Anne is the result of the law merchant. It is the custom, convenience, and sound business policy of merchants to induct into negotiable instruments the theory of exchange, and this reason, therefore, if no other, makes exchange a necessary modification of the general rule we have laid down.

N. W. 683; *PARKER v. PLYMELL*, 23 Kan. 402. *Hegeler v. Comstock*, 1 S. D. 138, 45 N. W. 331, contra. See Neg. Inst. L. § 21, subd. 1.

<sup>121</sup> The fact that an instrument for the payment of a specific sum of money is made payable with “current exchange” on some other place than the place of payment does not prevent its being a promissory note. *HASTINGS v. THOMPSON*, 54 Minn. 184, 55 N. W. 968; *Johns. Cas. Bills & N.* 33. See, also, *SMITH v. KENDALL*, 9 Mich. 241; *JOHNSON v. FRISBIE*, 15 Mich. 288. There have, however, been contrary holdings as to this point, as in the case of *PHILADELPHIA BANK v. NEWKIRK*, 2 Miles, 442; *Windsor Sav. Bank v. McMahon* (C. C.) 38 Fed. 283; *Second Nat. Bank v. Basiner*, 12 C. C. A. 517, 65 Fed. 58. In *FIRST NAT. BANK v. SLETTE*, 67 Minn. 425, 69 N. W. 1148, it was held that an instrument, not payable at any particular place, promising to pay \$1,673, “payable by New York or Chicago exchange,” could not be construed as a promise to pay in money \$1,673, with exchange, and hence, not being payable in money, was not negotiable. Distinguishing *HASTINGS v. THOMPSON*, supra. See Neg. Inst. L. § 21, subd. 4.

<sup>122</sup> *SMITH v. KENDALL*, 9 Mich. 241; *Grutacap v. Woullnise*, 2 McLean, 581, Fed. Cas. No. 5,854; *LEGGETT v. JONES*, 10 Wis. 34.

<sup>123</sup> Edw. Neg. Inst. § 154; *Benj. Chalmers*, p. 18, and decisions; *LOWE v. BLISS*, 24 Ill. 168; *PHILADELPHIA BANK v. NEWKIRK*, 2 Miles, 442; *READ v. McNULTY*, 12 Rich. Law (S. C.) 445.

**SPECIFICATION OF PARTIES.**

26. The instrument must be specific as to all its parties.

27. By signature is meant any written emblem made by a person with the intent of entering into a contract obligation.

28. The note or bill must contain the signature of the maker or makers, drawer or drawers.

29 The bill must be addressed to some person.

**EXCEPTIONS**—(a) If the drawee can be otherwise sufficiently identified from the bill it is sufficient.

(b) An unaddressed bill accepted or a bill accepted, where the drawer and acceptor are one and the same person, is to be treated as a promissory note, and is negotiable.

30. The bill or note must point out some person to whom the money is to be paid.

The following are the common rules concerning the nomination of payees:

(a) The payee of an instrument, except one payable to bearer, must be a person in being, natural or legal, and ascertainable, at the time of issue.

(b) Where the payee and maker or drawer are the same person, the instrument is not issued until after its indorsement and delivery.

(c) The payee may be a fictitious or nonexistent person, but the instrument is then construed as payable to bearer, and title thereto is made by estoppel.

***Definition of Parties.***

In the acceptation of the term as hereinafter applied to "parties," the meaning of the word "parties" is somewhat more narrow than its strict legal one. In its strict legal definition a party to a contract is one to whom its operation as a legal contract is confined.

And while the holder of a bill or note indorsed in blank, or made payable to bearer, or claiming it under equitable assignment, is in the widest sense of the word no less a party to it than any of its actual indorsers, still the courts usually designate as "parties" only those who appear by name on the face or back of the instrument.

*Signature of Parties.*

A person is made a party by his signifying by his signature or some other written emblem upon the instrument that he intends to be bound by the instrument.<sup>124</sup> A signature in pencil,<sup>125</sup> a signature made by another person but attested by a mark,<sup>126</sup> an indorsement upon the back of the note in form "1, 2, 8," made with the intention of indorsing,<sup>127</sup> are such evidences of intention. The question is whether the signer intended to bind himself or not.<sup>128</sup> As matter of theory and of law, and for the reason that the note being an evidence of obligation should point out on its face the party who primarily assumes that obligation, it is necessary that there should be a drawer or maker somewhere specified in the instrument. But as long as the signature or emblem of the drawer or maker appears anywhere upon the instrument it is deemed prima facie evidence of his intention to be bound by its obligation.<sup>129</sup> It is immaterial

<sup>124</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 20, subd. 1.

<sup>125</sup> GEARY v. PHYSIC, 5 Barn. & C. 234; REED v. ROARK, 14 Tex. 329; BAKER v. DENING, 8 Adol. & E. 94.

<sup>126</sup> GEORGE v. SURREY, Moody & M. 516; SHANK v. BUTSCH, 28 Ind. 19.

<sup>127</sup> BROWN v. BANK, 6 Hill, 443.

<sup>128</sup> Selby v. Selby, 3 Mer. 2; Lucas v. James, 7 Hare, 419; Boardman v. Spooner, 13 Allen (Mass.) 353; BRAYLEY v. KELLY, 25 Minn. 160.

<sup>129</sup> Palmer v. Stephens, 1 Denio, 471; MERCHANTS' BANK v. SPICER, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 443. The payment by the drawee of a bill of exchange is an admission of the drawer's signature, which he may not afterwards dispute, as between himself and the holder; and he cannot compel the holder to whom he has paid the bill to return the sum paid, where the drawer's signature is discovered to be a forgery. BANK OF COMMERCE v. UNION BANK, 3 N. Y. 230; PRICE v. NEAL, 3 Burrows, 1354. Such payment, however, is not an admission of the genuineness of the body of the bill. BANK OF COMMERCE v. UNION BANK, supra. As to the effect of a signature made in the presence of the owner, and by his authority, see Sager v. Tupper, 42 Mich. 605, 4 N. W. 555; Coy v. Stiner, 53 Mich. 42, 18 N. W. 552. As to the effect of acknowledging a forged signature, see Phillips v. Ford, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 89; WELLINGTON v. JACKSON, 121 Mass. 157.

in what part of the instrument the name appears, whether at the top, in the middle, or at the bottom.<sup>180</sup> Anything from which it will appear that a person intended to make the instrument his own is sufficient.<sup>181</sup> Where a note is signed by two or more persons, if it contains the words "we promise to pay," it is joint;<sup>182</sup> but, if it contains the words "I promise to pay," it is joint and several.<sup>183</sup>

*Certainty as to Parties—Maker—Drawer.*

The parties to a bill or note must appear on the face of the instrument, and must be certain. Thus an instrument whereby A promises to pay, but which is signed "A or else B," is not a promissory note.<sup>184</sup> A promissory note without a maker, or a bill of exchange without a drawer, is an impossibility.<sup>185</sup> In *McCALL v. TAYLOR*<sup>186</sup> an instrument was written in the following form: "Four months after date, pay to my order the sum of £300, for value received. To Captain Taylor, ship 'Jasper.'" There was no signature of any drawer; but written across the instrument by the defendant were these words: "Accepted, William Taylor." It was held that this could not be declared on either as a bill or as a note, since it was only an inchoate and imperfect instrument. This instrument was also imperfect because it lacked a payee; but, had a payee been designated, it would, by virtue of the acceptance, have been good as a promissory note, as will be explained in the next paragraph. Moreover, had the instrument designated a payee, the acceptance

<sup>180</sup> *Clason v. Bailey*, 14 Johns. 485; *Saunderson v. Jackson*, 2 Bos. & P. 238; *Welford v. Beazely*, 3 Atk. 503.

<sup>181</sup> In the case of *TAYLOR v. DOBBINS*, it was held that the allegation that the note was that of the defendant, and that "manu sua propria scripsit" was sufficient without his signature at the end, since his name appeared in the instrument. 1 Strange, 399.

<sup>182</sup> *Barnett v. Juday*, 38 Ind. 86; *Groves v. Sentell*, 153 U. S. 465, 14 Sup. Ct. 898.

<sup>183</sup> *CHAFFEE v. JONES*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 263; *Ely v. Clute*, 19 Hun (N. Y.) 35; *Salomon v. Hopkins*, 61 Conn. 49, 23 Atl. 716; *Dill v. White*, 52 Wis. 458, 9 N. W. 404. See Neg. Inst. Law, § 36, subd. 7.

<sup>184</sup> *FERRIS v. BOND*, 4 Barn. & Ald. 679.

<sup>185</sup> *Vyse v. Clarke*, 5 Car. & P. 403; *May v. Miller*, 27 Ala. 515; *Tevie v. Young*, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 197; *REG. v. HARPER*, 13 Cent. Law J. 174; *STOESIGER v. RAILWAY CO.*, 3 El. & Bl. 549, 23 Law J. Q. B. 293.

<sup>186</sup> 34 Law J. C. P. 365.

and delivery by the acceptor would have operated as authority to the payee or other legal holder to insert his own name as drawer, and thus to perfect the instrument as a bill of exchange. Such implied authority results from the fact that the instrument is delivered by the acceptor, who must be taken to intend the natural consequence of his act, in order that it may be put into circulation, which cannot be completely accomplished without perfecting it in the manner indicated.<sup>137</sup>

*Designation of Drawee.*

So, also, without a drawee, an instrument cannot be a bill of exchange. The reason for this is that the first essential of a bill is an order, and, a drawee not being nominated, the instrument must fail.<sup>138</sup> It is inherent in its nature that there must be a drawee, who in theory has funds of the drawer, which he is bound to apply upon the draft. The courts, however, are frequently able to sustain as a promissory note an instrument which for lack of a drawee is imperfect as a bill of exchange; for, where the essentials of a note are present, the courts will enforce the obligation in spite of formal inaccuracies. In *PETO v. REYNOLDS*,<sup>139</sup> where an instrument otherwise in the form of a bill was not addressed to any one, but across the face was written "Accepted," over what purported to be the defendant's signature, Barons Parke and Alderson both agreed that, while they could not treat the instrument as a bill, because of the absence of the drawee's name, they would, on proof of the defendant's signature, hold it to be a promissory note. This is the principle of *BLOCK v. BELL*,<sup>140</sup> where an instrument in the form of a promissory note was not signed at the foot, but was addressed to the defendant, who wrote across it "Accepted," and signed his name thereunder. It was held that this signature, though in terms

<sup>137</sup> *HARVEY v. CANE*, 34 Law T. (N. S.) 64. In this case the bill without the name of the drawer was accepted by the defendant, and given by him to C., by whom it was given to the plaintiff, who inserted his own name. It was held that the acceptance was with a view to negotiation, and that C. gave what authority he had to the plaintiff. See *MOIESE v. KNAPP*, 30 Ga. 942; *HOPPS v. SAVAGE*, 69 Md. 516, 16 Atl. 133.

<sup>138</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 20, subd. 5.

<sup>139</sup> 9 Exch. 410.

<sup>140</sup> 1 Moody & R. 149.

an acceptance, acted as an adoption of the promise, and that the instrument was a promissory note. And the courts have even gone so far as to say that, if the drawee be not specified in the bill, but be otherwise capable of identification from it, that will suffice. In *GRAY v. MILNER*,<sup>141</sup> the bill was addressed, "Payable at No. 1 Wilmot St., opposite the Lamb, Bethnal Green, London," and the argument was that, not being addressed to any one, it was not a bill of exchange. It appeared, however, in answer to this, that "Accepted. Chas. Milner" was written across the face of the bill. The court held that this was a bill of exchange; Dallas, J., saying that the direction to a particular place could only mean to the person who resided there, and that the defendant, by accepting it, acknowledged that he was the person to whom it was directed. Of *GRAY v. MILNER* it may be said that it can only be supported upon the theory that a bill of exchange made payable at a particular place of residence or of business can only be meant to be addressed to the person who resides or does business at that place. But it may also be said that such is certainly a very strained construction of the law,<sup>142</sup> and it is to be questioned whether the courts would to-day adopt such a view of this rule if the case were presented to them afresh.<sup>143</sup> It would seem, rather, subject to the rule of interpretation governing ambiguous instruments, that its acceptance must evidence an intention to incur an obligation, and although it did not fulfill the requisites of a bill of exchange, the holder might treat it as a promissory note,<sup>144</sup> and the courts would clearly give it effect as such. The principle is the same where the drawer and

<sup>141</sup> 8 Taunt. 739. An action was brought on the following writing: "Oct. 21, 1804. Two months after date, pay to the order of John Jenkins £78, 11s.. value received. Thos. Stephens. At Messrs. John Morson & Co." It was held that the instrument was a bill of exchange, and that Morson & Co. could be considered the drawees. *SHUTTLEWORTH v. STEPHENS*, 1 Camp. 407.

<sup>142</sup> *DAVIS v. CLARKE*, 6 Q. B. 16; Story, Bills (Bennett's Ed.) 58; 1 Pars. Notes & B. 62.

<sup>143</sup> *BALL v. ALLEN*, 15 Mass. 435; *WATROUS v. HALBROOK*, 39 Tex. 572.

<sup>144</sup> *EDIS v. BURY*, 6 Barn. & C. 433; *BLOCK v. BELL*, 1 Moody & R. 149; *DRUMMOND v. DRUMMOND*, reported in 1 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. p. 883, though see, contra, *Shuttleworth v. Stephens*, 1 Camp. 407; *ALLAN v. MAWSON*, 4 Camp. 115; *Rex v. Hunter*, Russ. & R. 511; *FUNK v. BABBITT*, 158 Ill. 408, 41 N. E. 166. See Neg. Inst. L. § 36, subd. 5; Id. § 214.



drawee are ostensibly different, though in law the same person. In *Fairchild v. Ogdensburgh R. Co.*,<sup>145</sup> the instrument was an order drawn by the president of the railroad upon its treasurer directing the latter to pay A B, or order, a certain sum of money, and was, in effect, an order of the corporation upon itself. Here the court of appeals said, because there were not the two parties requisite for a bill of exchange, the instrument was not a bill of exchange, but, following the authority of the English courts, that it was a promissory note.

### *Designation of Payee.*

It is likewise essential to a bill of exchange or promissory note that a payee be designated therein.<sup>146</sup> In *GIBSON v. MINET*,<sup>147</sup> Chief Baron Eyre declared: "If I put in writing these words: 'I promise to pay £500 on demand, value received,' without saying to whom, it is waste paper. If I direct another to pay £500 at some day after date, for value received, and not say to whom, it is waste paper."<sup>148</sup> The payee must be certain; but any words which with reasonable certainty designate a person as payee are enough. An acknowledgment of a balance due A, for which "I promise to pay," is a promise to pay A.<sup>149</sup> It is not necessary, moreover, that the designation be by name, but a description of the payee is sufficient.<sup>150</sup> "Bearer" is a sufficient designation;<sup>151</sup> and, somewhat analogously,

<sup>145</sup> 15 N. Y. 337.

<sup>146</sup> *Rex v. Randall*, Russ. & R. 195; *McINTOSH v. LYTTLE*, 26 Minn. 339, 3 N. W. 983. See, also, *TITTLE v. THOMAS*, 30 Miss. 125; *Bennington v. Dinsmore*, 2 Gill (Md.) 348; *RICH v. STARBUCK*, 51 Ind. 87; *Storm v. Stirling*, 3 El. & Bl. 832; *ADAMS v. KING*, 16 Ill. 169; *GRAY v. BOWDEN*, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 282; *Osgood v. Pearsons*, 4 Gray (Mass.) 455. "To Charles R. Whitesell et al. or order" is bad for uncertainty. *GORDON v. ANDERSON*, 83 Iowa, 224, 49 N. W. 86. "To the order of A" is good. *FISHER v. POMFRET*, 12 Mod. 125. See Neg. Inst. L. § 20, subd. 4; Id. §§ 27, 28.

<sup>147</sup> 1 H. Bl. 618.

<sup>148</sup> *Walrad v. Petrie*, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 576; *FERRIS v. BOND*, 4 Barn. & Ald. 697; *Douglass v. Wilkeson*, 6 Wend. 637; *Heman v. Francisco*, 12 Mo. App. 560.

<sup>149</sup> *CHADWICK v. ALLEN*, 1 Strange, 706.

<sup>150</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 99.

<sup>151</sup> Other words which indicate that the instrument is to be transferable by delivery have been construed as entitled to the same effect. "Holder,"—*PUTNAM v. CRYMES*, 1 McMul. (S. C.) 9; "bills payable,"—*WILLETS v. BANK*, 2 Duer (N. Y.) 121; *Mechanics' Bank v. Stratton*, \*42 N. Y. 365; "order



it is held that a bill or note is good if a blank space is left for insertion of the name, the issue of the instrument in this form operating as authority to any bona fide holder to insert his name.<sup>152</sup> The payee may be designated by his office. Thus "the trustees of the will of A," or "the administrators of the estate of A," are sufficient descriptions, since the payees are ascertainable.<sup>153</sup> The person designated, however, must have a natural or legal existence. For this reason a promise to pay to "the estate of Moses Lyon, deceased," has been held bad.<sup>154</sup> Not unlike this case is *COWIE v. STIRLING*,<sup>155</sup> where a note was made payable nine months after date "to the secretary for the time being" of a certain society. This was construed as a promise to pay to the person who should be secretary nine months thence, and, inasmuch as it could not be ascertained at the date of issue who that person would be, it was held that the instrument could not take effect as a note.

An order or promise to pay to A or B is not a bill or a note, because the instrument is payable to either, and that only on the contingency of its not being paid to the other.<sup>156</sup> But such instruments are to be distinguished from those in which the designation of the payees, though alternative in form, is not such in fact, as in

of 1658,"—*WILLETS v. BANK*, *supra*; "to J. S. or ship Fortune or bearer,"—*GRANT v. VAUGHAN*, 3 Burrows, 1526. See Neg. Inst. L. § 28, subd. 4.

<sup>152</sup> *CRUCHLEY v. CLARANCE*, 2 Maule & S. 90; Rand. Com. Paper, § 167. Post, p. 258.

<sup>153</sup> Administrators of A, deceased, *ADAMS v. KING*, 16 Ill. 169; *MOODY v. THREKELD*, 13 Ga. 55; or to trustees of the will of A, *MEGGINSON v. HARPER*, 2 Crompt. & M. 322; or the heirs of A, *Bacon v. Fitch*, 1 Root (Conn.) 181. See Neg. Inst. L. § 27, subd. 6.

<sup>154</sup> *Hendricks v. Thornton*, 45 Ala. 309. See, also, *LYON v. MARSHALL*, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 242. But in *SHAW v. SMITH*, 150 Mass. 166, 22 N. E. 887, "Pay to F. B. Bridgman's estate or order" was construed as an order to pay to the administrators,—a construction which is certainly according to the common acceptance of the words used.

<sup>155</sup> 6 El. & Bl. 333.

<sup>156</sup> *BLANCKENHAGEN v. BLUNDELL*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 417; *MUSSELMAN v. OAKES*, 19 Ill. 81. Neg. Inst. L. § 27, provides that the instrument may be drawn payable to the order of "one or some of several payees." This seems to change the law. But quære whether it does more than provide for such cases as *WATSON v. EVANS*, *infra*.

**DAVIS v. GARR,**<sup>157</sup> where the promise was to pay "Joseph M. Whitney, Charles A. Davis, and Louis McLane, Trustees of the Apalachicola Land Company, or their successors in office, or order." It was held that the designation was not uncertain, since payment could be made to the "successors" only in case the trustees named had ceased to be such; and the ambiguity, if any, would arise from a change of trustees after the note took effect. So a note was held good where the promise was "to pay A, B, and C, or their order, or the major part of them."<sup>158</sup> This was construed as a promise to pay to all three, or to the order of all three or of any two, the effect being that A, B, and C were joint payees, but that any two were authorized to sign for all. On the same principle the payee was held certain in a note payable "to the trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church, or their collector," the court observing that the rule prohibiting alternative payees does not apply "where the instrument discloses the fact that one of the two persons named is named as the agent of the other to receive the money."<sup>159</sup>

An instrument in the form of a note made payable to the order of the maker, or in the form of a bill where the payee and acceptor are one and the same person, is inoperative as a note or bill. Since a man cannot contract with himself, such a writing, unnegotiated, gives rise to no obligation. If, however, the payee negotiates the instrument, it becomes by his indorsement a valid note or bill in the hands of the holder, the original contract and the indorsement taken together becoming a binding contract, though an informal one, between the maker or acceptor and the indorsee.<sup>160</sup>

### *Fictitious Payee.*

Bills and notes are sometimes made payable to the order of a fictitious payee; and where such an instrument, purporting to be in-

<sup>157</sup> 6 N. Y. 124. To the same effect, **KING v. BOX**, 6 Taunt. 325. So of a promise to pay "A or heirs." **KNIGHT v. JONES**, 21 Mich. 161.

<sup>158</sup> **WATSON v. EVANS**, 1 Hurl. & C. 662.

<sup>159</sup> **NOXON v. SMITH**, 127 Mass. 485. To the same effect, **HOLMES v. JAKES**, L. R. 1 Q. B. 376.

<sup>160</sup> **Hooper v. Williams**, 2 Exch. 18; **MOSES v. BANK**, 149 U. S. 208, 13 Sup. Ct. 900. So where drawer, acceptor, and payee were one and the same. See Neg. Inst. L. § 27, subd. 2. Cf. § 320. **COM. v. BUTTERICK**, 100 Mass. 12. Neg. Inst. L. § 27, subd. 3.

dorsed by the person named as payee, passes into the hands of an innocent holder, the question arises as to what are his rights as against the original parties. The rule to be deduced from the authorities is that as against an acceptor, drawer, or maker, who had knowledge of the fictitious character of the payee, such an instrument, in the hands of an innocent holder, may be treated as valid, and (somewhat anomalously) as if payable to bearer; but that, if the original party was ignorant of the fictitious character, he cannot be charged.<sup>161</sup> Thus the principle of liability in such case rests on estoppel. Again, if the holder, when he received the instrument, knew that the name of the payee, and consequently, the indorsement, was fictitious, he cannot recover against the acceptor or maker, although the latter had knowledge of the facts when he accepted the bill or made the note.<sup>162</sup> The last branch of the rule has been changed in some jurisdictions by legislation, which provides that a note payable to the order of a fictitious person shall, if negotiated, have the same effect, as against persons having knowledge of the facts, as if payable to bearer.<sup>163</sup> Such appears to be

<sup>161</sup> MINET v. GIBSON, 3 Term R. 481, affirmed house of lords, 1 H. Bl. 569; BENNETT v. FARNELL, 1 Camp. 130, 180; ARMSTRONG v. BANK, 46 Ohio St. 512, 22 N. E. 866; SHIPMAN v. BANK, 126 N. Y. 318, 27 N. E. 371. But see Lane v. Krekle, 22 Iowa, 399; Ort v. Fowler, 31 Kan. 478, 2 Pac. 580.

<sup>162</sup> HUNTER v. JEFFERY, Peake, Add. Cas. 146; Rand. Com. Paper (2d Ed.) § 163.

<sup>163</sup> In New York this doctrine was changed by statute to the effect that a note "made payable to the order of the maker thereof, or to the order of a fictitious person, shall, if negotiated by the maker, have the same effect and be of the same validity, as against the maker and all persons having knowledge of the facts, as if payable to the bearer." This statute, the spirit of which has been followed in other jurisdictions (FOSTER v. SHATTUCK, 2 N. H. 446), was extended in New York in its operation. In Mechanics' Bank v. Straiton, 3 Abb. Dec. 269, the check in suit was demurred to because it was in form: "Pay to bills payable, or order." It was declared by the general term of the supreme court to be nonnegotiable, but the court of appeals said that by using the words "or order" the maker showed he intended that the instrument should be transferred, and be negotiable. In naming the persons to whose order the instrument is payable the maker limits the negotiability to those persons, and imposes the condition of indorsement upon them upon its first transfer. But no such intention is indicated by a fictitious or an impersonal payee; hence words of negotiability, in such connection, are capable of no reasonable

the effect of the "Negotiable Instruments Law,"<sup>164</sup> which provides that "the instrument is payable to bearer \* \* \* when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable." On the other hand, the English "Bills of Exchange Act" provides, without qualification, that, "where the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person, the bill may be treated as payable to bearer."<sup>165</sup>

### CAPACITY OF PARTIES.

**31. The capacity of parties is in general governed by the same rules as their power to make a contract. It is of two kinds:**

- (a) Capacity to incur liability.
- (b) Capacity to transfer the instrument.

**32. The following classes of persons incur no liability, though they may make a valid transfer of the instrument:**

- (a) A person non compos mentis.<sup>166</sup>
- (b) An infant.<sup>167</sup>
- (c) In some jurisdictions, a married woman.<sup>168</sup>
- (d) A corporation, when the act is ultra vires.<sup>169</sup>

interpretation except that the bill shall be negotiable without indorsement. In other words, it is to be treated in the same manner as if it had been made payable to bearer. In *Irving Nat. Bank v. Alley*, 79 N. Y. 536, the court went further. It held that, even where a party upon a note of this character, against whom a liability is sought to be enforced, does not have knowledge of the facts, in all other cases than that of the fictitious payee, he cannot raise the point that it was payable to the maker's or drawer's order, but will be estopped from doing so. Thus the old common law is substantially changed.

<sup>164</sup> Section 28, subd. 3.

<sup>165</sup> *BANK OF ENGLAND v. VAGLIANO* [1891] App. Cas. 107, reversing 23 Q. B. Div. 243, 22 Q. B. Div. 103; *CLUTTON v. ATTENBOROUGH* [1897] App. Cas. 90, affirming [1895] 2 Q. B. 707.

<sup>166</sup> See post, § 99, pp. 226-234.

<sup>167</sup> See post, § 94, pp. 218-220.

<sup>168</sup> See post, § 95, p. 221.

<sup>169</sup> See post, § 96, pp. 222-226.

**33. The following persons may transfer, but can incur only personal liability:**

- (a) Executors.**
- (b) Administrators.**
- (c) Guardians.**
- (d) Trustees.**

The generic principles governing the capacity of parties to contract are not changed in their application to bills and notes. A full discussion of that liability belongs more properly to a work upon the general subject of contracts than to a work of this character. The defenses of persons non compos mentis, infancy, coverture, and of transcending corporate powers, and their effect upon the position of the bona fide holder, will be considered to a limited degree later on. We speak here in a most general way of persons acting in a representative capacity as parties to negotiable paper.

Executors, administrators, guardians, and trustees occupy at least one general property relation in common: an estate is committed to them to apply. An executor or administrator is the hand of the court to collect property and pay debts. A guardian or trustee has, in addition to these functions, to hold property, and to keep it intact as far as in ordinary human prudence it can be done. They hold this property, as the law phrases it, in "*autre droit*," which means that they hold for others, and not in their own right. They are allowed by law to charge the estates left in their care with certain disbursements, which, in general, are those necessary to carry into force and effect the estates which they are to administer. But, aside from these, the estate cannot be bound. It cannot, for example, be bound by an executory contract. If the representative makes such a contract, the law, in order that the obligation may stand, rather than fall, holds the representative personally responsible, not the estate which he represents. Thus, in the case of the executory contract of negotiable paper, the law deems the descriptive character setting forth the representative character in which the party has signed as surplusage, and treats it as his personal obligation.<sup>170</sup> This principle is extended so far

<sup>170</sup> See *Willis v. Sharp*, 113 N. Y. 586, 21 N. E. 705. The main cases on this point are *AUSTIN v. MUNRO*, 47 N. Y. 360; *Ex parte Garland*, 10 Ves.

that an executor is not permitted to charge the estate, although he is expressly authorized to do so by the terms of the will under which he acts.<sup>171</sup> This, however, does not preclude the power of transfer. If a bill or note be negotiable, it may be indorsed, but the executor, guardian, or trustee indorsing is personally liable unless he exempts himself by an indorsement without recourse.<sup>172</sup>

### AUTHORITY OF AGENT.

34. The power of persons to incur liability as parties to, and to transfer, negotiable instruments by the hands of others is governed by the general rules applicable to principals and agents.

**EXCEPTION**—An undisclosed principal cannot sue or be sued as a party to a negotiable instrument.

#### *Signature by Agent—Liability.*

A person may become a party to, or transfer, a bill or note by the hand of an agent. Whether one whose name purports to have been signed by another as drawer, acceptor, maker, or indorser is liable as such depends upon the authority, express or implied, of the person who wrote the signature. If such authority existed, the principal, and he alone, is bound. No particular form of appointment is necessary, and the authority of the agent may be established as in other cases of agency.<sup>173</sup> For example, if a bill or note be drawn or indorsed "A B by C D," or "A B by C D, His Attorney," it appears clearly that A. B. is principal, provided C. D. had a right to sign A B's

119; *Fairland v. Percy*, L. R. 3 Prob. & Div. 217; *Labouchere v. Tupper*, 11 Moore, P. O. 198; *Downs v. Collins*, 6 Hare, 418. See, also, *Thompson v. Whitmarsh*, 100 N. Y. 35, 2 N. E. 273.

<sup>171</sup> *Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Gilbert*, 44 Hun, 201. Modified by *Willis v. Sharp*, 113 N. Y. 586, 21 N. E. 705, which holds that, where a will directs an executor to carry on business, the funds of the estate in the business are bound in equity for the payment of debts. It, however, admits that the executor is personally liable in the first event.

<sup>172</sup> *Rex v. Thom*, 1 Term R. 487; *CHILDS v. MONINS*, 5 Moore, 282; *Harrison v. McClelland*, 57 Ga. 531; *Tryon v. Oxley*, 3 G. Greene, 289; *Davis v. French*, 20 Me. 21; *WISDOM v. BECKER*, 52 Ill. 346.

<sup>173</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 38. Cf. §§ 38-40.

name. So, also, where the form of signature is "C D for A B," or "C D, Agent for A B."<sup>174</sup> If, however, C D had not authority, no person is bound on the instrument, for C D, in the cases put, did not undertake to be bound. C D would, indeed, be liable, but only upon an implied warranty of authority, to the person to whom he delivered the instrument or the assignee of the latter's right of action, for the damages resulting from the breach.<sup>175</sup> In cases of simple contract an undisclosed principal may take advantage of the act of an agent who has made a contract in his behalf, and may sue or be sued thereon; but this doctrine does not extend to instruments under seal, or to bills and notes. No person can be party to an action upon a negotiable instrument unless he appears thereon to be such.<sup>176</sup> Therefore, if the signature be "C D," although he was in fact agent for A B, evidence is not admissible to show that C D intended to bind A B. And even if, under the same circumstances, the signature was written "C D, Agent," the name of the principal being undisclosed, the word "Agent" is regarded as *descriptio personæ*, and C D is bound personally.<sup>177</sup> There are, however, conflicting decisions.<sup>178</sup>

<sup>174</sup> Daniel, *Neg. Inst.* § 298.

<sup>175</sup> *BARTLETT v. TUCKER*, 104 Mass. 336; *WHITE v. MADISON*, 26 N. Y. 117; *Taylor v. Shelton*, 30 Conn. 122. It seems that by *Neg. Inst. L.* § 38, the holder in such cases may sue the agent on the instrument, if he was not authorized to sign for the principal.

<sup>176</sup> *SIFFKIN v. WALKER*, 2 Camp. 308; *In re Adansonla Co.*, L. R. 9 Ch. 635; *GRIST v. BACKHOUSE*, 20 N. C. 362; *Arnold v. Sprague*, 34 Vt. 409; *Pease v. Pease*, 35 Conn. 131; *Texas L. & T. Co. v. Carroll*, 63 Tex. 51; *Stackpole v. Arnold*, 11 Mass. 27; *Hyde v. Paige*, 9 Barb. 150; *Nash v. Towne*, 5 Wall. 689. See *Neg. Inst. L.* § 37.

<sup>177</sup> *WILLIAMS v. ROBBINS*, 16 Gray (Mass.) 77; *ANDERTON v. SHOUP*, 17 Ohio St. 125; *Anderson v. Pearce*, 36 Ark. 293; *STINSON v. LEE*, 68 Miss. 113, 8 South. 272. It is, however, generally held that a corporation may be treated as a party to a bill or note where, instead of the corporate name, appears the name and title of its managing officer, as "A B, Cashier," or "A B,

<sup>178</sup> Such authorities as *Mott v. Hicks*, 1 Cow. 540, *GREEN v. SKEEL*, 2 Hun, 486, and *Moore v. McClure*, 8 Hun, 558, in New York lay down a different doctrine. It appears to have been the sense of the court in *Mott v. Hicks* that extrinsic testimony might be admitted to show that where an indorser signed his name as agent it was competent to show that it was agreed between the parties that such indorsement was merely for the purpose of transfer, and that the indorser, as agent, was not personally liable. This is also the doctrine



**DELIVERY OF INSTRUMENTS.**

**35. A bill or note is inoperative as against the drawer or maker until delivery.**

**36. Delivery means transfer of possession with intent to transfer title, and is of two kinds:**

**(a) Actual delivery, which is effected by the manual passing of the instrument itself to the payee or his agent.**

**(b) Constructive delivery, which is effected by direction to a third person in actual possession of the instrument to deliver it to, or to hold it for, the payee.**

**37. Delivery in escrow means delivery to a third person to hold until a certain event happens, or a certain condition is fulfilled. A bill or note delivered in escrow**

President"; the such designation of the officer with his title being deemed equivalent to the designation of the corporation. *Bank of Genesee v. Bank*, 13 N. Y. 309; *First Nat. Bank v. Hall*, 44 N. Y. 395; *Chillicothe Branch of State Bank v. Fox*, 3 Blatchf. 431, Fed. Cas. No. 2,683. See 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 873. Mr. Daniel states this as an exception confined to bank cashiers. Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 417. See, also, *Casco Nat. Bank v. Clark*, 139 N. Y. 307, 34 N. E. 908; *Souhegan Nat. Bank v. Boardman*, 46 Minn. 293, 48 N. W. 1116. Neg. Inst. L. § 72, provides that, "where an instrument is drawn or indorsed to a person as 'cashier' or other fiscal officer of a bank or corporation, it is deemed prima facie to be payable to the bank or corporation," etc. Where the names of the agent and principal both appear on the instrument, it is a question of construction which is the real party. Thus, where the name of the principal appears in the heading, and the paper is signed by one purporting to be agent, it has been held that the principal is liable. *CHIPMAN v. FOSTER*, 119 Mass. 189; *HITCHCOCK v. BUCHANAN*, 105 U. S. 416.

---

in *GREEN v. SKEEL*, where it is held that a person signing his name as agent in the business of his agency is not personally liable. See, also, *May v. Hewitt*, 33 Ala. 161. On the other hand, in *DE WITT v. WALTON*, 9 N. Y. 571, the addition of the word "agent" is treated as mere descriptive personæ, and this is emphasized and affirmed in *Pumpelly v. Phelps*, 40 N. Y. 59, and in a dictum in *Briggs v. Partridge*, 64 N. Y. 359, 363, this is further approved.



becomes absolute in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value, whether or not the event happens or the condition is fulfilled.

The inception of a note is defined by Judge Platt to mean "when it was first given, or when it first became the evidence of an existing contract."<sup>179</sup> It has no legal inception until it is delivered as evidence of a subsisting debt.<sup>180</sup> The mere writing and signing of a bill or note, which the drawer or maker retains in his hands, forms no contract.<sup>181</sup> No person has then a right of action upon it any more than if it were blank paper.<sup>182</sup> The inception of the paper is when there came into existence a right of action upon it.<sup>183</sup> This is because while the note or bill is in the maker's hands, it can be erased, canceled, or revoked. It cannot, therefore, be an evidence of indebtedness until it is beyond such possibility. The decisive step for this is the delivery.<sup>184</sup>

Two things must concur in a delivery. The first is the transfer, actual or constructive, of the possession of the instrument; the second an intent to transfer the title on the part of the transferrer. The minds of both parties, to this extent, must concur. This is the

<sup>179</sup> *Marvin v. McCullum*, 20 Johns. 288.

<sup>180</sup> Delivery is essential to the validity of a bill or note. *MEEKER v. SHANKS*, 112 Ind. 207, 13 N. E. 712, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 31. "As a general rule, a promissory note, like any other written contract, has no legal inception or valid existence, as such, until it has been delivered in accordance with the purpose and intent of the parties." *BURSON v. HUNTINGTON*, 21 Mich. 416; upon point, see, also, *CHIPMAN v. TUCKER*, 38 Wis. 43; *HILLSDALE COLLEGE v. THOMAS*, 40 Wis. 661; *CLINE v. GUTHRIE*, 42 Ind. 227.

<sup>181</sup> *GALE v. MILLER*, 54 N. Y. 536; *Bayley v. Taber*, 5 Mass. 286; *Freeman v. Ellison*, 37 Mich. 459; *WOODFORD v. DORWIN*, 3 Vt. 82; *Ward v. Churn*, 18 Grat. (Va.) 801; *MICHIGAN INS. CO. v. LEAVENWORTH*, 30 Vt. 11.

<sup>182</sup> It is held, however, in some jurisdictions, that though paper was never delivered, but was wrongfully taken from the possession of the maker, he is estopped, as against a bona fide purchaser for value, from denying its execution. Post, p. 267.

<sup>183</sup> *Eastman v. Shaw*, 65 N. Y. 527, 528.

<sup>184</sup> *Catlin v. Gunter*, 11 N. Y. 368; *COWING v. ALTMAN*, 71 N. Y. 435, 79 N. Y. 167; *Kinzle v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank*, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 105; *VINTON v. PECK*, 14 Mich. 287. See Neg. Inst. L. § 35. Cf. section 6.

law laid down <sup>185</sup> in a case where the question was whether a check for \$10,000 in gold left upon a clerk's desk, unknown to him, and without his consciously accepting it, was a delivery of it, and the court said it was not. And in a case where <sup>186</sup> it was the intention to deliver the instrument left in escrow on the 1st of May, but on April 30th the transferrer died, it was held that there could have been no actual delivery nor intention to deliver the instrument. The necessary elements to a delivery were wanting. So where the payee of a bill indorsed it, but died before delivering it, it was held that his executor, finding it among his papers, could not consummate the transfer by delivering it.<sup>187</sup> On the other hand, such acts as handing completed notes to the payee, who, though objecting to the form, retained them;<sup>188</sup> or depositing completed notes, properly addressed, in the post office;<sup>189</sup> or giving a duplicate bill in place of one lost, which the payee treated as an original,—have been held to constitute sufficient deliveries. It is to be noted, however, that the delivery need not be to the payee, nor need the intent of the transferrer to transfer title be communicated to him. For, as will be seen, a bill or note may be delivered in escrow, and take effect on performance of the condition, without knowledge or actual assent of the payee;<sup>190</sup> and a note delivered in a sealed envelope, to be opened after the maker's death, is operative, although the payee does not become aware of the existence of the note until after the

<sup>185</sup> *Klaine v. Ford*, 52 Barb. 196, affirmed 43 N. Y. 587.

<sup>186</sup> *Artcher v. Whalen*, 1 Wend. 179.

<sup>187</sup> *BROMAGE v. LLOYD*, 1 Exch. 32. This action was in assumpsit on a note in writing, made by defendants, indorsed in blank by the payee, and, after the death of the latter, delivered to the plaintiffs by the payee's executrix, without her indorsement. It was held that those to whom the note was so delivered had no right to sue upon it, for a "transfer" was not effected thereby. In the case of a note signed in Florence, and mailed to the maker's brother in London, who there delivered it to the payee, it was contended that the cause of action arose in the former place, but it was held that no contract arose until its delivery, and that consequently the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of such place of delivery. *CHAPMAN v. COTTRELL*, 13 Wkly. Rep. 843.

<sup>188</sup> *Bodley v. Higgins*, 73 Ill. 375.

<sup>189</sup> *REX v. LAMBTON*, 5 Price, 428; *Kirkman v. Bank of America*, 2 Cold. (Tenn.) 397.

<sup>190</sup> *WORTH v. CASE*, 42 N. Y. 362; 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 878.

death occurs.<sup>191</sup> The outward and visible indication of delivery is possession, because, in nine cases out of ten, where a man holds paper, he has a right to hold it. And the courts have, as we shall see, confirmed this business view accordingly, declaring that, when a bill or note is found in the hands of a payee, it will be presumed that it was legally delivered to him, and was in fact his.<sup>192</sup> But this presumption may be rebutted.<sup>193</sup>

Delivery may also be upon conditions.<sup>194</sup> Deliveries upon conditions are of two classes: delivery as an escrow, and delivery to the other party to the instrument upon a condition. Delivery as an escrow is defined <sup>195</sup> as a delivery to a third person, made to await the happening of an event, or performance of a condition, or some affirmative action on the part of the other party, before he is entitled to the absolute delivery of the instrument, as distinguished from the affirmative action of the party who delivers the instrument in escrow. The authorities agree that a delivery in escrow has two elements: It must be to some person not ultimately entitled to receive it; and the delivery must take effect and the title to the instrument pass the instant the condition of the escrow is fulfilled, even though the depository has not formally delivered it to the person entitled to the possession.<sup>196</sup> In these respects it is like the escrow of a deed, from the analogy of which it is in fact drawn. There are, however, these distinctions: A deed once de-

<sup>191</sup> WORTH v. CASE, *supra*; DEAN v. CARRUTH, 108 Mass. 242.

<sup>192</sup> Griswold v. Davis, 31 Vt. 390; RUSSELL v. WHIPPLE, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 536; Peets v. Bratt, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 662; Chappell v. Bissell, 10 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 274; Marshall v. Rockwood, 12 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 452; Keteltas v. Myers, 19 N. Y. 231; Cordier v. Thompson, 8 Daly (N. Y.) 172.

<sup>193</sup> Scaife v. Byrd, 39 Ark. 568; Chandler v. Temple, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 285; Rhine v. Robinson, 27 Pa. St. 30; Roberts v. Jackson, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 478.

<sup>194</sup> BELL v. INGESTRE, 12 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 319. In this case one Edwards, having drawn bills and procured acceptance by defendant, indorsed the bills, and sent them to the plaintiff, with which he was to take up overdue bills. It was stipulated as an express condition that such overdue bills should be returned to him. It was held that the indorsement was incomplete until the condition precedent had been fulfilled by the return of the overdue bills. BENTON v. MARTIN, 52 N. Y. 574.

<sup>195</sup> WORTH v. CASE, 42 N. Y. 367.

<sup>196</sup> Edw. Bills & N. § 243; Daniel, Neg. Inst. 68, and cases cited; Earl v. Peck, 64 N. Y. 596.

livered to be held in escrow by a third party, and wrongly passed on by him, is subject to defenses, even in the hands of a purchaser for value without notice, but a negotiable instrument is not.<sup>197</sup> A deed being delivered conditionally to the obligee, parol evidence that it was conditional is admissible.<sup>198</sup>

A delivery upon a condition is where the instrument is delivered to the payee, to be held by him pending some future event. It is explained in *Juilliard v. Chaffee*.<sup>199</sup> There Judge Danforth collates the authorities, and deduces the rule that a party sued by his promisee may always show that the instrument was delivered to the payee to take effect only on the happening of some future event, or that its design and object were different from the effect of its language if taken alone.<sup>200</sup> In that case, as the note did not indicate all the agreement, it was held the full purpose of its execution might be shown. So in *BENTON v. MARTIN*,<sup>201</sup> the law was laid down that conditions might be affixed to the delivery of a note in the hands of a payee, which, as between the immediate parties, would be binding, and a defense. This does not apply to the bona fide holder.<sup>202</sup> But the authorities are not unanimous, many cases holding that the delivery cannot be upon condition, or in escrow, to the payee himself.<sup>203</sup>

<sup>197</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 68; *VALLETT v. PARKER*, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 615; *FEARING v. CLARK*, 16 Gray (Mass.) 74; *Garner v. Flite*, 93 Ala. 405, 9 South. 367; *GRAFF v. LOGUE*, 61 Iowa, 704, 17 N. W. 171. *CHIPMAN v. TUCKER*, 38 Wis. 43, contra.

<sup>198</sup> *Couch v. Meeker*, 2 Conn. 302; *Prutsman v. Baker*, 30 Wis. 644.

<sup>199</sup> 92 N. Y. 529.

<sup>200</sup> *Seymour v. Cowing*, 40 N. Y. 532; *Eastman v. Shaw*, 65 N. Y. 522; *Blossom v. Griffin*, 13 N. Y. 569; *Hutchins v. Hebbard*, 34 N. Y. 24; *Barker v. Bradley*, 42 N. Y. 316; *Grierson v. Mason*, 60 N. Y. 394; *Chapin v. Dobson*, 78 N. Y. 75; *Crosman v. Feller*, 17 Pick. 171; *Watkins v. Bowers*, 119 Mass. 383; *Brown v. St. Charles*, 66 Mich. 71, 32 N. W. 926; *Burke v. Dulaney*, 153 U. S. 228, 14 Sup. Ct. 816.

<sup>201</sup> 52 N. Y. 570.

<sup>202</sup> See § 93 et seq., post. Note, also, *Bookstaver v. Jayne*, 60 N. Y. 146.

<sup>203</sup> *STEWART v. ANDERSON*, 59 Ind. 375; *Clanin v. Machine Co.*, 118 Ind. 372, 21 N. E. 35; *JONES v. SHAW*, 67 Mo. 667; *Carter v. Moulton*, 51 Kan. 9, 32 Pac. 633. See 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 205.

**DATE.**

**38. A date in a bill or note is not necessary to its validity.**

The date of an instrument is not so necessary to it in law, that its absence avoids the instrument. It is not an essential characteristic of the instrument, as other qualities are characteristic of the instrument or of its negotiability.<sup>204</sup> For this reason the date may be supplied by parol,<sup>205</sup> the date of delivery being the day of date; or it may be antedated or postdated,<sup>206</sup> or, if the date be left blank, all parties are deemed to consent that the holder may fill up the blank with a date.<sup>207</sup> Legally speaking, the chief importance of a date is that it is presumptive evidence of the time of its actual execution, a presumption, however, which may be contradicted by parol evidence.<sup>208</sup> Likewise the place of date is supposed to be contemplated by the parties as the place of payment,<sup>209</sup> because, in the absence of all other guides to any information on this point, the courts turn to the instrument itself, and say the place of date is probably the place of residence of the parties, and it is reasonable to suppose that the parties contemplated the place of their resi-

<sup>204</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 25, subd. 1.

<sup>205</sup> COWING v. ALTMAN, 71 N. Y. 441; Davis v. Jones, 25 Law J. C. P. 91.

<sup>206</sup> PASMORE v. NORTH, 13 East, 517; Frazier v. Trow's Printing & Book-binding Co., 24 Hun, 281; Gray v. Wood, 2 Har. & J. 328; McSHARRAN v. NEELEY, 91 Pa. St. 17; ALMICH v. DOWNEY, 45 Minn. 460, 48 N. W. 197. See Neg. Inst. L. § 31. Cf. § 36, subd. 3.

<sup>207</sup> Knisely v. Sampson, 100 Ill. 574; MITCHELL v. CULVER, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 336. See Neg. Inst. L. § 32. As to filling blanks, post, p. 258.

<sup>208</sup> Germania Bank v. Distler, 4 Hun, 633, affirmed in 64 N. Y. 642; DRAKE v. ROGERS, 32 Me. 524; BREWSTER v. McCARDELL, 8 Wend. 479. See Neg. Inst. L. § 30.

<sup>209</sup> The dating of a promissory note is prima facie evidence of the place of payment, as it is presumptive evidence that the maker resides at the place of date. Where the maker is known to have a residence which is not changed when the note is payable, a regular demand must be made, regardless of the place of date. TAYLOR v. SNYDER, 3 Denio, 145; see, also, BANK OF ORLEANS v. WHITTEMORE, 12 Gray, 469. As to the presumption raised by the date as to the maker's residence, see Smith v. Philbrick, 10 Gray, 252; Demond v. Burnham, 133 Mass. 339.

dence as the place where the instrument was to be paid. It becomes important sometimes in determining whether the instrument is a foreign or inland bill or note,<sup>210</sup> and where presentment and demand are to be made, or where notices of dishonor are to be sent, and questions of that character.<sup>211</sup> These remarks are to be understood with some limitations. The date of a completed instrument cannot be changed unless by mutual consent without avoiding it.<sup>212</sup> Neither must it be understood that dating a note at a particular place makes that place the one at which payment should be demanded. It does not.<sup>213</sup> It merely is a presumption to guide the court. And, lastly, in practical affairs an instrument without date will not circulate, because neither banks nor merchants will discount it. The date, in most instances, determines when the instrument is to be paid. And unless it has a date, or one is agreed upon and inserted, it is impracticable as a circulating medium.

#### VALUE RECEIVED.

### 39. Value received is not necessary to be expressed in a negotiable instrument.

The expression "value received" is an acknowledgment of the receipt of a consideration sufficient *prima facie* to support the contract, and make it a binding promise for the payment of money. It raises the various questions relating to consideration, which, so far as they pertain to the circulation of the instrument, are commented upon hereafter.<sup>214</sup> In itself, with bills it means that a con-

<sup>210</sup> Ante, p. 24.

<sup>211</sup> STEWART v. EDEN, 2 Caines, 121

<sup>212</sup> See § 105, post. where a note is intended to bear date as of its execution, but is wrongly dated by mistake, the mistake may be corrected, except as to an innocent purchaser who would be prejudiced. ALMICH v. DOWNEY, 45 Minn. 460, 48 N. W. 197.

<sup>213</sup> ANDERSON v. DRAKE, 14 Johns. 114. It is held in this case that where a note is not made payable at a particular place, and the owner has a known and permanent residence within the state, the holder is bound to make a demand at such residence in order to charge the indorser. Whoever takes such note is presumed to have made inquiry for the residence of the maker in order to know where to demand payment.

<sup>214</sup> See post, § 111. et seq.

sideration has been received by the drawer of the payee, or by the acceptor of the drawer, according as the bill has or has not been accepted.<sup>215</sup> With notes it implies a consideration received by the maker.<sup>216</sup> Indorsers, from the mere fact of their indorsement, are deemed to have received a consideration, each indorser from his immediate indorsee.<sup>217</sup> And thus the instrument in its circulation bears upon itself *prima facie* proof of a consideration received by any of the parties against whom it is sought to be enforced. The student must, however, note that, although these words are well-nigh universal in negotiable bills and notes, they are in no wise necessary to them.<sup>218</sup> Their omission is unimportant, because the negotiable instrument itself imports a consideration. A mere production of the instrument on a trial is *prima facie* proof of the fact that it was given for a sufficient consideration.<sup>219</sup> The courts of New York in a late decision<sup>220</sup> have declared that this rule applies to certain classes of non-negotiable promissory notes, or at least to that class which import an absolute promise to pay money, but without words of negotiability. It is hard to say what effect

<sup>215</sup> GRANT v. DA COSTA, 3 Maule & S. 351; BENJAMIN v. TILLMAN, 2 McLean, 213, Fed. Cas. No. 1,304; Highmore v. Primrose, 5 Maule & S. 65; Thurman v. Van Brunt, 19 Barb. 409.

<sup>216</sup> Clayton v. Gosling, 5 Barn. & C. 361, 8 Dowl. & R. 110.

<sup>217</sup> Edw. Neg. Inst. § 439; Chit. Bills, 69; Story, Prom. Notes, 7, 81.

<sup>218</sup> Underhill v. Phillips, 10 Hun, 591; Arnold v. Sprague, 34 Vt. 402; People v. McDermott, 8 Cal. 288; JENNISON v. STAFFORD, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 168; DEAN v. CARRUTH, 108 Mass. 242. This case holds that in an action on a promissory note the plaintiff sustains the burden of proof by producing the note and proving its execution. It is evidence under the hand of the promisor of a contract made upon a good consideration, even if the words "value received" are omitted. TOWNSEND v. DERBY, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 363; HATCH v. TRAYES, 11 Adol. & E. 702; FRANKLIN v. MARCH, 6 N. H. 364. See Neg. Inst. L. § 25, subd. 2.

<sup>219</sup> Underhill v. Phillips, 10 Hun (N. Y.) 591; KIMBALL v. HUNTINGTON, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 675; TOWNSEND v. DERBY, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 363.

<sup>220</sup> CARNWRIGHT v. GRAY, 27 N. E. 835, 127 N. Y. 92. Post, pp. 205-274. See, also, CARVER v. HAYES, 47 Me. 257; FRANKLIN v. MARCH, 6 N. H. 364. Here the action was upon this instrument: "Good to R. C. or order for \$30, borrowed money." And it was held that in this case the note "shows that it is founded upon a sufficient consideration, it purporting on its face to have been given for money borrowed; and 'good to R. C. or order' is equivalent to a promise to pay R. C. or order."



this decision will have upon the rule that in case of a non-negotiable instrument, unless a consideration appeared upon the face of the instrument, and prima facie evidence was thus created by an admission upon the instrument itself, a consideration must be proved.<sup>221</sup> But it will perhaps be the case that, except in absolute promises for the payment of money, the latter rule will still prevail.

#### DAYS OF GRACE.

**40. Days of grace are days added to the nominal time of payment of all bills or notes except those impliedly or expressly payable on demand, and are computed by excluding the day of date and including the day of payment.**

Originally, days of grace were days allowed the drawee or acceptor of a foreign bill by the holder to enable him to provide funds to meet the bill. They were days obtained by the drawee or acceptor through the grace of the holder. This was first custom, then law. These days are now extended to cases of negotiable inland bills and promissory notes as well as the foreign bills to which at first the custom was only appended. It extends under the common-law rules to all negotiable bills of exchange or notes,<sup>222</sup> except those wherein the instrument is made payable on demand,<sup>223</sup> or without specification of time, in which case on demand without grace is understood, or wherein grace is expressly waived. These common-law

<sup>221</sup> *AVERETT v. BOOKER*, 15 Grat. (Va.) 169; *Atkinson v. Manks*, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 691; *BILDERBACK v. BURLINGAME*, 27 Ill. 338; *JOSSELYN v. LACIER*, 10 Mod. 294, 317.

<sup>222</sup> In the case of *ORIDGE v. SHERBORNE*, which was an action on a promissory note payable in installments, it was held that the maker was entitled to the usual days of grace as each installment fell due. 11 Mees. & W. 374. And see *PERKINS v. FRANKLIN BANK*, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 483; *Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank*, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 13; *Wood v. Corl*, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 203. As to notes payable in installments, see *Coffin v. Loring*, 5 Allen (Mass.) 153. Checks are not entitled to days of grace. *ANDREW v. BLACHLY*, 11 Ohio St. 89, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 50.

<sup>223</sup> *HART v. SMITH*, 15 Ala. 807; *TRASK v. MARTIN*, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 505; *Sommerville v. Williams*, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 484. Post, p. 344.



provisions are very generally modified by the statutes of various states. In some states, too, promissory notes are not entitled to grace. The doctrine is that they, not being negotiable in themselves, but being made so by statute, are not placed upon the footing of bills of exchange, unless the statute expressly gives them all the privileges of negotiability. But where the statute does place notes on the footing of bills of exchange, then grace follows as a matter of course. For the same reason non-negotiable instruments, unless by statute placed on the footing of negotiable instruments, are not entitled to grace.<sup>224</sup>

The number of days allowed as grace is generally three,<sup>225</sup> and is computed by adding them to the days, or months reckoned as calendar months, stipulated in the instrument.<sup>226</sup> The day of date is excluded from the calculation and the day of payment included.<sup>227</sup> This computation by months does not take into account the varying length of the month. The time reckoned in months may be longer or shorter, according as there are more or less days in the month. It also does not take into account the fact that the last day of grace happens upon a non-business day. In this last event, though in case of all non-commercial instruments the time which must expire before suit can be brought against the debtor is extended to

<sup>224</sup> Under the statute of 3 & 4 Anne, notes payable to a particular person, without "order," have been held entitled to grace. *SMITH v. KENDALL*, 6 Term R. 123; *Duncan v. Institution*, 10 Gill & J. (Md.) 299; *Cox v. Reinhardt*, 41 Tex. 591; *Dubuis v. Farmer*, 22 La. Ann. 478. *Luce v. Shoff*, 70 Ind. 152, contra. See *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 1057.

<sup>225</sup> *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 622. Demand of payment on negotiable bills and notes cannot be legally made until the third day of grace. *GRIFFIN v. GOFF*, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 423, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 49. In the case of *Lenox v. Roberts* it was held that demand should be made on the third day, and notice of the maker's default be posted in time to go by the mail of the day after. *Lenox v. Roberts*, 2 Wheat. 373; *Bank of Alexandria v. Swann*, 9 Pet. 33.

<sup>226</sup> *Thomas v. Shoemaker*, 6 Watts & S. 179; *McMurchy v. Robinson*, 10 Ohio, 496.

<sup>227</sup> *ROEHNER v. INSURANCE CO.*, 63 N. Y. 160; *Bellasis v. Hester*, 1 Ld. Raym. 280; *Campbell v. French*, 6 Term R. 212; *Hartford Bank v. Barry*, 17 Mass. 24; *RIPLEY v. GREENLEAF*, 2 Vt. 129; *AVERY v. STEWART*, 2 Conn. 69, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 57; *Henry v. Jones*, 8 Mass. 453; *Pearson v. Stoddard*, 9 Gray (Mass.) 199; *Wentworth v. Clap*, 11 Mass. 87.

the next succeeding business day,<sup>228</sup> yet with negotiable instruments, under the common law, grace is not extended in this way. With them the days of grace end on the next preceding business day, because the debtor cannot compel the creditor to extend the indulgence which a custom of doubtful advantage has already attached to the paper.<sup>229</sup> This rule has been wisely modified by the statutes of many jurisdictions, where the day of payment has been declared to be the next succeeding secular or business day.<sup>230</sup> But, in the absence of any express statute, it is generally understood that the common-law rule would prevail. It is to be observed that by the Negotiable Instruments Law, as it has been enacted in most states, days of grace have been abolished.<sup>231</sup>

<sup>228</sup> *SALTER v. BURT*, 20 Wend. 205. In this case a postdated check was payable on the day of its date, without days of grace. As it fell due on Sunday, the question arose as to whether payment should be made on the previous Saturday or the Monday following. The following is a portion of the court's opinion: "When there are no days of grace, and the time for payment or performance specified \* \* \* falls on Sunday, the debtor may, I think, discharge his obligation on the following Monday." A bill or note falling due on Sunday, without days of grace, is payable on the following day. *HIRSHFIELD v. BANK*, 83 Tex. 452, 18 S. W. 743; *Id.*, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 53; *BARRETT v. ALLEN*, 10 Ohio, 426; *AVERY v. STEWART*, 2 Conn. 69.

<sup>229</sup> *BUSSARD v. LEVERING*, 6 Wheat. 121; *Reed v. Wilson*, 41 N. J. Law, 29; *KUNTZ v. TEMPLE*, 48 Mo. 78; *Farnum v. Fowle*, 12 Mass. 89; *Barker v. Parker*, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 80; *City Bank v. Cutter*, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 414.

<sup>230</sup> Rev. St. N. Y. pp. 2506, 2507.

<sup>231</sup> Section 145. Cf. §§ 5, 146.

### CHAPTER III.

#### ACCEPTANCE OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE

- 41. Definition.
- 42-45. Acceptance According to Tenor.
- 46. Who may Accept.
- 47. Delivery.
- 48-49. Forms and Varieties of Acceptance.
- 50. Implied Acceptance.
- 51-52. Acceptance on Separate Paper.
- 53. Parol Acceptance of a Bill.
- 54-54a. Acceptance for Honor or Supra Protest.
- 55. Time Allowed for Acceptance.

#### DEFINITION.

**41. An acceptance is an undertaking by the drawee to pay the bill when due.\***

It will perhaps help the student to understand the theory of acceptance to present it to him as a phase of the elementary theoretical notion of a contract as constituted by an offer and acceptance.

The acceptance is the assent to the proposition contained in the draft, which on its part is an offer, and which offer and assent, taken together, constitute a contract right or relation. In its practical aspect as a contract, it obviates the transfer of cash by means of credit. In the illustration under § 10, C. owed A. A., we may assume, says to B, "Give me cash for my debt, and treat the debt itself as cash." B agrees to this proposition, and A gives, as an evidence of the transfer of the debt to B, the ordinary draft, making him the payee. B then turns over this evidence of indebtedness, and the right of action along with it, to D, and D, on his part, to E. E now comes with the paper to C. At this point the relation of the parties is as follows: The right A had to the debt of C is now held by E in the shape of a piece of commercial paper, which E is about to present to C. A is liable to B for the £1,000 B paid A;

\*See Neg. Inst. L. § 220.

B, on his part, is liable to D for the £1,000 paid by D to B; and D to E. As yet C owes nothing to B, D, or E, and he only owes A for the debt he owed him in the first place. The paper in E's hands has been passing from hand to hand, and used for the payment of debts, and accepted as such upon the supposed solvency of each person who has held and indorsed it. C now says, "Yes, I will pay this £1,000"; and evidences his assent by writing on the bill "Accepted" over his own signature. At that moment he enters into a contract relation with the holder of the bill, and also with the various indorsers, that he will pay the bill.<sup>1</sup> In other words, C promises B, D, and E, and each of them severally, that he will pay £1,000 to the holder. Thus, B, D, and E may look to either C or A for the £1,000 they have expended, but the condition implied is that B, D, and E, inasmuch as they have paid A for C's debt, will look to C to pay first, and, if C does not pay, then they will look to A. This is the practical aspect of the theory of acceptance.

It follows that the drawee, until acceptance, is a stranger to the bill.<sup>2</sup> In *Swope v. Ross* the drawee, who had not accepted a bill, discounted it before maturity, and the argument was that, in thus cashing it, he had paid it. But the court said it was neither acceptance nor was it payment, unless such was the express intention of the parties. So that if a drawee receives and discounts a bill for the drawer, and then discounts it away, the drawer, and not the acceptor, is the person who must ultimately pay the bill.<sup>3</sup> But the drawee, upon acceptance, in the order of liability, becomes the principal debtor. He is precisely like the maker of a promissory note. This means that all parties may look to him to pay the instrument;

<sup>1</sup> The acceptance is probably not complete, however, until delivery. Post, p. 88. As to an acceptance being irrevocable, see *TRENT TILE CO. v. BANK*, 54 N. J. Law, 33, 23 Atl. 423, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 87.

<sup>2</sup> *SWOPE v. ROSS*, 40 Pa. St. 186; *Chapman v. White*, 6 N. Y. 412; *Bellamy v. Majoribanks*, 8 Eng. Law & Eq. 523; *Mandeville v. Welch*, 5 Wheat. 277; *ATTENBOROUGH v. MACKENZIE*, 36 Eng. Law & Eq. 562; *DESHA v. STEWART*, 6 Ala. 852; *Tyler v. Gould*, 48 N. Y. 682; *Bullard v. Randall*, 1 Gray (Mass.) 605; *Tiernan v. Jackson*, 5 Pet. 580.

<sup>3</sup> *Chapman v. White*, 6 N. Y. 412; *Winter v. Drury*, 5 N. Y. 525; *Duncan v. Berlin*, 60 N. Y. 151.

that no demand need be made of him; and that notice of dishonor to him is unnecessary,—all matters of moment in business affairs.\*

With these shifts of liability on the part of the drawee before and after acceptance, there is a corresponding change of liability on the part of the drawer. If the drawee refuses to accept, after having promised so to do, the drawer may either sue him directly upon the promise for all loss occasioned,<sup>5</sup> or he may fall back upon their original relation for his remedy. If it was debt, as in the case we put, he must sue on the indebtedness. If the drawer had deposited funds, he must demand them, and, on refusal, sue in tort or for conversion. In such a case, too, as we have already shown, all prior parties must look to the drawer to be repaid the moneys they have expended on taking the bill. The drawer remains, at all times, the principal debtor on the bill. On the other hand, upon acceptance the drawer is relieved from primary liability upon the bill, and stands as to the other parties to the instrument in a relation somewhat akin to a guarantor, or, as it is accurately put, in the position of first indorser. He is liable to pay the bill if the acceptor does not. A glance at the example will show the fairness of this. A received from B cash for a debt C promised to pay; B received cash from D; and D from E. If C fails in his promise, the cash received should be refunded in the order it was paid. This would leave the controversy as it ought to be between C and A.

So far as classification is concerned, acceptances may be classified according to their essential elements, and according to their technical form. In their essential elements, acceptances are analogous to the acceptances of offers in ordinary contract law. As with the acceptance of the offer in the ordinary contract,<sup>6</sup> the accept-

\* WALLACE v. McCONNELL, 13 Pet. 136, which contains cases on this point; Foden v. Sharp, 4 Johns. 183; Wolcott v. Van Santvoord, 17 Johns. 247; RUSSELL v. PHILLIPS, 14 Q. B. 891; Jarvis v. Wilson, 46 Conn. 90; COX v. BANK, 100 U. S. 712.

<sup>5</sup> Ilsley v. Jones, 12 Gray (Mass.) 260; RIGGS v. LINDSAY, 7 Cranch, 500; Van Wart v. Woolley, 5 Dowl. & R. 374; ALLEN v. SUYDAM, 20 Wend. 321; Barney v. Newcomb, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 46.

<sup>6</sup> Potts v. Whitehead, 23 N. J. Eq. 512; Ellason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 225; Eads v. City of Carondelet, 42 Mo. 113; Corcoran v. White, 117 Ill. 118, 7 N. E. 525; Slebold v. Davis, 67 Iowa, 560, 25 N. W. 778; Northwestern Iron Co. v. Meade, 21 Wis. 474; Clark, Cont. p. 36.

ance of the bill of exchange must, in every respect, meet and correspond with the terms contained in the bill itself. It must neither fall within or go beyond these terms, but must exactly meet them at all points.<sup>7</sup> In technical phrase, it must be according to the tenor of the bill. Again, as with the ordinary contract,<sup>8</sup> an offer made to one person cannot be accepted by another. The drawee, or some person who, in view of law, is the same as the drawee, must be the acceptor.<sup>9</sup> In their technical form, acceptances may be express or constructive, oral or written.<sup>10</sup> Express acceptances are those expressed in the words of the drawee; constructive, those implied from his acts. Written acceptances are assents written either upon the bill itself, or upon a piece of paper separate from the bill. The common, general principles governing the detail of form of a written acceptance are that it need not be dated; it may be accepted by the drawee in any name he chooses to adopt;<sup>11</sup> it may be placed upon a bill before it has been signed by the drawer, or while otherwise incomplete,<sup>12</sup> or after it is overdue, or after dishonor. With these general observations as to the nature and form of acceptances, let us turn and examine more carefully their specific details.

<sup>7</sup> See post, § 42.

<sup>8</sup> *Price v. Easton*, 4 Barn. & Adol. 433; *Leake, Cont.* 481; *Tuttle v. Catlin*, 1 D. Chp. 366; *Rossman v. Townsend*, 17 Wis. 95; *Ross v. Milne*, 12 Leigh, 204; *Ellison v. Jackson Water Co.*, 12 Cal. 542; *Seaman v. Whitney*, 24 Wend. 260; *Fugure v. Mutual Soc. of St. Joseph*, 46 Vt. 362; *Haskett v. Flint*, 5 Blackf. 69; *Clark, Cont.* p. 508.

<sup>9</sup> See post, § 46.

<sup>10</sup> *STURGES v. BANK*, 75 Ill. 595, *Johns. Cas. Bills & N.* 69; *Dull v. Bricker*, 76 Pa. St. 255; *Averill v. Wood*, 78 Mich. 342, 44 N. W. 381; *Peterson v. Hubbard*, 28 Mich. 197; *Grant v. Shaw*, 16 Mass. 341; *WELLS v. BRIGHAM*, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 6.

<sup>11</sup> *Lindus v. Bradwell*, 5 C. B. 591; *ALABAMA COAL MIN. CO. v. BRAINARD*, 35 Ala. 476; *Nicholls v. Diamond*, 9 Exch. 154.

<sup>12</sup> *London & Southwestern Bank v. Wentworth*, 5 Exch. Div. 96; *HARVEY v. CANE*, 34 Law T. (N. S.) 64.

**ACCEPTANCE ACCORDING TO TENOR.**

**42.** The acceptance must be absolute and according to the tenor of the bill to bind all the parties to it.

**43. THE TENOR OF THE BILL**—Is the request in the bill to pay the money at the time and place and in the manner mentioned in it. A change in the acceptance in any one of these respects renders the acceptance “qualified.”

**44.** The payment of the bill by the acceptor may be made dependent on a condition. It is then called “conditional” acceptance.

**45.** A qualified or a conditional acceptance is only valid—

(a) As to all parties subsequent to the acceptance.

(b) As to all prior parties who, upon due notice, assent.

The general principle is that, for an instrument or an act to be an acceptance, it must be according to the tenor of the bill.<sup>18</sup> The promise must be to pay all the money called for in the bill, for, if a bill be accepted for only part of that sum, it would result in splitting up the right of action on the bill, part being chargeable to the acceptor, and part to the drawer; it would necessitate a partial protest for non-acceptance and for non-payment; and lastly, on payment, the drawee would be entitled to demand the possession of the bill, and his possession of it would be presumptive evidence of the payment of the whole bill, though he has in fact paid only part of it. These, of course, are grave reasons against such an instrument acting as a circulating medium. So, also, equally grave business objections exist against modifying the assent to the bill,

<sup>18</sup> *WEGERSLOFFE v. KEENE*, 1 Strange, 214; *BOEHM v. GARCIA*, 1 Camp. 425, note. This was on a bill, “payable in effective and not in vals reals.” The drawee offered to accept payable in vals denaros, but this was refused. It was held that the plaintiff had a right to so refuse, and that the proposed acceptance was not a sufficient acceptance of a bill drawn as was this one. The acceptance should have been general. *GIBSON v. SMITH*, 75 Ga. 84; *Shackelford v. Hooker*, 54 Miss. 716. In *PETIT v. BENSON*, the acceptance

as to the time, place, or manner of its payment, or making its payment conditional. For if, in the illustration under § 10, the bill was a 6-months bill, and B, D, and E were indorsers upon it, and the bill were payable in Jamaica, B, D, and E, as indorsers, might make all their calculations to pay the money at that time and place if C, the acceptor, did not. It would therefore be an injustice and hardship to B, D, and E if C were to accept the bill in three months, payable at London, England, because, if C did not pay at that time and place, the holder might sue B, D, and E, who had every right to expect that they would not be called upon to pay until after the expiration of 6 months, and then at Jamaica. Thus such a rule is necessary to protect the other parties to the bill who act as sureties or guarantors. And, taking all things into consideration, it is wiser to disallow than to allow them.

But the student must not understand that such acceptances in themselves are bad. They promise to pay the bill. They create contract rights upon the consideration which would have rendered the acceptance, had it been given in the ordinary form, binding. They are contracts valid, but so inconsistent with the contracts of the indorsers acting as sureties or guarantors that they are impracticable and hence not allowed to be enforced. Where, however, they do not prejudice the rights of the indorsers, or in other words, where the modification of the tenor of the bill is such that it either casts no hardship upon the indorser, or where the indorser or parties prior to the acceptor know of the modification and assent to it, there the reason for rejecting it as a form of acceptance ceases to exist, and so the rule is that a modified or qualified acceptance if immaterial, or if known and assented to, is a valid acceptance.<sup>14</sup> If it

was, "I do accept this bill to be paid half in money and half in bills." It was held that a partial acceptance would charge the acceptor, but also that it might be refused and protested by the one to whom the bill was due, so as to charge the first drawer. Comb. 452. In an action upon a bill of exchange, it was held that, where the day of payment was past at the time of acceptance, an agreement to pay *secundum tenorem et effectum billæ* was equivalent to a general acceptance, for the reason that it was then impossible to pay as is directed in the bill. JACKSON v. PIGOTT, 1 Ld. Raym. 364; Ford v. Angelrodt, 37 Mo. 50, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 76; SWOPE v. ROSS, 40 Pa. St. 186. See Neg. Inst. L. § 220.

<sup>14</sup> In SMITH v. ABBOTT the defendant accepted a bill to pay when the



is a material alteration of the terms of the bill, and is not known and assented to, then it is invalid. If the modification is known and assented to, then the parties enter into a new contract. Parties subsequent to the modified acceptance of course enter into the contract on the basis of the acceptance as modified and are bound by it. Parties prior to it, who assent, waive their right to object and create as against themselves a right in the holder akin to an estoppel. The materiality of an alteration in the tenor of the bill is well brought out in two cases, one of which was where the draft was addressed to Cobourg, and accepted payable at Port Hope, a town some miles distant;<sup>15</sup> in the other, where the bill was drawn payable in New York generally, and accepted payable "at Continental Bank, New York." \* In this last case the fixing or designating a specific place in the city to which the bill was addressed was no hardship,—no material change; while compelling an indorser to be ready at some distant place was a hardship and a material change.

There is a further distinction maintained by the authorities, which is perhaps rather of form than of substance. Where the acceptance varies the offer contained in the bill as to the time, place, or mode of payment, it is a qualified acceptance.<sup>16</sup> Where, however, a variation is introduced into the acceptance of the bill in the na-

goods for which it was drawn were sold. As the plaintiff submitted, this was held good, though the plaintiff might have refused such acceptance, and have protested the bill. 2 Strange, 1152. In *WALKER v. ATWOOD* a bill without a day of payment was accepted by the drawee to be paid on a certain date after it was presented. Although bills without such date when payable are due at sight, in an action against the acceptor the acceptance was held good. Yet by the acquiescence of the holder in the qualified acceptance prior holders would have been discharged. 11 Mod. 190. *Shackelford v. Hooker*, 54 Miss. 716, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 78. "An acceptance is either general or qualified. A general acceptance assents without qualification to the order of the drawer. A qualified acceptance in express terms varies the effect of the bill as drawn." Neg. Inst. L. § 227.

<sup>15</sup> *NIAGARA DIST. BANK v. MANUFACTURING CO.*, 31 Barb. 403. But see *Brown v. Jones*, 125 Ind. 375, 25 N. E. 375.

\* *TROY CITY BANK v. LAUMAN*, 19 N. Y. 477. "An acceptance to pay at a particular place is a general acceptance, unless it expressly states that the bill is to be paid there only, and not elsewhere." Neg. Inst. L. § 228. "An acceptance is qualified which is \* \* \* local; that is to say, an acceptance to pay only at a particular place." etc. Id. § 229.

<sup>16</sup> Byles, Bills, 316; Story, Bills, § 204; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 515.

ture of a condition, the acceptance is called "conditional." † In the last class of cases the plaintiff as a part of his case must show that the condition has been performed before the liability of the acceptor can be deemed to have accrued.<sup>17</sup> A common example of this is an acceptance to pay "when in funds,"<sup>18</sup> which means that when the acceptor has cash which the drawer has a right to demand and receive he will then pay the bill.<sup>19</sup> This manner of acceptance, as well as the qualified one, creates a new contract, and is governed by the rules and reasons we have just laid down. The holder may elect to reject it altogether, and at once give notice either of non-acceptance or of protest, or he may, if willing to accept the offer, give notice to prior parties, and they in turn may assent to it, and thus become bound.\* This is, however, not always the rule with regard to the drawer as a prior party. If, as is sometimes the case, the drawer makes a draft upon a drawee without having a right to do so, there is no more reason why the courts should release him from his contract than that they should seek to protect him by giving him notice of dishonor in case of a refusal to accept or to pay. In both cases the holder is injured by the act of the drawer, and in both cases the drawer is held bound.<sup>20</sup>

† Neg. Inst. L. § 229, classes qualified acceptances as (1) conditional; (2) partial; (3) local; (4) qualified as to time; and (5) where the acceptance is of some, but not all, of the drawees.

<sup>17</sup> Gammon v. Schmoll, 5 Taunt. 344; Nagle v. Homer, 8 Cal. 358; Read v. Wilkinson, 2 Wash. C. C. 514, Fed. Cas. No. 11,611; Gooding v. Underwood, 89 Mich. 187, 50 N. W. 818; Ferguson v. Davis, 65 Mich. 677, 32 N. W. 892; STORER v. LOGAN, 9 Mass. 55.

<sup>18</sup> SMITH v. ABBOTT, supra; Marshall v. Clary, 44 Ga. 513.

<sup>19</sup> WINTERMUTE v. POST, 24 N. J. Law, 420; Campbell v. Pettengill, 7 Greenl. (Me.) 126; Owen v. Lavine, 14 Ark. 389.

\* "When the drawer or an indorser receives notice of a qualified acceptance, he must, within a reasonable time, express his dissent to the holder, or he will be deemed to have assented thereto." Neg. Inst. L. § 230.

<sup>20</sup> Daniel. Neg. Inst. § 511.

### WHO MAY ACCEPT.

46. The only person permitted by the law merchant to be an acceptor is the person to whom the bill is addressed. Another person is liable only upon a collateral undertaking.

#### EXCEPTION—An acceptor for honor.

The arbitrary custom of merchants is said by the courts to be the reason of this rule.† Though it is not the language of the courts, yet it so coincides with the fundamental theory of contracts that we add as an additional reason that no person other than the drawee can be acceptor, because such a person would be in a measure a stranger to the contract.<sup>21</sup> He is not, as appears from the face of the instrument, indebted to, nor has he funds of, the drawer. It is true, his intention may have been to signify to the parties to the bill that he was willing to pay and would pay the instrument. But he was not the person to whom the proposition or on whom the order was made. He was not a party to the contract. If the courts were to treat him as an acceptor, they would make a contract for the drawer with a party with whom, as far as it can be gathered from the bill, the drawer had no intention of contracting. This, though somewhat vaguely stated, seems to be the underlying principle in *Walker v. Bank of State of New York*.<sup>22</sup> In that case the bill was addressed to Mr. E. C. Hamilton, of New York, and was "accepted payable at American Ex. Bank. [Signed] Empire Mills. By E. C. Hamilton, Treas." The question was whether this was an acceptance, and the court said this was an acceptance of the Empire Mills, not a party to the contract. This point is brought out more clearly in some of the English cases. In *Jackson v. Hudson*<sup>23</sup> a bill was addressed to Mr. L. Irving, and accepted, "L. Irving. Joseph Hudson." This was a case for sale of goods to Irving. Hud-

† See Neg. Inst. L. § 220.

<sup>21</sup> *Heenan v. Nash*, 8 Minn. 407 (Gil. 363), *Johns. Cas. Bills & N.* 63; *RA BORG v. PEYTON*, 2 Wheat. 385.

<sup>22</sup> *WALKER v. BANK*, 13 Barb. 636; *Id.*, 9 N. Y. 582.

<sup>23</sup> *JACKSON v. HUDSON*, 2 Camp. 447.

son accepted, by way of making the acceptance doubly sure. But Lord Ellenborough said Hudson's undertaking was a collateral one. Yet, whatever its effect, it was not an acceptance.<sup>24</sup> This rule is subject to exceptions, to some of which we have before called attention. We have seen that if it were clear to whom the bill is meant to be addressed, and the acceptance is made by such a person, then the acceptance is sufficient. This is based upon the case of *Gray v. Milner*,<sup>25</sup> where an instrument was addressed "Payable at No. 1 Wilmot St.," and the words "Accepted, Charles Milner," were treated as a proper acceptance, because such an address could only mean the person residing there. This rule has been followed in this country, and it is now probably the law. In addition to this exception, there are others. A draft may be accepted by some drawee other than the one named, provided in the draft there was a misnomer as to the drawee and it was accepted by the person to whom it was intended to be addressed.<sup>27</sup> The acceptor for honor—a branch of this subject to be discussed later on—is also a modification of this rule. Besides these instances, an agent may accept for and in the name of the principal,<sup>28</sup> but not in his own name, because that is his individual acceptance, and not the acceptance of the drawee.<sup>29</sup> If the bill be addressed to the agent, he cannot accept

<sup>24</sup> *DAVIS v. CLARKE*, 6 Q. B. 16. In this case the maker drew a bill of exchange payable to himself or order, and addressed also to himself, and a third party wrote his name under the word "Accepted." It was held that such third party could not be sued as an acceptor, on the ground that he was not the acceptor of a bill of exchange directed to him. See, also, *MAY v. KELLY*, 27 Ala. 497; *Steele v. McKinlay*, 43 Law T. (N. S.) 358; *WALTON v. WILLIAMS*, 44 Ala. 347.

<sup>25</sup> *GRAY v. MILNER*, 8 Taunt. 739. See criticism of this case, ante, p. 58.

<sup>27</sup> *Hascall v. Life Ass'n*, 5 Hun, 151.

<sup>28</sup> Thom. Bills, 211.

<sup>29</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 487. A bill was directed to an unincorporated company, and was accepted for it by one of its members, who signed as manager. In an action on this it was claimed that such acceptance did not bind the party accepting, because he had no authority. This, however, was held not to affect his personal liability, as it was shown that he was one of those associated under the name of the company to whom the bill was directed. *OWEN v. VAN USTER*, 20 Law J. Q. P. 61. To the same purpose, see *Nicholls v. Diamond*, 9 Exch. 154.

it in behalf of his principal.<sup>80</sup> An acceptance in blank, where the bill is incomplete, and is afterwards to be filled in, is valid.<sup>81</sup>

### DELIVERY.

**47. An acceptance is probably complete only upon delivery.**

It is maintained by Professor Ames that an acceptance is complete without delivery because, as he says, the delivery of a bill or note is necessary only for the purpose of creating or transferring title;<sup>82</sup> and an acceptance has no effect upon the title to the bill, and is, therefore, complete the moment it is written upon the bill, *animo contrahendi*. In support of this position he cites *WILDE v. SHERIDAN*.<sup>83</sup> In this case the question was whether the judge of the Norfolk county court, whose jurisdiction was local and dependent upon the accrual of the cause of action within the county, had jurisdiction over a case where the defendant signed an acceptance in London, England, and sent it by mail to Norwich, Norfolk county. The court held that the contract was made in London, and not in Norwich, and therefore that the whole cause of action did not accrue within the county, and hence that the court had not jurisdiction. Lord Coleridge, referring to the argument that an acceptance was like an indorsement, distinguished the acceptance from an in-

<sup>80</sup> *Walker v. Bank*, 9 N. Y. 582.

<sup>81</sup> *LESLIE v. HASTINGS*, 1 Moody & R. 119. Defendant gave A a stamp with his acceptance in blank, authorizing A to draw for a certain sum at a specified date, and A drew the bill on the stamp accordingly. Held, in an action by the indorsee against the acceptor, that the acceptance was valid. *HOPPS v. SAVAGE*, 69 Md. 513, 16 Atl. 133. "A bill may be accepted before it has been signed by the drawer, or while otherwise incomplete." Neg. Inst. L. § 228.

<sup>82</sup> 2 Ames, Bills & N. p. 791.

<sup>83</sup> 21 Law J. Q. B. 260. See, also, *Roff v. Miller*, 19 Law J. C. P. 278; *THORNTON v. DICK*, 4 Esp. 270. In *BENTINCK v. DORRIEN*, 6 East, 199, a bill on the defendants was left by the plaintiff, who was indorsee. The defendants accepted, but on the next day canceled their acceptance, whereupon plaintiff protested for nonacceptance. It was held that, while such acceptance might be valid as to a third party, the plaintiff had, by protesting, precluded himself from claiming an acceptance.

dorsement, and said: "One purpose of an indorsement is to pass the property in the bill, and that purpose is not effected until actual or constructive delivery. But the acceptor has no property in the bill before or after acceptance. He must be supposed to receive the drawer's paper and on it write his promise without in any way altering the property in the bill. He may, indeed, before any communication to the drawer of the act done, revoke it, but his promise, unless so revoked, is complete, and takes effect from the time when it is made." The reasoning of this case cannot be reconciled with the earlier case of *COX v. TROY*,<sup>84</sup> where the indorsee of a bill left it with the drawee for acceptance, and he after writing an acceptance thereon redelivered it with the acceptance crossed out, and it was held that he was not liable as acceptor, on the ground that an acceptor was at liberty to revoke an acceptance before redelivery of the bill. The reason advanced in support of this view was the practical one that no person could be prejudiced by permitting the drawee to withdraw his acceptance before redelivery, and the law is generally laid down in accordance with *COX v. TROY*.<sup>85</sup>

#### FORMS AND VARIETIES OF ACCEPTANCE.

**48. An acceptance, if in writing, is constituted by any words from which an intention to accept can be gathered.**

**49. An acceptance, if verbal, is constituted by any words which evidence such intention clearly and unequivocally, if they be addressed to the drawer or holder, and he waive his right to a written acceptance. An acceptance may also be implied from conduct evidencing such intention.**

The foregoing principal text shows the form and varieties of acceptances. They are acceptances expressed in written or spoken words, as contrasted with each other and also with acceptances

<sup>84</sup> 5 Barn. & Ald. 474.

<sup>85</sup> *DUNAVAN v. FLYNN*, 118 Mass. 537; *Freund v. Bank*, 8 Hun (N. Y.) 689; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 637; *Daniel, Neg. Inst.* § 490. Under *Neg. Inst. L.* § 2, however, acceptance is complete without delivery, provided it be communicated.

implied from merely the conduct of the drawee. Another variety of the general class is caused by its being written on a separate piece of paper; and a third, by its being issued as a written, spoken, and implied acceptance before or after the issuing of the bill. It is our purpose to first show the underlying theory of an acceptance, and then to show the forms and general principles required for an acceptance by the law merchant.

As has been said, the acceptance is the assent of the drawee to the request of the drawer. The question, then, is, what, under the law merchant, will be deemed an evidence of such assent.<sup>36</sup> There are three general classes based upon the divisions we have given above: Acceptances in writing, acceptances by parol, and acceptances implied from conduct.

If in writing, the courts, according to Judge Cowen,<sup>37</sup> go to the length of saying that any form of words which do not in themselves negative the request of the bill shall be treated as a valid acceptance of it.<sup>38</sup> Under the common law, neither the word "Accepted" nor the signature of the acceptor is necessary. The unsigned words

<sup>36</sup> In *re Armstrong*, 41 Fed. 381; *Van Staphorst v. Pearce*, 4 Mass. 258; *Peck v. Cochran*, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 34.

<sup>37</sup> *SPEAR v. PRATT*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 582. Referring to the laxity of the courts in construing acceptances, Willes, J., said, in *SPROAT v. MATTHEWS*, 1 Term R. 185: "The court has not of late been very nice with regard to what shall be construed to be an acceptance; for though formerly it was held necessary that an acceptance should be in writing, yet of late years a parol acceptance has been deemed sufficient; and, indeed, at present almost anything amounts to an acceptance."

<sup>38</sup> Where a bill was drawn on the defendant, and he wrote across it: "Accepted. Payable at Messrs. Stevens & Co.,"—but failed to sign, it was held to amount to an acceptance. The court, in summing up, said that it was of opinion that the writing might be valid in law, though unsigned, but that whether it was intended so to operate in its unfinished condition was a question for the jury. *DUFAUR v. OXENDEN*, 1 Moody & R. 90. In an action of assumpsit by the indorsee against the acceptor, it was proved that the defendant had given a stamp, with his acceptance in blank to the drawer, and authorized him to draw at a certain date for a specific amount. It was held that there was an actual acceptance in writing, with express authority to fill in the bill in a particular manner. *LESLIE v. HASTINGS*, 1 Moody & R. 119.



"Seen,"<sup>39</sup> "Presented,"<sup>40</sup> "Honored,"<sup>41</sup> or merely the name of the drawee,<sup>42</sup> or "I will pay this bill,"<sup>43</sup> are sufficient acceptances, and evidence the fact merely that the drawee has seen the bill, and does not dissent from it. In many jurisdictions written and signed acceptances are required,\* meaning, according to the interpretation of numerous cases, that an acceptance is sufficient if it be the name of the acceptor alone, which complies with the regulation that the acceptance shall be in writing and be signed.<sup>44</sup> And every holder of a bill, presenting the same for acceptance, may require the acceptance to be written on the bill. A refusal to comply shall be deemed a refusal to accept, and the bill may be protested.

In jurisdictions where acceptances are not required to be in writ-

<sup>39</sup> *Barnet v. Smith*, 10 Fost. (N. H.) 256.

<sup>40</sup> *Para. Bills & N.* 282.

<sup>41</sup> *Anson*, Cont. 401.

<sup>42</sup> *SPEAR v. PRATT*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 582.

<sup>43</sup> *WARD v. ALLEN*, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 53.

\* The statutes differ in their provisions, some requiring the acceptance to be in writing, and others that it be in writing, and signed by the acceptor. The American statutes are collected in *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 605. The student should consult the statutes of his own state. The Negotiable Instruments Law goes far to reform and render uniform the unsatisfactory condition of the American law. It provides that "the acceptance must be in writing, and signed by the drawee" (section 220); that the holder "may require that the acceptance be written on the bill" (section 221); and that, "where an acceptance is written on a paper other than the bill itself, it does not bind the acceptor, except in favor of a person to whom it is shown, and who, on the faith thereof, receives the bill for value" (section 222). The Negotiable Instruments Law is less radical than the English Bills of Exchange Act (45 & 46 Vict. c. 61), which (section 17) provides that the acceptance must be written on the bill, and be signed by the drawee. This was a re-enactment of 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, § 6 (1856), and of 1 & 2 Geo. IV. c. 78, § 2 (1821), which, however, applied only to inland bills. The English act thus gives complete recognition to the principle that the obligation of the acceptor, like that of all other parties to negotiable paper, should appear on the bill itself. 2 *Ames, Cas. Bills & N.* 787.

<sup>44</sup> The drawee of a bill of exchange wrote his name across the face of the bill, without words of acceptance. This was held to be such an acceptance as to bind him, even though the statutory requirements were that the acceptance should be in writing, and signed. *SPEAR v. PRATT*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 582.



ing, or the statutes do not otherwise modify the common law, parol acceptances, if assented to by the holder, are permitted.<sup>45</sup> A parol acceptance is any form of words used by the drawee which by reasonable intendment can be made to signify that he honors the bill. There are some limitations to this rule. These words are to be addressed to the drawer or holder. They must be assented to by the holder.<sup>46</sup> They must relate to an existing bill, for, if they pertain to a future bill, they will not be deemed an acceptance.† They must be unequivocal, for, if they are equivocal, they will not be deemed an acceptance. In such expressions as "Your bill shall have attention," "I will pay the bill, but I cannot now," "I will give you a bill at three months,"<sup>47</sup> there is no distinct, definite promise or agreement to pay the bill. They were consequently deemed by the court too uncertain to be treated as acceptances. The point to be determined is whether, by a reasonable construction, the words used will show that the acceptor recognized an immediate obligation on the part of the drawee upon him, assented to it, and declared himself bound to the payment of it as evidenced by the bill.<sup>48</sup> Keeping in mind

<sup>45</sup> *Scudder v. Bank*, 91 U. S. 406; *STOCKWELL v. BRAMBLE*, 3 Ind. 428; *MASON v. DOUSAY*, 35 Ill. 424; *STURGES v. BANK*, 75 Ill. 595; *St. Louis Nat. Stockyards v. O'Reilly*, 85 Ill. 546; *Lumley v. Palmer*, 2 Strange, 1000; *SPROAT v. MATTHEWS*, 1 Term R. 182; *Arnold v. Sprague*, 34 Vt. 402; *MILLER v. NEIHAUS*, 51 Ind. 401; *Pierce v. Kittredge*, 115 Mass. 374.

<sup>46</sup> *Story, Bills*, §§ 242-247; *Edw. Bills & N.* §§ 416, 417; *Bayley, Bills & N. c. 6*, § 109; *JOHNSON v. COLLINGS*, 1 East, 98.

† In *JOHNSON v. COLLINGS*, the bill on which the action was brought was drawn by R. on defendant, the latter saying that if R. would draw such bill he would pay it on maturity. This bill was subsequently indorsed to plaintiffs. It was held that such mere promise to pay a nonexisting bill did not operate as an acceptance. 1 East, 98.

<sup>47</sup> *Reynolds v. Peto*, 11 Exch. 418.

<sup>48</sup> In *POWELL v. JONES*, the bill was given to the defendant for acceptance by the clerk of the plaintiff. On calling for it afterwards the defendant said: "There is your bill. It is all right." It was held—though by what was certainly a somewhat strained application of the rule—that these words did not amount to an acceptance, as they did not evidence the defendant's intention to bind himself to pay at all events. 1 Esp. 17. The words, "If you will send it to the counting house again, I will give directions for its being accepted," were held to constitute only a conditional promise, and not to

the expressions we have quoted, contrast them with such expressions as those used by the drawee in a case where a foreign bill had been protested for nonacceptance, and the drawee said, "If the bill comes back, I will pay it,"<sup>49</sup> or, in another case, where the drawee said, "Leave your bill with me, and I will accept,"<sup>50</sup> both of which expressions were held to be sufficient acceptances. In these last expressions there was a distinct promise to honor the bill. It is probably the case that, when verbal acceptances are permitted, they will at the present day be construed with extreme strictness. It is undoubtedly the common law that they are allowable.<sup>51</sup> But it is also equally true that they are not in accord with the true theory of negotiability. A bill of exchange should have all its indicia upon its face. And this rule, with every other that contravenes it, complicates business operations, and clogs the circulation of an instrument as a medium of payment.

#### SAME--IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE.

**50. AN IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE**—Is any act which clearly indicates an intention to comply with the request of the drawer, or any conduct of the drawee from which the holder is justified in drawing the conclusion that the drawee intended to accept the bill, and intended to be so understood.<sup>52</sup>

operate as an acceptance until the bill was actually sent back. *ANDERSON v. HICK*, 3 Camp. 179. Where the defendants agreed to accept as soon as the underwriters had settled a certain loss, it was held that such conditional acceptance could not be declared on as an absolute acceptance, when such contingency had actually happened. *LANGSTON v. CORNEY*, 4 Camp. 176.

<sup>49</sup> *Cox v. Coleman*, Chit. Bills, 274.

<sup>50</sup> 1 Chit. Bills, p. 12.

<sup>51</sup> In *SPAULDING v. ANDREWS*, it was shown that, shortly after a bill was drawn, the payee, who was the holder, presented it to the drawee, and received verbal assurance that it would be paid on maturity. It was held there was an acceptance good as to a third party who obtained the bill after such parol acceptance, though he did not know of the acceptance, and that it made no difference as to when a parol acceptance was made, if after the bill was drawn. 48 Pa. St. 411.

<sup>52</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 499; 1 Pars. Notes & B. 287.

An implied acceptance is equally open to the objections we have made to the verbal acceptance, though the doctrine of constructive or implied acceptance is in itself consistent with justice. Its limits are not exactly defined. It may arise where the bill is detained for a long time, contrary to the usage of the parties, or withheld upon the understanding that the drawee is to accept.<sup>54</sup> Where, however, the detention is not contrary to the usual dealings between the parties, or is due to the fact that the holder failed to call for it, the doctrine does not apply.<sup>55</sup> And in general it may be said that mere retention cannot amount to acceptance.<sup>56</sup> This follows from the fact that, where there is no usage of the parties to the contrary, it is the duty of the holder to call or send for the bill, and hence no implication of acceptance can arise from the failure of the drawee to return. A fortiori, a refusal to return can give rise to no such implication, since the refusal plainly negatives an intention to accept. The same remark applies to the destruction of the bill, which, like refusal to return on demand, amounts to a conversion, but cannot, on any sound principle, imply an acceptance.<sup>57</sup> In some states,

<sup>54</sup> *HALL v. STEEL*, 68 Ill. 231; *Hough v. Loring*, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 254; *Nason v. Barff*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 26; *Koch v. Howell*, 6 Watts & S. 350.

<sup>55</sup> *Overman v. Hoboken City Bank*, 30 N. J. Law, 61.

<sup>56</sup> *JEUNE v. WARD*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 653; *DUNAVAN v. FLYNN*, 118 Mass. 537, per Gray, C. J.; *HOLBROOK v. PAYNE*, 151 Mass. 383, 24 N. E. 210; *Colorado Nat. Bank v. Boettcher*, 5 Colo. 190; *Overman v. Bank*, 31 N. J. Law, 564.

<sup>57</sup> *JEUNE v. WARD*, *supra*. Here the drawee, after refusing to accept, destroyed the bill, and it was held, Lord Ellenborough dissenting, that this did not amount to an acceptance. Bayley, J., said: "Where a bill is, in the usual course of business, left for acceptance, it is the duty of the party who leaves it to call again for it, and to inquire whether it has been accepted or not. \* \* \* I forbear to say, at present, what would be my judgment on the effect of a destruction of the instrument, by the party with whom it was left for acceptance, within the reasonable time during which the other party might expect an acceptance of the bill. If a party says he has destroyed the bill, and that he will not accept it, such destruction might probably subject him to an action of trover for the bill; but I cannot think it would amount to an acceptance of it. For, what is an acceptance? It is an engagement of the one party acceding to the proposition of the other; and it would be very strange, indeed, if a refusal on his part could in law be deemed an acceding to the proposition." This case in effect overruled *HARVEY v*

however, it is provided by statute that if the drawee destroys the bill, or refuses within 24 hours after delivery, or within such other period as the holder may allow, to return the bill accepted or non accepted, he will be deemed to have accepted.<sup>58</sup> Such is the provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law.<sup>59</sup> Under a former New York statute to this effect it was held that the statute did not cover the case of a mere failure to return, but referred to something of a tortious character, implying an unauthorized conversion of the bill.\*

#### **SAME—ACCEPTANCE ON SEPARATE PAPER.**

51. If the bill is in existence, for the convenience of business the acceptance may be on a separate paper, but the promise must be clear and unequivocal.

52. If the bill is not in existence, for the convenience of business the acceptance may be on a separate paper. Its elements are:

- (a) That the contemplated drawee shall describe the bill to be drawn, and promise to accept it.
- (b) That the bill shall be drawn in a reasonable time after such promise is written.
- (c) That the holder shall take the bill upon the credit of the promise.

Acceptances on a separate paper are of two classes: Those referring to a bill in existence at the time of the acceptance; and those referring to a bill yet to be drawn, and promising to accept it when drawn. Theoretically, as forcibly pointed out by Professor Ames, these acceptances are in defiance of the general principles of the law merchant. By this creation of the law, one indorser who does not see the outside acceptance has no remedy against the acceptor, while

MARTIN, 1 Camp. 425, note, where Lord Ellenborough held that retention of the bill was an acceptance.

<sup>58</sup> The statutes are collected in Rand. Com. Paper, § 620.

<sup>59</sup> Section 225. Cf. § 224.

\* MATTESON v. MOULTON, 11 Hun, 268, affirmed 79 N. Y. 627.

his immediate indorsee, who sees and discounts the bill on the faith of the promise, has a remedy his prior indorser had not.<sup>60</sup> As a business expedient, the reasons in support of promises to accept stated by Chief Justice Marshall apply alike to both classes.<sup>61</sup> "The great motive," he said, "for construing a promise to accept as an acceptance, is that it gives credit to the bill, and may induce a third person to take it. If the letter be not shown, its contents, whatever they may be, can give no credit to the bill; and, if it be shown, an absolute promise to accept will give all the credit to the bill which a full confidence that it will be accepted can give it." His decision closes with the declaration "that a letter written within a reasonable time before or after the date of a bill of exchange, describing it in terms not to be mistaken, and promising to accept it, is, if shown to the person who afterwards takes the bill on the credit of the letter, a virtual acceptance, binding on the person who makes the promise." The reasons for this rule are twofold. One is the practical one that, without it, much embarrassment would be thrown in the way of commercial transactions. A knowledge that a draft will be accepted is often of the utmost importance to the drawer in assisting the negotiation of bills of exchange; and, if the promisor was not bound by what he had written, extensive frauds might be perpetrated. The view which the courts take is that the rule prevents these frauds, and accommodates the mercantile transactions of the country.<sup>62</sup> The other reason was based in its origin upon the great authority of Lord Mansfield in England,<sup>63</sup> supported in the United States by the opinion of Chief Justice Kent,<sup>64</sup> that if the collateral acceptance be shown to a third person, so as to excite credit, and to induce him to advance money on the bill, such third person ought not to suffer by the confidence excited. And these two reasons have generally prevailed over the strongest objection

<sup>60</sup> 2 Ames, Bills & N. p. 788.

<sup>61</sup> COOLIDGE v. PAYSON, 2 Wheat. 66.

<sup>62</sup> Greele v. Parker, 5 Wend. 414; RUSSELL v. WIGGIN, 2 Story, 213, Fed. Cas. No. 12,165, per Story, J.

<sup>63</sup> PILLANS v. VAN MIEROP, 3 Burrows, 1663, afterwards repudiated in JOHNSON v. COLLINGS, 1 East, 98, and BANK OF IRELAND v. ARCHER, 11 Mees. & W. 383.

<sup>64</sup> McEVERS v. MASON, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 206.

and severest criticism of the opponents of the theory, so that it is at present established law. It is the credit which such acceptance or engagement to accept has given to the bill which gives to it its binding operation.<sup>65</sup>

There is a distinction drawn between acceptances on separate paper or promises to accept existing bills and promises to accept bills to be drawn within a reasonable time in the future. It may be urged that this is a distinction without a substantial difference, but traces of it are found everywhere. The enactments of the Negotiable Instruments Law are declarative of the American law. The statute enacts: <sup>66</sup> "Sec. 222. Where an acceptance is written on paper other than the bill itself, it does not bind the acceptor except in favor of a person to whom it is shown, and who, on the faith thereof, receives the bill for value. Sec. 223. An unconditional promise in writing to accept a bill before it is drawn is deemed an actual acceptance in favor of every person who, upon the faith thereof, receives the bill for value." This distinction lies rather in words than in principle, for throughout both classes run these three principles: (1) In order to make this extrinsic promise an acceptance, credit must be given to it; (2) like every other promise or contract, its subject-matter must be definite or reasonably so; and (3) the promise must not be a nudum pactum. It must be upon a consideration, or, to express it as it commonly occurs in business transactions, the holder or person claiming the benefit of the promise must have discounted the bill upon the promise. The actual acceptance and the promise to accept differ mainly in the remedies administered upon them. With the actual acceptance there is but the remedy against the acceptor on the bill. With the promise to accept, if there is a

<sup>65</sup> Thompson, C. J., in *Goodrich v. Gordon*, 15 Johns. 6; *Cassel v. Dows*, 1 Blatchf. 335, Fed. Cas. No. 2,502; *Worcester Bank v. Wells*, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 107; *STEMAN v. HARRISON*, 42 Pa. St. 57; *Rulz v. Renauld*, 100 N. Y. 256, 8 N. E. 182; *Murdock v. Mills*, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 5; *Carnegie v. Morrison*, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 381; *Jones v. Bank*, 84 Ill. 313; *PARKER v. GREELE*, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 545. This is very common as a statutory provision in the laws of various states. An agreement by telegram has been held sufficient acceptance. *NORTH ATCHISON BANK v. GARRETTSON*, 2 C. C. A. 145, 51 Fed. 168, affirming (C. C.) 47 Fed. 867, and 39 Fed. 163; *In re Armstrong* (C. C.) 41 Fed. 381.

<sup>66</sup> Post, p. 472.

refusal to give acceptance, the promisor is sued for breach of ordinary contract for whatever damage the holder of the bill has actually suffered, limited by the amount of the bill, with interest and costs.

These principles exclude from the operation of the rule cases where the indorsee has taken the bill in entire ignorance of the promise, or where the promise is made to some person, not the drawer of the bill, and made with no intention of its being shown as a means of exciting credit. In such cases the promisor is exempted. It is true that some cases draw a distinction in this respect between existing and non-existing bills, and hold that an acceptance of an existing bill, though on a separate paper, is equivalent in effect to an acceptance written upon the bill, and accrues to the benefit of the holder, whether or not he took the bill on the faith of such acceptance.<sup>67</sup> Such was the rule in England before enactment of the statute requiring the acceptance to be written upon the bill itself.† But it is believed that the prevailing rule in the United States places acceptances of existing bills and promises to accept non-existing bills on the same footing in this respect, and requires the bill to be taken on the faith of the acceptance.\*

<sup>67</sup> *Read v. Marsh*, 5 B. Mon. (Ky.) 8; *MASON v. DOUSAY*, 35 Ill. 424; *STOCKWELL v. BRAMBLE*, 3 Ind. 428. See *SPAULDING v. ANDREWS*, 48 Pa. St. 411. Mr. Daniel points out (Neg. Inst. § 552) that the decisions on this point are in a condition of inextricable confusion, a result which was perhaps inevitable, the door having once been opened to recognizing the anomaly of extrinsic acceptances.

† *WYNNE v. RAIKES*, 5 East, 514; *Billing v. Devaux*, 3 Man. & G. 565; *Grant v. Hunt*, 1 C. B. 44.

\* *EXCHANGE BANK v. RICE*, 98 Mass. 298; *Overman v. Bank*, 30 N. J. Law, 61; *Lugrue v. Woodruff*, 29 Ga. 648. In *EXCHANGE BANK v. RICE*, supra, Hill drew a bill to order of Pitman & Co. "against 12 bales of cotton." This being indorsed to plaintiffs, they presented it for acceptance, which was refused. In a letter to Hill defendant drawees explained that this was because no bill of lading had been sent, but that when the bill of lading was received they would accept the draft. Plaintiffs, having procured this letter and a duplicate bill of lading, again presented the bill, and protested it for non-acceptance, and subsequently for non-payment. It was held that the letter, having been written after plaintiffs took the bill of exchange, and not being addressed to them, did not make defendants liable to them as acceptors. Gray, J., said: "The American rule has the advantage of being uniform



There remains but one more question to be answered, and that is, how definitely must the letter describe the draft to be binding in law as an acceptance of it. The letter need not be an agreement in terms to honor the draft. It may be read in the light of the surrounding circumstances, which may be used by the court to aid in ascertaining its purpose, and in applying and interpreting its language. The absence of technical promissory words is of no practical moment where the language employed is such as to import a promise to pay.<sup>68</sup> It need not contain a particular description or identification of the bill to be drawn. It is enough if it can be shown that the bill was drawn in pursuance of the authority to that effect. And it is safe to say from an examination of the authorities that in general all that is wanted is a general power to draw and a reasonable intendment; by this last is meant a statement of facts from which a man of ordinary prudence would infer that the power related to the bill which is offered for discount upon the supposed acceptance. If this appears, it is sufficient.

#### PAROL ACCEPTANCE OF A BILL.

53. In the absence of statute to the contrary, an unequivocal parol promise to accept a specific existing bill is binding. But a promise to accept a future bill, even though the bill be taken by the holder upon the faith and credit of such promise, is not binding as an acceptance.

It is proper to say in the beginning that the doctrine of parol acceptances should be received with extreme caution. It is contrary to the theory of negotiability, which requires the obligation of all the parties to appear on the instrument itself, and to the general

in its application to all promises to accept a particular bill, not made to the holder or written on the very bill, whether made before or after it is drawn; and of restricting within the narrowest limits the anomalous doctrine of liability to an action upon negotiable paper by reason of anything not appearing on the face of the paper itself."

<sup>68</sup> *Barney v. Worthington*, 37 N. Y. 112; *BANK OF MICHIGAN v. ELY*, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 508, 512; *ULSTER COUNTY BANK v. McFARLAN*, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 432; *Valle v. Cerre*, 36 Mo. 575; *NAGLE v. LYMAN*, 14 Cal. 451; *Nelson v. Bank*, 48 Ill. 39; *NEVADA BANK v. LUCE*, 139 Mass. 488, 1 N. E. 926.



policy of law because of the vague and often uncertain evidence by which the acceptance itself is proved. But it is undoubtedly the law that oral acceptances of existing bills<sup>69</sup> are valid and binding acceptances. The reasons given for this rule are much the same as those given for separate acceptances in writing. A verbal promise is treated as an acceptance because sound principles of morality require that one who promises another, although by parol, to accept a particular bill of exchange, and thereby induces him to advance his money upon such bill in reliance upon such promise, should be held to make good his promise. The party advances money upon an original promise upon a valuable consideration, and the promisor is bound to carry out his undertaking. Whether it is held to be an acceptance, or whether he is subject to damages for a breach of his promise to accept, or whether he is held to be estopped from impeaching his word, is a matter of form merely. The result in either event is to compel the promisor to pay the amount of the bill with interest.<sup>70</sup> It would seem that this reason would apply alike to existing bills and to non-existing bills, yet the cases make a distinction. A verbal promise to pay a non-existing bill, even with the qualification that the bill is subsequently taken on the faith of it, does not amount to an acceptance, because in order to constitute an acceptance there ought to have been a bill

<sup>69</sup> *Scudder v. Bank*, 91 U. S. 406; *STURGES v. BANK*, 75 Ill. 595; *Dull v. Bricker*, 76 Pa. St. 255; *Nelson v. First Nat. Bank*, 48 Ill. 37; *Elliott v. Miller*, 8 Mich. 132. See ante. p. 93.

<sup>70</sup> *TOWNSLEY v. SUMRALL*, 2 Pet. 170; *BOYCE v. EDWARDS*, 4 Pet. 111; *Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank*, 91 U. S. 406; *Scott v. Pilkington*, 15 Abb. Prac. 280; *Bissell v. Lewis*, 4 Mich. 450; *Williams v. Winans*, 14 N. J. Law, 339; *BANK OF IRELAND v. ARCHER*, 11 Mees. & W. 383. In this case, a party being requested to accept a bill to be subsequently made, said: "Send it for acceptance as usual, remitting proceeds at the same time, and I will advise my partner." In an action on the bill it was held that a parol promise to accept a bill of exchange afterwards drawn, on the faith of which promise the bill is discounted, does not amount to an acceptance. *JOHNSON v. COLLINGS*, 1 East, 98; *KENNEDY v. GEDDES*, 8 Port. (Ala.) 263; *MERCANTILE BANK v. COX*, 38 Me. 500; *PLUMMER v. LYMAN*, 49 Me. 229; *WILSON v. CLEMENTS*, 3 Mass. 1; *Edson v. Fuller*, 22 N. H. 183, 188; *Wakefield v. Greenhood*, 29 Cal. 600; *Pike v. Irwin*, 1 Sandf. 14; *Taylor v. Drake*, 4 Strob. (S. C.) 431.

in existence to be accepted.\* And to hold that the same act would be an acceptance or not, according to the varying relations of the subsequent holders of the bill, would introduce a strange anomaly and confusion into the relation of the parties to the bill, the drawee being an acceptor as to some and not as to the other indorsees. There is one further objection to be noted to parol acceptances which is found in the cases. It is that a parol acceptance is obnoxious to that provision of the statute of frauds which provides that all promises to answer for the debt of another shall be in writing and signed by the promisor. It is maintained that an acceptance is such a promise, and particularly in the case when it is an accommodation acceptance, because then the acceptor merely guaranties some one else's debt. But despite the respectable authority supporting this view, its reasons do not seem sound. In issuing a bill the drawer says to the drawee, "Pay so much money to the payee, and I will repay it to you," and the drawee in his acceptance thereupon promises to pay the money called for in the bill to the payee. The promises are thus original and independent. And if money is paid on the faith of it, there is an original consideration moving between the parties to the contract. Damage to the promisee constitutes as good a consideration as benefit to the promisor. And where there is a substantial credit given by the party to the drawer upon the bill, and the party parts with his present rights at the instance of the promisee, this promise is substantially a new and independent one, and not a mere guaranty of the existing promise of the drawer. The object of the promise is to induce the party to take the bill upon the credit of the promise, and, if he so take it, it binds the promisor.<sup>71</sup>

#### ACCEPTANCE FOR HONOR OR SUPRA PROTEST.

**54. DEFINITION**—An acceptance supra protest is an undertaking by a stranger to the bill, after protest, for the benefit of all parties subsequent to him for whose honor

\* *BANK OF IRELAND v. ARCHER*, supra, note 70. *JOHNSON v. COLLINGS*, 1 East, 98. See ante, p. 94.

<sup>71</sup> *TOWNSLEY v. SUMRALL*, 2 Pet. 170.

it is made, and conditioned to pay the bill when it becomes due if the original drawee does not.

**54a. An acceptance supra protest may be made—**

(a) After dishonor by non-acceptance.

(b) After protest for better security after acceptance.

The acceptance for honor is an exception to the rule (supra, § 46) that no one but the drawee can be an acceptor. It is not commonly met with in this country, and therefore it is our purpose to outline without much discussion the rules concerning it.

In its nature it is a sort of conditional acceptance, the contract being, as we shall hereafter see (see post, § 72), to pay if, upon further presentment of the bill to the drawee for payment at maturity, it is again dishonored and duly protested. The bill must in the first instance be presented to the drawee and protested, because the drawer and indorsers have a right to a presentment to and demand of the drawee and also a right to the full legal form of protest.<sup>72</sup> But protest once being made, any person not a party to the bill may accept it for the honor of any other party to it, or there may be successive acceptors to the bill for the honor of different parties to it,<sup>73</sup> or any one acceptor may accept for any or all parties to the bill. The method of making an acceptance for honor is for the party to appear before a notary public and declare that he accepts such protested bill in honor of the drawer or indorsers, as the case may be, and he then in some form of writing signifies such acceptance. Usual forms are "Accepts S. P.," or "Accepted for the honor of X." As soon as this form is complete, it is the duty of the acceptor for honor to notify the parties to the bill for whose honor he has accepted. Of course, no holder is bound to take the acceptance of such an acceptor, but having once accepted it he is bound by it and cannot sue such party until the maturity of the bill and its dishonor by the acceptor supra protest.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Story, Bills, § 256.

<sup>73</sup> König v. Bayard, 1 Pet. 250.

<sup>74</sup> WILLIAMS v. GERMAINE, 7 Barn. & C. 468, 1 Man. & R. 394. For the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law concerning acceptance for honor, see sections 280-289, post, p. 480.

There is a species of acceptance for honor known as the protest for better security. According to Mr. Chitty,<sup>75</sup> "The custom of merchants is stated to be that if the drawee of a bill of exchange abscond before the day when the bill is due, the holder may protest it in order to have better security for its payment, and should give notice to the drawer and indorsers of the absconding of the drawee; and if the acceptor of a foreign bill become bankrupt before it is due, it seems the holder may also in such case protest for better security. The neglect to make this protest will not affect the holder's remedy against the drawer and indorsers, and its principal use appears to be that by giving notice to the drawer and indorsers of the situation of the acceptor, or by which it is become improbable that payment will be made, they are enabled by other means to provide for the payment of the bill when due."<sup>76</sup>

#### TIME ALLOWED FOR ACCEPTANCE.

**55. The drawee is allowed a reasonable time, generally held to be 24 hours, within which to accept a bill of exchange.**

After presentment the drawee is entitled to a reasonable time to decide whether or not he will accept, and this is generally held to be 24 hours.<sup>77</sup> It is said that this time may be shortened by the departure of the regular mail in the meantime, but this rule has not been followed in the United States.<sup>78</sup> If, upon expiration of the time allowed, the drawee has not accepted, it is the duty of the holder to protest for non-acceptance.<sup>79</sup> The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that the drawee shall be allowed 24 hours, but that acceptance, if given, dates from the day of presentation.<sup>80</sup> A bill may be accepted after acceptance has been refused, and after pro-

<sup>75</sup> Chit. Bills, 388.

<sup>76</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 530. See, also, *Ex parte Wackerbarth*, 5 Ves. 574.

<sup>77</sup> *Bellasis v. Hester*, 1 Ld. Raym. 280; *Ingram v. Forster*, 2 J. P. Smith (Eng.) 243; *Connelly v. McKean*, 64 Pa. St. 113; *Case v. Burt*, 15 Mich. 82.

<sup>78</sup> Rand. Com. Paper, § 595.

<sup>79</sup> *Ingram v. Forster*, 2 J. P. Smith (Eng.) 243.

<sup>80</sup> Section 224. Cf. § 225.

test for non-acceptance.<sup>81</sup> It may also be accepted after maturity, or after dishonor, in which case the acceptor becomes liable to pay the holder on demand.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>81</sup> STOCKWELL v. BRAMBLE, 3 Ind. 428; Rand. Com. Paper, § 596. But the previous refusal discharges the other parties unless they assent or the bill was protested. 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 789; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 491.

<sup>82</sup> Rand. Com. Paper, § 596. "A bill may be accepted \* \* \* when it is overdue, or after it has been dishonored by a previous refusal to accept, or by non-payment. Neg. Inst. L. § 228. As to acceptance of an incomplete bill, see ante, p. 81.

**CHAPTER IV.****INDORSEMENT.**

- 56. Definition.
- 57. Formal Requisites.
- 58-59. Indorsement in Blank.
- 60-61. Special Indorsement.
- 62-64. Indorsement without Recourse, Conditional and Restrictive Indorsement.
- 65. Nature of Indorsement.
- 66. Requisites of Indorsement.
- 67-68. Irregular Indorsements.

**DEFINITION.**

**56. INDORSEMENT**—Is the writing of the name of the indorser on the instrument with the intent either to transfer the title to the same, or to strengthen the security of the holder by assuming a contingent liability for its future payment, or both. It strictly applies only to negotiable instruments.

**FORMAL REQUISITES.**

**57. The formal requisites of an indorsement are:**

- (a) Though usually on the back of the instrument, an indorsement is valid if on its face, but it must be somewhere upon it. When by reason of rapid circulation the instrument becomes filled with indorsements, the law merchant permits the holder to paste on a slip of paper for his own and subsequent indorsements. This is called an allonge.
- (b) The usual form of indorsement is the signature of the indorser, with or without a direction to pay to the indorsee described, or to him or order. Any form of words with the signature from which the intent of the holder to incur the liability of an indorser may be gathered is a sufficient indorsement.

An indorsement is classed by itself as a distinct body of contract rights and liabilities. It has its origin in and is confined to negotiable instruments.<sup>1</sup> In the illustration under § 10, which we have so often referred to, B pays A £1,000, and A gives the bill to him; D pays B £1,000, and B indorses the bill to him; and E pays D £1,000, and D indorses the bill to him. In each instance B, D, and E get what for their purposes is as good and better than £1,000 in gold. And, in turn, as B or D was paid the £1,000, and indorsed the bill, he assumed some liability. He did all he could to assure the indorsee, who paid the £1,000 to him, that he in turn would get his money. He said to the indorsee: "You give me £1,000 in gold, which cannot be transported because of its weight, or £1,000 in bank notes, which are inconvenient to carry because of their danger of being lost, and I will give you a claim payable to you alone, and which at New York or Charleston or Jamaica will be just as good to you as the £1,000 in gold or bank notes would have been. You may safely take this, because if C does not accept or pay this, or A does not pay this as drawer, I, to whom you have paid the £1,000, will repay it to you."<sup>2</sup> "A payee or subsequent holder," says Professor Ames, "instead of holding a bill and collecting it at maturity, may wish to transfer his interest in it to another, in which case he indorses the bill, i. e. he writes and signs upon the back of the bill an order directing its payment to the desired transferee. The order is written with mercantile conciseness, e. g. 'Pay A [Signed] X,'—the other terms being contained upon the face of the

<sup>1</sup> *Orrick v. Colston*, 7 Grat. 195; *Bank of Marietta v. Pindall*, 2 Rand. (Va.) 475. In *WHISTLER v. FORSTER*, which was an action by the indorsee of a check against the drawer, it was held that the holder of a bill payable to order must obtain an indorsement and is affected by notice of fraud if he fails to do so; and, though he afterwards obtains an indorsement, yet if he has meanwhile acquired knowledge of the fraud, he does not acquire the rights of a bona fide indorsee. 14 C. B. (N. S.) 248. In an action against certain parties as the indorsers of a bill it was claimed that such parties were liable, even though the indorsement was shown to be a forgery, on the ground that the writing must have been by the defendant's authority. This was held not to be an indorsement such as would entitle the plaintiffs to recover. *MOXON v. PULLING*, 4 Camp. 50; *Dunning v. Heller*, 103 Pa. St. 269.

<sup>2</sup> *Ingalls v. Lee*, 9 Barb. 647; *Hill v. Lewis*, 1 Salk. 132; *EVANS v. GEE*, 11 Pet. 80.

bill. The custom of merchants, however, has attached to this order of the indorser a liability similar to that which attaches to the order of the drawer. By an indorsement, therefore, a party not only passes his interest in the bill to another, but also pledges his credit for the honor of the bill. In other words, an indorsement is at once a transfer and a contract."

The student must fully grasp this idea,—that the indorsement is a contract, and a contract to which the law merchant and the common law have appended very peculiar conditions. It is a contract something in the nature of a guaranty,<sup>3</sup> something in the nature of a warranty, and to the liability under which the laws have attached the very unusual conditions of presentment, demand, and notice of dishonor.<sup>4</sup> It is, to be sure, an evidence of a transfer of title, but it is principally a development of a form of contract at the hands of the creators of the body of rules of the law merchant. We may be pardoned in referring again to the illustrations under §§ 12 and 13. In these instances the drawer or maker contracted to pay "John Smith, or his order," meaning John Smith, or some person to whom John Smith especially directed the sums of money called for in the instruments should be paid. The only construction of this would be that John Smith must direct payment. He must direct it in writing. Until he does so direct it, and evidences this direction by writing it on the instrument, the title to the instrument, and the right to the sum of money called for by its terms, remain in him. But, when he does direct it by indorsing it, that (under the law merchant) shows to all the world that John Smith has signified his wish that it should be paid to some person.

In the place and form of the words of the indorsement, the law looks rather to the intention of the parties than to a strict compliance with its usual forms. According to the usual method, an indorsement, as its name implies, is written on the back of the instrument. And indeed this usual method and this original meaning carry with them such force that it has been held that where

<sup>3</sup> *Oakley v. Boorman*, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 588; *KINGSLAND v. KOEPIE*, 137 Ill. 344, 28 N. E. 48; *Id.*, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 118; *DE PAUW v. BANK OF SALEM*, 126 Ind. 553, 25 N. E. 705, and 26 N. E. 151; *Id.*, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 128.

<sup>4</sup> *OSGOOD'S ADM'RS v. ARTT* (C. C.) 17 Fed. 575, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 107.



one alleges that a note was "indorsed" he may be presumed to mean that there was writing of some kind on its back.<sup>6</sup> But neither this customary method nor this original meaning are allowed by the law to prevail over the purpose and intention of the parties. And an indorsement elsewhere upon the instrument is as much an indorsement as though written upon its back.<sup>7</sup> It may, for example, be upon its face,<sup>7</sup> or it may be, and frequently is, where indorsements have covered the back of the paper, upon the extension of the instrument referred to in the principal text as an allonge.<sup>8</sup> But it must be somewhere upon the bill or note, for if upon a separate paper the transfer is not an indorsement, but an assignment,<sup>9</sup>—and the transferrer cannot avail himself of the privileges, nor is he subject to the rules governing indorsement. So, too, in the form of words of an indorsement, the law looks to the intention rather than the method of expression of the parties. For while a signature or some of the forms of words we shall hereafter discuss are the usual forms, yet initials, or figures,<sup>10</sup> or writing in pen or in pencil,<sup>11</sup> or a mark, if they evidence an intention to indorse, can create a

<sup>6</sup> GORMAN v. KETCHUM, 33 Wis. 427.

<sup>7</sup> In YOUNG v. GLOVER, the defendants wrote their names on the face of an accepted bill, under the name of the acceptor. It was contended that this was not an indorsement according to the custom of merchants. The intention of the defendants to assume liability as indorsers being clear, there was held to be a good indorsement, and that the place of writing was immaterial. 3 Jur. (N. S.) 637; Schwenk v. Yost, 9 Wkly. Notes Cas. (Pa.) 16.

<sup>7</sup> Ex parte Yates, 27 Law J. Bankr. 9; COM. v. BUTTERICK, 100 Mass. 12; REX v. BIGG, 3 P. Wms. 419; HERRING v. WOODHULL, 29 Ill. 92.

<sup>8</sup> FOLGER v. CHASE, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 63; FRENCH v. TURNER, 15 Ind. 59. Probably an indorsement on an attached paper would be sufficient, though there was in fact room on the instrument. OSGOOD'S ADM'RS v. ARTT (C. C.) 17 Fed. 575, per Harlan, J. "The indorsement must be written on the instrument itself or upon a paper attached thereto." Neg. Inst. L. § 61.

<sup>9</sup> Fenn v. Harrison, 3 Term R. 757. In this case the indorsement was upon a mortgage which was given with the note as collateral security, and was to this effect: "I hereby assign the within mortgage and notes therein described." This was held not to be a proper indorsement, under the requirement that it should have been made "thereon," or "on another paper annexed, \* \* \* when there are many successive indorsements to be made." Story. Bills. § 204.

<sup>10</sup> BROWN v. BANK, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 443.

<sup>11</sup> GEARY v. PHYSIC, 5 Barn. & C. 234.

binding indorsement. This rule is usually the subject of discussion in interpreting words of transfer on the back of instruments, which seem to imply an assignment rather than indorsement. The most often quoted instance of such an expression is, "I hereby assign this draft," which Gurney, B., declared "to amount to nothing more than an ordinary indorsement."<sup>12</sup> And the interpretation given by the courts to such a form of words, written on instruments in the place where indorsements are usually found, is that the transferer, in making the writing evidencing a transfer, intended such a transfer as is usually made of such instruments. In other words, he may be reasonably presumed to have intended to turn over the paper in the usual business way, although he did not choose business words peculiarly appropriate for that purpose. The usual business way is by indorsement. Therefore it is reasonable to presume that an indorsement rather than an assignment was intended. And so such words, unless they contain expressions clearly showing an intention to exempt the transferer from an indorser's liability, are treated as an indorsement.<sup>13</sup> It may be that there is one exception to the foregoing rule, though there is weight of contrary authority. It is that, where one contracts in the form of a guaranty on the back of a bill or note, he cannot be made liable as an indorser.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *Richards v. Frankum*, 9 Car. & P. 221; *MAINE TRUST & BANKING CO. v. BUTLER*, 45 Minn. 506, 48 N. W. 333; *MARKEY v. COREY*, 108 Mich. 184, 66 N. W. 493; *Spencer v. Halpern*, 62 Ark. 595, 37 S. W. 711. *Briggs v. Latham*, 36 Kan. 205, 13 Pac. 129, contra.

<sup>13</sup> *SEARS v. LANTZ*, 47 Iowa, 658; *SHELBY v. JUDD*, 24 Kan. 166; *Fassin v. Hubbard*, 55 N. Y. 465; *HALL v. TOBY*, 110 Pa. St. 318, 1 Atl. 369; *ADAMS v. BLETHEN*, 66 Me. 19. *Lyons v. Divilbis*, 22 Pa. St. 185; *Kilpatrick v. Heaton*, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 92, contra.

<sup>14</sup> In an action on a promissory note it was shown that the payee of a note transferred the same to a third party, having first written over his signature: "I hereby guaranty the within note." It was held by the court that, where the name of the payee was indorsed on the back of the note in no other form than as a signature to a guaranty fully written out, this was not such an indorsement as authorized a subsequent holder to sue upon it as indorsee. *BELCHER v. SMITH*, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 482. *CENTRAL TRUST CO. v. BANK*, 101 U. S. 68. Otherwise where the payee (D) indorsed "Pay E. [Signed] D." and also "Payment guaranteed. D." *ELGIN CITY BANKING CO. v. ZELCH*, 57 Minn. 487, 59 N. W. 544. And see *Tuttle v. Bartholomew*, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 452; *FULLERTON v. HILL*, 48 Kan. 558, 29 Pac. 583; *Id.*, *Johns. Cas. Bills & N.*

A guaranty is declared by the courts to mean a guaranty, and not an indorsement.<sup>15</sup> And this one rule of interpretation differs from the other in that the words are not doubtful words of transfer, but are plain words, having a plain legal meaning. Hence it is not proper for courts to seek to construe the meaning of words which are already settled beyond dispute. It is only their province to enforce the contract in the clear words in which it stands, and that contract they will enforce as a guaranty.<sup>16</sup>

#### INDORSEMENT IN BLANK.

**58. AN INDORSEMENT IN BLANK.**—Specifies no indorsee, and the instrument so indorsed is payable to bearer, and may be negotiated by delivery.\*

**59.** The holder may convert a blank indorsement into a special indorsement by writing over the signature of the indorser any contract consistent with the character of the indorsement.†

124. As to liabilities of guarantors and sureties, see *Gridley v. Capen*, 72 Ill. 11, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 209; *Read v. Cutts*, 7 Me. 186, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 210; *Temple v. Baker* (Pa. Sup.) 17 Atl. 516. For distinction between guarantor and surety, see *La Rose v. Logansport Nat. Bank*, 102 Ind. 332, 1 N. E. 805; *Id.*, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 213.

<sup>15</sup> Where the payment of a note is guaranteed subsequent to its delivery there must be a distinct consideration. Had the guaranty been written before the delivery, no other consideration would have been necessary than that implied in the note. By the statute of the state, since the guaranty did not express any consideration, it is void. *MOSES v. BANK*, 149 U. S. 298, 13 Sup. Ct. 900. And see *LEONARD v. VREDENBURG*, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 29; *Tinker v. McCauley*, 3 Mich. 188; *Phelps v. Church*, 65 Mich. 231, 32 N. W. 30; *Hunt v. Adams*, 7 Mass. 518; *Spaulding v. Putnam*, 128 Mass. 363; *NATIONAL BANK OF COMMONWEALTH v. LAW*, 127 Mass. 72; *Dubois v. Mason*, *Id.* 37.

<sup>16</sup> *BROWN v. CURTISS*, 2 N. Y. 225. But see *Upham v. Prince*, 12 Mass. 14; *Manrow v. Durham*, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 584, and cases cited; *Barrett v. May*, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 1; *Partridge v. Davis*, 20 Vt. 449; *Vanzant v. Arnold*, 31 Ga. 210; *Judson v. Gookwin*, 37 Ill. 286; *Pattillo v. Alexander*, 96 Ga. 60, 22 S. E. 646; *National Bank of Commerce v. Galland*, 14 Wash. 502, 45 Pac. 35,—holding a contrary doctrine to the apparently reasonable doctrine of the text.

\* This is the language of Neg. Inst. L. § 64. See, also, *Id.* § 28.

† This is the language of Neg. Inst. L. § 65.

In form an indorsement in blank consists in writing merely the name of the payee or holder upon the back of the instrument. Thus, if John Smith, in the illustration mentioned in § 12, indorsed the instrument in blank, he would write simply "John Smith" on the back of it. How the courts have interpreted this appears from *PEACOCK v. RHODES*<sup>17</sup> and *GRANT v. VAUGHAN*,<sup>18</sup> which have been generally adopted as the law.

*PEACOCK v. RHODES* was a case of a bill indorsed in blank by the payee to a third person, and stolen from the third person, and received by a bona fide purchaser for value. Lord Mansfield said, "I see no difference between a note indorsed in blank and one payable to bearer. They both go by delivery, and possession proves property in both cases;" and it was deemed that such a bill is to be treated as so much cash, unless the payee chooses by a specific indorsement to some person to restrain its currency. The court construed the contract to mean that the payee might follow out the contract embodied in the bill, "Pay to John Smith, or such person as he directs," and that, when he so indorsed, he was deemed to say, "You may pay to any one who holds the bill." In *GRANT v. VAUGHAN*, the maker of a note\*\* to bearer was sued by Grant, who gave value for the note to a person who had found it, and who had no right to it. It was contended that Grant could only recover from the person from whom he got the note. But the court construed the contract of Vaughan otherwise.<sup>19</sup> In these cases the law goes to the limit that the true owner cannot recover in trover from the bona fide holder.

The student must keep in mind that this relates only to an instrument held by a bona fide holder.<sup>20</sup> Where the instrument is not in the

<sup>17</sup> 2 Doug. 633.

<sup>18</sup> 3 Burrows, 1516.

\*\* The instrument, though called a note in the report, was a check.

<sup>19</sup> See, also, *MILLER v. RACE*, 1 Burrows, 452. This was an action in trover to recover a bank note payable to W. F. or bearer, on demand. The note was stolen, and later came into the plaintiff's possession. Upon notice of the robbery, W. F. ordered payment stopped on the note. It was held that such note, when it came into the hands of a third party, for value and without notice, could not be followed.

<sup>20</sup> As to who is a bona fide holder, see *JOHNSON v. WAY*, 27 Ohio St. 374, *Johns. Cas. Bills & N.* 185; *DRESSER v. CONSTRUCTION CO.*, 93 U. S. 92,

possession of a bona fide holder, but of the finder or the thief, this extreme rule does not apply. The instrument is, then, like all other property. It cannot be enforced by the wrongful holder. But, when once it is in the hands of the bona fide holder, then it is treated as money in the ordinary course of business. Alike in case of money and of paper indorsed in blank, where either has been stolen or found, the true owner cannot recover after it has been paid away fairly and honestly upon a valuable consideration, because it is necessary for the purposes of commerce that its currency should be established and secured.

Very much like this general power, vested in the payee or subsequent indorser, to vest any lawful holder with the power to enforce the payment of the instrument,<sup>21</sup> is the power conferred upon the indorsee in blank to write over the indorsement any contract consistent with the character of the instrument. The authority followed in most jurisdictions is *RUSSEL v. LANGSTAFFE*.<sup>22</sup> There the defendant indorsed his name in blank on five copper-plate notes, the body of the notes being at that time not filled out. Upon the trial, on behalf of the defendant, it was urged that, because these notes were blank at the time of the indorsement, they were not promissory notes; and that no subsequent act could alter the original nature or operation of the defendant's signature, which, when written, was a mere nullity. Lord Mansfield, in deciding the case, used these often-quoted words: "The indorsement on a blank note is a letter of credit for an indefinite sum. The defendant said: 'Trust Galley to any amount, and I will be his security.'" The amount of the main instrument being left blank, an authority to fill it in for any sum was implied. The terms of the body of the note or bill are the principal terms of the contract of indorsement, and nothing inconsistent with these can be implied from the indorsement. Says Judge Cowen:<sup>23</sup> "The holder may put the blank paper in any form

*Johns. Cas. Bills & N.* 187; *Brook v. Teague*, 52 Kan. 119, 34 Pac. 347; *Id.*, *Johns. Cas. Bills & N.* 189; *Lenheim v. Fay*, 27 Mich. 70; *Rickle v. Dow*, 39 Mich. 91.

<sup>21</sup> As to the effect of subsequent indorsements upon an indorsement in blank, see *Bailey v. Armstrong*, 4 Wkly. Notes Cas. 381; *Gould v. Mortimer*, *Id.* 322.

<sup>22</sup> 2 Doug. 514.

<sup>23</sup> *Dean v. Hall*, 17 Wend. 214.

which shall accord with the intent of the names, either as makers, drawers, payees, or indorsers. This power of the bona fide holder depends upon the intent of the parties not written out in full, but evinced by the character of the slip on which the name appears." And so an indorsement in blank signifies not only that it was the payee's or subsequent indorser's mind and wish that the money called for in the instrument should be paid by the maker or acceptor to whomsoever should lawfully have it in his possession, but also that over such indorsement—which may be treated in itself as a blank general power—a subsequent holder might write any modification of the instrument which was not inconsistent nor a material alteration of its terms.<sup>24</sup> He may not write over a blank indorsement a waiver of demand and notice;<sup>25</sup> or he may not change such an indorsement into a guaranty.<sup>26</sup> He cannot split up the instrument, making part of the sum called for in it payable to one person, and part payable to another.<sup>27</sup> All these change the terms of the contract as they are implied in law. But, if there are successive indorsements in blank, the holder may fill up the first to himself,<sup>28</sup> or

<sup>24</sup> *Camden v. McKoy*, 3 Scam. (Ill.) 437; *Webster v. Cobb*, 17 Ill. 459; *HANCE v. MILLER*, 21 Ill. 636; *MAXWELL v. VANSANT*, 46 Ill. 58; *BOYNTON v. PIERCE*, 79 Ill. 145; *TENNEY v. PRINCE*, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 385; *Central Bank v. Davis*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 373. But see *Allen v. Coffin*, 42 Ill. 293. In *Dale v. Gear* it was held that parol evidence was not admissible to prove that an indorsement in blank of a promissory note was to be considered as without recourse by a special agreement between the parties, where there was no evidence of any agency or equity as between them. 38 Conn. 15. The holder under a blank indorsement may write over it an order to pay to another. *EVANS v. GEE*, 11 Pet. 80.

<sup>25</sup> *CENTRAL BANK v. DAVIS*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 373.

<sup>26</sup> *Seabury v. Hungerford*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 80; *Blatchford v. Melliken*, 35 Ill. 434; *SEYMOUR v. MICKEY*, 15 Ohio St. 515; *BELDEN v. HANN*, 61 Iowa, 42, 15 N. W. 591.

<sup>27</sup> *Erwin v. Lynn*, 16 Ohio St. 547; *LINDSAY v. PRICE*, 33 Tex. 282. See *Neg. Inst. L. § 62*.

<sup>28</sup> In *DAY v. LYON*, it was held that although, by an indorsement in blank, the transferee was authorized to fill in the blank, he must do so before submitting the note in evidence in a suit thereon. 6 Har. & J. (Md.) 140. *Brewster v. Dana*, 1 Root (Conn.) 266; *Peaslee v. Robbins*, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 164. But the weight of authority appears to be contrary. *Sawyer v. Patterson*, 11 Ala. 523; *Gillham v. Bank*, 2 Scam. (Ill.) 245; *Rich v. Starbuck*, 51 Ind. 87; *Greenough v. Smead*, 3 Ohio St. 415. As to the liability of a special indorser,

he may deduce his title through all, or he may strike out any or all, or he may turn the instrument over to a stranger without indorsement by himself;<sup>29</sup> for all these instances in no wise change the tenor of the main instrument, or effect an alteration in the letter or the spirit of its terms. There is no objection to injecting a special indorsement upon an instrument payable to bearer or under an indorsement in blank. It merely limits the person or class of persons to whom an indorser signifies that he is willing to pay the instrument. Such an indorser says, in effect, "I will pay my indorsee, and such person as he directs." Hence, to recover against such an indorser, title through his indorsee must be proved by proving his indorsee's signature. Such a contract is not inconsistent with what may be supposed to have been in the mind of the indorser when he wrote his name on the instrument. The indorsee may treat any indorsement as transferring the instrument to himself, and may change it to a form to express this intention.

*Same—Parol Evidence.*

Whether parol evidence is admissible to contradict or vary the implied terms of a blank indorsement is a question upon which there is much conflict of authority. It is held by some cases that the rule excluding parol evidence, while applicable to special indorsements, which express the contract, is not applicable to blank indorsements, under which the contract arises by implication of law.<sup>30</sup> The pre-

see *JOHNSON v. MITCHELL*, 50 Tex. 212, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 132; *COLE v. CUSHING*, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 48; *Ellsworth v. Brewer*, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 316.

<sup>29</sup> *SMITH v. CLARKE*, Peake, 225. In this case a bill indorsed in blank by payee, and with subsequent indorsements, came into the hands of J. under a special indorsement. J. sent the bill, without indorsement, to another party, who discounted the same with plaintiffs, who had struck out all save the first indorsement. It was objected that the instrument was affected by the special indorsement, but it was held that a fair holder of a bill might consider himself the payor's indorsee, and strike out other indorsements. For a similar holding, see *MITCHELL v. FULLER*, 15 Pa. St. 268; *JOSSELYN v. AMES*, 3 Mass. 274; *Sweetser v. French*, 13 Metc. (Mass.) 262; *Jackson v. Haskell*, 2 Scam. (Ill.) 565; *BURNAP v. COOK*, 32 Ill. 168; *CURTIS v. SPRAGUE*, 51 Cal. 239. Striking out an indorsement releases all subsequent indorsers. Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 694a. See Neg. Inst. L. § 78.

<sup>30</sup> *Susquehanna Bridge & Bank Co. v. Evans*, 4 Wash. C. C. 480, Fed. Cas. No. 13,635; *ROSS v. ESPY*, 66 Pa. St. 481; *BRENNEHAN v. FURNISS*, 90 Pa.



vailing view, however, is that there is no distinction in this respect between these two classes of indorsements, since the contract implied by the blank indorsement is as definite as if it were expressed.<sup>81</sup> Mr. Daniel states that there are three classes of cases in which parol evidence is admissible as between indorser and indorsee, not to contradict or vary the contract imported by the instrument, but to impeach the validity of the indorsement:<sup>82</sup> (1) Evidence is admissible to show that the indorsement was without consideration; for example, that it was for the accommodation of the indorsee, or for collection, or to transfer the legal title to one in fact the owner. (2) Evidence is admissible to show that the indorsement was in trust for a special purpose, or as an escrow. (3) Evidence is admissible to show that the indorsement was obtained by false representations, so that the enforcement of the contract of indorsement would operate as a fraud upon the indorser. It is also held by some cases that the indorser may, as against his indorsee, prove a contemporaneous parol waiver of demand or notice or dishonor, but the opposite view is also held.<sup>83</sup> A discussion of the conflicting authorities upon the effect of collateral agreements cannot be undertaken in an elementary work.<sup>84</sup>

St. 186; *Davis v. Morgan*, 64 N. C. 570; *Commissioners of Iredell Co. v. Wasson*, 82 N. C. 312.

<sup>81</sup> *Day v. Thompson*, 65 Ala. 269; *Crocker v. Getchell*, 23 Me. 392; *Barry v. Morse*, 8 N. H. 132; *Bank of Albion v. Smith*, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 489; *Woodward v. Foster*, 18 Grat. (Va.) 200; *Holton v. McCormick*, 45 Ind. 411; *Schnell v. Mill Co.*, 89 Ill. 581; *CLARKE v. PATRICK*, 60 Minn. 269, 62 N. W. 284; *Doolittle v. Ferry*, 20 Kan. 230; *Farr v. Ricker*, 46 Ohio St. 265, 21 N. E. 354; *Kling v. Kehoe*, 58 N. J. Law, 529, 33 Atl. 946; *Van Vleet v. Sledge* (C. C.) 45 Fed. 743. Prof. Ames, however, maintains the opposite view. 2 Ames, *Cas. Bills & N.* 804.

<sup>82</sup> Daniel, *Neg. Inst.* § 720 et seq.

<sup>83</sup> Daniel, *Neg. Inst.* § 719a; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 784.

<sup>84</sup> The subject is fully discussed in Daniel, *Neg. Inst.* §§ 717-723; *Rand. Com. Paper*, §§ 778-784.



**SPECIAL INDORSEMENT.**

**60. A SPECIAL INDORSEMENT.**—Specifies the person to whom, or to whose order, the instrument is payable; and the indorsement of such indorsee is necessary to the further negotiation of the instrument.<sup>85</sup>

**61.** An instrument which is originally payable to bearer, or which has been indorsed in blank, though afterwards specially indorsed, is still payable to bearer; except as to the special indorser, who, on such an instrument, after such an indorsement, is only liable on his indorsement to such parties as make title through it.<sup>86</sup>

A special indorsement is in form commonly in this wise: If it were by John Smith, the payee in the illustration under §§ 12 and 13, it would be, "Pay to the order of John Jones," or "Pay to John Jones, or order," or simply, "Pay John Jones." While the special indorsement, or the indorsement in full, as it is indifferently called, must name the indorsee, the indorsement need not necessarily be in words negotiable. It may be either "Pay to John Jones," or "Pay to the order of John Jones."<sup>87</sup> In either case John Jones may negotiate the note away. This is because the original instrument was negotiable. It contemplated its passing from hand to hand. Hence, in the illustration, John Smith, the payee, may direct that the instrument be paid to John Jones, and John Jones, upon delivery, being the owner, may direct that it be paid to Thomas Robinson, and the maker must pay to Thomas Robinson, or to John Jones, or to John Smith; so, also, must John Jones pay

<sup>85</sup> This is the language of Neg. Inst. L. § 64.

<sup>86</sup> "Where an instrument, payable to bearer, is indorsed specially, it may nevertheless be further negotiated by delivery; but the person indorsing specially is liable as indorser to only such holders as make title through his indorsement." Neg. Inst. L. § 70. Cf. Id. § 28.

<sup>87</sup> "An instrument negotiable in its origin continues to be negotiable until it has been restrictively indorsed or discharged by payment or otherwise." Neg. Inst. L. § 77. "But the mere absence of words implying power to negotiate does not make an indorsement restrictive." Id. § 66.

to Robinson, because Robinson has a right of action against Jones, and Jones against Smith; hence Robinson has also a right of action against Smith.<sup>38</sup>

When an instrument is specially indorsed, title can only be transferred from the indorsee by his indorsement. In the very outset, this principle must be sharply contrasted with the case of bills or notes payable to bearer or indorsed in blank. With bills or notes payable to bearer or indorsed in blank, the holder is presumed to be the owner. Possession and title are one and the same thing, and this though the party possessing it is in no wise a party to the instrument. But where the direction in the contract is to pay specially to some person, that person and no other can direct that the money is to be paid in its turn.<sup>39</sup> No other person can personate this indorsee, and by forgery satisfy the conditions of this contract. And it does not avail even that the bill is paid under a forged indorsement. Such payment or transfer was not in contemplation of the parties making the contract, and is utterly void.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>38</sup> LEAVITT v. PUTNAM, 8 N. Y. 494; EDIE v. EAST INDIA CO., 1 W. Bl. 295, 2 Burrows, 1216. In the latter case it was claimed that a special indorsement to A B, the words "or order" being omitted, was equivalent to a restrictive indorsement; but it was held that, since the bill in its origin was negotiable, whatever indorsement carried the property carried the power to assign it. In MORE v. MANNING the holding was to the same purpose. An assignment was made to W., and not to him and order; and it was claimed that W. could not assign, for, by so doing, W.'s assignor would be able to suit by subsequent indorsees. It was held that the assignee of a bill has all the interest in it, and may assign to whom he pleases. Comyn, 311. Hodges v. Adams, 19 Vt. 74.

<sup>39</sup> COLSON v. ARNOT, 57 N. Y. 253; MEAD v. YOUNG, 4 Term R. 28. In the case of MEAD v. YOUNG, a note was drawn on defendant, payable to "Henry Davis or order," but came into possession of another Henry Davis. The bill was accepted by defendant, and the plaintiff, being requested by Davis to discount it, inquired of defendant if the acceptance was his. This being affirmed, the bill was discounted, the plaintiff not knowing Davis. It was held, on an action being brought, that as no person can demand payment of a bill of exchange but the payee, or the person authorized by him, the acceptor only undertakes to pay to them, and cannot be compelled to pay to any other person, and if he makes such payment it will not discharge his debt to the drawer.

<sup>40</sup> GRAVES v. BANK, 17 N. Y. 205; HOLT v. ROSS, 54 N. Y. 472; CHAMBERS v. BANK, 78 Pa. St. 205; ESPY v. BANK, 18 Wall. 604.

In case of the combination of the two classes,—indorsements in blank and in full,—the application of the rules is somewhat confusing to the student. For example, let us assume that there are indorsed upon an instrument some blank indorsements, then some special indorsements, and after these again some indorsements in blank. The special indorser will be liable only to those “who can make their title through his special indorsement.” The rule is well settled that if a note or bill be once indorsed in blank, though afterwards indorsed in full, it will still, as against the drawer, the payee, and prior indorsers, be payable to bearer, though, as against the special indorser himself, title must be made through his indorsee. Suppose the following to be a series of indorsements: (1) John Smith. (2) Pay to the order of Thomas Robinson. Richard Roe. (3) Thomas Robinson. In such cases the rule is laid down in *Bank v. White*.<sup>41</sup> In that case, the suit was upon a promissory note, payable to a W. J. Worth, and made by White, the defendant. It was indorsed in blank by Worth and by E. Olcott, and had upon it a special indorsement, in these words: “Pay to E. Olcott, or order. [Signed] E. O. Kendrick, Cashr.” It was objected that no formal transfer of the note had been shown from Olcott. But the court said that, in suing the payee under a blank indorsement, this was not necessary. Worth’s signature was sufficient. Only in case of suit against Olcott would it have been necessary to prove Kendrick’s signature. All the bank must needs prove was the signature of the payee in blank. And, in the example we are illustrating, any holder, to sue Richard Roe, must prove in addition to his signature the signature of Thomas Robinson, because the indorsement is a special order or indorsement to Thomas Robinson.<sup>42</sup> But in the

<sup>41</sup> *Watervliet Bank v. White*, 1 Denio, 608; *Pentz v. Winterbottom*, 5 Denio, 51.

<sup>42</sup> *JOHNSON v. MITCHELL*, 50 Tex. 212; *SMITH v. CLARKE*, 1 Esp. 180, Peake, 225; *WALKER v. MacDONALD*, 2 Exch. 527, 17 L. J. Exch. 377; *MITCHELL v. FULLER*, 15 Pa. St. 268; *Dudman v. Earl*, 49 Iowa, 37; *BURNAP v. COOK*, 32 Ill. 168; *HARROP v. FISHER*, 30 L. J. C. P. 283. In this case a bill was drawn, payable to the order of the drawer, one Johnson. The bill was discounted by R., but Johnson failed to indorse, and subsequently left the country. The acceptor refused to accept, on account of the omission to indorse, and R. then indorsed to the plaintiff for Johnson. It was at first decided that the inference might be drawn that Johnson authorized such in-

other cases, the indorsement in blank would presuppose right and possession, and merely the signature of the indorser sought to be recovered against would have to be proved.

**INDORSEMENT WITHOUT RECOURSE, CONDITIONAL AND  
RESTRICTIVE INDORSEMENT.<sup>43</sup>**

**62. AN INDORSEMENT WITHOUT RECOURSE —** Means that the indorser exempts himself from liability to indemnify the holder upon the dishonor of the bill or note.

**63. A CONDITIONAL INDORSEMENT —** Means an indorsement by which the title to the instrument does not pass until the condition mentioned in the indorsement is fulfilled.

**64. A RESTRICTIVE INDORSEMENT —** Means that the indorsee is deputed by the indorser to be his agent in collecting the bill or note, or else that the title is vested in the indorsee as a trustee or for the use or for the benefit of a third person.

We have seen that, whether an indorser makes a blank or a special indorsement upon the instrument, he both incurs a liability as an indorser thereon, and transfers it. This is true of indorsements generally, whatever be their form, provided the intention to be bound and to transfer be present. If these can be construed from its form, it is sufficient to make the writing an indorsement. For example, the words, "I this day sold and delivered to C. A. the within note,"<sup>44</sup> were deemed an indorsement. And any form of words consistent with the tenor of the main instrument, and showing such intention, will be treated by the courts as creating the contract.

dorsement, but on appeal it was held that evidence of authority was wanting, and that the law would not infer it. *Watervliet Bank v. White*, 1 Denio, 608; *Pentz v. Winterbottom*, 5 Denio, 51.

<sup>43</sup> "An indorsement may be either special or in blank; and it may also be either restrictive or qualified, or conditional." *Neg. Inst. L.* § 63. Cf. *Id.* § 68, which identifies qualified indorsements with indorsements without recourse.

<sup>44</sup> *ADAMS v. BLETHEN*, 66 Me. 19; *Pinnes v. Ely*, 4 McLean, 173. *Fed. Cas. No. 11,169. Ante, p. 109.*

The needs of commerce have created special forms of indorsement modifying and limiting the effect of this contract, without, in many instances, destroying the negotiability of the main instrument. For example, an indorser may exempt himself from liability as an indorser by an indorsement without recourse, and yet the instrument remain negotiable. He may perhaps, by a conditional indorsement, give all subsequent parties notice that, so far as he is concerned, the title to the instrument has not vested in his indorsee and subsequent parties, and that the instrument cannot be safely paid to the holder until some condition written upon it is fulfilled, or he may restrict it in its circulation; or he may make a restrictive indorsement. The reason of these indorsements is to be kept carefully in mind while examining them. They are based upon the idea that the right of property in the lawful owner implies the right, not merely to sell it outright, but also to make such disposition of it as he sees fit.

*Indorsement without Recourse.*

The indorsement without recourse is in form of words, "Without recourse," or "Sans recourse," or "At the indorsee's own risk,"<sup>45</sup> or "I hereby indorse and transfer my right and interest in this bill to C D, or order, but with this express condition: that I shall not be liable to him or to any subsequent holder for the acceptance or payment of the bill."<sup>46</sup> Such indorsements throw no discredit on the bill.<sup>47</sup> Such an indorser does not escape from the effect of the warranties, as explained hereafter.<sup>48</sup> The promisee of a negotiable bill or note indorses it to a third person, merely stipulating that, as the indorser, he is not to be responsible if the acceptor or maker

<sup>45</sup> *RICE v. STEARNS*, 3 Mass. 225; *RICHARDSON v. LINCOLN*, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 201; *Fitchburg Bank v. Greenwood*, 2 Allen (Mass.) 434; *Welch v. Lindo*, 7 Cranch, 159; *Mott v. Hicks*, 1 Cow. 513; *Craft v. Fleming*, 46 Pa. St. 140; *STEVENSON v. O'NEAL*, 71 Ill. 314; *Walter v. Kirk*, 14 Ill. 55.

<sup>46</sup> *Chit. Bills*, 235. As against his immediate indorsee, an indorser may prove a collateral agreement that the indorsement should be without recourse. *PIKE v. STREET*, 1 Moody & M. 226; *Davis v. Brown*, 94 U. S. 423; 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 836; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 779.

<sup>47</sup> *LOMAX v. PICOT*, 2 Rand. (Va.) 260.

<sup>48</sup> *Frazer v. D'Invilliers*, 2 Pa. St. 200; *HANNUM v. RICHARDSON*, 48 Vt. 508; *DUMONT v. WILLIAMSON*, 18 Ohio St. 516; *CHALLISS v. McCRUM*, 22 Kan. 157.

does not pay it. This he may do, because he has the property in the bill or note, and he may dispose of it on what terms he pleases. Such an indorsement does not render the negotiable security no longer negotiable.<sup>49</sup> The bill or note remains negotiable in the hands of the indorsee, although he has no remedy against the indorser without recourse. And, into whose hands soever the bill or note may come, the maker is still liable according to the terms of his original contract.<sup>50</sup> The question with the courts in construing indorsements without recourse is whether the words of the indorsement are such that they clearly express an intention on the part of the indorser not to be bound, and a corresponding intention on the part of the immediate subsequent indorsees, evidenced by their acceptance of the instrument with such an indorsement, to exempt the indorser from his liability.<sup>51</sup> The presumption is rather that the usual liability of an indorser is intended to be incurred. And, to overcome this, it must clearly appear that the transfer of the instrument was only to transfer the title to it, and not to indemnify the indorsee against loss in case it was not paid by the acceptor or maker.<sup>52</sup>

#### *Conditional Indorsement.*

The conditional indorsement is a device by which a payee or an indorsee may part with the possession of an instrument, but not with the legal title to it. Mr. Daniel instances "Pay to A B, or order, if he arrives at 21 years of age," or "Pay to A B, or order, unless before payment I give you notice to the contrary," as examples of conditional indorsements, the former being an indorsement upon a condition precedent, and the latter one upon a condition subsequent.<sup>53</sup> These conditional indorsements have not come very often before the courts, but they are recognized as a distinct class. It may be said, by way of criticism, that in them commercial convenience has overridden the strict theory of negotiability. This theory would not permit to exist a con-

<sup>49</sup> RUSSELL v. BALL, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 50; BORDEN v. CLERK, 26 Mich. 410. Post, p. 124.

<sup>50</sup> RICE v. STEARNS, 3 Mass. 225.

<sup>51</sup> Fassin v. Hubbard, 55 N. Y. 465.

<sup>52</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 68, which declares the law as above stated. Cf. § 74. See ante, p. 109.

<sup>53</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 697.

dition which charged every subsequent indorsee with the duty of seeing whether the condition had been fulfilled before he could legally own the instrument. For, certainly, with the conditional indorsement, as well as with the conditional bill or note, it would be a most effective restriction to circulation as a medium of payment. With this criticism in mind, it is well to note the authority usually referred to as the leading case upon the subject,—**ROBERTSON v. KENSINGTON**.<sup>54</sup> There this indorsement was made upon an ordinary draft: "Pay the within sum to Messrs. Clerk & Ross, or order, upon my name appearing in the 'Gazette' as ensign in any regiment of the line, between the 1st and 64th, if within two months from this date." This was transferred to bona fide holders, and the acceptors paid the bill on its maturity to one of these. In the meantime the indorser's name had never appeared in the Gazette as an ensign, and he brought suit as the payee of the bill against the acceptors who had accepted the bill after this indorsement had been written upon it. And it is to be inferred from the report of the case that the court decided that such an indorsement was only a conditional transfer of the absolute interest in the bill, and, its condition never having been performed, the transfer was defeated. As appears from the cases, the point emphasized is that the condition operates as notice, and, being merely a notice, it does not destroy the negotiability of the bill or note. Thus, where a note in usual form had these words upon it, signed by the makers, "The within obligation is to be delivered to the payees of the note as a consideration for a judgment which was to be assigned to the makers,"<sup>55</sup> the court properly said the words were no part of the note. Their effect was only to show the consideration, and to operate as a notice to any person who might purchase the note. By this was meant that it was the intention of the parties that it was not to affect the original contract. And in cases of conditional indorsement, when it is not the intention of the original parties that the main instrument should be contingent, the act of the conditional indorser is not to be understood as operating to change the main instrument. The terms of the face of the instrument still remain an absolute negotiable order or promise of payment to some one. That

<sup>54</sup> **ROBERTSON v. KENSINGTON**, 4 Taunt. 30.

<sup>55</sup> **Sanders v. Bacon**, 8 Johns. 485; **Tappan v. Ely**, 15 Wend. 363.



some one might in turn negotiate the bill or note to some one else, who in his turn might continue his negotiation until it came to the conditional indorser. But he, on parting with it, having the right of property in himself, might make a special contract which would be distinct from the contract embodied on the face of the instrument. And the only purpose and result of this contract would be to notify every holder subsequent to himself, and the maker or acceptor, when the time for the payment of the instrument arrived, that he as an indorser parted with the instrument upon the understanding that his ownership of it was not to cease until some stated condition was fulfilled. As between the immediate indorser and indorsee, there can be little doubt that this is a correct and proper rule. As to them the contract of indorsement is but an ordinary contract, open to all objections and defenses to which other contracts are open. Some of these objections and defenses may even be shown by parol evidence.<sup>56</sup> This is because the contract consists partly of the written indorsement, partly of the act of delivery of the bill to the indorsee, and partly of the mutual intention with which the delivery is made by the indorser and received by the indorsee.<sup>57</sup> But when the question is not one between the immediate indorser and indorsee, but between that indorser or indorsee and third parties holding in good faith and for value, it becomes much more embarrassing. It is clear that parol evidence or evidence of intention cannot be allowed to ingraft a condition upon the instrument such that it will affect third parties.<sup>58</sup> But where the indorsement is in writing, the rule is so far settled that the maker or acceptor and probably prior parties are bound to take notice of the title of the indorsee, and, having such notice, they pay the instrument to him or to subsequent parties at the risk of repayment to the conditional indorser, if the condition is unfulfilled.<sup>59</sup> But, on

<sup>56</sup> *Bookstaver v. Jayne*, 60 N. Y. 146; *Sawyer v. Chambers*, 44 Barb. 42. See Daniel, *Neg. Inst.* §§ 717, 723, as to classification of defenses which may be shown by parol evidence. *BENEDICT v. COWDEN*, 49 N. Y. 396; *HARTLEY v. WILKINSON*, 4 Maule & S. 25; *Cholmeley v. Darley*, 14 Mees. & W. 343; *Leeds v. Lancashire*, 2 Camp. 205.

<sup>57</sup> *Bruce v. Wright*, 3 Hun (N. Y.) 548; *BENTON v. MARTIN*, 52 N. Y. 570; *Prentiss v. Graves*, 33 Barb. 621; *Ocean Bank v. Dill*, 39 Barb. 577.

<sup>58</sup> *Byles, Bills*, p. 155; *Willse v. Whitaker*, 22 Hun, 242.

<sup>59</sup> *ROBERTSON v. KENSINGTON*, 4 Taunt. 80; *Savage v. Aldren*, 2 Starkie,



the other hand, the conditional indorser cannot restrict the negotiability of the instrument and prevent its further indorsement by his indorsee.<sup>60</sup> The terms of the original instrument making it negotiable prevail, and persons other than the conditional indorsee may take it subject to the notice of the condition. And though there is little, if any, authority upon the point, still it may be assumed that in the absence of an express warranty no other than a conditional warranty of title in the subsequent indorser would be implied.<sup>61</sup> There seems to be no reason why the other implied warranties should not remain a part of the contract. But the notice of a conditional title with which the subsequent purchaser of the instrument would be charged would seem to expressly except warranty of title from the obligations of the indorser.

### *Restrictive Indorsement.*

The last of these peculiar classes of indorsements originating in the needs of commerce is the restrictive indorsement. It is of two kinds.<sup>62</sup> The first and commonest variety, and the one which is generally spoken of by the text writers as the restrictive indorsement, is that where the holder deposes to some other person the

232. "Where an indorsement is conditional, a party required to pay the instrument may disregard the condition, and make payment to the indorsee or his transferee, whether the condition has been fulfilled or not. But any person to whom an instrument so indorsed is negotiated will hold the same, or the proceeds thereof, subject to the rights of the person indorsing conditionally." Neg. Inst. L. § 69. This section alters the law. See Huffcut, Neg. Inst. 24.

<sup>60</sup> Soares v. Glyn, 8 Q. B. 24; s. c. 14 L. J. Q. B. 313.

<sup>61</sup> Mandeville v. Newton, 119 N. Y. 10, 23 N. E. 920.

<sup>62</sup> "An indorsement is restrictive which either (1) prohibits the further negotiation of the instrument; or (2) constitutes the indorsee the agent of the indorser; or (3) vests the title in the indorsee in trust for or to the use of some other person. But the mere absence of words implying power to negotiate does not make an indorsement restrictive." Neg. Inst. L. § 66. The first and second subdivisions cover the first class of indorsements discussed in this paragraph, the third subdivision the second class. "A restrictive indorsement confers upon the indorsee the right (1) to receive payment of the instrument; (2) to bring any action thereon that the indorser could bring; (3) to transfer his rights as such indorsee, where the form of the indorsement authorizes him to do so. But all subsequent indorsees acquire only the title of the first indorsee under the restrictive indorsement." Id. § 67. This section declares the law substantially as stated in this paragraph.

business of collecting the bill; the other where the holder indorses the instrument to one person for the use or benefit of, or as the trustee of, another. Upon an indorsement of the first kind the instrument is no longer negotiable; the second variety of indorsement does not, however, restrict its circulation. Examples of the first species of indorsement are indorsements "For collection,"<sup>63</sup> the indorsement for collection meaning that the holder takes no title to it and can transfer none, but can merely present it and receive the money upon it.<sup>64</sup> In construing these and other cases like them, such as "Pay to A only,"<sup>65</sup> or "Pay to A for my use,"<sup>66</sup> or "Pay to A for me,"<sup>67</sup> or "Pay to my steward and no other person," or "Pay to my servant for my use,"<sup>68</sup> the courts have been governed by two principles. The first and most important is the reason that the natural construction of such a form of words is that it implies a mere authority to receive the money called for in the instrument for the use of the indorser himself, or according to his directions. It therefore vests a mere agency in the indorsee, and shows that he, at least, did not give a valuable consideration for the bill or note and is not therefore its absolute owner. It follows from this that the restrictive indorser, in creating such an agency, did not intend to pass the title to the indorsee, but rather to retain it in himself. And hence, there being no intention to transfer, the instrument cannot be negotiated through the indorsement.<sup>69</sup> The second is the reason that

<sup>63</sup> *National City Bank of Brooklyn v. Westcott*, 118 N. Y. 468, 23 N. E. 900; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 726. It is generally held, however, that indorsement "for deposit" passes title. *National Com. Bank v. Miller*, 77 Ala. 168; *Wasson v. Lamb*, 120 Ind. 514, 22 N. E. 729; *Security Bank v. Fuel Co.*, 58 Minn. 141, 59 N. W. 987. *Beal v. City of Somerville*, 1 C. C. A. 598, 50 Fed. 647, contra.

<sup>64</sup> *SIGOURNEY v. LLOYD*, 8 Barn. & C. 622; *LLOYD v. SIGOURNEY*, 5 Bing. 525; *WHITE v. BANK*, 102 U. S. 658. The indorsee "for collection" may bring suit in his own name. *Boyd v. Corblitt*, 37 Mich. 52; *Wilson v. Tolson*, 79 Ga. 137, 3 S. E. 900; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 726. *Rock County Nat. Bank v. Hollister*, 21 Minn. 385 (under statute requiring action to be prosecuted in name of real party in interest), contra. See *COMMERCIAL BANK v. ARMSTRONG*, 148 U. S. 50, 13 Sup. Ct. 533.

<sup>65</sup> *POWER v. FINNIE*, 4 Call (Va.) 411.

<sup>66</sup> *LLOYD v. SIGOURNEY*, 5 Bing. 525.

<sup>67</sup> *Williams v. Potter*, 72 Ind. 354.

<sup>68</sup> *EDIE v. EAST INDIA CO.*, 2 Burrows, 1221.

<sup>69</sup> *HOOK v. PRATT*, 78 N. Y. 371.

the restrictive indorsement, like the conditional indorsement, operates as notice both to the persons called upon to pay the instrument and those who might acquire it after the indorsement as purchasers. No subsequent purchaser could take the instrument in good faith, because whoever reads the indorsement, as it would be every purchaser's legal duty to read it, must see that its operation was limited. Such a purchaser must see that the object of the indorser was to prevent the money received from being applied to the use of any other person than himself. And therefore, to whomsoever the money might be paid, it would be paid in trust for the indorser, and wheresoever the instrument traveled it carried that trust on the face of it.<sup>70</sup> But there is a class of so-called restrictive indorsements which has a very different construction at the hands of the courts. The words in which these indorsements are framed are such as "Pay to A or order for the use of B,"<sup>71</sup> and "Pay to the order of A for the benefit of B."<sup>72</sup> The meaning of these words is

<sup>70</sup> LLOYD v. SIGOURNEY, 5 Bing. 525. In this case the indorsement was to this effect: "Pay to S. W., or order, for my use. Henry Sigourney." It was held that such indorsement was restrictive, and was sufficient to put a purchaser of such bill upon inquiry, since it indicates that the holder is simply acting as the agent for the one for whose use he is holding. ANCHER v. BANK OF ENGLAND, 2 Doug. 637.

<sup>71</sup> EVANS v. CRAMLINGTON, Carth. 5, affirmed in the exchequer chamber, 2 Vent. 309.

<sup>72</sup> HOOK v. PRATT, 78 N. Y. 371. In this case the payee, who was also drawer, of a draft indorsed it to the order of Mrs. Mary Hook "for the benefit of her son Charlie." In an action by her, as trustee of her son, against the executors of the drawer, it was held that she could maintain the action. Rapallo, J., said: "She was constituted trustee of her son, and held the legal title. The indorsement gave notice of the trust, so that, if she had passed it off for her own debt, or in any other manner indicating that the transfer was in violation of the trust, her transferee would take it subject to the trust, but there was nothing reserved to the drawer and indorser. \* \* \* The presumption is that the draft was drawn and indorsed by him for a consideration received either from the indorsee or the beneficiary." See ante, p. 74. In TREUTTEL v. BARANDON, 8 Taunt. 100, the indorsement was in form "Pay to A or order for account of B" (a third person). This would seem to transfer the legal title to A in trust for B, yet it was held that B could maintain trover for the value of the bill against one with whom A had deposited it for cash advances. This bill was properly negotiable, like the draft in HOOK v. PRATT, subject to the trust. "The plaintiff, who was cestui que

declared to be that on making such an indorsement the indorser intended to part with his whole title to the instrument. At least there is nothing in the words themselves to negative such a presumption. And it perhaps is the case, though it is not so expressly stated, that, unless there was some expression negating this idea, the words "or order," taken with the fact of the indorsement itself, would be an evidence of intendment to part with the title. However this may be, the courts have declared the meaning of the words "for the use" and "for the benefit" to mean that the indorser vested the indorsee with the title of the bill, not for the benefit of the indorser, but for the benefit of some one else. So that the indorsee was a trustee for that other person, and could not pass off the bill for his own debt. For this reason the indorsement must be presumed to have been made upon a consideration. And being thus a transfer, with its operation limited to the right of the indorsee to apply its proceeds to the benefit of some person other than himself, the instrument could in turn be transferred, and so the paper continued negotiable. And because it was negotiable it was a pledge of the credit of the restrictive indorser. It is settled that an indorsement "Pay to A" does not restrict the negotiation of the instrument, because the intention of the original parties to make the instrument negotiable prevails over the absence of words of negotiability in the indorsement.<sup>73</sup> And for the same reason, with these forms of words the instrument should continue negotiable unless it expressly appears from the contract between the indorser and indorsee that the indorser intended to absolve himself from liability as an indorser and to destroy the effect of the general rule that the indorsee, having possession of the instrument, was its owner.<sup>74</sup>

trust, seems clearly to have misconceived his action in bringing trover against his trustee; but the point was not taken." 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 837.

<sup>73</sup> EDIE v. EAST INDIA CO., 1 W. Bl. 295, 2 Burrows, 1216; MORE v. MANNING, Comyn, 311; LEAVITT v. PUTNAM, 3 N. Y. 494. Ante, p. 116.

<sup>74</sup> While these views seem sound, it must be admitted that the distinction between these two classes of restrictive indorsements is not always clearly recognized by the text-books. See Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 698, 699; Edw. Bills & N. § 395; Tied. Com. Paper, § 268; Rand. Com. Paper, §§ 724-727. But see 2 Ames, Bills & N. p. 837.

**NATURE OF INDORSEMENT.**

**65. The nature of an indorsement is as follows: It is**

**(a) A contract which the indorser assumes with his indorsee and subsequent holders that, if the drawee, acceptor, or maker fails to honor the bill or note, he will, upon the performance of certain conditions imposed by the law merchant, indemnify the holder for all loss incurred by reason of the dishonor of the bill or note.**

**(b) A transfer of the title to the instrument."**

Perhaps the most important aspect of the indorsement is that it is a distinct contract. It gives it all the effect of a new instrument as against the indorser, though it does not in fact create a new instrument. Every indorser of a bill is a new drawer, and it is a part of the inherent property of the original instrument that an indorsement operates as against the indorser in the nature of a new drawing of the bill by him.<sup>76</sup> The first legal fact of the theory with which the student should familiarize himself is that, from the form of words which we have already given as common methods of indorsement, the courts have created a peculiar class of rights and liabilities. The main terms of the contract are found on the face of the bill or note. In the illustrations under §§ 12 and 13, for example, the main terms were an order or promise to pay at a given time and place a certain sum of money, either to some specified person or to such person as he might direct. The indorser in his contract adopts and ratifies each of these terms, and makes them the main terms of his own contract. This idea will perhaps be made more clear by saying that if, in the illustration under § 13, John Smith had indorsed the note: "Pay to John Jones. [Signed] John Smith,"—John Jones could negotiate it further, despite the indorsement was not in the negotiable form of "Pay to Jones, or

<sup>75</sup> 2 Ames, Bills & N. p. 837.

<sup>76</sup> PENNY v. INNES, 1 Crompt., M. & R. 439; McCamant v. Miners' Trust Co. Bank, 15 Wkly. Notes Cas. (Pa.) 122.

order." This is because, by the terms on the face of the instrument, the maker, Thomas Robinson, had promised to pay "to order." This means that he had put into circulation a promise to pay money not only to John Smith, but to any one who might legally hold the instrument. And, except in case of John Smith's making a restrictive indorsement to an agent without intention on his part to transfer title, the indorsement of John Smith would be construed only as an adoption of the promise of Thomas Robinson, which was that the note might pass from hand to hand *ad infinitum*, until Robinson paid it.<sup>77</sup>

But there is more embodied in the contract of the indorser than the terms which are found in the face of the instrument. And these are the terms which are implied in and made a part of the contract by the law. As we have seen, a part of the contract of the indorser is that it is a contract of indemnity.<sup>78</sup> The right to this indemnity accrues only upon the fulfillment of certain conditions which are conditions precedent to its enforcement.<sup>79</sup> It is not, like the guaranty of payment, for instance, payable absolutely, primarily, and forthwith. The indorser is in law a new drawer of the bill and a new maker of the note.<sup>80</sup> In either instance with reference to his indorsee he stands precisely in the position of the drawer of the bill or the maker of the note. If the instrument be a bill he may be supposed to have assets in the hands of the drawee and to give the indorsee an order for the payment of them. In the case of a

<sup>77</sup> *LEAVITT v. PUTNAM*, 3 N. Y. 494; *EDIE v. EAST INDIA CO.*, 1 W. BL 295, 2 Burrows, 1216.

<sup>78</sup> Byles, Bills, p. 154; Edw. Neg. Inst. § 384; Story, Prom. Notes, § 135.

<sup>79</sup> *MUSSON v. LAKE*, 4 How. (U. S.) 262; *Cuyler v. Stevens*, 4 Wend. 568; *Cayuga Co. Bank v. Warden*, 1 N. Y. 413.

<sup>80</sup> *AYMAR v. SHELDON*, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 439. In this case the following was held: No principle seems more fully settled or better understood in commercial law, than that the contract of the indorser is a new and independent contract, and that the extent of his obligations is determined by it. The transfer by indorsement is equivalent in effect to the drawing of the bill. In *GWINNELL v. HERBERT* a distinction is drawn between a bill and a note, to the effect that on a bill each indorser is a new drawer, but the drawer is liable only on default of the acceptor, while the maker of a note is liable in the first instance. So, if each indorser became a maker, he also would be liable primarily. 5 Adol. & E. 436. *Holbrook v. Vibbard*, 2 Scam. (Ill.) 465; *Belford v. Bangs*, 15 Ill. App. 76.

note the considerations existing between the payee and the maker may be supposed to exist between him and his indorsee. But he does not by his contract assume liability affecting his general funds until the consideration existing between the original parties shall have failed. By this is to be understood that by the mere non-payment of the instrument in the first instance the indorser breaks no contract, because his contract is separate and apart from that of the original parties.<sup>81</sup> The contract which the law puts into his mouth when he writes his name on the back of the instrument is payment on his part according to the terms of the original instrument, with the added conditions of due presentment, dishonor, and notice of dishonor. His contract therefore is that his general funds are liable according to the original terms of the instrument and indemnity for their breach, provided there have been due and proper presentment, dishonor, and notice of dishonor by the holder.<sup>82</sup>

*As a Transfer.*

The last general element of an indorsement is that it is a transfer of the title to the instrument.<sup>83</sup> It is sufficient here to say, in general terms, that by this is meant nothing more than that it is a mere purchase and sale of a piece of property. The indorser or transferer is viewed in many respects as a vendor, and the indorsee or transferee as a vendee. It is, of course, not tangible property, but a chose in action, and as such transferee or vendee the indorsee merely purchases the rights of the indorser. What these are, and

<sup>81</sup> In *ROTHSCHILD v. CURRIE*, it was held that the indorser contracts to pay not primarily or absolutely, but on two conditions: dishonor by drawee or acceptor; and due notification to himself of such dishonor. Being in law a new drawer of the bill, the same state of things is supposed to exist between him and the indorsee, as the law supposes between the drawer and payee. 1 Q. B. 43. In *MATTHEWS v. BLOXSOME*, 33 Law J. 209, the defendant, intending to become surety for A, put his name at the back of a blank bill stamp. The bill was then filled up by plaintiffs as drawers, payable to their own order. As he gave authority to fill out the bill, the defendant was in the same position as an indorser after the bill had been drawn, and might be treated as a new drawer. 33 Law J. Q. B. 209.

<sup>82</sup> *MT. MANSFIELD HOTEL CO. v. BAILEY*, 64 Vt. 151, 24 Atl. 136; *Id.*, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 109; *May v. Coffin*, 4 Mass. 341; *Warder v. Tucker*, 7 Mass. 449; *Bryant v. Farles*, 15 Ill. App. 414.

<sup>83</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 60.



the legal relation of the indorsee to the various parties to the instrument, will be considered hereafter.

### REQUISITES OF INDORSEMENT.

**66. The requisites of an indorsement are as follows:**

- (a) It must follow the tenor of the bill or note.
- (b) It must be by the payee or a subsequent holder.
- (c) It is only complete upon delivery.

#### *Following Tenor of Instrument.*

The tenor of a bill or note has already been explained, under § 43. The same reasons require that the indorsement follow the tenor of the original instrument that require that the acceptance follow it. The indorser, as well as the acceptor, may not alter the amount of money<sup>84</sup> obligated in the instrument to be paid, nor the time,<sup>85</sup> place, or manner of payment. If, for instance, the indorser ordered payment of part of the sum called for in the original instrument to one person, and part to another, it would amount to an apportionment of the contract, and the acceptor or maker would thus, by the indorser's act, be liable to two actions where, by the terms of the original contract, he was liable to but one.<sup>86</sup> Were the rule otherwise, the indorser would be empowered to make a contract for the maker or acceptor without his assent,—a *reductio ad absurdum*. But this does not mean that, when an instrument has been paid in part, a receipt for the amount paid may not be written

<sup>84</sup> *HAWKINS v. CARDY*, 1 Ld. Raym. 360. In this case it was shown that Cardy drew a bill for £46. 19s., payable to B or order, and that B indorsed £43. 4s. of it payable to plaintiff. It was held by the court that the note was such a personal contract as not to be capable of apportionment. *Planters' Bank of Tennessee v. Evans*, 36 Tex. 592.

<sup>85</sup> In *SMALLWOOD v. VERNON*, 1 Strange, 478, it was held that an indorser might charge himself to pay at a different time from that specified in the note, though he could not lay a charge upon the maker of a note, differing from the terms of such note. If a note were payable May 1st and it was indorsed payable April 1st, this would make it a promissory note payable, as to the indorser, April 1st.

<sup>86</sup> *Douglass v. Wilkeson*, 6 Wend. 637; *HUGHES v. KIDDELL*, 2 Bay (S. C.) 324. See Neg. Inst. L. § 62.



on its back, and the indorser may not transfer the balance,<sup>87</sup> nor that a note may not be transferred to two or more persons, who hold it in co-ownership as a joint right,<sup>88</sup> nor that an instrument may not be indorsed to a third person as collateral security for a claim equaling but part of the amount called for in the instrument itself.<sup>89</sup> All these are perfectly proper courses, because they transfer but one right of action. The test is, does the transfer cut up the right of action, or vary it, or invest different persons with different rights of action against different parties to the instrument? If it does, the indorsement is void as such.

It is sometimes argued that a writing on the back of the instrument, in the form of words of a guaranty, corresponds to and follows the tenor and purpose of the instrument, and that for this reason it is a form of indorsement. But the better opinion is that its legal effect is what it purports to be,—a form of a special contract. A guaranty in general terms, such as "I warrant the collection of the within note, for value received," is not an indorsement.<sup>90</sup> Whether a guaranty on a negotiable bill or note is itself negotiable is a question concerning which there is much confusion.<sup>91</sup> On the one hand it is held by some cases that the guaranty does not fall within the rule of negotiability, and can inure only to the benefit of the person to whom it was given.<sup>92</sup> On the other hand it is held in some jurisdictions that the guaranty passes with the instrument, and inures to the benefit of the holder.<sup>93</sup> In this view, in states where choses in action are assignable, and an action must be brought by the real party in interest, suit may be brought by the holder upon the guaranty in his own name.<sup>94</sup> But, even where the latter rule prevails, it cannot be said that the guaranty is strictly "negotiable," inas-

<sup>87</sup> *Douglass v. Wilkeson*, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 637.

<sup>88</sup> *FLINT v. FLINT*, 6 Allen (Mass.) 36; *CONOVER v. EARL*, 26 Iowa, 167.

<sup>89</sup> *Reid v. Furnival*, 5 Car. & P. 499.

<sup>90</sup> Ante, p. 109.

<sup>91</sup> Daniel, *Neg. Inst.* §§ 1774–1778; *Rand. Com. Paper*, §§ 860, 861.

<sup>92</sup> *TRUE v. FULLER*, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 140; *Tinker v. McCauley*, 3 Mich. 188; *McDoal v. Yeomans*, 8 Watts (Pa.) 361; *Irish v. Cutter*, 31 Me. 536; *Hayden v. Weldon*, 43 N. J. Law, 128. See *Para. Notes & B.* 133, 134.

<sup>93</sup> *Webster v. Cobb*, 17 Ill. 466; *Phelps v. Church*, 65 Mich. 232, 32 N. W. 20; *Story, Bills*, § 458.

<sup>94</sup> *COOPER v. DEDRICK*, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 516; *Cole v. Bank*, 60 Ind. 350:

much as only the rights of the party to whom the guaranty was given can pass to subsequent holders, and it would still be subject to defenses existing between the original parties.<sup>95</sup>

*Who may Indorse.*

The requisite of an indorsement next in importance to its being according to the tenor of the instrument is that it be by the payee or a subsequent holder.<sup>96</sup> The sense of this rule is, however, restricted. As we shall see in the next section, a person who is not a holder or owner of the instrument in any sense, but who puts his name upon it merely to support its circulation by his credit, may incur liability as a so-called "irregular indorser." All that we would here say is that in case of instruments payable to order the payee must be in the first instance the first indorser.<sup>97</sup>

*Harbord v. Cooper*, 43 Minn. 466, 45 N. W. 860; *Phelps v. Sargent*, 69 Minn. 118, 71 N. W. 927.

<sup>95</sup> *Gallagher v. White*, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 92; *Omaha Nat. Bank v. Walker* (C. C.) 5 Fed. 399; *BARLOW v. MYERS*, 64 N. Y. 41; 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 225, note 1; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 861. See *CENTRAL TRUST CO. v. BANK*, 101 U. S. 70. *Webster v. Cobb*, 17 Ill. 466, contra.

<sup>96</sup> An apparent exception exists in the case of an instrument drawn or indorsed to the order of a person as "cashier" of a bank, and perhaps as other managing officer of a corporation. Ante, p. 66, note 77. In such case either the bank or corporation or the officer may indorse. *First Nat. Bank v. Hall*, 44 N. Y. 395; *FOLGER v. CHASE*, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 63; *Baldwin v. Bank*, 1 Wall. 239. See *Neg. Inst. L.* § 72, which makes the rule applicable to a "cashier or other fiscal officer of a bank or corporation." Cf. *Id.* § 37. As to indorsement by a payee or indorsee whose name is misspelled or wrongly designated, see *Neg. Inst. L.* § 73. "Where an instrument is payable to the order of two or more payees or indorsees who are not partners, all must indorse, unless the one indorsing has authority to indorse for the others." *Neg. Inst. L.* § 71. This states the common-law rule. If one undertakes to indorse, he transfers only his interest by way of equitable assignment. *CARVICK v. VICKERY*, 2 Doug. 653; *SMITH v. WHITING*, 9 Mass. 334; *Dwight v. Pease*, 3 McLean, 94, Fed. Cas. No. 4,217; *Daniel*, *Neg. Inst.* §§ 684, 701a.

<sup>97</sup> *COCK v. FELLOWS*, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 143; *PREVOT v. ABBOTT*, 1 Taunt. 786. In this case the plaintiff averred delivery to him by the defendant, and also the facts of acceptance, presentment for payment, and dishonor. Judgment for plaintiff was arrested after verdict for the reason that indorsement by the defendant had not been averred. *Pease v. Hirst*, 10 Barn. & C. 122; *Freeman v. Perry*, 22 Conn. 617; *Newman v. Ravenscroft*, 67 Ill. 496;

This is because of several reasons. The first is that the property of the instrument is in the payee.<sup>98</sup> Until he indorses it, the legal title is not transferred.\* Mere possession by some one else of the instrument unindorsed does not entitle that other person to the full rights of a bona fide purchaser, and if the maker or acceptor pays it to such person, it is at the risk of possible re-payment.<sup>99</sup> But this rule is not universal in its application. An indorsement is only necessary to transfer the legal as distinguished from the equitable title to the paper. If by mistake, accident, or fraud, the indorsement has been omitted, when it was intended that the indorsement should be made, the payee may be compelled by a court of equity to make the indorsement. Meantime the transferee holds the bill or note under the same rights that he would have acquired under the assignment of paper not negotiable. In other words, he is the beneficial owner, and has those rights and only those rights against prior parties which the payee or his assignor might have,—and every equitable defense available against them is available against him.<sup>100</sup> This rule applies to subsequent holders. In cases of indorsements in full, the indorsee in such indorsement named must for the same reasons himself indorse the instrument. In no other way will the

**Woodbury v. Woodbury**, 47 N. H. 11; **Lewis v. Hathman**, 7 Ind. 585; **Titcomb v. Thomas**, 5 Greenl. 282; **Pease v. Dwight**, 6 How. (U. S.) 190.

<sup>98</sup> An infant who is holder or payee of a note or bill may transfer it by indorsement. **HARDY v. WATERS**, 38 Me. 450, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 152; **SPENCER v. ALLERTON**, 60 Conn. 410, 22 Atl. 778; *Id.*, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 120; **BANK OF JAMAICA v. JEFFERSON**, 92 Tenn. 537, 22 S. W. 211; *Id.*, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 126.

\* **Ellis v. Brown**, 6 Barb. 282.

<sup>99</sup> **Doubleday v. Kress**, 50 N. Y. 410.

<sup>100</sup> **HARROP v. FISHER**, 9 Wkly. Rep. 667, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 196; **Hedges v. Sealy**, 9 Barb. 214; **Freund v. Importers' & Traders' Nat. Bank**, 6 Thomp. & C. 236; **WOODWORTH v. HUNTOON**, 40 Ill. 131, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 150; **Minor v. Bewick**, 55 Mich. 491, 22 N. W. 12. Subsequent indorsement does not place him in a better position in this respect if after maturity, or if he had in the meantime acquired notice of existing equities. **WHISTLER v. FORSTER**, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 248; **OSGOOD'S ADM'RS v. ARTT** (C. C.) 17 Fed. 575. Cf. Neg. Inst. L. § 79. This section provides that in cases of transfer without indorsement "the transfer vests in the transferee such title as the transferror had therein and the transferee acquires, in addition, the right to have the indorsement of the transferror." "It establishes the equitable rule as the rule at law." **Huffcut**, Neg. Inst. 26. See, also, *post*, p. 200.

transfer convey the legal title to the holder, so that he can at law hold the other parties liable to him. The second reason rests upon the theory that the liability of indorsers to each other is regulated by the position of their names. This reason also is restricted in its application. To this rule, too, the irregular indorser, who has not owned the paper, and to whom no such transfer has been made, is also an exception;<sup>101</sup> although, of course, where the second accommodation indorser of an instrument has paid and taken it up, he becomes a holder for value, and may compel the first accommodation indorser to pay him, although both are accommodation indorsers.<sup>102</sup> But, leaving aside the doctrine of irregular indorsements, the contract which each indorser makes when he indorses the paper is that he is liable to every subsequent indorsee, just as every antecedent party is liable to him. The liability is several. It is successive. And the object of the rule is only to maintain these indorsements in the regular order of their liability. It does not go further than this. Thus where<sup>103</sup> A made a note payable to B or order, and B afterwards indorsed the note to C, who afterwards indorsed it to B again, the court, upon suit by B against C, refused a recovery because it was a prior indorser calling upon a subsequent one; and the inference of the decision is that this course was not allowed because it involved circuitry of action. One who has indorsed a bill or note, and become liable as indorser, cannot, as a rule, on having the instrument reindorsed to him by the other, bring an action against him on the indorsement, for the intermediate indorsee would have his remedy over, and the result of the action would be to place the parties in precisely the same situation as before any action at all. But if such prior indorser had indorsed without recourse, or if the circumstances otherwise negatived the right of his intermediate indorsee to sue upon the indorsement, the objection as to circuitry of action would be removed, and the prior indorser could recover under the indorsement back as indorsee.<sup>104</sup>

<sup>101</sup> *EASTERLY v. BARBER*, 66 N. Y. 433; *Greusel v. Hubbard*, 51 Mich. 95, 16 N. W. 248; *Brewer v. Boynton*, 71 Mich. 254, 39 N. W. 49.

<sup>102</sup> *Kelly v. Burroughs*, 102 N. Y. 93, 6 N. E. 109; *Holloway v. Quinn*, 18 Wkly. Notes Cas. 284.

<sup>103</sup> *BISHOP v. HAYWARD*, 4 Term R. 470.

<sup>104</sup> In *WILDERS v. STEVENS*, a bill was drawn by plaintiffs to their order,

*Necessity for Delivery.*

As in the case of the inception of the original contract rights under the principal terms of the instrument, and also under the acceptance, an indorsement requires delivery.<sup>106</sup> And the rules and reasons relating to the delivery of an indorsed instrument by the payee or indorser are in most respects the same as those already given relating to the delivery of bills and notes and of acceptances. The negotiation of the instrument begins with the act of indorsement as distinguished from the intention of the parties to indorse,<sup>106</sup> and is consummated by the delivery of the instrument and its acceptance with the intention to pass and vest title. On these simple acts the whole contract rests. The law *prima facie* presumes the other elements of contract. For example, delivery once being made and the title having once passed, these facts of themselves import a consideration.<sup>107</sup> Possession of the instruments obviates the necessity of pleading delivery, non-delivery being wholly a matter of affirmative defense.<sup>108</sup> And the term "indorsed" in pleading includes delivery for value to the indorsee.<sup>109</sup> But both indorse-

on J. H., and it was then indorsed by plaintiffs to defendant and by defendant to plaintiffs. It was claimed that circuity of action would arise from such indorsement. It was shown in the pleading that the indorsement by the defendant was to make him liable as surety, and the court held that, inasmuch as the defendant could not sue the plaintiff, the objection as to circuity being removed, the plaintiffs might recover from the defendant. 15 Mees. & W. 208. *MOORE v. CROSS*, 19 N. Y. 227; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 719. Compare *Neg. Inst. L.* § 80.

<sup>106</sup> *SPENCER v. CARSTARPHEN*, 15 Colo. 445, 24 Pac. 882; *Id.*, *Johns. Cas. Bills & N.* 117; *Pardee v. Lindley*, 31 Ill. 174; *Richards v. Darst*, 51 Ill. 140; *BADGLEY v. VOTRAIN*, 68 Ill. 25; *Kyle v. Thompson*, 2 Scam. 432. As to whether delivery is necessary to constitute an acceptance, see ante, p. 88. "Indorsement" means an indorsement completed by delivery." *Neg. Inst. L.* § 2.

<sup>106</sup> *GOSHEN NAT. BANK v. BINGHAM*, 118 N. Y. 349, 23 N. E. 180.

<sup>107</sup> *HOOK v. PRATT*, 78 N. Y. 371; *Durham v. Manrow*, 12 N. Y. 533; *Keteltas v. Myers*, 19 N. Y. 231; *RUSSELL v. WHIPPLE*, 2 Cow. 536; *Chappell v. Bissell*, 10 How. Prac. 274; *Marshall v. Rockwood*, 12 How. Prac. 452.

<sup>108</sup> *Peets v. Bratt*, 6 Barb. 662; *Lafayette Ins. Co. v. Rogers*, 30 Barb. 49.

<sup>109</sup> In the case of *MARSTON v. ALLEN*, 8 Mees. & W. 494, one Harrop, a bank accountant, drew a bill payable to himself upon defendant, who was indebted to the bank, which was accepted by defendant. The bill was signed on the back by Harrop and given to W. Marston, another employé, to keep for the

ment and delivery must concur in the transfer.<sup>110</sup> The indorsement without delivery is nothing, although the indorser has in fact signed his name and the indorsee knows that it is signed. Still the contract so far as it has gone may be revoked by the indorser, and the indorsement countermanded,<sup>111</sup> unless some contract right other than that of the indorsement itself exists in the indorsee. The delivery must be by the indorser, otherwise the transfer of the instrument is not by his order. His executor or administrator even cannot make delivery, although the payee before his decease has written his name upon it.<sup>112</sup> So, too, if a transferee of a bill or note send it back to his indorser, refusing to accept it, this is a refusal of an offer, and his subsequently getting possession of the instrument without the assent of the indorser will not invest him with title, because there was then no intention to contract present between them, and hence no contract.<sup>113</sup>

bank. It was testified by E. Marston that he received this bill, for value, from W. Marston, and that he had indorsed and delivered it for value to the plaintiff. It was held that the indorsement and delivery of the bill to W. Marston was not to him as indorsee, and was consequently not such indorsement as to transfer the bill. In *ADAMS v. JONES*, a bill drawn on and accepted by defendant was indorsed in blank by J. F. and delivered to plaintiff to deliver to R. The defendant, being acceptor, was notified by R. not to pay to plaintiff, and refused payment. On the action in assumpsit being brought, it was held that plaintiff had no title to sue, but that he held the bill only as the agent of R. 12 Adol. & E. 455. *Federick v. Winans*, 51 Wis. 472, 8 N. W. 301; *HIGGINS v. BULLOCK*, 66 Ill. 37; *Freeman's Bank v. Ruckman*, 16 Grat. 129; *Dann v. Norris*, 24 Conn. 333.

<sup>110</sup> In *BUCKLEY v. HANN*, the action was upon a bill drawn by W. and indorsed to plaintiff, and it was shown that the bill was drawn and accepted and W.'s name signed upon it, and that it was then by messenger sent to plaintiff, who lived some distance from London, W.'s residence. Under the statute requiring that the whole cause of action must arise in the city, it was held that the action could not be maintained, since indorsement was inoperative without delivery. 5 Exch. 43.

<sup>111</sup> *BRIND v. HAMPSHIRE*, 1 Mees. & W. 365.

<sup>112</sup> *BROMAGE v. LLOYD*, 1 Exch. 32; *MARSTON v. ALLEN*, 8 Mees. & W. 494.

<sup>113</sup> *Cartwright v. Williams*, 2 Starkie, 340. Thus, in the case of *BRIND v. HAMPSHIRE*, one Usher indorsed a bill, payable to himself, to the order of B., and gave it to the defendant to deliver to B. Before this had been done, Usher directed defendant not to deliver the bill. B., knowing the facts, brought

**IRREGULAR INDORSEMENTS.**

**67. A person whose name is on the back of a bill or note payable to the order of the maker or drawer, or payable to bearer, is to be deemed an indorser.**

**68. Where a person signs his name on the back of a negotiable bill or note payable to order of third person, before the signature of the payee, different rules prevail in different jurisdictions as to the liability of the irregular indorser.**

- (a) In some jurisdictions he is prima facie presumed to assume no liability to the payee, and to be a second indorser; but this presumption may be rebutted by showing that the indorsement was made to give the maker credit with the payee, and the irregular indorser then becomes liable as first indorser, upon the theory that the payee may indorse to him without recourse, and fill up the blank indorsement of the irregular indorser to himself.**
- (b) In other jurisdictions the irregular indorser is presumed to be a joint maker.**
- (c) In other jurisdictions he is presumed to be a guarantor.**
- (d) In other jurisdictions he is presumed to be an indorser.**
- (e) In other jurisdictions the liability of the irregular indorser is regulated by statute.**

**If an instrument is payable to bearer, or to order of the maker or drawer, and indorsed in blank, so that it passes by delivery, a person, not otherwise a party to the instrument, whose name ap-**

**action in trover to recover the bill. It was held that the indorsement without delivery was insufficient to give B. the right to maintain the action. There was no binding obligation between plaintiff and defendant, merely an inchoate contract. 1 Mees. & W. 365.**



pears on the back, is deemed to be an indorser only.<sup>114</sup> In such case the name of the indorser appears in its regular place upon the instrument, and is treated, as in fact it appears to be, as if it had been made by one to whom the instrument had been delivered, and who, before himself transferring it by delivery, had indorsed it in order to incur the liability of indorser to his transferee and subsequent holders. The effect of the indorsement cannot be varied by parol proof.

Where, however, an instrument bearing upon its back the signature of a person not otherwise a party is payable to the order of a specific payee, who is not the maker or drawer, a different question arises. On the one hand we are met with the objections that no one but the payee or a subsequent holder can be an indorser, and that the contract actually intended is not expressed. On the other hand it is obvious that the irregular indorser intended to assume liability of some kind, and, if the irregular indorsement was made before delivery, intended to assume liability in favor of the payee. Different courts have determined the nature of this liability in different ways, and the decisions of the courts of the various states are in hopeless conflict.

In New York, and in some other jurisdictions, a curious device has been adopted for carrying into effect the intention of the parties in such cases. The problem was to overcome the legal presumption from the face of the note that such an indorser stood in the position of a subsequent indorser to the payee. So far as the paper showed the record of the transaction, such an indorser could only be presumed to have intended to become liable as second indorser, and could only be regarded as such, and of course not liable upon the instrument to the payee, who was supposed to be the first indorser. The court, construing the instrument before it, was bound to consider the order of its transfer, as, first, from the maker or drawer to the payee; second, an indorsement by the payee to the irregular indorser as his indorsee; and, lastly,

<sup>114</sup> *Bigelow v. Colton*, 13 Gray (Mass.) 309; *Dubois v. Mason*, 127 Mass. 37; *Thacher v. Stevens*, 46 Conn. 561; *Heath v. Van Cott*, 9 Wis. 516; *ARMSTRONG v. HARSHMAN*, 61 Ind. 52; *FIRST NAT. BANK v. PAYNE*, 111 Mo. 291, 20 S. W. 41; *Hately v. Pike*, 162 Ill. 241, 44 N. E. 441; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 707a. See Neg. Inst. L. § 114.



by the irregular indorser to the subsequent indorsee on the paper. Thus, the payee could not hold such an indorser liable because he was, so far as the paper showed, his indorsee.<sup>115</sup> But the courts soon saw that carrying this doctrine to all lengths would often mean the enforcement of theory at the expense of justice, and of defeating the intent of the parties. The purpose of the irregular or anomalous indorser in making the indorsement, and of the payee in receiving the instrument with such an indorsement, was to enter into a contract of indemnity. The payee took the instrument for value because the indorser's name was there. Hence in such cases the rule was relaxed. The paper itself was held to furnish only prima facie evidence of this intention. It was competent to rebut this presumption by parol proof that the indorsement was made to give the maker credit with the payee. To meet the objection that the payee, in order to complete the chain of transfer, must needs be the first indorser, the payee, as holder, was permitted to indorse the instrument to the accommodation indorser without recourse, and to fill up the blank indorsement of the accommodation indorser to himself. In this way the parties were placed in the same position as if the maker had in the first instance delivered the note to the payee, the payee had then indorsed it without recourse to the accommodation indorser, and the accommodation indorser had then indorsed it to the payee. This, moreover, could be done at any time,—on the trial, or even, if omitted then, on an appeal. The practical effect of this course was to obviate the difficulty raised by the other rule we have just mentioned,—that, where an instrument came into the hands of a person who already appeared upon it as a payee, he could not maintain an action against any of the parties whose indorsements were subsequent to the first appearance of his name, because each of these persons, on paying him the note, would have an immediate right to demand payment from him on his earlier indorsement. The law in such case, to avoid this circuitry, denied him the right of action. But, by the intervention of this device, this defense of circuitry was not available against him, because the irregular or anomalous indorser, under his agreement of indemnity with the payee, could have no right of action against the

<sup>115</sup> *Herrick v. Carman*, 12 Johns. 159; *Tillman v. Wheeler*, 17 Johns. 325; *Bacon v. Burnham*, 37 N. Y. 614; *Phelps v. Vlscher*, 50 N. Y. 69.

payee, and, the reason failing, the rule itself fell to the ground.<sup>116</sup> It is important to notice that it is incumbent on the payee suing the indorser to show that such indorsement was made by the indorser to give credit to the note, and was taken by him because of such credit. He cannot be silent upon this point, and avail himself of the rule, for the presumption is that such an indorser is a second indorser, and not liable to the payee. The burden is upon the payee to show that, by agreement between the parties, the liability is otherwise.

But these reasons and rules do not prevail throughout the Union; nor do they prevail in England. In the rule just set forth the plain effect of the writing was overcome and contradicted by parol evidence. And many of the courts have not seen fit to flatly defy this rule of evidence. These courts have sought either to distinguish and make the case an exception to this rule of evidence, or to carry out the intention of the parties in other ways. In distinguishing the rule they have made a difference in its application to immediate and to remote parties. Between immediate parties it was thought that the indorsement in blank implied an authority to write over it anything that was in fact agreed upon by the parties. It was therefore perfectly competent both to show by parol evidence what this agreement was, and also, such agreement being shown, for the courts to carry it into effect. If the agreement was to indorse, then the writing of the name was to be an indorsement,<sup>117</sup> if to guaranty, then the writing was to be a guaranty;<sup>118</sup> and so likewise in cases of surety or joint maker.<sup>119</sup> But in case of remote

<sup>116</sup> *HALL v. NEWCOMB*, 3 Hill, 233, s. c. in error 7 Hill, 416. In this case a promissory note payable to H. was made by F. This was indorsed in blank by N. for the accommodation of F., and knowing that it was the intention of F. to obtain money from H. upon it. H. took the note and supplied the amount desired. N. was held not to be liable to H. as maker or guarantor, but to be liable as an indorser only. *MOORE v. CROSS*, 19 N. Y. 227; *COULTER v. RICHMOND*, 59 N. Y. 478; *Jaffray v. Brown*, 74 N. Y. 393; *Kamm v. Holland*, 2 Or. 59; *Wade v. Creighton*, 25 Or. 455, 36 Pac. 289; *Cady v. Shepard*, 12 Wis. 639; *BLAKESLEE v. HEWETT*, 76 Wis. 341, 44 N. W. 1105. In New York the liability of the irregular indorser is now governed by the Negotiable Instruments Law. Post, p. 143.

<sup>117</sup> *Eberhart v. Page*, 89 Ill. 550; *Mammon v. Hartman*, 51 Mo. 169.

<sup>118</sup> *Camden v. McKoy*, 3 Scam. 43; *Taylor v. French*, 2 Lea, 260.

<sup>119</sup> *Rey v. Simpson*, 22 How. 341; *Walz v. Alback*, 37 Md. 404.

parties, the same reason could not obtain. Between them there can be no mutual understanding, and therefore this rule, so far as showing by the words or acts of the parties what was meant by the writing, was rejected.<sup>120</sup> The courts then fell back upon the principle that the signature of the irregular indorser must have meant something, and that they would support his act as a contract of some sort, rather than let it fail as a void obligation. This has given rise to a chaos of conflicting authorities, but from out of it the following rules have been classified:<sup>121</sup> In some jurisdictions, for the reason that the irregular indorser is not the payee or legal holder, and hence cannot be deemed an indorser, it is held that he is presumptively a joint maker.<sup>122</sup> This rule prevails perhaps more widely than any other, though in states where it prevails the courts differ as to whether the presumption is conclusive or merely prima facie, and open to rebuttal. In other jurisdictions, while the considerations just stated have withheld the courts from treating the irregular indorser as in law an indorser, the anomalous position of the signature upon the back of the instrument has also withheld them from treating him as a maker, and they have held that he was to be presumed to be a guarantor.<sup>123</sup> Nor does this exhaust the catalogue of the different liabilities which different courts have spelled out of the anomalous indorsement. In England it seems that the anomalous indorser is not liable at all.<sup>124</sup> It is impossible in a work

<sup>120</sup> *Houston v. Bruner*, 39 Ind. 383; *Whitehouse v. Hanson*, 42 N. H. 18.

<sup>121</sup> *CROMWELL v. HEWITT*, 40 N. Y. 491, note, p. 492. The student is referred to this note, and also to the note of Prof. Ames (volume 1, p. 269) to *BOYNTON v. PIERCE*, for a large number of collated cases, which are the authority for the above statement. See, also, *Huffcut*, Neg. Inst. 479, note 1; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. §§ 707, 716.

<sup>122</sup> *UNION BANK v. WILLIS*, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 504; *Way v. Butterworth*, 108 Mass. 509; *GOOD v. MARTIN*, 95 U. S. 90; *Colburn v. Averill*, 30 Me. 310, *Schroeder v. Turner*, 68 Md. 508, 13 Atl. 331; *Gumz v. Glegling*, 108 Mich. 296, 66 N. W. 48; *Robinson v. Bartlett*, 11 Minn. 410 (Gil. 302); *Schultz v. Howard*, 63 Minn. 196, 65 N. W. 363; *Scanland v. Porter*, 64 Ark. 470, 42 S. W. 897; *Philpps v. Harding*, 17 C. C. A. 203, 70 Fed. 468.

<sup>123</sup> *Carroll v. Weld*, 13 Ill. 682; *BOYNTON v. PIERCE*, 79 Ill. 145; *Kingsland v. Koepp*, 137 Ill. 344, 28 N. E. 48; *Firman v. Blood*, 2 Kan. 496; *Lank v. Morrison*, 44 Kan. 594, 24 Pac. 1106; *Arnold v. Bryant*, 8 Bush, 668 (Ky. statute); *Lyon, Potter & Co. v. Bank*, 29 C. C. A. 45, 85 Fed. 120 (Iowa statute).

<sup>124</sup> 2 Ames, Bills & N. p. 839, citing *LECAAN v. KIRKMAN*, 6 Jur. (N. S.)

of this character to discuss at length the reasons for these various conflicting rules, or their qualifications, for they have been only broadly stated. The student must fix in his mind the general classification, and should consult in detail the authorities in his particular state.

An important step towards uniformity on this subject has already been attained by the adoption in many states of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which provides: "Where a person, not otherwise a party to an instrument, places thereon his signature in blank before delivery, he is liable as indorser in accordance with the following rules: (1) If the instrument is payable to the order of a third person, he is liable to the payee and to all subsequent parties. (2) If the instrument is payable to the order of the maker or drawer, or is payable to bearer, he is liable to all parties subsequent to the maker or drawer. (3) If he signs for the accommodation of the payee, he is liable to all parties subsequent to the payee."<sup>125</sup> This enactment has the further advantage that it abolishes so-called "presumptions," and lays down definite rules of liability, and that it probably gives expression as nearly as possible to the actual intention of the parties in such cases.

17; *Steele v. McKinlay*, 5 App. Cas. 754; *GWINNELL v. HERBERT*, 5 Adol. & E. 436.

<sup>125</sup> Neg. Inst. L. § 114. Cf. *Id.* §§ 36, subd. 6, 113, 117. See *Kohn v. Egg Co.*, 63 N. Y. Supp. 265, 30 Misc. Rep. 725 (arising under section 114). The liability of irregular indorsers had been the subject of legislation in various states prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law by some of them. See *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 714; *Rand. Com. Paper*, §§ 831, 836, 838, 839, 844.

## **CHAPTER V.**

### **OF THE NATURE OF THE LIABILITIES OF THE PARTIES.**

- 69.    **Acceptor and Maker.**
- 70.    **Facts which the Acceptor Admits.**
- 71.    **Facts which the Acceptor does not Admit.**
- 72-73. **Acceptor Supra Protest.**
- 74-76. **Drawer and Indorser.**
- 77.    **Undertaking of Drawer.**
- 78.    **Warranties of Indorser.**
- 79.    **Warranties of Indorser without Recourse—Of Transferror by Delivery.**
- 80.    **Damages against the Acceptor, Maker, Drawer, and Indorsers upon the Bill or Note and upon the Warranties.**
- 81-83. **Accommodation Parties and Persons Accommodated.**
- 83a-83b. **Conflict of Laws.**

### **ACCEPTOR AND MAKER.**

**69. The acceptor and maker each promises the payee and subsequent holders that he will pay the bill or note according to its tenor at the time of signing.\***

Under § 41, we commented upon the shifting relations of the holder with the drawer and the drawee or acceptor of a bill before and after acceptance. And in a later section we shall show that the phrase, "The acceptor of a bill and the maker of a note is the principal debtor thereon," means that as against them there is no necessity for presentment at a particular place, or of protest, or of notice of dishonor, and that all parties look to them to eventually pay the instrument. As has been shown, the bill and its acceptance amounts to a transfer to the holder of property of the drawer in the acceptor's hands to the amount of its face value. In technical phrase, there is a direct privity of contract between the holder and acceptor, and at common law an acceptance was evidence of money had and received by the acceptor to the use of the holder.<sup>1</sup>

\* See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 110, 112.

<sup>1</sup> Black v. Caffé, 7 N. Y. 281; Wolcott v. Van Santvoord, 17 Johns. 248.

The drawer is presumed to draw upon his funds in the hands of the drawee; the payee is presumed to have given a full value for the bill; and, when the drawee accepts the bill, he becomes an immediate debtor to the payee, as upon a valuable consideration paid to the drawer by the payee and by the drawer to the acceptor of the funds in the hands of the acceptor. The acceptor stands in the same relation to the payee as the maker of a note does to the indorsee; and the drawer is regarded in the light of an indorser.

But the student must not identify the acceptor of a bill and the maker of a note further than that they make the same promise to the payee and subsequent holders. Beyond this point they differ. An acceptor enters into a contract relation based upon rights or liabilities accruing to or against the drawer, payee, and perhaps indorsers. The maker can make but one contract, and that is with the payee. All other rights and liabilities arising to or against the makers of notes are merely a transfer of such as the payee himself has. But with the acceptor, there is a call for the adjustment of the conflicting rights of drawer and acceptor, drawer and payee, payee and acceptor, and perhaps of indorsers with each of these parties and with each other prior to the time of acceptance—a body of rights and liabilities distinct from any involved in the making of a note. These will be discussed therefore in the sections next following. All that is meant to say here is that there is no difference in their contract classification between the promise of the maker and that of the acceptor to pay the money called for in the instrument.<sup>2</sup> They are alike, independently of all other contract rights, *prima facie* promises to pay the instrument when it becomes due according to the tenor of the instrument.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Bull v. Sims, 23 N. Y. 570; Fairchild v. Ogdensburgh R. Co., 15 N. Y. 337; MILLER v. THOMSON, 3 Man. & G. 576; Wardens & Vestrymen of St. James Church v. Moore, 1 Ind. 289; Marion & M. R. R. v. Hodge, 9 Ind. 163.

<sup>3</sup> HOFFMAN v. BANK, 12 Wall. 181.

**FACTS WHICH THE ACCEPTOR ADMITS.**

**70. The acceptor of a bill of exchange, by the acceptance, admits as against a bona fide holder:†**

- (a) The genuineness of the drawer's signature.**
- (b) The existence of the drawer.**
- (c) The capacity of the drawer to make the draft.**
- (d) His authority to draw for the sum named.**
- (e) Where the bill is to the payee's order, that the payee was competent to make the indorsement.‡**

What are called the "warranties" of the acceptor are a phase of the legal doctrine of estoppel. "An estoppel," says Lord Coke, "is when a man is concluded by his own act or acceptance to say the truth." And with bills the acceptor is precluded from testifying in the instances given in the principal text. It may well be in case of an acceptor that his drawer had no existence, or that his signature is forged, or that the acceptor had no funds of the drawer in his hands when he accepted the bill. But the legal estoppel shuts out all evidence of these facts, and thus they cannot avail as defenses. From this rule of evidence it is but an easy step to develop a right of quasi contract. The holder of the bill may, perhaps, by the operation of this very rule, and by its operation alone, be enabled to recover the amount of the bill from the acceptor. This being established as a rule of business, it grows to be something more than a mere rule of evidence. With indorsements it becomes a distinct right on which persons may be presumed to act when they discount the instrument. With them it is not inaccurate to speak of these estoppels as warranties, or distinct stipulations created by law and embodied in the contract indorsement.§

† See Neg. Inst. L. § 112.

‡ These rules probably apply to the acceptor *supra* protest also.

§ In the case of *BANK OF COMMERCE v. UNION BANK*, it was held that the drawee was presumed to know the handwriting of the drawer, and the payment of a bill by him is an admission which the drawer may not deny as between himself and the holder. Even though such signature is discovered subsequently to be a forgery the drawee cannot recover the amount paid to an innocent holder. This rule is founded on the presumed negligence of the

As between the payee or some subsequent holder, who has taken the bill in good faith, and the acceptor, whose acceptance has given currency to the bill, the latter must bear the loss, if any arises. He may not give in evidence any of the defenses specified in the principal text.<sup>6</sup> This rule is based on sound business reasons. The acceptor's promise is a distinct and separate one to all parties who, upon the faith of it, have given value, in adjusting the equities between parties. It is more just to hold the acceptor to knowing his own correspondent with whom he has business dealings than to subject every holder who may take a bill in its circulation to loss or danger of loss from parties of whom he knows nothing. When the acceptor and the holder are each innocent, the acceptor, who had the best means of knowledge, is the more negligent of the two, and therefore the equities are against him.

PRICE v. NEAL<sup>7</sup> is usually quoted as the leading case in illustration of this. This was an action on the case by Price to recover from Neal the sum paid him on two bills of exchange, of which Price was the drawee. One of the bills had been paid by Price without a previous acceptance; and the other was first accepted, and, after acceptance, indorsed for value to the defendant, and then paid at maturity. There had been a forgery of the drawer's signature in

drawee to fail to detect an irregularity in the signature, but does not apply where the forgery is in the body of the bill. 3 N. Y. 230. And see WILKINSON v. LUTWIDGE, 1 Strange, 648. Where a forged bill of exchange was accepted and paid by the drawee, he cannot recover back from the indorsee to whom he paid. PRICE v. NEAL, 3 Burrows, 1354. An acceptor for honor does not admit the genuineness of the drawer's signature. WILKINSON v. JOHNSON, 3 Barn. & C. 428, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 83.

<sup>6</sup> Where one has made a bona fide purchase for value of a bill of exchange, before it was accepted, or before the drawee knew of its existence, the acceptor will not be estopped from showing that the drawer's signature is not genuine. In this case the acceptors had done nothing to induce the holder to believe that the signature was genuine at the time of his purchase, and consequently he had no right of action against them. MCKLEROY v. BANK, 14 La. Ann. 458; HOFFMAN v. BANK, 12 Wall. 181. As to the responsibility of a bank paying a check upon it for the genuineness of the drawer's signature, see National Bank of North America v. Bangs, 106 Mass. 441; Mackintosh v. Elliot Nat. Bank, 123 Mass. 393; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Eagle Nat. Bank, 101 Mass. 281.

<sup>7</sup> 3 Burrows, 1354.



the case of both bills. Lord Mansfield said: "It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to be satisfied that the bill drawn upon him was the drawer's hand before he accepted it or paid it; but it was not incumbent on the defendant to inquire into it." This means that it is a just and reasonable rule in the conduct of business to require the acceptor, when the bill is presented for acceptance or payment, to examine the signature of the drawer. He, better than the payee or any innocent third party, can be supposed to know the signature and handwriting of the drawer,—usually his customer or correspondent. He, rather than such party, should be held to detect the forgery, or to know the fact that he had no funds of the drawer in his hands, or that he had no legal right to enter into a binding contract; and if he fails in such examination, and acknowledges by his acceptance the genuineness of the right to make the order upon him contained in the bill, it is his neglect, and must be his loss, rather than that of any one who has taken the bill in good faith and for value.\*

These fundamental reasons, which we have given in the particular instance of forgery of the drawer's signature, have governed the courts in the other cases we have classified. Where there is no such person in fact as the drawer, then it has been decided\* that

\* *HOFFMAN v. BANK*, 12 Wall. 193; *BANK OF UNITED STATES v. BANK OF GEORGIA*, 10 Wheat. 333; *SMITH v. CHESTER*, 1 Term R. 655; *BASS v. CLIVE*, 4 Maule & S. 15; *BANK OF COMMERCE v. UNION BANK*, 3 N. Y. 230; *Goddard v. Merchants' Bank*, 4 N. Y. (4 Comst.) 149; *CANAL BANK v. BANK OF ALBANY*, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 287; *NATIONAL PARK BANK v. NINTH NAT. BANK*, 46 N. Y. 77.

\* *COOPER v. MEYER*, 10 Barn. & C. 468. In this case, the defendants accepted for the accommodation of D. bills drawn, apparently, by W., and some by U. & Co., and indorsed by the same, but in fact drawn and indorsed by D., for whom the bills were discounted by plaintiff. It was proved that the drawers and indorsers were fictitious, and that the names were written by D. It was held that defendants should not have accepted without knowing whether or not there were such persons as the supposed drawers. As they accepted without inquiry they were considered as undertaking to pay to the signature of the actual drawer. In *BASS v. CLIVE* it was held that the acceptor, before accepting a bill drawn upon him in the name of an aggregate firm, was bound to know whether the firm consisted of a plurality of persons, and when he accepted he was estopped from averring that it was not in fact drawn by an aggregate firm, since he has accredited the description by accepting the bill when so drawn. 4 Maule & S. 13.

the fair construction of the acceptor's undertaking is that he will pay to the order of the same person that signed for the drawer. He ought not to have accepted the bill without knowing whether or not there were such persons as the supposed drawers. If he chooses to accept without making the inquiry, then he must be considered as undertaking to pay to the signature of the person who actually drew the bill.

Closely connected with this is the kindred doctrine that the acceptor may not set up as a defense that the drawer had no capacity to make the draft. He may not, for instance, say that the drawer is an infant<sup>10</sup> or a lunatic or a married woman<sup>11</sup> or a bankrupt,<sup>12</sup> or that, as a corporation, the act of drawing was ultra vires.<sup>13</sup> It is no defense that the acceptor can recover nothing over against the drawer because the drawer is incapacitated to make a contract, or because the acceptor has none of the drawer's funds in his hands. The acceptor of a bill in theory is presumed to accept upon the funds of the drawer in his hands. In ordinary business affairs, the very theory of a draft implies that the acceptor is entitled to a credit as between him and the drawer on their mutual current accounts if he pays the money called for in the bill or accepts it. And so, if he accepts without funds in his hands, and upon the credit of the drawer, he must look to the drawer for his indemnity.<sup>14</sup> If the acceptor were permitted to say, "The drawer is an infant or a lunatic, and I will not pay you upon this bill because the drawer will not pay me or credit me upon our mutual account," or if he were permitted to say, "I accepted the bill for the accommodation of the drawer, and the payee or holder took it knowing it to be an accom-

<sup>10</sup> TAYLOR v. CROKER, 4 Esp. 187.

<sup>11</sup> SMITH v. MARSACK, 6 C. B. 486.

<sup>12</sup> BRAITHWAITE v. GARDINER, 8 Q. B. 473.

<sup>13</sup> HALIFAX v. LYLE, 3 Welsb., H. & G. 446. In this case a bill was drawn by a corporation on defendant, and was accepted by him. The corporation then indorsed the bill to plaintiff. To the action on this bill, the defendant pleaded that the corporation had no right to indorse. Held, that plea was bad; that the acceptor of a bill payable to drawer's order was estopped from denying that the drawer had authority to indorse it.

<sup>14</sup> HORTSMAN v. HENSHAW, 11 How. 177; Jarvis v. Wilson, 46 Conn. 90; HEUERTEMATTE v. MORRIS, 101 N. Y. 63, 4 N. E. 1.

modation acceptance,<sup>15</sup> and I will not pay it," these would be very serious objections to the bill being negotiated. The reason which has influenced the courts is well stated by Judge Lawrence in *Charles v. Marsden*.<sup>16</sup> "It is to be supposed," he says, "that the drawer persuades a friend to accept a bill from him because he cannot lend him money. Now, would there be any objection, if, with the knowledge of the circumstance that this is an accommodation bill, some person should advance money upon it before it was due." The indorsee has discounted the bill on the faith of the acceptor's promise, and it is no answer for the acceptor to say to him, "I have received nothing for this acceptance."

We cannot do better than follow Mr. Daniel in his succinct statement of reasons for the rule that the acceptor warrants, when the bill was indorsed before acceptance, that the payee was competent to indorse. To insure negotiable securities a ready circulation, a person may not dispute the power of another to indorse an instrument, when he asserts by the instrument which he issues to the world that the other has such power. The drawer of the bill, on his putting it into circulation, holds out to all the world that there is such a payee as is described in the instrument, and that, having made the instrument payable to such payee's order, the payee on his part may order the instrument paid to some one else in turn. When the drawee accepts the bill, he assents to these two propositions, and to the proposition, especially, that the payee is competent to indorse. Hence the acceptor may not say that the payee was an infant, or an insane person, or a bankrupt, or a corporation without legal existence. "Indeed," says Mr. Daniel, "there could be no reason why the acceptor should be interested to show that the payee was incompetent to make the order, for he has been guarantied in that regard by the drawer, and may charge the amount in account against him, whether the payee were competent or not."<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> *GRANT v. ELLICOTT*, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 227; *Harger v. Worrall*, 69 N. Y. 370; *HEUERTEMATTE v. MORRIS*, *supra*; *Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Coumbe*, 47 Mich. 358, 11 N. W. 196.

<sup>16</sup> *CHARLES v. MARSDEN*, 1 Taunt. 224.

<sup>17</sup> Daniel, *Neg. Inst.* § 536.

**FACTS WHICH THE ACCEPTOR DOES NOT ADMIT.****71. An acceptance does not admit:**

- (a) That the payee's or subsequent indorsements are genuine.
- (b) That all the terms contained in the bill at the time of acceptance are genuine.<sup>18</sup>

The rules of the acceptor's estoppel, as we have seen, are based upon the supposed negligence of the drawee in failing, by an examination of the signature when the bill is presented, to detect the forgery of the drawer's name, and to refuse payment. The drawee should be supposed to know the handwriting of the drawer, who is usually his customer or correspondent, and, as between him and an innocent holder, the drawee from his imputed negligence should bear the loss. But here the courts stop. It is only the facts pertaining to the drawer, such as his existence, capacity, and authority, that the drawee can be reasonably presumed to be familiar with. But of the payee's indorsement, aside from his competency to indorse, he can know nothing.<sup>19</sup> Nor is there any reason why the acceptor should know that the body of the bill is in the drawer's handwriting, or in any handwriting known to the acceptor. If the alteration or forgery committed is that of the payee's name, or consists in altering the date or amount of the bill, there is no reason why the acceptor should be better able than the indorsers to detect an alteration or forgery. The forgery being in the body of the bill, or in the payee's signature, the greater negligence here is chargeable upon the party who received the bill from the perpetrator of the forgery.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> This rule probably applies to the acceptor *supra* protest.

<sup>19</sup> *HOLT v. ROSS*, 54 N. Y. 474. The general rule is that the acceptor admits the handwriting of the drawer, but not of the indorsers, and the holder is bound to know that the previous indorsements, including that of the payee, are in the handwriting of the parties whose names appear upon the bill. And, if it should appear that one of them is forged, he cannot recover against the acceptor, although the forged name was on the bill at the time of acceptance. Taney, C. J., in *HORTSMAN v. HENSHAW*, 11 How. 177.

<sup>20</sup> *BANK OF COMMERCE v. UNION BANK*, 8 N. Y. 230; *WHITE v. BANK*, 64 N. Y. 620; *YOUNG v. GROTE*, 4 Bing. 253. In this case plaintiff left with his wife checks, signed in blank, on defendant's bank. One W., at

The result of the foregoing rule is that, if the signature of the payee or of the indorser be forged, the acceptor will not be bound to pay the bill to any one who traces title through such indorsements. And, if he has gone so far as to pay the bill to any one holding it under such forged indorsement, he may, as a general rule, recover back the amount. So, also, if the bill has been altered so as to purport to bind the drawer for a larger sum or in a different manner than in the original bill, he will not be bound to pay the bill. And, if the bill is paid, he may in the same way recover back the money paid upon it.<sup>21</sup>

#### ACCEPTOR SUPRA PROTEST.

**72.** The undertaking of the acceptor supra protest is analogous to that of the indorser.

**73.** To consummate the liability of the acceptor supra protest, it is necessary to take three steps:

- (a) To present the bill at maturity to the original drawee.
- (b) Upon refusal of the original drawee to pay, to protest for nonpayment.
- (c) To present the bill for payment to the acceptor supra protest.

The foregoing doctrines are common among the text writers, and are probably the positions which would be taken on the subject by the courts. The cases, however, involving questions of such acceptances, are not many, and the rules relating to them, therefore, not established.\* The meaning and process of an acceptance supra protest have already been explained.<sup>22</sup> As a contract, it is an undertak-

the wife's request, filled out a check for a certain amount, but in such a way that the amount could be raised without possibility of detection. After showing check to the wife, W., without authority, raised the value of the check and secured the amount from defendant. It was held that due care was not taken in filling out the check, and, since the negligence was the plaintiff's, he alone must suffer.

<sup>21</sup> HOLT v. ROSS, 54 N. Y. 479; WHITE v. BANK, 64 N. Y. 316.

\* Cf. Neg. Inst. L. §§ 280-289.

<sup>22</sup> See pages 101-103, supra.

ing to pay on presentment if the original drawee, upon a presentment to him, should persist in dishonoring the bill, and such dishonor by him be notified by protest to the person who has accepted for honor.<sup>23</sup> It is thus not like the contract of the acceptor,—an absolute engagement to pay at all events,—but only a collateral conditional engagement to pay if the drawee does not. Hence the reason of the giving of the acceptance requires a second resort to the drawee when the bill is in the hands of the holder under an acceptance supra protest, and a further protest for nonpayment by such drawee.<sup>24</sup> It might happen that in the meantime effects would reach the drawee, who had refused in the first instance, out of which the bill might and would be satisfied, if again presented to the drawee when the period of payment arrived. “An acceptance for honor,” said Lord Tenterden,<sup>25</sup> “is to be considered not as absolutely such, but in the nature of a conditional acceptance. It is equivalent to saying to the holder of the bill: ‘Keep the bill. Don’t return it. And when the time arrives at which it ought to be paid, if it be not paid by the party on whom it was originally drawn, come to me, and you shall have the money.’ This appears to me to be a very sensible interpretation of the nature of acceptances for honor, where the parties say nothing upon the subject.” The courts thus clothe with language and interpret the intention of the acceptor supra protest in giving an acceptance and of the holder in receiving it.

Upon the refusal of the original drawee to pay the bill and its protest, it may or may not be paid by the acceptor for honor. If it is paid by him, it seems clear that he can pay only for the honor of the party for whose honor he accepted.† But unless some party or parties are specified in the acceptance supra protest, the courts construe

<sup>23</sup> *HOARE v. CAZENOVE*, 16 East, 391. In this case it was held that the acceptors of a foreign bill of exchange, who, after presentment to drawees and refusal to accept, and protest for nonacceptance, accept the same for the honor of the first indorsers, are not liable on such acceptance unless there has been a presentment to the drawees for the payment and a protest for nonpayment.

<sup>24</sup> *SCHOFIELD v. BAYARD*, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 488; *Lenox v. Leverett*, 10 Mass. 1.

<sup>25</sup> *WILLIAMS v. GERMAINE*, 7 Barn. & C. 468.

† Chalm. Bills & N. art. 242, note.

the acceptance as made for the honor of the drawer.<sup>26</sup> Payments of this kind do not, like a single payment by the original drawee, operate as a satisfaction of the bill, but themselves transfer the holder's rights to the party paying.<sup>27</sup> For example, if the payment is made for the honor of a particular indorser, the party paying may sue such indorser and all parties prior to him to whom he could have resorted.<sup>28</sup> If he pays for the honor of the bill generally, it is the same as payment for honor of the last indorser, and he may recover against all parties to the bill.<sup>29</sup> But if the bill is not paid by the acceptor *supra* protest,\* then the rule for recovery against him laid down by Lord Tenterden<sup>30</sup> is generally applied, and the reasons for it accepted as the true ones. "Whatever is requisite to enable a person who has accepted a bill for honor of another to call upon that person to repay him, and to enable him to recover over against such person, may also be reasonably held necessary to enable another party to recover against such an acceptor for honor. For, if you could recover against an acceptor for honor by proof of less than will enable him to recover against the party for whom he accepts, there would be an inconsistency. For it might be said with some reason that, if the acceptor for honor chose to pay without requiring all the proof from the holder

<sup>26</sup> Chit. Bills, 387.

<sup>27</sup> *Smith v. Sawyer*, 55 Me. 141; *VANDEWALL v. TYRRELL*, 1 Moody & M. 87. As to payment *supra* protest, see post, p. 300.

<sup>28</sup> *MERTENS v. WINNINGTON*, 1 Esp. 112. In this case it was claimed by the defense that, where a bill is taken up for the honor of any of the parties whose names are on it, only such person is liable. It was held that, in such case, the party so taking up the bill may be considered as an indorsee paying full value, and consequently entitled to all remedies which an indorsee is entitled to, and to sue all parties to the bill.

<sup>29</sup> *Fairley v. Roch*, Lutw. 891. In *Ex parte LAMBERT* it was held that where a bill, accepted, being dishonored, was taken up for the honor of the drawer by A., the latter had a clear right as against the drawer. He had a right to stand in the place of the drawer; but he could not make a title stronger than that of the drawer, thus ousting the assignees of the bankrupt drawees of the defense which they would have against him. 13 Ves. 179; *Ex parte Wyld*, 30 Law J. Bankr. 10.

\* "When a bill of exchange is dishonored by the acceptor *supra* protest it must (probably) be again protested in order to charge the other parties liable thereon." Chalm. Bills & N. art. 187.

<sup>30</sup> *WILLIAMS v. GERMAINE*, 7 Barn. & C. 468.



which would be necessary for him to recover upon, the payment would be made in his own wrong, and he would not be entitled to recover over. It seems, therefore, that the same rule as to proof which prevails in the case of an acceptor for honor in suing the party for whose honor he accepts, must also be observed when the holder of a bill sues the person so accepting." This means, if we may be pardoned in amplifying the words of so great a judge, that, in prosecuting the acceptor supra protest, the steps are each to be demonstrated which fix the rights and liabilities of the parties. In the first place it is necessary to show the right of the acceptor supra protest to so accept. This is shown by pleading and proving if such be the case that the bill was first presented to the drawee for acceptance, but that its acceptance was refused and that thereupon, the bill being protested, the acceptance supra protest was made. The contract of the holder at this juncture is construed to be that he and subsequent parties have a right to collect the bill of the acceptor supra protest, provided the bill is not paid when due by the drawee,—the legal situation of the prior parties remaining unchanged until the liabilities and rights under the instrument are finally fixed at the time of the presentation of the instrument for payment. At this time the holder who has obtained the acceptance supra protest, or subsequent holders, for the reasons we have given, must present the instrument for payment to the drawee, and if payment is refused again protest it and then present it to the acceptor supra protest for payment. At this juncture the rights of the parties are that the holder who obtained the acceptance supra protest and all parties subsequent to him have the right to enforce payment against the acceptor supra protest upon pleading and proving the foregoing facts of the first and second presentment, protest, and notice.<sup>81</sup> It is probably the doctrine that they may also enforce the bill against parties prior to the time of the acceptance supra protest upon the foregoing fact of the protest for non-acceptance. The acceptor supra protest, if he pays the bill, is then not only subrogated to the rights of parties to the bill whom he pays, but also may recover both from the parties for whose honor he has accepted, and from all parties antecedent to them, all damages he may have incurred by reason of his acceptance. But to do so he must

<sup>81</sup> *BARING v. CLARK*, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 220; *Gazzam v. Armstrong*, 3 Dana (Ky.) 554; *Wood v. Pugh*, 7 Ohio, pt. 2, p. 156.



plead and prove all the facts upon which his liability rests.<sup>82</sup> There seems to be no reason from the equities of the case why the acceptor *supra* protest should not be subject to the estoppels which are implied in the acceptance of an ordinary acceptor. And although there is conflicting authority it has been held that they are the same.<sup>83</sup> He intends to assume by his act the liability of an acceptor, and his liability would probably be held by the courts to be the same were questions of this character often coming before them for decision. But the rule thus laid down has been but little discussed, and this enunciation of them, therefore, is rather speculative than positive.

#### DRAWER AND INDORSER.

74. Every drawer promises the payee and subsequent holders, and every indorser promises his indorsee and subsequent holders, that if the bill or note is presented for payment to the drawee, acceptor, or maker, and payment demanded and refused, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be taken, he will indemnify the holder for loss.

75. The drawer of a bill of exchange promises the payee and subsequent holders, and the indorsers before acceptance promise subsequent holders, that if on due presentment the bill be not accepted, and necessary proceedings on dishonor be taken, he will indemnify them for loss.<sup>84</sup>

76. The liability of the drawer and of each indorser is several from that of all the other parties to the instrument.

<sup>82</sup> SCHOFIELD v. BAYARD, 3 Wend. 491; *Ex parte Wackerbarth*, 5 Ves. 574; HOARE v. CAZENOVE, 16 East, 391; Byles, Bills, pp. 267, 271.

<sup>83</sup> Goddard v. Merchants' Bank, 4 N. Y. 147; Salt Springs Bank v. Syracuse Savings Inst., 62 Barb. 101. See, contra, WILKINSON v. JOHNSON, 3 Barn. & C. 428. But see PHILLIPS v. — THURN, L. R. 1 C. P. 463, holding that it admits the drawer's signature alone. 18 C. B. 694.

<sup>84</sup> These propositions are adopted from Ames, Bills & N. p. 817. Cf. Neg. Inst. L. §§ 111, 116.

In the chapter relating to "Indorsement" the student was introduced to two of the ideas embodied in the principal text. The first was that an indorsement was a contract separate and apart from that evidenced by the terms set forth on the face of the paper. The second was that in addition to these terms so set forth it was a contract in which the law itself implied others equally important.<sup>85</sup> The terms last spoken of consist of certain conditions precedent to the right of its enforcement as a contract of indemnity, which were presentment for acceptance to the drawee or for payment either to the acceptor of the bill or the maker of the note, and in case of its dishonor then that due notice of that fact should be given the indorser. In the chapter relating to "Acceptance," and in a foregoing section of this chapter, the student was further introduced to the idea that the liability of the drawer is a shifting one. Before acceptance he is the party primarily liable; after acceptance he is the party secondarily liable, his position being that substantially of an indorser, and subject to the rules we have just stated. In a later section of this work we shall show that presentment for acceptance by a holder is not vital to the life of his various contracts with the other parties to the bill. It is only for his better security. And although the holder of a bill, by its nonacceptance, may acquire a right of action against the drawer and indorsers prior to himself, it is not absolutely necessary for him to do so.<sup>86</sup> These facts being explained, it leaves little to be said about the principal text. In fact, the principal text is set out mainly that the student may fix its statements in mind by way of contrast to the contract of the maker and acceptor.

There are, however, two points to be noticed. They are that the liability of the drawer and indorser is in most respects identical, and that their liability is several. "There is no distinguishing the case of an indorser from that of the drawer," said Lord Ellenborough,<sup>87</sup> "it having been long ago decided that every indorser is in the nature of a new drawer, every indorsement as a new bill, and that the indorser stands to his indorsee in the law merchant the same as the drawer." With both drawer and indorser a distinct bill is drawn.

<sup>85</sup> See, also, *CASTRIQUE v. BUTTIGIEG*, 10 Moore, P. C. Cas. 94.

<sup>86</sup> *Walker v. Stetson*, 19 Ohio St. 400, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 89; *Cashman v. Harrison*, 90 Cal. 297, 27 Pac. 283; *Id.*, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 104.

<sup>87</sup> *BALLINGALLS v. GLOSTER*, 3 East, 481.

With the drawer, the contract is between himself and the payee; with the indorser, between himself and his indorsee, the indorser standing in the place of the drawer, the remedy of the indorsee being first against his immediate indorser and then against the original drawer as the assignee and standing in the place of the indorser. In this respect the case of the promissory note when once indorsed and the bill of exchange are parallel. In the case of the promissory note before indorsement the contract is only a promise to pay, but after indorsement it becomes an order by the indorser upon the maker of the note to pay the debt of the maker transferred to indorser, and again by him as indorser transferred to his indorsee.

The difference between bills and notes is therefore in this respect but of words, the indorser of a promissory note being almost the same as the drawer of the bill of exchange.<sup>38</sup> It is partly this reason and partly the business one that the drawer and indorser may protect themselves, the drawer by withdrawing his effects from the hands of the acceptor, the indorser by taking steps against parties prior to him, that are the foundations of the rule that both drawer and indorser are entitled to the prior presentment and protest and notice.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>38</sup> HEYLYN v. ADAMSON, 2 Burrows, 669. In this case it was held "that in actions upon inland bills of exchange, by an indorsee against an indorser, the plaintiff must prove a demand of, or due diligence to get the money from, the drawee (or acceptor), but need not prove any demand of the drawer; and that, in actions upon promissory notes by an indorsee against the indorser, the plaintiff must prove a demand of, or due diligence to get the money from, the maker of the note."

<sup>39</sup> BLESARD v. HIRST, 5 Burrows, 2670. This was a case where an inland bill made payable to one was by him indorsed to a third party who tendered it for acceptance and was refused, and who then kept it for some time without giving notice of the refusal. It was held that the third party should have given notice, and that by failing to do so he took the risk upon himself, as the indorser of the bill was imposed upon. The person who neglected to give notice should suffer for it. In the case of COLLOTT v. HAIGH, a bill drawn by defendant upon J. D. and accepted by him for defendants' accommodation, was indorsed to plaintiffs. Upon maturity, time was given to J. D. in consideration of his giving security to plaintiffs, which security proved not to be available. It was held that such granting of time to the acceptor did not discharge the defendant, and he could not defend himself on that ground, or for want of notice, as the bill was for his accommodation. 3 Camp. 281. GALE v. WALSH, 5 Term R. 239; ANIBA v. YEOMANS, 39 Mich. 171; Newberry v. Trowbridge, 13 Mich. 263.

It is also the reason of the estoppels discussed in the next succeeding sections applying to drawer and indorser alike. And it may be stated generally, and the student must fix it in his mind, that the doctrines of the contract of the drawer are the doctrines of the contract of the indorser, because they are, in their legal effect, one.

The second point to be fixed in the mind is the character of the contract of the drawer and of each indorser as several from that of every other party to the contract. It naturally follows that, so long as the promises of the drawer and indorser are separate and independent, they must always be separate in the liability incurred under them. The indorsee enters into a contract with his immediate party from whom he got the bill and who indorsed it to him. Every prior indorser on the bill, by virtue of his indorsement, makes a promise to each new indorsee. If A, B, C, and D are indorsers on a negotiable instrument, A makes separate promises to do certain things with B, C, and D; B with C and D; and so on. Each makes a separate promise with every individual who comes after him on the instrument. The liability of each indorser is in legal phrase several from that of all other parties to the instrument. Under the old common-law rule this meant that the holder might sue the parties to the instrument one at a time, or he might sue separate indorsers in separate actions at the same time. But if any one of these indorsers thus sued should pay the instrument the claim of the holder against each upon it was satisfied.<sup>40</sup> It is now generally settled by statute throughout the Union that all the parties to the instrument may be jointly sued upon their several liability, or one or more may be sued at separate times.\*

#### UNDERTAKING OF DRAWER.

**77. The drawer of a bill before acceptance undertakes with the payee and subsequent holders:**

- (a) That there is a drawee, and that he is capable of accepting.**
- (b) That he will accept.**

<sup>40</sup> Chit. Bills, 538, 539; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1203.

\* As to the American statutes, see Rand. Com. Paper, § 1660.

When the drawer issues a bill to the world, he undertakes two things. One is that the situation, nature, or character of the drawee is such that the bill can be accepted; and the other is that the drawee, upon presentment, will accept the bill. The legal interpretation of the words on the face of the bill indicating the place of presentment to the drawee, as, "To John Smith, at Baring Bros.," is that the drawer contracts that the drawee may be found at that place, and the bill presented to him there.<sup>41</sup> Thus, in case of a bill<sup>42</sup> drawn on Paris, where the French convention had passed a decree prohibiting the payment of bills drawn in any country at war with France, the court so applied the rule that ultimately the loss should not fall upon the payee or indorser, but upon the drawer who issued the bill, who, it is to be inferred, was deemed to warrant that the situation of affairs would be such that the bill could be presented for acceptance. If this turned out not to be the case, then the drawer must bear the loss. This loss to be borne by him consists of all loss incurred, such as re-exchange, notarial expenses, and other damage<sup>43</sup> necessarily incidental to the failure to obtain the acceptance, because the party taking the bill was obliged to make these expenditures to collect the bill, and if the drawer's contract was broken, and such collection failed, the drawer must reimburse such party.<sup>44</sup> The holder

<sup>41</sup> Edw. Neg. Inst. §§ 530-534; *Wing v. Terry*, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 160.

<sup>42</sup> *MELLISH v. SIMEON*, 2 H. Bl. 378.

<sup>43</sup> *AURIOL v. THOMAS*, 2 Term R. 52. In this case a bill of exchange, 2,800 star pagodas, payable to defendant or order, and directed to G. M., Madras, was indorsed to plaintiffs, who discounted it at the rate of exchange, 6s. 6d. per pagoda. On sending the bill to Madras it was returned protested for nonacceptance and nonpayment. The plaintiffs recovered 10s. per pagoda and £5 per cent. after end of 30 days' notice to defendant. Such recovery was held not usurious, as it was proved to be the usual custom in case of such bills, as such recovery included charges of exchange and other incidental expenses as well as legal interest. In *GANTT v. MACKENZIE*, a bill of exchange was presented for acceptance and refused, April 17, 1809, and was presented for payment on the 19th of June of the same year. It was decided that the holder was entitled to £10 per cent. as damages, and interest was to be allowed from the time of presentation for payment. 3 Camp. 51. In *Mellish v. Simeon*, it was held that where the holder has been guilty of no default, the drawer is answerable for the amount of the bill, and also for the re-exchange which is a consequence of the bill not being paid. 2 H. Bl. 378.

<sup>44</sup> Byles, Bills, 402; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1445; and *Weldon v. Buck*, 1 Johns. 444.

of a bill, whom it reaches, in the course of its circulation, may present the bill to the drawee; and, if he refuses to accept, although the bill is not due, the holder may at once turn and hold the drawer, indorsers, and all parties upon the bill prior to himself. The reason of this is to guaranty the circulation of bills, by preventing the drawer from withdrawing funds from the hands of the drawee before the bill is presented, and also to assure the holder that, if anything is wrong between the drawer and drawee, and the drawee refuses to accept, he may at once turn for reimbursement to the parties through whom the bill has been circulated, and who treated it as the equivalent of cash, and were paid money, each in turn, for it.<sup>45</sup> The further effect of this rule will be considered in the chapter on "Presentment."

The courts speak of this legal relation of the drawer as a stipulation or part of the contract rather than as an estoppel. This is because the reason of the rule is somewhat different from that which is the basis of the estoppels of the acceptor. It is argued that the main purpose of the contract between the drawer, on the one hand, and the payee and person to whom he transfers his rights, on the other, is to remit money. For this purpose the payee and subsequent holders pay valuable consideration. To effect this purpose, the drawer, on his part, agrees that the money shall be paid at the time, place, and by the person nominated in the bill. Of the very essence of this agreement, therefore, is the fact that the drawee, who may be a stranger to the payee or subsequent holder, should be found in the place where he is described to be.<sup>46</sup> Otherwise, it would be the duty of the holder to search the world over for the person to pay him in turn the money he had paid the drawer. It is also of its essential nature that the drawee shall have funds in his hand to warrant his accepting, or that he accepts from some other consideration, immaterial to the payee, perhaps, but good as between the drawer and

<sup>45</sup> *BALLINGALLS v. GLOSTER*, 3 East, 481; *Mason v. Franklin*, 3 Johns. 202; *Weldon v. Buck*, 4 Johns. 144; *Miller v. Hackley*, 5 Johns. 375; *BANK OF ROCHESTER v. GRAY*, 2 Hill, 227.

<sup>46</sup> *De Wolf v. Murray*, 2 Sandf. 166; *HINE v. ALLELY*, 4 Barn. & Adol. 624. In this case an accepted bill was presented at the place of payment specified in the instrument, but the house was closed. It was objected that for this reason there had been no presentment, but it was held that the presentment as described was good. *Buxton v. Jones*, 1 Man. & G. 83; *Pierce v. Struthers*, 27 Pa. St. 249.

drawee. In other words, as between the drawer and payee, the drawee, though he is designated as the person to make the payment, is a mere agent of the drawer; and the latter, therefore, since he undertakes for his agent's acts, "undertakes that the acceptance be made at all events."<sup>47</sup>

### WARRANTIES OF INDORSER.

**78. Every indorser who indorses without qualification warrants to his indorsee and to all subsequent holders:**

- (a) That the bill or note is, in every respect and as to all prior parties, genuine, and neither forged, fictitious, nor altered.
- (b) That the bill or note is a valid and subsisting obligation, and that the contract obligations of all prior parties are valid.
- (c) That the prior parties were competent to bind themselves, whether as drawer, acceptor, maker, or indorser.
- (d) That he, as indorser, has good title to the bill or note, and also a right to transfer it.<sup>48</sup>

As we have seen, the contract of the indorser, while it embodies the terms of the instrument indorsed, is nevertheless a distinct contract. The contract of the indorser includes a promise of indemnity in case of the dishonor of the instrument, and it also includes certain so-called "warranties." It must be observed, however, that these warranties are implied, not from the undertaking of the indorser to pay in case of dishonor, but as incidents to the transfer or sale of the bill or note.

A warranty may be defined as an agreement with reference to the subject of the contract, but collateral to its main purpose. Warranties may be express or implied, but it is only implied warranties that are here in question. In every contract of sale of personal property, the seller impliedly warrants his right to sell the goods unless the circumstances of the sale or agreement to sell are such as to show that

<sup>47</sup> *Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe*, 84 N. Y. 367.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. *Neg. Inst. L.* § 116.



he is transferring, not the absolute property, but only such property or interest as he may have, in the thing sold. Hence from the indorser's transfer or sale of the instrument indorsed it follows that he impliedly warrants that he has lawful title to it and a right to transfer it. As a rule the implied warranties of the seller of personal property do not extend beyond this, and he does not warrant the quality of the thing sold. It is true that there are certain exceptions, which arise in particular cases from the nature of the agreement and of the thing sold, where the law does imply a warranty of certain qualities, but these exceptions are mainly confined to contracts for the sale of unascertained goods,—that is, of goods which the seller is to select or manufacture and appropriate to the contract; and therefore these exceptions cannot apply to the sale of a specific bill or note, which the buyer has an opportunity to inspect. In case of the sale of specific goods, the rule of *caveat emptor* applies, and no warranty, strictly speaking, except of title, is implied; subject, perhaps, to a single exception, namely, where the seller is also the manufacturer or grower, it has in some cases been held that a warranty is implied that they are free from latent defects arising from the process of manufacture or growth.<sup>49</sup> It is obvious, of course, that this exception cannot apply to the transfer of bills and notes. Upon the strict analogy of the sale of other personal property it would follow, therefore, that the implied "warranty," in the proper sense of the term, of the indorser would be confined to warranty of title. There is, however, another principle governing the sale of personal property which is material in this connection. Where goods, even if they be specific and the buyer has an opportunity to inspect, are sold by description, there is an implied "condition" that the goods shall correspond with the description. This condition is sometimes improperly called, and generally so called in the United States, a "warranty." But whether this undertaking be called a "condition" or a "warranty," it is the law that if the article sold fails to conform to the description the buyer has a right of action against the seller for its breach.<sup>50</sup> Applying this principle to the sale of bills and notes, it may fairly be said that

<sup>49</sup> As to implied warranty of quality, see *Benj. Sales*, § 644 et seq.; *Tiff. Sales*, 167 et seq.

<sup>50</sup> As to sale by description, see *Benjamin, Sales*, §§ 600, 645; *Tiff. Sales*, 155, 171.



if the instrument for any reason is invalid in its inception it is not what it purports to be, a bill or note, but a mere worthless piece of paper; and in such case the purchaser has a right of action against the seller for breach of contract, based on the failure of the thing sold to conform to its description.<sup>51</sup> It seems that this principle is the foundation of the so-called warranties of the indorser which are not to be explained by the implied warranty of title. Therefore, when it turns out that a note or bill is forged or altered or void for usury, or that the parties were infants, or that the bill had been stolen, the bank which has taken it, or the party who has accepted it in payment for goods, may turn upon the indorser who transferred it to him, and sue him upon his indorsement. And, when the indorser sets up any of these facts by way of defense, the holder may answer, "I am suing you upon a separate contract in which you warranted these things to me," and the courts conclude the indorser from such a defense.<sup>52</sup>

Thus, in warranting the genuineness of the instrument, the indorser agrees that if it cannot be enforced against the drawer, acceptor, or maker, whose names appear upon it, because these names are forged, these defenses will not avail him;<sup>53</sup> and this rule also applies in case of prior indorsements.<sup>54</sup> In warranting its validity he agrees that if the paper cannot be enforced against the acceptor or maker because of some illegality in its inception, for example because it was given for a gaming debt,<sup>55</sup> or void for usury,<sup>56</sup> or given for other illegal

<sup>51</sup> Meyer v. Richards, 163 U. S. 385, 16 Sup. Ct. 1148; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 733a.

<sup>52</sup> The liability for breach of warranty accrues at the time of indorsement, and the statute of limitation begins to run at that date. BLETHEN v. LOV-ERING, 58 Me. 437.

<sup>53</sup> COGGILL v. BANK, 1 N. Y. 113; Mosher v. Carpenter, 13 Hun (N. Y.) 604; TURNBULL v. BOWYER, 40 N. Y. 456; Meacher v. Fort, 3 Hill (S. C.) 227, and Riley, 248; HANNUM v. RICHARDSON, 48 Vt. 508; Condon v. Pearce, 43 Md. 83; York Co. M. F. Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 51 Me. 506; Chase v. Hathorn, 61 Me. 505; SELSER v. BROCK, 3 Ohio St. 302.

<sup>54</sup> TURNER v. KELLER, 66 N. Y. 66; OGDEN v. SAUNDERS, 12 Wheat. 313; FISH v. BANK, 42 Mich. 204, 8 N. W. 849; WILLIAMS v. INSTITUTION, 57 Miss. 633.

<sup>55</sup> BOWYER v. BAMPTON, 2 Strange, 1155, 7 Mod. 334; Edwards v. Dick, 4 Barn. & Ald. 212.

<sup>56</sup> Morford v. Davis, 28 N. Y. 481; Ingalls v. Lee, 9 Barb. 647; McKNIGHT v. WHEELER, 6 Hill, 492; Ord, Usury, 109.

considerations,<sup>57</sup> these defenses will not avail him. In warranting the competency of the parties he agrees if the paper cannot be enforced against the original parties because they were incapable of contracting, because they were married women,<sup>58</sup> or because they were a copartnership,<sup>59</sup> or as an agent,<sup>60</sup> or as a corporation,<sup>61</sup> that these defenses will not avail him. And, the reason being the same in case of genuineness and competency, it is probable that this rule applies also to prior indorsers.<sup>62</sup> In warranting title and right to transfer he agrees that, if the instrument cannot be enforced against the original parties because it was lost by them or stolen from them, these defenses will not avail him, because he held himself out as having a good title, and therefore a right to transfer.<sup>63</sup>

A thoroughly consistent theory, it might be urged, would require that if the principal contract, set forth on the face of the instrument, is void *ab initio*, all the subsidiary contracts of indorsement depending upon it would also be of no legal effect, because they could never give life to a contract which had no existence. But even granting this to be so, yet legal theory is overruled by common sense. Besides, it is not always necessary that the principal contract to which a collateral contract of guaranty is added should be enforced in order that the contract of guaranty may avail.<sup>64</sup> A guarantor can sometimes be held, although no suit whatever can be maintained on the original debt. For it is sometimes the very essence of a guaranty that it is given because the principal debt cannot be enforced, as in cases where

<sup>57</sup> *Graham v. Maguire*, 39 Ga. 531; *Succession of Well*, 24 La. Ann. 139.

<sup>58</sup> In the case of *ERWIN v. DOWNS*, it was held that the indorsement of a promissory note imports a contract that the makers were competent to contract, and that one who became the holder of such a note for a valuable consideration, before maturity, is not deprived of the right to rely upon the contract of the indorser, even though such holder have knowledge that the makers were incompetent, as being married women. 15 N. Y. 575; *HALY v. LANE*, 2 Atk. 181; *Kenworthy v. Sawyer*, 125 Mass. 28; *Robertson v. Allen*, 3 Baxt. 233.

<sup>59</sup> *Dalrymple v. Hillenbrand*, 62 N. Y. 5.

<sup>60</sup> *Burrill v. Smith*, 7 Pick. 291.

<sup>61</sup> *Remsen v. Graves*, 41 N. Y. 471; *Zalbriskie v. Cleveland, C. & C. R. Co.* 23 How. (U. S.) 399; *Glidden v. Chamberlin*, 167 Mass. 486, 46 N. E. 103.

<sup>62</sup> *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 676; *Lennon v. Grauer*, 159 N. Y. 433, 54 N. E. 11.

<sup>63</sup> *Edw. Neg. Inst.* § 407; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 677; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 755.

<sup>64</sup> *McLaughlin v. McGovern*, 34 Barb. 208.

the guarantor undertakes to be responsible for the goods to be supplied to a married woman or an infant. Neither does the fact that the guarantor cannot call upon the person for whom he has given his guaranty constitute any defense. The party to whom the guaranty is given has nothing to do with their mutual relations. The indorser guaranties to such party the payment of the instrument, and, if it is not paid, he immediately becomes liable upon this guaranty.<sup>66</sup> Whether also he knew of any defects in the instrument is immaterial. If the indorser knew of defects, he is undoubtedly liable under the general principles of warranty already given. If the indorser did not know of defects, he is none the less liable in damages upon the construction of the general contract of indemnity he made when he indorsed the instrument.

The existence of this contract as a distinct stipulation becomes more apparent when we consider the practical application of these rules by the courts. Where the bill or note is forged or altered, for example, it is void, as we have said, because in fact no such legal obligation was ever created. Money, therefore, paid upon the indorsement of such a bill or note, is governed by the same principle that governs other money paid under a mistake of fact. In other cases the equitable action for money had and received will lie against one who has received money which in conscience does not belong to him.\* And so, when the maker or acceptor or a prior indorser has refused to pay a note or bill upon the ground that it is void because of forgery, or alteration, or on the ground of usury, gaming consideration, or the like, the holder, relying upon the so-called "warranty" of the indorser, may hold him for the money paid to him for the instrument

<sup>66</sup> *Remsen v. Graves*, 41 N. Y. 471. In the case of *LAWSON v. FARMERS' BANK* it was held by the court that the liability of the indorser was strictly conditional and dependent upon due demand upon the maker or acceptor and also due and legal notice of nonpayment. The purpose of such demand is to enable the indorser to look to his own interests and to secure his own indemnity. Demand and notice being conditions precedent to the indorser's liability, the holder must make proof of them before he can recover. *LAWSON v. BANK*, 1 Ohio St. 206.

\* *Kelly v. Solari*, 9 Mees. & W. 54.

**WARRANTIES OF INDORSER WITHOUT RECOURSE—OF  
TRANSFERROR BY DELIVERY.**

**79. Every person who negotiates a bill or note by indorsement without recourse or by delivery warrants:**

- (a) That the instrument is, in every respect and as to all prior parties, genuine, and neither forged, fictitious, nor altered.**
- (b) That he has good title to the instrument, and also a right to transfer it.**
- (c) That he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity of the instrument or render it valueless.**
- (d) That all prior parties were competent to bind themselves, although the authorities are not unanimous upon this point.**
- (e) That the instrument is a valid and subsisting obligation, although the authorities are not unanimous upon this point, and in states which have adopted the Negotiable Instruments Law this warranty is not implied.**

**But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the warranty extends in favor of no holder other than the immediate transferee.\*\***

The indorser without recourse and the transferror of a bill or note by delivery stand upon much the same footing. So far as an indorsement and transfer is a promise of indemnity, neither the transferror without indorsement nor the indorser without recourse promises to pay the instrument. In fact, the object of an indorsement without recourse is to relieve such an indorser from his obligation as a promisor of indemnity. He exempts himself by these words from his

**\*\* The last paragraph follows the language of Neg. Inst. L. § 115, and implies that the warranty of the indorser without recourse extends to subsequent holders. Whether it so extends irrespective of statute, quære. It seems that the warranty of the transferror by delivery does not. Chalm. Bills & N. art. 226. But see 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 840, 882.**

promise to pay if the parties antecedent to him do not. But because the transfer is in effect a sale, the transferror without recourse, like the seller of a chattel, warrants his title<sup>67</sup> to the instrument and its genuineness.<sup>68</sup> And it would seem upon principle, for the reasons already set forth,<sup>69</sup> that all the warranties which are implied in the case of unqualified indorsements should apply to the indorser without recourse. Accordingly he warrants the competency of prior parties,<sup>70</sup> and the validity of the instrument,<sup>71</sup> although upon the latter point there is conflict of authority, as will be pointed out in the next paragraph.

When the transfer is of paper payable to bearer and is made by mere delivery, since the warranties in both cases arise as incidents to the sale, there seems to be no reason why the same warranties should not be implied as those which arise upon an ordinary transfer by indorsement. The authorities are agreed that in such case the transferror warrants his title<sup>72</sup> and the genuineness of the instrument,<sup>73</sup> and, it seems, also warrants at least that he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity of the instrument or render it valueless.<sup>74</sup> And it has frequently been held that he warrants the competency of the prior parties,<sup>75</sup> and also the validity of the instrument.<sup>76</sup> On the other hand, it has been held in a leading case in New York,<sup>77</sup> involving a note void for usury, that the

<sup>67</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 670.

<sup>68</sup> DUMONT v. WILLIAMSON, 18 Ohio St. 515; Palmer v. Courtney, 32 Neb. 781, 49 N. E. 754.

<sup>69</sup> Ante, p. 163.

<sup>70</sup> LOBDELL v. BAKER, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 193, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 469 (transfer by delivery).

<sup>71</sup> HANNUM v. RICHARDSON, 48 Vt. 508; CHALLISS v. McCURUM, 22 Kan. 157.

<sup>72</sup> MURRAY v. JUDAH, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 483; HERRICK v. WHITNEY, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 240; Shaver v. Ehle, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 201.

<sup>73</sup> FRANK v. LANIER, 91 N. Y. 112; BELL v. DAGG, 60 N. Y. 528.

<sup>74</sup> Littauer v. Goldman, 72 N. Y. 506. See, also, Edw. Bills & N. § 355; Mandeville v. Newton, 119 N. Y. 13, 23 N. E. 920; MERIDIAN NAT. BANK v. GALLAUDET, 13 N. Y. St. Rep. 269.

<sup>75</sup> LOBDELL v. BAKER, supra; Baldwin v. Van Deusen, 87 N. Y. 487.

<sup>76</sup> HANNUM v. RICHARDSON, 48 Vt. 508; CHALLISS v. McCURUM, 22 Kan. 157; Giffert v. West, 33 Wis. 617.

<sup>77</sup> Littauer v. Goldman, 72 N. Y. 506.

transferrer by delivery was not liable against such a defect upon a warranty of validity, and that in such case it is necessary for the transferee in order to recover to prove a scienter, that is, to prove that the transferrer had knowledge of the defect. The court said that the law excepts only two cases as coming within the doctrine of an implied warranty, namely, a warranty of title and a warranty that the instrument is genuine and not forged. This case has been adversely criticised by the supreme court of the United States<sup>78</sup> in an opinion which accepts the principle, already explained, that it is a condition of the contract of sale, often miscalled an implied warranty, that the thing sold must be what it is described or purports to be, and that if the instrument transferred be not a valid and subsisting obligation there is a breach of this condition. It is, indeed, only by accepting this principle that it is possible to imply a warranty of genuineness, and the logical application of the principle requires the implication also of a warranty that the instrument is not invalid, either by reason of incapacity of the original parties or of illegality in its inception.<sup>79</sup> The Negotiable Instruments Law<sup>80</sup> has in part at least adopted the rule as laid down in the New York case; for, while it declares that the general indorser warrants that the instrument is valid and subsisting, it excludes this warranty in the case of transfer by delivery as well as of indorsement without recourse, substituting in its place a warranty on the part of such transferrer that he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity of the instrument or render it valueless. Where a bill or note is transferred by delivery or indorsed without recourse, the transferee takes the risk of the insolvency of the maker or other principal party, unless the transferrer be guilty of fraud in passing it off with knowledge of the fact.<sup>81</sup> A broker or other agent who negotiates a bill

<sup>78</sup> MEYER v. RICHARDS, 163 U. S. 885, 16 Sup. Ct. 1148. See, also, Wood v. Sheldon, 42 N. J. Law, 421; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 733a.

<sup>79</sup> "The opinion in this case [Littauer v. Goldman] \* \* \* admits the common law rule and then denies its essential result by eliminating conditions of nonexistence which are necessarily embraced in it. \* \* \* Either the principle of warranty of identity must be accepted or rejected; it cannot be accepted and its legitimate and inevitable results denied." Meyer v. Richards, supra, per White, J.

<sup>80</sup> Section 115. Cf. section 116.

<sup>81</sup> Bicknall v. Waterman, 5 R. I. 43. There is, however, much conflict of authority on this point. See Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 737.

or note without indorsement is liable upon the implied warranties applicable to a transferror by delivery, unless he discloses his agency and the name of his principal.\*

**DAMAGES AGAINST THE ACCEPTOR, MAKER, DRAWER, AND  
INDORSERS UPON THE BILL OR NOTE AND  
UPON THE WARRANTIES.**

80. The acceptor of a bill of exchange and the maker of a promissory note is liable, upon its dishonor, for the amount of the bill or note and legal interest, and also notarial expenses where they are allowed by law.

Where the drawee of a bill of exchange has agreed for a valuable consideration to accept it, he is liable, upon its dishonor, for his breach of promise to accept, in all damages which are the immediate consequences of such breach.

The measure of damages to be recovered against a drawer or indorser upon his indorsement is—

(a) On an inland bill: the amount of the bill and interest, and also protest fees where they are allowed.

(b) On a foreign bill: the amount of the bill, interest, protest fees, re-exchange, or damages in lieu thereof.

The measure of damages to be recovered against the drawer or indorsers in case of a breach of warranty is the original consideration.

It is our purpose to point out in this section the practical application of the rules we have laid down, by showing what damages the courts administer against the parties upon the breach of their contracts. For the present we shall leave the matter of consideration as a basis for damage, both as between parties immediate and not immediate, out of the question. The rules pertaining to this point will be discussed further on. The only point to be considered is the

\* CABOT BANK v. MORTON, 4 Gray (Mass.) 156; WORTHINGTON v. COWLES, 112 Mass. 30. Neg. Inst. L. § 119, so declares the law.



damages which, assuming the contract between the parties to be for value, and enforceable, the courts find were in contemplation of the parties when it was made.

In some of these contracts, important items are exchange and re-exchange. Exchange, as we have seen, is the market value in one country of money to be delivered in another. The drawer of a foreign bill contracts for its payment at the place where it is drawn payable. When the bill is dishonored, the doctrine of re-exchange applies. Re-exchange is a doctrine founded upon equitable principles. It means, for instance, when the payee, for example, gives premium for a bill drawn in this country payable in Paris, France, which is dishonored in Paris, the amount which would restore the payee to the situation he was in when he bought the bill. This is either the payment of the money in Paris that the payee expected to and would get there, or the payment in this country of those sums, together with the difference in value between the whole sum at Paris and the same amount in this country. This difference in value is ascertained by the premium on a bill drawn in Paris and payable in this country which should sell at Paris for the sum claimed.<sup>82</sup> In many states statutes provide for a fixed amount payable by way of damages in lieu

<sup>82</sup> *Bank of United States v. U. S.*, 2 How. 737. In *SUSE v. POMPE*, 30 Law J. C. P. 75, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 538, where a bill was drawn and indorsed in Liverpool, payable in English money, directed to V. at Vienna, by whom it was dishonored, in an action by the indorsees against the indorsers it was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover as much English money as would have enabled them in Vienna on the day of maturity to purchase as many Austrian florins as they ought to have received from the drawee, with the expenses necessary to obtain them. Byles, J., said: "The most obvious and direct mode of obtaining that English money is to draw on Vienna on the indorser in England a bill at sight for so much English money as will purchase the required number of Austrian florins at the actual rate of exchange on the day of dishonor, and to include in the amount of that bill the interest and necessary expenses of the transaction. The whole amount is called \* \* \* re-exchange. \* \* \* This bill for re-exchange being negotiated at Vienna puts into the pocket of the holder at the proper time and place the exact sum which he ought to have received from the drawee. \* \* \* Although in English practice the re-exchange bill is seldom drawn, yet the theory of the transaction is as we have above described it, and settles the principle on which the damages are to be computed, although no re-exchange bill be in fact drawn."



of re-exchange.† Notarial fees are those incurred for a notary where protest is required or permitted by law.

The other principal item of damage is the amount nominated in the principal terms of the paper, and this discussion principally pertains to this, and how far the warranties relate to it. The general rule is that the acceptor and drawer of a bill, the maker of a note, and all indorsers are liable for the amount nominated in the bill, and interest.<sup>88</sup> It is, however, held, though not without weighty dissent, that as against his immediate indorser the recovery of an indorsee is limited to the amount of the consideration paid with interest.\* In

† Rand. Com. Paper, § 1720.

<sup>88</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 749; Rand. Com. Paper, § 1726. Where the instrument provides for interest, it runs from the date. *Dorman v. Dibdin*, Russ. & M. 381; *Williams v. Baker*, 67 Ill. 238; *CAMPBELL PRINTING PRESS & MFG. CO. v. JONES*, 79 Ala. 475. See Neg. Inst. L. § 36, subd. 2. Interest on a demand note runs from demand. *Barough v. White*, 4 B. & C. 325; *Breyfogle v. Beckley*, 16 Serg. & R. 264; *Hunter v. Wood*, 54 Ala. 71. Where the rate fixed by law as prevailing in absence of contract is lower than the contract rate, the better opinion is that after maturity the contract rate should still prevail. *Seymour v. Insurance Co.*, 44 Conn. 300; *Cecil v. Hicks*, 29 Grat. (Va.) 1; *Findlay v. Hall*, 12 Ohio St. 610; *Pruyn v. Milwaukee*, 18 Wis. 568. Contra, *Macomber v. Dunham*, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 550; *Duran v. Ayer*, 67 Me. 145; *Newton v. Kennerly*, 31 Ark. 626. Cf. *Holden v. Trust Co.*, 100 U. S. 72; *CROMWELL v. COUNTY OF SAC*, 96 U. S. 61. See Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1458a. Interest after maturity is by way of damages. Where no interest is reserved, interest runs after maturity at the legal rate. *Lithgow v. Lyon*, Coop. Ch. (Tenn.) 29; *Laing v. Stone*, 2 Man. & R. 562; *Swett v. Hooper*, 62 Me. 54; *Godfrey v. Craycraft*, 81 Ind. 476. As to conflict of law governing interest by way of damages, see post, 188.

\* *Munn v. Commission Co.*, 15 Johns. 43. In this case it was decided that, where a payee parts, for a discount greater than the legal rate of interest, with a valid note upon which he might maintain an action when mature, such transfer is not usurious, even where the payee indorses the note, and the indorsee may, on nonpayment by the maker, sue the indorser, but that his recovery will be the amount advanced by him and the interest thereon. In *CRAM v. HENDRICKS*, the above case was cited upon a point similar, and the decision was to the same effect. 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 569; *Ingalls v. Lee*, 9 Barb. 647; *Judd v. Seaver*, 8 Paige, 548; *Hutchins v. McCann*, 7 Port. (Ala.) 94; *Noble v. Walker*, 32 Ala. 456; *Raplee v. Morgan*, 3 Ill. 561; *Semmes v. Wilson*, 5 Cranch, C. C. 285, Fed. Cas. No. 12,658; *Bank of U. S. v. Smith*, 4 Cranch, C. C. 712, Fed. Cas. No. 936. But see contra, *Roark v. Turner*, 29 Ga. 455; *NATIONAL BANK v. GREEN*, 33 Iowa, 140; *DURANT v. BANTA*, 27 N. J.

addition to this, the rules governing these parties as to re-exchange and fees are as follows: The acceptor at common law is probably not primarily liable to the holder for re-exchange, because his contract is to pay the money named in the bill at the place of payment and not at the place of drawing;<sup>84</sup> nor is he liable for damages;<sup>85</sup> though the better reason seems to be that he is liable to the drawer, where he has dishonored the bill which he had promised to pay and the drawer has been obliged to pay re-exchange.<sup>86</sup> It is probably the common-law rule, also, that the maker of a note is liable neither for re-exchange nor damages because of the supposed rule that notes are subject to the rules of the law merchant only in those respects covered by the enactment of the statute of Anne;<sup>87</sup> though it must be added that this point is by no means settled.<sup>88</sup> Protest fees are chargeable against the acceptor and maker only when a protest is required or permitted by law. But when it is required, or permitted but not required, they are allowed as an item of damage.<sup>89</sup> The drawer and the indorsers, in their succession, are liable for protest fees, and, in case of foreign bills, for all re-exchanges, or else damages in lieu thereof.<sup>90</sup>

These rules being understood, it only remains to consider the dam-

Law, 624. See Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 767, 768; 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 819 (supporting the latter view).

<sup>84</sup> Newman v. Goza, 2 La. Ann. 642; Trammell v. Hudmon, 56 Ala. 237; Watt v. Riddle, 8 Watts, 545.

<sup>85</sup> Bowen v. Stoddard, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 375; Manning v. Kohn, 44 Ala. 343.

<sup>86</sup> WALKER v. HAMILTON, 1 De Gex, F. & J. 602; Bowen v. Stoddard, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 379, per Hubbard, J.; In re General South American Co., 37 Law T. 599. Some authorities hold that the acceptor is liable for re-exchange to the holder. Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1449.

<sup>87</sup> Martin v. Franklin, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 124; SCOFIELD v. DAY, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 102; Adams v. Cordis, 8 Pick. 260; Lodge v. Spooner, 8 Gray, 166.

<sup>88</sup> Lee v. Wilcocks, 5 Serg. & R. 48; Grant v. Healey, 3 Sumn. 523, Fed. Cas. No. 5,696.

<sup>89</sup> Johnson v. Bank of Fulton, 29 Ga. 260; German v. Ritchie, 9 Kan. 110; MERRITT v. BENTON, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 117 (where it was held that the protest fee is an expense to which the holder of a note is subjected by the default of an indorser, whose duty it is to pay at maturity, and that the holder should therefore recover it. "It may fairly be considered as a charge incident upon the indorser's failure to perform his contract").

<sup>90</sup> MELLISH v. SIMEON, 2 H. Bl. 378; Tied. Com. Paper, § 407.

ages administered by the courts with reference to the drawee, when he refuses to accept, and upon the warranties which have been the subject of discussion in this chapter. Of these latter, the students will have noticed that we have pointed out a distinction between the acceptor, on the one hand, and the drawer and indorser, on the other. In the case of the acceptor, the rules of law were merely to the effect that the acceptor was estopped from denying certain items. There was nothing of a promise which might be the basis of an affirmative right contained in them. The acceptor's liability, therefore, is limited to the contract contained in words of the bill. But the liability of the drawer and indorser on his so-called warranty is the basis of an affirmative right of action. It is different in its nature from the estoppel of the acceptor, because the acceptor is not affirmatively liable as acceptor thereon. He is, however, liable as drawee before acceptance to the drawer, if, under certain circumstances, he does not accept the bill. The drawer, as we have seen, may then have one of two remedies. He may either sue the drawee upon the original consideration or for damages.<sup>91</sup> What the original consideration is will be different according to the circumstances of each case. Where the drawer chooses the alternative of damages, he sues upon the promise to accept, and the damages are then measured by his loss and inconvenience, and not by the amount of the draft.<sup>92</sup> The promise to accept is then the foundation of the right of action, and not the bill itself.

The general rule that the warrantor shall pay so much as the actual value of property falls short of what it would be worth if the warranty had been kept, applicable to warranties of quality or title of personal property, does not apply to bills and notes.<sup>93</sup> With negotiable instruments between immediate parties the recovery of damages is limited to the amount paid out by reason of the breach of warranty, or, in other words, to refunding the consideration.<sup>94</sup> The right upon which such an action rests is that upon which actions for

<sup>91</sup> See *supra*, p. 80.

<sup>92</sup> 2 Suth. Dam. p. 104; *Ilseley v. Jones*, 12 Gray (Mass.) 260; Sedg. Dam. (6th Ed.) p. 296.

<sup>93</sup> Sedg. Dam. (6th Ed.) p. 340; Suth. Dam. p. 149.

<sup>94</sup> *GOMPERTZ v. BARTLETT*, 2 El. & Bl. 854; *ALDRICH v. JACKSON*, 5 R. I. 218; *BELL v. DAGG*, 60 N. Y. 530.

moneys had and received also rest. The first element of such actions is that money or property has been received by the defendant to which in equity and good conscience he is not entitled, and the court, in its remedy, aims to restore just the property received, neither more nor less.<sup>95</sup> The consideration may always be shown between these immediate parties, and the consideration proved always measures the amount of the recovery.<sup>97</sup>

These rules we have just given must be applied with caution. They are doubtless the settled law in case of warranties between immediate parties. But even between immediate parties there is not much business reason why the general rule of contracts should be departed from and the consideration returned rather than the contract performed. The effect of the consideration should be, as in other cases, only to make the indorser's promise of indemnity binding, and not to furnish a measure of damages. There is still less reason why the consideration should furnish a measure of damage between parties not immediate. As between them the consideration is not even open to inquiry.<sup>98</sup> And if it be true that the consideration is eliminated as an item of proof, it would logically follow that it would be eliminated as an item of damage also. In which case the other ground of damages—the promise of the indorser to pay the whole instrument—remains for the court to apply. There is privity of contract sufficient for this between remote parties because privity between immediate indorsers is carried forward through the chain of indorse-

<sup>95</sup> It has been held that an accommodation indorser who indorsed a draft which had without his knowledge been raised, to enable another to obtain the money at a bank, could not be held liable by reason of the alteration without demand and notice, the court holding that an indorser, to be held as guarantor, must have himself received consideration. *Susquehanna Valley Bank v. Loomis*, 85 N. Y. 207. But this case has been adversely criticised on the ground that the consideration paid to the party accommodated is attributable to the accommodation indorser, and that the rule of notice applies only to the indorser's contract of indemnity. See *Daniel, Neg. Inst.* § 669.

<sup>97</sup> *BROWN v. MOTT*, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 361; *Braman v. Hess*, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 52; *Rapelye v. Anderson*, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 472; *WIFFEN v. ROBERTS*, 1 Esp. 261; *Livingston v. Hastie*, 2 Caines, 248.

<sup>98</sup> *CRAM v. HENDRICKS*, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 569; *Munn v. Commission Co.*, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 44; *Collier v. Nevill*, 3 Dev. 31; *Littell v. Hord*, Hardin, 87; *Cowles v. McVickar*, 3 Wis. 725; *Importers' & T. Nat. Bank v. Littell*, 47 N. J. Law, 234.

ments to the holder prosecuting; so that, in the phraseology of the old common-law remedies, debt would lie<sup>99</sup> as well as assumpsit for moneys paid out on account of the indorsement.<sup>100</sup> And thus the better reason seems, in case of parties not immediate, to support the variation from the rule we have quoted, and to hold that as to them the face of the paper furnishes the measure of damages.<sup>101</sup>

### ACCOMMODATION PARTIES AND PERSONS ACCOMMODATED.

**81. AN ACCOMMODATION PARTY**—Means a person who has signed a bill or note as acceptor or drawer, maker, or indorser, without recompense, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person as a means of credit.<sup>102</sup>

**82. The accommodated party impliedly contracts:**

(a) That he will pay the bill or note.

(b) That he will repay the accommodation party for all loss incurred, if that party is compelled to pay in case of his default.

**83. The accommodation party is liable to all parties except the party accommodated.**

As between the accommodated and accommodation party, the paper is given gratuitously. Between them there is no binding contract, because the accommodation paper is not based upon a consideration.

<sup>99</sup> *ONONDAGA COUNTY BANK v. BATES*, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 53. In this case the court referred to the case of *Wilmarth v. Crawford*, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 343, in which it had held that debt would lie by an indorsee against the maker of a note on the ground that, since the statute making promissory notes negotiable, the money payable thereby became, by virtue of the transfer, due and payable to indorsee or holder; and that, in judgment of law, privity of contract existed between the parties. See, also, *HODGES v. STEWARD*, 1 Salk. 125; *Priddy v. Henbrey*, 1 Barn. & C. 674; *Stratton v. Hill*, 3 Price, 253; *Riddle v. Mandeville*, 5 Cranch, 322.

<sup>100</sup> *Barker v. Casidy*, 16 Barb. 177.

<sup>101</sup> *Mason v. Mason*, 8 Cranch, C. C. 648, Fed. Cas. No. 9,245.

<sup>102</sup> *Benj. Chalm. Dig.* art. 90; *Byles, Bills*, 131; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 472; 1 *Para. Notes & B.* 184. Cf. *Neg. Inst. L.* § 55.

But subsequent parties, who discount the paper, are on a different footing. With them, not only the accommodated, but also the accommodation party may be considered as entering into a contract upon a consideration received by the accommodated party only,<sup>103</sup> for the accommodation party has offered to all the world to loan his credit upon the instrument.<sup>104</sup> The parties who, subsequent to the offer, have either discounted the instrument or paid for it when due, have accepted that offer and paid for it, and may enforce it even though themselves subsequent accommodation parties.<sup>105</sup> Thus, in accommodation paper there are three classes of relations to be considered:

(1) The liability upon the paper of the accommodated party to the accommodation party.

(2) The liability upon the paper of the accommodating party to the person for whose accommodation he has given it.

(3) The liability upon the paper of the accommodating party to all the other parties who take it.<sup>106</sup>

In case of a bill, if the acceptance be for the drawer's accommodation, the acceptor does not thereby become entitled to sue the drawer upon the bill. But when he has paid the bill, and not before, he may recover back the amount from the drawer in an action for money had and received.<sup>107</sup> This is equally the case with the accommodation maker of a note. He cannot sue the payee for whom he makes the accommodation. In either case, only the amount paid by the accommodation party can be recovered. The reason for this is that, the maker and acceptor of the instrument being the ultimate parties to it, when the instrument is paid by them it is extinguished, and no longer exists as a valid instrument. Therefore, the instrument not being in existence, the acceptor or the maker cannot recover upon

<sup>103</sup> *Yeaton v. Bank of Alexandria*, 5 Cranch, 49.

<sup>104</sup> *Meyer v. Hibsher*, 47 N. Y. 265.

<sup>105</sup> *KELLY v. BURROUGHS*, 102 N. Y. 93, 6 N. E. 109.

<sup>106</sup> *Hodges v. Nash*, 43 Ill. App. 638, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 153; *Thatcher v. West River Nat. Bank*, 19 Mich. 196; *Warder v. Gibbs*, 92 Mich. 29, 52 N. W. 73. The fact that a bill or note was accommodation paper furnishes no defense as against one advancing money upon it. *Church v. Barlow*, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 547; *Thompson v. Shepherd*, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 311; *SHAW v. KNOX*, 98 Mass. 214; *Davis v. Randall*, 115 Mass. 547. But see *Quinn v. Fuller*, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 224.

<sup>107</sup> *Pearce v. Wilkins*, 2 N. Y. 469.

the instrument itself.<sup>108</sup> The principle is the same when the accommodation party is subsequent to the party<sup>109</sup> for whom he gives the accommodation as where the accommodated party is the maker of a note and the accommodation party is payee. There, the instrument being without consideration as between the payee and the maker, the accommodation party cannot sue the accommodated party, because the instrument, as between them, is without consideration and a nudum pactum. The accommodated party can in no case look to the accommodation party, for the reason that the obligation, as between them, is without consideration and a nudum pactum; and also that the purpose of the instrument was that the accommodation party should give it "the security" of his name. This being the intention of the obligation, no action will lie in behalf of the party to whom accommodation is given.<sup>110</sup>

These relations between the accommodated and accommodation parties do not invalidate it as to third parties. Knowledge of the mere want of consideration between the original parties will not alone prevent the purchaser from becoming a bona fide holder.<sup>111</sup> Accommodation paper is daily placed in the market for discount or sale, and the indorsee or purchaser who knows that a bill or note was drawn, made, accepted, or indorsed without consideration is as much entitled to recover as if he had been ignorant of the fact.<sup>112</sup> The pur-

<sup>108</sup> *Griffith v. Reed*, 21 Wend. 505; *Young v. Hockley*, 3 Wils. 346; *Pomeroy v. Tanner*, 70 N. Y. 547; *Suydam v. Westfall*, 2 Denio, 205. But in *Fowler v. Strickland*, 107 Mass. 552, it was held that an accommodation payee and indorser, for accommodation of the maker, who took up the note for less than its face, could recover the full amount from the maker.

<sup>109</sup> *Van Duzer v. Howe*, 21 N. Y. 531; *Kitchel v. Schenck*, 29 N. Y. 515.

<sup>110</sup> *Jackson v. Warwick*, 7 Term R. 121; *LANCEY v. CLARK*, 64 N. Y. 209; *Knight v. Hunt*, 5 Bing. 432; *Sparrow v. Chisman*, 9 Barn. & C. 241; *THOMPSON v. CLUBLEY*, 1 Mees. & W. 212. In this action by an indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, it was held that the acceptor might show that the acceptance was for the accommodation of the plaintiff, and that he had received no consideration from the drawer, and also that it was agreed that when due, the bill should be taken up by the plaintiff.

<sup>111</sup> *Fitch v. McDowell*, 80 Hun, 207, 30 N. Y. Supp. 31; *Palmer v. Field*, 76 Hun, 229, 27 N. Y. Supp. 738.

<sup>112</sup> *MOORE v. CROSS*, 19 N. Y. 227; *Meyer v. Hibsher*, 47 N. Y. 265; *Montross v. Clark*, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 115; *Lincoln v. Stevens*, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 529; *Stephens v. Monongahela Nat. Bank*, 88 Pa. St. 163; *Thatcher v. Bank*,



chaser of accommodation paper with mere notice of the accommodation is a bona fide purchaser.<sup>113</sup> The bill is accepted or note made for the accommodation of another, for the purpose of furnishing a guaranty. The fact that all the world knows it was a guaranty without consideration is immaterial.<sup>114</sup> And if the accommodation party seeks a defense in saying that it is accommodation paper, it will not be necessary for the holder to show on his part in rebuttal that he gave value for it.

This rule is subject to modifications. In New York<sup>115</sup> the authorities depart from the English rule. An accommodation indorser is discharged by the transfer of a bill or note after maturity, because it is considered unfair to treat an accommodation indorsement as a continuing guaranty.<sup>116</sup> It was not the intention of the accommoda-

19 Mich. 196; *Jones v. Berryhill*, 25 Iowa, 289; *Cronise v. Kellogg*, 20 Ill. 11. Where an accommodation note was executed at the request of the person to whom it was delivered, on his statement that he needed money and had exceeded his line of discounts, and was made payable to a bank, the obvious purpose was to procure its discount at such bank; and the fact that when it made the discount it was chargeable with notice of the purpose for which the note was given would not prevent its recovery thereon. *Israel v. Gale*, 174 U. S. 391, 19 Sup. Ct. 768.

<sup>113</sup> *GRANT v. ELLICOTT*, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 227; *BROWN v. MOTT*, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 361; *Montross v. Clark*, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 115; *Thatcher v. West River Bank*, 19 Mich. 202; *CHARLES v. MARSDEN*, 1 Taunt. 224; *Jones v. Berryhill*, 25 Iowa, 289; *Bank of Ireland v. Beresford*, 6 Dow, 237.

<sup>114</sup> In the case of *GRANT v. ELLICOTT*, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 227, holding that, in an action by the payee against the acceptor, the fact of an acceptance being for accommodation was no defense, the court cited the opinion of Lord Eldon in *SMITH v. KNOX*, 3 Esp. 46, to the effect that where an accommodation paper is sent out it is no answer, in an action upon such bill, that the acceptor accepted for the accommodation of the drawer, and that such fact was known to the holder. If a bona fide consideration were given, the holder could recover, though with full knowledge of the transaction. See, also, *CHARLES v. MARSDEN*, 1 Taunt. 224.

<sup>115</sup> *CHESTER v. DORR*, 41 N. Y. 279.

<sup>116</sup> In the case of *CHESTER v. DORR*, it was held that an accommodation indorser, without consideration, of a promissory note, is not liable to a transferee after maturity from the person for whose accommodation it was indorsed, although the transferee paid full consideration. The defense of want of consideration attaches after maturity, into whatever hands it may come. In the course of his opinion, Woodruff, J., said: "I deem the just view of the subject to be that when a note has become due, and is dishonored, the rights



tion indorser to be liable upon his indorsement for all time. It was only his intention to give indemnity to such persons as took the bill or note during the time when, by its terms, it was supposed to circulate, or, in other words, up to the time of the maturity of the instrument. And it would be contrary to the intention of the parties and unwarrantable to create extensions of time after the instrument had become due. This modification prevails in some other states.<sup>117</sup> It is in direct contradiction to the English and to the common-law rule.<sup>118</sup>

Another modification of this rule applying to immediate parties is in case of what is called "diversion." It often happens that one business man tells a second that he wants to borrow his credit for a specified purpose, and, to further that purpose, the second man accepts a bill, or makes or indorses a note for the first to discount. This arrangement amounts to an agreement between them that the instrument shall be devoted to that especial purpose. And the questions arising upon the diversion of accommodation paper are mainly whether the instrument has been used for the purpose for which it was given or not.

The cases make a distinction between material and immaterial diversion. A material diversion has these elements: (1) The accommodation party must have some interest in the application of the money raised on the bill or note. Unless he has, he is not in a position to object that there has been a misapplication of the paper on which he is the accommodation party.<sup>119</sup> (2) The accommodation bill or note must be made for some specific purpose, and be diverted

and responsibilities of the parties thereto are fixed \* \* \* and thereafter he who takes it takes it with knowledge of its dishonor, \* \* \* and with just such right to enforce it as the holder has, and no other." *CHESTER v. DORR*, 41 N. Y. 279. See, also, *Hascall v. Whitmore*, 19 Me. 102.

<sup>117</sup> *Bower v. Hastings*, 36 Pa. St. 285; *Barnett v. Offerman*, 7 Watts, 130; *Hoffman v. Foster*, 43 Pa. St. 137; *Battle v. Weems*, 44 Ala. 105; *Bacon v. Harris*, 15 R. I. 599, 10 Atl. 647.

<sup>118</sup> *CHARLES v. MARSDEN*, 1 Taunt. 224; *STURTEVANT v. FORD*, 4 Man. & G. 101; *Carruthers v. West*, 11 Q. B. 143; *STEIN v. YGLESIAS*, 3 Dowl. 252; *First Nat. Bank of Salem v. Grant*, 71 Me. 374, with note; *SEYFERT v. EDISON*, 45 N. J. Law, 393. See post, p. 211.

<sup>119</sup> *Edw. Neg. Inst.* § 451; *Mohawk Bank v. Corey*, 1 Hill, 513; *Story, Bills*, § 191; *Dawson v. Goodyear*, 43 Conn. 548; *Quinn v. Hard*, 43 Vt. 375; *FETTERS v. MUNCIE NAT. BANK*, 34 Ind. 254.

to some other purpose.<sup>120</sup> An immaterial diversion is where an accommodation bill or note is made for the purpose of loaning the parties credit generally,<sup>121</sup> or where the substantial design for which the instrument was given is not departed from,<sup>122</sup> or where the agreement for which the instrument was given and which is broken is not one of substance and is unimportant. An immaterial diversion cannot avail as a defense. A material diversion is thus, in some respects, like a contract, based upon a consideration. There is some substantial interest at stake which makes it binding upon the accommodation party to carry out its purpose. If he fails to do this, the reason for its being given fails. It then becomes the duty of the accommodated party having it in possession to return it. If, in defiance of the agreement, the note is misapplied, then it is a fraud, which, as in the case of other contracts, vitiates the agreement between parties and privies, and against the defense of which the courts will allow no recovery.<sup>123</sup> The purchaser of accommodation paper obtained by fraud, deception, or fraudulently misapplied, with notice of these facts, is not a bona fide holder, but rather, if he attempts to recover upon the paper, is a partaker in the fraud.<sup>124</sup>

Carrying in mind that accommodation paper is a mere loan of credit, or, as it sometimes is put, a loan of money, the purchaser be-

<sup>120</sup> *Bank of Rutland v. Buck*, 5 Wend. 66; *Kasson v. Smith*, 8 Wend. 437; *Spencer v. Balou*, 18 N. Y. 327; *WOODHULL v. HOLMES*, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 231.

<sup>121</sup> *Cole v. Saulpaugh*, 48 Barb. 104; *Schepp v. Carpenter*, 51 N. Y. 602.

<sup>122</sup> *Bank of Chenango v. Hyde*, 4 Cow. 567; *POWELL v. WATERS*, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 176.

<sup>123</sup> *Denniston v. Bacon*, 10 Johns. 196.

<sup>124</sup> In the case of *Small v. Smith*, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 583, it was held that where accommodation paper had been negotiated in violation of an agreement between payee and maker, upon which agreement the payee had indorsed, the holder could not recover against such accommodation indorser, unless the note had been received in good faith, for a valuable consideration, and without notice of the agreement. Where the holder took such a note with notice of an agreement, he was held to have taken subject thereto. *Wardell v. Howell*, 9 Wend. 170; *Brown v. Taber*, 5 Wend. 566; *Farmers' Bank v. Noxon*, 45 N. Y. 762; *STODDARD v. KIMBALL*, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 469; *DAGGETT v. WHITING*, 35 Conn. 372; *Evans v. Kymer*, 1 Barn. & Adol. 528; *Key v. Flint*, 8 Taunt. 21; *Gray v. Bank of Kentucky*, 29 Pa. St. 365; *DUNN v. WESTON*, 71 Me. 270; *Hidden v. Bishop*, 5 R. L. 29.

ing the lender, and the seller of the paper the borrower,<sup>125</sup> it is easy to reach the next logical step in the theory. Where there is no limitation or restriction as to the manner in which accommodation paper is to be used, the accommodated party is at liberty to sustain his credit with it in any way he chooses. He may appropriate it to any purpose. In such a case there can be no substantial material diversion;<sup>126</sup> and, even when there is a departure from the express directions of the accommodation party in regard to the note, it will sometimes not amount to a material diversion. The accommodation party may, for instance, direct it to be discounted at one bank, and the accommodated party may discount it at another,<sup>127</sup> and generally, if the paper has accomplished the purpose in the minds of the parties at the time of giving the accommodation and answers the test that it has in no wise changed the responsibility of any of them, the diversion will be disregarded by the courts and deemed immaterial.<sup>128</sup>

The fact that paper was originally given for accommodation does not affect the ordinary rule that the holder as against any one not his immediate indorser is not under the necessity of showing that he gave value.<sup>129</sup> He may recover the full amount of the paper, but as to this the authorities are conflicting, some holding that his recovery is limited by the amount paid.<sup>130</sup> It is immaterial that the holder acquired the paper for a pre-existing debt,<sup>131</sup> or as collateral security; although if he acquired it as collateral security he can recover from the accommodation party only the amount of the debt.<sup>132</sup> A

<sup>125</sup> *OLAFLIN v. BOORUM*, 25 N. E. 360, 122 N. Y. 385; *Clark v. Slisson*, 22 N. Y. 312; *Newell v. Doty*, 33 N. Y. 83.

<sup>126</sup> *Cole v. Saulpaugh*, 48 Barb. 104; *Seneca Co. Bank v. Neass*, 3 N. Y. 442; *Grandin v. Le Roy*, 2 Palge, 509; *Mohawk Bank v. Corey*, 1 Hill, 514; *Agawam Bank v. Strever*, 18 N. Y. 502.

<sup>127</sup> *POWELL v. WATERS*, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 176; *Bank of Chenango v. Hyde*, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 567.

<sup>128</sup> *Duel v. Spence*, 1 Abb. Dec. 559; *Seneca Co. Bank v. Neass*, 3 N. Y. 442; *Duncan v. Gilbert*, 29 N. J. Law, 521; *JACKSON v. BANK*, 42 N. J. Law, 178; *Briggs v. Boyd*, 37 Vt. 538; *DUNN v. WESTON*, 71 Me. 270.

<sup>129</sup> *MILLIS v. BARBER*, 1 Mees. & W. 425; *Harger v. Worrall*, 69 N. Y. 370.

<sup>130</sup> *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. §§ 754-757. As to the right of a purchaser for value in general to recover the full amount when less is paid, post, p. 316.

<sup>131</sup> *GROCERS' BANK v. PENFIELD*, 69 N. Y. 502; *Lord v. Bank*, 20 Pa. St. 384.

<sup>132</sup> *NASH v. BROWN*, Chit. Bills (10th Ed.) 53; *Hilton v. Smith*, 5 Gray (Mass.) 400; *Atlas Bank v. Doyle*, 9 R. I. 76.

partner has no right to make accommodation paper in the firm name, but the fact that the paper was so made without authority is no defense against a bona fide purchaser.<sup>133</sup> Neither is it a defense against a bona fide purchaser that paper executed by a corporation was accommodation paper, and ultra vires.<sup>134</sup> Presentment for payment is not required in order to charge an indorser for whose accommodation the instrument was made or accepted, for the reason that he has no recourse against any other party; nor is he entitled to notice of dishonor.<sup>135</sup> Payment by the party accommodated, since he is in fact primarily liable, operates as a discharge of the instrument.<sup>136</sup>

### CONFLICT OF LAWS.

**83a.** The validity of the contract of the acceptor, maker, drawer, and indorser of a bill or note is determined generally by the law of the place where the contract is made.

**83b.** The interpretation and obligation of the contract of the acceptor, maker, drawer, and indorser of a bill or note are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made, unless the contract is to be performed in another place, in which case the law of the place of performance governs.

<sup>133</sup> Chemung Canal Bank v. Bradner, 44 N. Y. 680; Beach v. Bank, 2 Ind. 488; Waldo Bank v. Lumbert, 16 Me. 416; HOGARTH v. LATHAM, 3 Q. B. Div. 643. The purchaser is of course affected with notice if there is anything in the character of the indorsement, as for example if it be an irregular indorsement, or in the circumstances, to inform him that the paper was given for accommodation. Rand. Com. Paper, § 419. Post, p. 322.

<sup>134</sup> Bird v. Daggett, 97 Mass. 494; National Bank v. Young, 41 N. J. Eq. 531, 7 Atl. 488; American Trust & Savings Bank v. Gluck, 68 Minn. 129, 70 N. W. 1085; Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. Trust Co., 97 Ga. 573, 25 S. E. 171.

<sup>135</sup> Sharp v. Bailey, 9 Barn. & C. 44; Miser v. Trovinger, 7 Ohio St. 281; HULL v. MYERS, 90 Ga. 674, 16 S. E. 653. See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 140, 186, to this effect.

<sup>136</sup> LAZARUS v. COWIE, 3 Q. B. 459; COOK v. LISTER, 32 Law J. C. P. 121; BLENN v. LYFORD, 70 Me. 149. Chalm. Bills & N. art. 234. To this effect, Neg. Inst. L. §§ 200, 202. Compare 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 825. See post, p. 296.

*Conflict of Laws.*

A few words must be said concerning the so-called "conflict of laws," in its effect upon the rights and liabilities of the parties to negotiable instruments. Since a bill or note may be drawn or made in one country, accepted or payable in another, indorsed in a third, and suit may be brought in a fourth, questions frequently arise, where the laws of the different countries conflict, as to which law governs. Sometimes the governing law is the law of the place where the contract is made, or the *lex loci contractus*; sometimes the law of the place where the instrument is payable, or the *lex loci solutionis*; and sometimes the law of the place where action is brought, or the *lex fori*. As has already been stated,<sup>137</sup> the several states in this respect stand towards each other in the relation of foreign countries, and unfortunately the law of negotiable instruments differs widely in the different states.

*Same—Execution and Validity.*

The law of the place where the contract is made governs the formalities of its execution. This includes the formal validity of the bill or note as drawn or made, and of the contracts of the acceptor and indorsers.<sup>138</sup> Thus the sufficiency of a parol acceptance is determined by the law of the place of acceptance, and if it be valid there it will be enforced elsewhere, even in a state where an acceptance must be in writing.<sup>139</sup>

The law of the place of contract also governs the validity of the contracts of the different parties.<sup>140</sup> If the consideration is legal where

<sup>137</sup> Ante, p. 24.

<sup>138</sup> *Dacosta v. Davis*, 24 N. J. Law, 319; *HYDE v. GOODNOW*, 8 N. Y. 266; *Herdic v. Roessler*, 109 N. Y. 127, 16 N. E. 198; *EVANS v. ANDERSON*, 78 Ill. 558; *Moore v. Clopton*, 22 Ark. 125; *Wood v. Gibbs*, 35 Miss. 559; *Thayer v. Elliott*, 16 N. H. 102. Such is the provision of the English Bills of Exchange Act (section 72, subd. 1). The Negotiable Instruments Law does not deal with the conflict of laws.

<sup>139</sup> *Scudder v. Bank*, 91 U. S. 406; *EXCHANGE BANK v. HUBBARD*, 10 C. C. A. 295, 62 Fed. 112; *Hubbard v. Bank*, 18 C. C. A. 525, 72 Fed. 234; *MASON v. DOUSAY*, 35 Ill. 424; *Bissell v. Lewis*, 4 Mich. 450. Cf. *Hall v. Cordell*, 142 U. S. 116, 12 Sup. Ct. 154.

<sup>140</sup> *Akers v. Demond*, 103 Mass. 318; *DUNSCOMB v. BUNKER*, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 8; *Scudder v. Union Bank*, 91 U. S. 406; *Adams v. Robertson*, 37 Ill. 45. There is much conflict as to whether if the contract is to be performed

the instrument is executed, it is valid everywhere; and if illegal where executed, it is invalid everywhere. "The question of \* \* \* validity [of the contract], as affected by the legality of the consideration, or of the transaction upon which it is founded, and in which it took its inception as a contract, must be determined by the law of the state where that transaction was had. No other law can apply to it. Usury, in a loan effected elsewhere, is no offense against the laws of Massachusetts. \* \* \* But when a usurious or other illegal consideration is declared by the laws of any state to be incapable of sustaining any valid contract, and all contracts arising therefrom are declared void, such contracts are not only void in that state, but void in every state and everywhere."<sup>141</sup> The harshness of the rule in regard to usury is, however, modified by the qualification that if the rate of interest would be lawful at the place of payment the parties may elect as to the law by which the contract is to be governed; and conversely if the rate of interest would be usurious at the place of payment, but is not usurious at the place where the instrument was made, the instrument may be held valid.<sup>142</sup> A bill or note void for want of a stamp is void everywhere, although if the stamp is merely a condition of its admissibility in evidence the requirement will have no effect without the jurisdiction.<sup>143</sup>

*Same—Interpretation and Obligation of Contract.*

The law of the place where the contract is made also governs the nature, interpretation, and obligations of the various contracts of

in another country its laws determine the validity. See 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 255, note 1, and cases collected. Mr. Daniel so states the law. Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 868.

<sup>141</sup> Akers v. Demond, 103 Mass. 323, per Wells, J.

<sup>142</sup> Harvey v. Archibold, 1 Ryan & M. 184; DEPAU v. HUMPHREYS, 20 Mart. N. S. (La.) 1; POTTER v. TALLMAN, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 182; KILGORE v. DEMPSEY, 25 Ohio St. 413; Villet v. Camp, 13 Wis. 198; MILLER v. TIFFANY, 1 Wall. 310; McKay's Estate v. Bank (Colo. Sup.) 59 Pac. 745; Rand. Com. Paper, §§ 43, 44.

<sup>143</sup> Alves v. Hodgson, 7 Term R. 241; Bristow v. Sequeville, 5 Exch. 275; Fant v. Miller, 17 Grat. (Va.) 47. If the performance is to be in another county, it may be that the absence of a stamp would be immaterial. Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 915. The Bills of Exchange Act (section 72, subd. 1, a) enacts that where a bill is issued out of the kingdom, it is not invalid by reason that it is not stamped according to the law of the place of issue.

the parties, except that where the contract is to be performed in another place the law of that place governs.<sup>144</sup>

Accordingly the nature of the instrument, as negotiable or non-negotiable, is as a rule determined by the place where it is made.<sup>145</sup> Thus a promissory note payable to bearer, made in England, is transferable by delivery in France, although by the law of France transfer by delivery be inoperative.<sup>146</sup> And when a note was made in Mississippi, where the maker might set up equitable defenses against a bona fide holder, and was transferred in Louisiana, it was held in an action in that state by the indorsee that the maker was entitled to the defenses allowed by the former state, his obligations having been contracted in the light of its law.<sup>147</sup> So where a note was made in Scotland payable to A, and hence not negotiable by English law, but negotiable by Scotch law, and was indorsed in England, it was held by the Scotch court that the maker could not object to the form of transfer, inasmuch as it was according to the law which determined the nature of the instrument.<sup>148</sup> If, however, a note be not negotiable according to the law of the place where it is payable, it will be held non-negotiable, although negotiable according to the law of the place where it was made.<sup>149</sup>

It follows from what has been said that the liability of the maker of a note is governed by the law of the place where it is made, and of the acceptor of a bill by the law of the place where it is accepted, unless in either case the instrument is payable elsewhere, in which case the law of the place of payment will control. This principle regulates the time of payment, for example the number of days of

<sup>144</sup> *ANDREWS v. POND*, 13 Pet. 65; *Prentiss v. Savage*, 13 Mass. 21; *FANNING v. CONSEQUA*, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 511; *HYDE v. GOODNOW*, 3 N. Y. 268; *Freese v. Brownell*, 35 N. J. Law, 285; *Thorp v. Craig*, 10 Iowa, 461; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 867; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 31. "The general principle is that the law of the place of performance is the law of the contract. This rule applies to the operation and effect of the contract, and to the rights and obligations of the parties under it." *Akers v. Demond*, 103 Mass. 323, per Wells, J.

<sup>145</sup> *DE LA CHAUMETTE v. BANK*, 2 Barn. & Adol. 385; *Robertson v. Burdekin*, 1 Ross, Lead. Cas. 812; *ORY v. WINTER*, 4 Mart. (La.) 277; *WOODS v. RIDLEY*, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 194.

<sup>146</sup> *DE LA CHAUMETTE v. BANK*, 2 Barn. & Adol. 385.

<sup>147</sup> *ORY v. WINTER*, 4 Mart. (La.) 277.

<sup>148</sup> *Robertson v. Burdekin*, 1 Ross, Lead. Cas. 812.

<sup>149</sup> *Freeman's Bank v. Ruckman*, 16 Grat. (Va.) 126.



grace, if any, to which the acceptor or maker is entitled.<sup>150</sup> A strong illustration is found in a case where a bill, drawn in England, was accepted by the drawees in Paris, and before the day of payment, owing to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war, the French government passed a law prolonging the time of protest on negotiable instruments signed before its promulgation and postponing the time of payment, and it was held in an action by the indorsee against the drawers that presentment for payment in accordance with this law was sufficient.<sup>151</sup>

The liability contracted by the drawer and by the indorser is different from that of the acceptor and maker in that the former undertake to pay only in the event of dishonor and upon receiving due notice. They contract to pay at the place of drawing or of indorsement respectively, and their contracts are hence governed by the law of the place where their contracts are entered into. Thus where the defense of failure of consideration was available to the drawer according to the law of Mississippi where the bill was drawn, but not according to the law of Louisiana where the drawee resided, it was held that the drawer was entitled to the defense.<sup>152</sup> And as there may be many indorsements, each made in a different state, a series of contracts of indorsement may arise, each governed by the law of a different state, and all differing in effect one from another.<sup>153</sup> It is to be observed, however, that while the liability of the indorser as against his immediate and subsequent indorsees upon his contract of indorsement is governed by the law of the place of the indorsement, a different question is presented as to the effect of the indorsement as a transfer and in conferring rights upon the transferee and subsequent holders against the original parties. As to the effect of the indorsement as a transfer there has been great diversity of opinion, but it seems that under the decisions the rights of the indorsee or transferee by delivery against the original parties are governed by the law of the place where the prior contract

<sup>150</sup> *Washington Bank v. Triplett*, 1 Pet. 25; *BOWEN v. NEWELL*, 13 N. Y. 290; *BLODGETT v. DURGIN*, 32 Vt. 361; *Walsh v. Dart*, 12 Wis. 635.

<sup>151</sup> *ROUQUETTE v. OVERMANN*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 525.

<sup>152</sup> *Wood v. Gibbs*, 85 Miss. 560.

<sup>153</sup> *Williams v. Wade*, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 82; *VIOLETT v. PATTON*, 5 Cranch, 142; *Trabue v. Short*, 18 La. Ann. 257; *Ingersoll v. Long*, 4 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 293; *HUNT v. STANDART*, 15 Ind. 83.



was made or to be performed.<sup>154</sup> If the transfer is good according to the law governing the contract of the acceptor or maker the transferee may maintain suit against the acceptor or maker, but otherwise not.

By the place where the contract is made is meant, as between the original parties, the place where it is delivered or issued, not where it is dated;<sup>155</sup> but the place of date is *prima facie* the place of issue, and as against a bona fide purchaser the instrument will be deemed to have been made at that place.<sup>156</sup>

*Same—Damages.*

The rate of interest payable as damages<sup>157</sup> is determined by the law of the place of performance: in case of the acceptor or maker

<sup>154</sup> *Robertson v. Burdekin*, 1 Ross, Lead. Cas. 812; *TRIMBEY v. VIGNIER*, 1 Bing. N. C. 151; *LEBEL v. TUCKER*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 77; *BRADLAUGH v. DE RIN*, L. R. 5 C. P. 473. "It has been held that on a bill drawn and payable in England, but indorsed in France in form invalid there, but valid by English law, the indorsee might maintain suit in England against the acceptor, whose contract is to be interpreted by English law; but as between the indorsee and the indorser, such indorsement would confer no right of action, being governed by the law of France, the *lex loci contractus*. In *BRADLAUGH v. DE RIN* the exchequer chamber held that in \* \* \* *LEBEL v. TUCKER* and *TRIMBEY v. VIGNIER* the French law had been mistaken, and that as regards the point raised—i. e., the right of an indorsee under a blank indorsement to sue in his own name—there was no conflict between the laws of France and England, but the principles laid down in those cases are not questioned." *Benj. Chalm. Bills & N.* 71, note. These three cases are severely criticised by Prof. Ames, who maintains that upon principle the transfer of a bill is governed by the law of the place where it is at the time of transfer. 2 Ames, *Cas. Bills & N.* 807, 808. See Daniel, *Neg. Inst.* §§ 903–907. The Bills of Exchange Act (section 72, subd. 2) provides that the "interpretation of the drawing, indorsement, acceptance, or acceptance supra protest of a bill is determined by the law of the place where such contract is made. Provided that where an inland bill is indorsed in a foreign country the indorsement shall as regards the payor be interpreted according to the law of the United Kingdom."

<sup>155</sup> *COOK v. MOFFAT*, 5 How. 295; *Lawrence v. Bassett*, 5 Allen (Mass.) 140; *Bell v. Packard*, 69 Me. 105; *Freese v. Brownell*, 35 N. J. Law, 286; *Gay v. Rainey*, 89 Ill. 221; *Briggs v. Latham*, 36 Kan. 255, 13 Pac. 393.

<sup>156</sup> *Snaith v. Mingay*, 1 Maule & S. 87; *LENNIG v. RALSTON*, 23 Pa. St. 139.

<sup>157</sup> As to the distinction between interest by way of damages and stipulated interest, ante, p. 172, note 83.

where the instrument is payable;<sup>158</sup> in case of the drawer and indorser, where the contract of indemnity is to be performed,—that is, at the place of drawing or indorsing. Thus where F. in California drew bills on B. in Washington, D. C., which were not accepted, and the payee brought suit in England against the drawer, and it appeared that the California rate of interest was 25 per cent., and the Washington rate 6 per cent., it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover interest at the higher rate.<sup>159</sup> It would logically follow that in case of dishonor the drawer or indorser upon receiving due notice would be liable to pay in performance of his contract of indemnity whatever interest had then accrued against the acceptor or maker according to the law of the place of dishonor; but that if the drawer or indorser failed upon receiving notice to make such payment he would thereafter become liable to pay interest by way of damages for the breach of his contract at the rate in force in the place where he was liable to perform it.<sup>160</sup> The cases, however, generally fail to take the distinction between the interest payable by the drawer or indorser in performance and the interest payable by him as damages upon breach, and lay down the rule broadly that the rate of interest payable by the drawer is determined by the law of the place where the bill was drawn, and of the indorser by the law of the place where the instrument was indorsed.<sup>161</sup> The same rules apply where there is a conflict of laws as to the damages payable in lieu of re-exchange.<sup>162</sup>

<sup>158</sup> *Cooper v. Earl of Waldegrave*, 2 Beav. 282; *Scofield v. Day*, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 102; *AUSTIN v. IMUS*, 23 Vt. 286; *Hawley v. Sloo*, 12 La. Ann. 815; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 41.

<sup>159</sup> *GIBBS v. FREMONT*, 9 Exch. 25.

<sup>160</sup> This distinction is pointed out by Prof. Ames, 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 819.

<sup>161</sup> *GIBBS v. FREMONT*, *supra*; *Crawford v. Bank*, 6 Ala. 15; *Bailey v. Heald*, 17 Tex. 102; *Ex parte HEIDELBACK*, 2 Low. 526, Fed. Cas. No. 6,322; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 920; *Chalm. Bills & N.* art. 222. It has been held, however, in Vermont that the place of payment of the note governs. *PECK v. MAYO*, 14 Vt. 83.

<sup>162</sup> *SLACUM v. POMERY*, 6 Cranch, 221; *LENNIG v. RALSTON*, 23 Pa. St. 187; *Hendricks v. Franklin*, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 119.

*Same—Lex Fori.*

The lex fori governs the remedy, and determines the form of action, in whose name action must be brought, the time within which action may be brought, questions of the admissibility of evidence, and the like. Where the foreign law is relied upon, it must be alleged and proved as a fact.<sup>168</sup>

<sup>168</sup> As to conflict of laws in respect to presentment, protest and notice, post, p. 402.

## CHAPTER VI.

### TRANSFER.

- 84. Definition.
- 85. Validity between Immediate Parties.
- 86. Methods of Transfer.
- 87. By Assignment.
- 88. By Operation of Law.
- 88a-89. By Negotiation.
- 90-90a. Negotiation by Indorsement.
- 91. By Delivery.
- 92. Overdue Paper.
- 92a. Right to Sue.

### DEFINITION.

**84. The transfer of a bill or note is either the assignment or devolution of the right to its enforcement.**

Thus far we have been considering the two classes of contracts embodied in negotiable bills and notes. They are the contract embodied on the face of the bill and of the note, and the contract embodied in their acceptance and in their indorsement. We have examined the elements necessary to constitute each of those classes of contracts, and the nature and extent of the obligations that were assumed by their parties. And, because in this work we have only sought to apply these rules to negotiable bills and notes, in the outset we examined and discussed negotiability, its peculiar immunities, and the reasons for it, and in what ways negotiable instruments were distinguished from nonnegotiable ones.

The present chapter opens a new phase of the subject. The past chapters have sought to explain principally the legal rules which govern and the relations which are created by the fundamental contracts upon which the law of negotiable instruments rests. The future chapters seek to explain the rules which courts have enforced in the transfer of instruments, and particularly with reference to their circulation as an equivalent for money. The underlying problem before courts in laying down these rules has been to determine what was sound policy for a circulating medium, and

also what was just and equitable where interests and rights of parties to the instrument conflict. In this last respect the problem differs accordingly as the parties may have contracted directly with each other or as they may have acquired rights against other parties by virtue of the transfer of the instrument. For, as we have seen, in many instances parties by the transfer of the instrument become liable to or acquire rights against others of whom they have no knowledge or with whom they have had no business transactions. And since most relations of contract depend upon the theory that rights are acquired or liabilities are assumed by virtue of the express or the implied agreement of the person enforcing the right or against whom the right is enforced, it is obvious that some system different from that of the ordinary rules of contract must be developed. This system we shall examine by first investigating the nature of transfer, then the common defenses which arise in the circulation of the instrument and their effect in case of immediate and remote parties, and lastly the unique position in contract of the purchaser for value without notice.

#### VALIDITY BETWEEN IMMEDIATE PARTIES.

**85. As between immediate parties or parties privy, any cause which would invalidate an ordinary contract will invalidate the contract created by the transfer.**

A negotiable instrument containing indorsements is an aggregate of independent contracts. It often evidences as many distinct business transactions as there are contracts. Each distinct transaction may be widely different from every other. And the legal relations of the parties created by every individual transaction may be as widely different as the transactions themselves are distinct. Ordinarily, the instrument itself shows the parties who participated in a single transaction. They are technically spoken of as "immediate parties." Parties who participated in different transactions are called "remote." Ordinarily, too, the instrument itself shows to which class these parties belong. The maker and payee of a note,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Puget de Bras v. Forbes*, 1 Esp. 117; *JEFFERIES v. AUSTIN*, 1 Strange, 674; *Kennedy v. Goodman*, 14 Neb. 585, 16 N. W. 834.

the drawer and acceptor of a bill,<sup>3</sup> the indorser and immediate indorsee of a note or bill,<sup>3</sup> the drawer and payee of a bill,<sup>4</sup> are immediate parties. The indorsee and maker of a note,<sup>5</sup> or the indorsee and one who is not his immediate indorser,<sup>6</sup> are remote parties. And the conclusion to be drawn from the instrument itself is that the maker and payee of a note, for instance, participated in one transaction, while the third and fourth indorsers participated in another, and perhaps a widely different one. This is merely a presumption, however, and not of very much effect. Sometimes the instrument does not show who are the immediate and who the remote parties. In such cases the ostensible and real relations of the parties may be shown. Thus, where an accommodation note was both made and indorsed for accommodation and then delivered, without consideration, to the plaintiff, the court said that the real relation of the parties could be shown, and that the lack of consideration between them was a complete defense.<sup>7</sup> The mere position of these parties on the paper, as not immediate, does not in fact make them so. And the true nature of the transaction can be given in evidence.

It once being determined whether the parties to an instrument between whom there is controversy are immediate or remote, it then becomes clear whether the general rules of law applicable to contracts, or the peculiar rules and equitable theories applica-

<sup>3</sup> *Thomas v. Thomas*, 7 Wis. 476.

<sup>4</sup> *Easton v. Pratchett*, 1 Crompt., M. & R. 798; *HOLLIDAY v. ATKINSON*, 5 Barn. & C. 501. This was an action on a promissory note indorsed without consideration, and brought by the indorsee after death of the giver, against the executors, and the decision was against an action lying in such case, there being no legal consideration. *Abbott v. Hendricks*, 1 Man. & G. 791; *Klein v. Keyes*, 17 Mo. 326.

<sup>5</sup> *McCULLOCH v. HOFFMAN*, 10 Hun (N. Y.) 133. In this case, in which plaintiff was payee and defendant was drawer, it was held competent to prove certain facts and circumstances of Hoffman's signature, and that the subject of consideration might be inquired into, since the action was between the original parties.

<sup>6</sup> *Burnes v. Scott*, 117 U. S. 582, 6 Sup. Ct. 865; *Chemical Electric Light & Power Co. v. Howard*, 148 Mass. 359, 20 N. E. 92.

<sup>7</sup> *Etheridge v. Gallagher*, 55 Miss. 464.

<sup>8</sup> *Powers v. French*, 1 Hun, 582.

ble to negotiable bills and notes, apply. If the parties are immediate, and the controversy is between them as parties to a distinct contract, then any defense which is sufficient to prevent the enforcement of an ordinary contract will prevail.\* To them the theories of the purchaser for value do not apply, for it is no part of the theory of negotiability that it should give immunity to the person who has procured the instrument through fraud or misrepresentation or duress, or through an illegal consideration, or who has found or stolen it. Negotiability, as a theory, only aims to protect innocent parties, who have taken the instrument in ignorance of the existence of these defenses, affecting some contract embodied in the instrument before the innocent party takes it. Therefore an immediate party to a contract who has been guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, and duress must suffer as against him upon whom he has committed such a wrong.

In general, where the parties are remote, then the theories of negotiability apply. The fact of importance in the doctrine of negotiable instruments is the presumption in favor of the purchaser for value without notice necessary to preserve the instrument as a circulating medium.\* The remote party is one who knows nothing of

\* Lack of consideration, *Murphy v. Keyes*, 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 18; *Wilson v. Ellsworth*, 25 Neb. 246, 41 N. W. 177; *KULENKAMP v. GROFF*, 71 Mich. 675, 40 N. W. 57; *Macomb v. Wilkinson*, 83 Mich. 486, 47 N. W. 336. But see *In re KING'S ESTATE*, 94 Mich. 411, 54 N. W. 178; *THACHER v. DINSMORE*, 5 Mass. 299; *Hodgkins v. Moulton*, 100 Mass. 309; *Black v. Ridgway*, 131 Mass. 80. Duress, *CLARK v. PEASE*, 41 N. H. 414. Fraud, *Vathir v. Zane*, 6 Grat. (Va.) 246; *Rogers v. Morton*, 12 Wend. 484. Illegality, *Edmunds v. Groves*, 2 Mees. & W. 642; *Cummings v. Boyd*, 83 Pa. St. 372; *WRIGHT v. IRWIN*, 83 Mich. 32; *Bierce v. Stocking*, 11 Gray (Mass.) 174. Loss or theft, *Millis v. Barber*, 1 Mees. & W. 425.

\* It was held in an ANONYMOUS CASE that where a bank bill payable to A or bearer was lost, and was afterwards found by X, and was by him passed over to Y for value, who got a new bill from the bank in his own name, an action in trover for the first bill would not lie against Y. 1 *Ld. Raym.* 738. An action was brought against the acceptor by an indorsee, and the defendant offered to prove the drawer's name forged, but it was held that such proof would not be a defense against an acceptance which gave credit to the bill. *JENYS v. FAWLER*, 2 *Strange*, 946. A note was made payable to J. C. in consideration of money given to be used in gambling, and indorsed by J. C. to the plaintiff for value. It was held that the plaintiff could not recover, even though he had no notice of the use to which the money had been put. *BOW-*

the facts of defense which have arisen between immediate parties. He has not contracted with them, and is ignorant of their transactions. He is to be protected in paying money or giving value for the instrument from the wrong other parties have committed. The wrong which has tainted their contract does not vitiate his. He stands in the position of one fortified by the doctrines of equity, who will be protected by courts, because the loss was not occasioned by his act, but rather that of some prior party of whom he knows nothing.<sup>10</sup>

**YER v. BAMPTON**, Id. 1155. In **GREY v. COOPER**, an action by indorsee against the drawer of a bill, payable to W., who in turn indorsed it to another, and which finally came into possession of plaintiffs by indorsement, it was pleaded in defense that the payee was an infant. Held, that the drawer was charged, on the ground that, according to the bill, he engaged to pay to the order of the payee, whoever that might be. 3 Doug. 65. In **SMITH v. CHESTER**, it was held that an indorsee, in an action against an acceptor, must prove the handwriting of the first indorser, as a bill would be no payment to the one in whose favor it was drawn, unless indorsed by him. 1 Term R. 654.

<sup>10</sup> In **PROUTY v. ROBERTS** the action was upon a note payable to D. W. or order, signed by defendant, and indorsed by D. W. It was claimed by defendant that there had been no legal transfer of the note, as it had been obtained by H. & F. under false representations, and that the plaintiff took the note with knowledge of the facts. It was held that the plaintiff proved a legal title to the note, and the facts stated by the defendant were no defense if proved. The plaintiff was called upon to pay only what he had agreed, and payment to the plaintiff discharged the debt. 6 Cush. (Mass.) 19. In **LOWE v. WALLER** an action was brought against the acceptor of a bill, of which the indorser, L., was also the maker and payee. This bill was indorsed to H. & S., by whom it was indorsed to plaintiff. It was pleaded that the bill was upon a usurious contract between defendant and H. & S. In accordance with the principle laid down in **BOWYER v. BAMPTON**, this was held a good defense. 2 Doug. 736. In **Duncan v. Morrison** it was held that an assignee of note or bill not mature takes free from defenses of which he has no notice. Breese (Ill.) 151. To the same effect, see **Murray v. Beckwith**, 81 Ill. 43; **Cook v. Norwood**, 103 Ill. 558; **Vanliew v. Second Nat. Bank**, 21 Ill. App. 126; **MILLER v. LARNED**, 103 Ill. 562; **SMITH v. LIVINGSTONE**, 111 Mass. 342; **Gilson v. Stevens Mfg. Co.**, 124 Mass. 546.



**METHODS OF TRANSFER.**

**86. There are three methods of transfer:**

- (a) By assignment.
- (b) By operation of law.
- (c) By negotiation.

**SAME—BY ASSIGNMENT.**

**87. A bill or note may be transferred by assignment, or sale, as distinguished from negotiation, subject to the same conditions that would be requisite in the case of an ordinary chose in action.<sup>11</sup>**

We have already seen that transfers in the form of words commonly used for an assignment when written on the bill or note are construed as indorsements and not as assignments, unless the intention between the parties plainly is to treat them as an assignment in distinction from an indorsement. See *supra*, pp. 105 to 110. But where such form of words is not written on the instrument, but is found in a separate paper, and from its phraseology is clearly meant to transfer title, the plain intention of the parties is enforced and the title vests in the transferee by operation of assignment.<sup>12</sup> So where a bill or note which can only be transferred by indorsement, is transferred without indorsement, yet with intention to vest title, as we shall see in the later sections of this chapter, the title vests by assignment, and is different in its legal effects from that passing on negotiation, or according to the doctrines of negotiability. And this raises the question of title conferred by an assignment.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Chalm. Bills & N. art. 103.

<sup>12</sup> Examples are: An order by the payee of a note on the maker to pay over proceeds to some one, *Noyes v. Gilman*, 65 Me. 589; a transfer of a note or bill by deed, *McClain v. Weldemeyer*, 25 Mo. 364; an assignment by a separate writing, *Morris v. Poillon*, 50 Ala. 403; an order by a holder to his collecting agent to pay over proceeds, *Gayoso Sav. Inst. v. Fellows*, 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 467; a bond by the payee of a note in which he includes the note, *Crosby v. Roub*, 16 Wis. 645.

<sup>13</sup> It was once held that a bill payable to A or bearer was not negotiable.

The effect of the assignment of an ordinary contract right is that the party holding the right drops out of the contract and another takes his place. The assignee is substituted in place of the assignor. And that the student may better understand the matter, we will say that the assignee, and every subsequent person to whom the contract comes by assignment, may be considered as the person who made the contract in the first instance, and as having said and done everything in making the contract which the original assignor said or did. Hence if the original assignor said or did something which under the ordinary law of contracts would prevent him from enforcing the contract, or asserting his right against the other party to the original contract, the assignee, although he knows nothing of the original transaction, may be deemed to have said and done the same things. And further, if any subsequent assignee from whom, as an assignor, the holder in turn derives the contract, has done anything to prevent its enforcement against the original party, the last holder cannot enforce it against the original party. Each assignee takes his chances as to the exact position in which any party making an assignment of it stands.<sup>14</sup> And as it is called in law, the assignee takes the contract subject to equities; that is, to defenses to the contract which would avail in favor of the original party up to the time of the notice of the assignment given to

Hodges v. Steward, 1 Salk. 125; NICHOLSON v. SEDGWICK, 1 Ld. Raym. 180. But these cases have been overruled. GRANT v. VAUGHAN, 3 Burrows, 1516. See Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 104. Before the passing of the statute 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, a promissory note was held not assignable or indorsable over within the custom of merchants. BULLER v. CRIPS, 6 Mod. 29. See ante, p. 4. As to whether inland bills only were contemplated by this statute, see MILNE v. GRAHAM, 1 Barn. & C. 192. In the case of LODGE v. PHELPS, the question arose as to whether the assignee of a promissory note given in Connecticut, where such assignee could not maintain an action in his own name, might so maintain such action in New York. It was held that the action might be brought in the assignee's own name, but allowing the defendant every defense to which he would have been entitled in New York. 2 Calnes, Cas. 321.

<sup>14</sup> CROUCH v. CREDIT FONCIER, L. R. 8 Q. B. 386; Mangles v. Dixon, 3 H. L. Cas. 735; Littlefield v. Bank, 97 N. Y. 581; Callanan v. Edwards, 32 N. Y. 483; Kleeman v. Frisbie, 63 Ill. 482; Willis v. Trambly, 13 Mass. 204; SPINNING v. SULLIVAN, 48 Mich. 5, 11 N. W. 758; Lane v. Smith, 103 Pa. St. 415; Shade v. Creviston, 93 Ind. 591; WARNER v. WHITTAKER, 6 Mich. 133.

the person against whom the contract is sought to be enforced. The effect of an assignment in this respect thus differs from the effect of negotiation, for the chief difference between an assignment and a negotiation is, as already explained (see *supra*, pp. 9 to 14), that the negotiable contract can be enforced by the transferee, without previous notice to the contractor, and without the risk of being met by defenses which would have been good against the assignor.

#### **SAME—BY OPERATION OF LAW.**

**88. The full title to a bill or note passes, without assignment or negotiation, by operation of law, in the following cases:**

- (a) Upon the death of the holder, when the title vests in his personal representative, or**
- (b) Upon the bankruptcy of the holder, when the title vests in his assignee, or**
- (c) At common law, if the holder is an unmarried woman, upon her subsequent marriage, when the title vests in her husband, or**
- (d) At common law, if a bill or note be made payable or be transferred to a married woman, when the title vests in her husband, or**
- (e) Upon the death of a joint payee or indorsee, when the title vests at once in the survivor or survivors.**

By "operation of law" is meant that in the cases above specified the law implies a transfer where there is none by act of the parties. The rules of law themselves effect the transfer. The position, rights and liabilities of executors and administrators and trustees have been already sufficiently explained.<sup>15</sup> The position, rights, and liabilities of an assignee in bankruptcy are similar to theirs, because in most

<sup>15</sup> Ante, p. 63. Upon death of the holder, the title vests in his executor or administrator. *STONE v. RAWLINSON*, Willes, 559; *Rand v. Hubbard*, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 256. Even if the bill or note be specifically bequeathed. *BISHOP v. CURTIS*, 21 Law J. Q. B. 391; *CRIST v. CRIST*, 1 Ind. 570.

respects he is but an ordinary trustee.<sup>16</sup> As regards the position of married women at common law, there is not much to be said, because in England and in almost all our states the common law has been abrogated by statutes abolishing most of the old rules. These rules were that at common law a married woman, though she might have contracted as feme sole, was nevertheless by marriage disabled from acquiring the benefits under the contract. These belonged conditionally to her husband. If he reduced them to possession, they were his absolutely. If he did not reduce them to possession, on his death they survived to her if alive, but, if dead, to her representatives. These rules were operative in case of bills and notes whether made payable to or indorsed to a married woman. And during the marriage, the husband was for all purposes deemed to be the holder of the instrument payable to the order of the wife, whether it was made payable to her before or after marriage. As regards the joint payee or indorsee, the rule stated in the text is the statement of the contract rule of survivorship, perhaps the principal characteristic of the doctrine of joint right. By this is meant that the order in the bill or indorsement and the promise in the note are made to all the promisees, not as separate individuals, but as one legal entity. We may liken them, in their being but one party in ownership, to a corporation, which may be composed of many individuals, yet acts as one, and which in case of the death of some of its members still exists and acts through the survivors. So with joint payees or indorsees, the right does not descend to representatives, but passes on or is transferred to the survivors, who have the title to it and are entitled to enforce it.

The title, in all these cases, received by the transferee, is only that held by the transferrer, because this devolution of interest by operation of law is but an assignment of that interest. The executor, administrator and assignee in bankruptcy merely stand in the place of the original owner and can have no better position than he had.<sup>17</sup> They pay nothing for the paper, neither do they take it in any commercial transaction, but it comes to them as part of the holder's property, to be collected and paid over to the creditors of the holder or

<sup>16</sup> Title vests in assignee. *SMITH v. DE WITTS*, 6 Dowl. & R. 120; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 260.

<sup>17</sup> *Billings v. Collins*, 44 Me. 271.

persons entitled to it. And this also is the principle governing in the reduction to possession by a husband of the choses in action of a wife,<sup>18</sup> and in the case of the survivor of joint owners.<sup>19</sup>

### **SAME—BY NEGOTIATION.**

**88a.** "Negotiation" means transfer of a bill or note in the form and manner prescribed by the law merchant, with the incidents and privileges annexed thereby.<sup>20</sup>

**89.** There are two modes of negotiation: (a) Negotiation by indorsement, and (b) negotiation by delivery. The form of the instrument determines which mode is applicable.<sup>21</sup>

The effect of "negotiation" has already been somewhat discussed, and will be further considered hereafter. The incidents and privileges of negotiation may be briefly capitulated as follows: (1) The transferee can sue all parties to the instrument in his own name. (2) Consideration for the transfer is prima facie presumed. (3) The transferer can, under certain conditions, give a good title, although he has none himself. (4) The transferee can further negotiate the bill, with like privileges and incidents.<sup>22</sup>

### **NEGOTIATION BY INDORSEMENT.**

**90.** A bill or note which is in legal effect payable to order is negotiated by indorsement.<sup>23</sup>

**90a.** The transferee of an instrument made payable to order without indorsement is the equitable owner, and takes it subject to all the equities vested in prior parties.

The facts which determine whether or not the instrument is negotiable by indorsement are the terms of the face of the instrument.

<sup>18</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 257, 258.

<sup>19</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 1182, 1183, 1183a.

<sup>20</sup> Chalm. Bills & N. art. 106.

<sup>21</sup> Id. art. 108. Cf. Neg. Inst. L. § 60.

<sup>22</sup> Chalm. Bills & N. art. 106.

<sup>23</sup> Chalm. Bills & N. art. 110. Cf. Neg. Inst. L. § 60.

If the instrument be to order, then it was in contemplation of the parties that the money called for was to be paid to the payee, or to some person to whom he would direct it to be paid.<sup>24</sup> It would be a violation of the terms of the contract to pay it otherwise. For the meaning of the words "or order" is that the original parties intended in the first place that the instrument might pass from the payee to some person, they did not know whom, and on again from him to another, who in turn might transfer it. They therefore may be deemed to promise to pay its amount to any one whatever, provided only that such person can show an order for its payment. And thus, as we have seen (see ante, p. 105), it is immaterial whether the indorsement contains words of negotiability or not.<sup>25</sup> But the only method by which this order can be evidenced is an indorsement,<sup>26</sup> although the indorsement may have various forms, and be made sometimes by the payee or indorsee and sometimes by persons upon whom their interests devolve.<sup>27</sup> And the words or order are construed as an express power

<sup>24</sup> *CCOCK v. FELLOWS*, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 143; *Hedges v. Sealy*, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 214. A note by R. B. & A. G., payable to J. B., was indorsed thus: "Pay the within to J. R. [Signed] J. B." It was held that the legal ownership of the note was not transferred to J. R. by this indorsement, so as to authorize him to maintain a suit upon the note in his own name against the makers. *Robinson v. Brown*, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 128. In some states, by statute, words of negotiability are not required. See *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 174.

<sup>25</sup> *MORE v. MANNING*, Comyns, 311; *EDIE v. EAST INDIA CO.*, 1 Wm. Bl. 295, 2 Burrows, 1216; *LEAVITT v. PUTNAM*, 3 N. Y. 494.

<sup>26</sup> In the case of *BRYANT v. EASTMAN*, where one who was carrying on business for himself, but in the name of a company which had not been organized, though incorporated, received as payment for a debt due him in such business a note payable to the order of the company, it was held that such person might transfer the note by indorsing it in his own name. 7 Cush. (Mass.) 111. *Warder, Bushnell & Glessner Co. v. Gibbs*, 92 Mich. 29, 52 N. W. 73; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 700; *Byles, Bills & N.* pp. 2, 151; *Daniel, Neg. Inst.* §§ 663, 664.

<sup>27</sup> The various forms are arranged as follows: (1) If payable to A or order, A must indorse. (2) If payable to A, and he is dead, B, as executor of A, must sign. Thus, in the case of *STONE v. RAWLINSON*, it was held that the executor or administrator of a person to whom or whose order a bill is payable has the absolute property in such bill, and may assign it to whomsoever he pleases, and such assignee may maintain an action in his own name. *Willes*, 559. In such case the indorsement of one of several executors is good. *Sanders v. Blain*, 6 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 446. But if payable to A, B, C, and D,

given the payee to assign only in case the payee evidences his assent to the transfer by his indorsement.<sup>28</sup>

There is a large class of cases where, through accident, forgetfulness, mistake, or some other cause, a negotiable instrument is transferred in good faith, but without the indorsement of the person to whose order it is made. It is true that an indorsement of an instrument and an assignment of it such as we have been endeavoring to explain are widely distinct. An indorsement is a negotiation, and carries with it the full legal title, and the assignment carries with it only the equitable one.<sup>29</sup> And it was the doctrine of the courts of equity, as distinct from those of the common law, that, inasmuch as property in equity could be assigned without a writing,<sup>30</sup> and merely by delivery, with an oral agreement and an intent to assign, therefore a court of equity would treat a delivery of the bill or note payable to order, without indorsement, as an assignment of it, or a transfer of the title of the bill or the note and all interest in it.<sup>31</sup> And because it was only the courts of equity which would treat it as such an assignment, and vest the interest and right to the bill or note in the transferee, therefore a corresponding equity would admit of rea-

executors of A, all must sign. *Johnson v. Mangum*, 65 N. C. 146; *SMITH v. WHITING*, 9 Mass. 334. But see *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 266. (3) If payable to A, and he is bankrupt, B, as assignee of A, must sign. *SMITH v. DE WITTS*, 6 Dowl. & R. 120. (4) If payable to A, wife of B, B must sign. *MASON v. MORGAN*, 2 Adol. & E. 30; *COTES v. DAVIS*, 1 Camp. 485. (5) If payable to A, B, C, and D, a copartnership, any member may sign by the firm name. Thus, a note, made payable to E. & R. or order, was indorsed by R. in his own name to his partner E. It was held that E. could not maintain an action as payee, since the indorsement must be in the partnership name. *ESTABROOK v. SMITH*, 6 Gray (Mass.) 570. (6) If payable to A, B, C, and D, not partners, all must sign. Thus, a bill payable to father and son, not partners, was indorsed by the son alone. Such indorsement was held not good, as both payees should have indorsed. *Carrick v. Vickery*, 2 Doug. 653n. Cf. Neg. Inst. L. § 71.

<sup>28</sup> *NICHOLSON v. SEDGWICK*, 1 Ld. Raym. 180; *HODGES v. STEWARD*, 1 Salk. 125.

<sup>29</sup> *Freund v. Importers' & Traders' Nat. Bank*, 76 N. Y. 352; *U. S. v. White*, 2 Hill, 59.

<sup>30</sup> *Briggs v. Dorr*, 19 Johns. 93.

<sup>31</sup> Ante, p. —.



sions or defenses to show why the bill or note should not be paid.<sup>32</sup> Hence the doctrine that a transferee of a note made payable to order without indorsement takes it subject to all equities attached to the note;<sup>33</sup> and this although the holder was a bona fide holder for value. The transferee stands in the position of an assignee. He owns the note. He, in turn, may transfer it, but he owns it and transfers it subject to the rules applicable in case of an assignment of any other chose in action. And although he subsequently obtains an indorsement, if he has in the meantime acquired knowledge of the equities,<sup>34</sup> or if the indorsement be after maturity,<sup>35</sup> he still holds the instrument subject to the same defenses. In the language of the Negotiable Instruments Law,<sup>36</sup> "for the purpose of determining whether the transferee is a holder in due course, the negotiation takes effect as of the time when the indorsement is actually made."

There is, indeed, some authority to the effect that if it was the intention of the parties that the instrument should be indorsed, but the indorsement was omitted through accident, mistake, or fraud, the indorsement, when subsequently obtained, will relate back to the time of the delivery, and operate as if then given, the holder standing as a bona fide purchaser as of that date.<sup>37</sup> But it is doubtful, to say the least, whether any such exception can be reconciled with principle. The governing principle is that, in order that a purchaser may take title discharged of equities, three things must concur: (1) Bona fides,

<sup>32</sup> *Muller v. Pondir*, 55 N. Y. 325; *SAVAGE v. KING*, 17 Me. 301; *Calder v. Billington*, 15 Me. 398; *Southard v. Porter*, 43 N. H. 379.

<sup>33</sup> *EDGE v. BUMFORD*, 31 Law J. Ch. 805; *Hedges v. Sealy*, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 214; *GOSHEN NAT. BANK v. BINGHAM*, 118 N. Y. 349, 23 N. E. 180; *LANCASTER NAT. BANK v. TAYLOR*, 100 Mass. 18; *Clark v. Callison*, 7 Ill. App. 263; *Haskell v. Mitchell*, 53 Me. 468; *Clark v. Whitaker*, 50 N. H. 474; *CENTRAL TRUST CO. v. BANK*, 101 U. S. 68; *OSGOOD'S ADM'R v. ARTT (C. C.)* 17 Fed. 575.

<sup>34</sup> *WHISTLER v. FORSTER*, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 248, 1 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 341, 345, note 1 (citing cases); *LANCASTER NAT. BANK v. TAYLOR*, 100 Mass. 18; *Clark v. Whitaker*, 50 N. H. 474; *OSGOOD v. ARTT*, 17 Fed. 575.

<sup>35</sup> *Haskell v. Mitchell*, 53 Me. 468; *Lyon, Potter & Co. v. Bank*, 29 C. C. A. 45, 85 Fed. 120.

<sup>36</sup> Section 79.

<sup>37</sup> *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 745, citing *Southard v. Porter*, 43 N. H. 380; *WATKINS v. MAULE*, 2 Jac. & W. 237; *Hughes v. Nelson*, 29 N. J. Eq. 547. See, also, *Tied. Com. Paper*, § 248; *Benj. Chalm. Bills & N.* 119.



(2) the giving of value, and (3) the transfer of the legal title. In the cases which fall within this supposed exception, when the legal title is subsequently acquired the essential element of bona fides is wanting. Indeed, it is questionable whether these cases can be distinguished, even upon the facts, from the cases which have established the rule, as these cases generally arose from mistake or accident in failing to obtain at the time of delivery the indorsement which it was evidently the intention of the parties should be made. In the leading case of *WHISTLER v. FORSTER*,<sup>88</sup> for example, the payee of a check made by the defendant, and obtained from him by the payee by fraud, gave it to the plaintiff for value, but did not then indorse it, and, upon the want of an indorsement becoming apparent, the plaintiff went to the payee, and obtained his indorsement. It was held that the plaintiff took subject to the defense of fraud. Erle, C. J., said: "According to the law merchant, the title to a negotiable instrument passes by indorsement and delivery. A title so acquired is good against all the world, provided the instrument is taken for value, and without notice of any fraud. The plaintiff's title under the equitable assignment here, therefore, was to be rendered valid by the indorsement; but at the time he obtained the indorsement he had notice that the bill had been fraudulently obtained by Griffiths from the defendant, and that Griffiths had no right to make the indorsement." It is difficult to see how, in the cases supposed to fall within the exception, the transferee could acquire any greater equities than were acquired by the plaintiff in this case, or why in the one case, as in the other, the equities of the transferee must not be postponed to the prior equities of the defendant.<sup>89</sup>

#### **SAME—BY DELIVERY.**

**91. A bill or note which is in legal effect payable to bearer is negotiated by delivery without indorsement.<sup>90</sup>**

Bills and notes payable to bearer and bills and notes indorsed in blank are, in legal effect, the same. The contract in the case of the

<sup>88</sup> 14 C. B. (N. S.) 248.

<sup>89</sup> A bank discounting a note not indorsed by the payee takes it subject to all defenses, though such indorsement was omitted by mistake, and was supplied after the paper matured. *Lyon, Potter & Co. v. Bank*, 29 C. C. A. 45, 85 Fed. 120.

<sup>90</sup> Chalm. Bills & N. art. 109. Cf. Neg. Inst. L. § 60.

note payable to bearer imports that the maker or acceptor is willing to pay any one who may have it in his lawful possession. The indorsement in blank signifies the same thing with regard to an indorser making it.<sup>41</sup> And the holder of both an instrument payable to bearer and one indorsed in blank may transfer the instrument without indorsement.<sup>42</sup> Such a transfer is a negotiation, but except to the extent of the warranties already specified (see *supra*, p. 162) it imposes no liability upon the transferrer; for bills made payable to bearer are negotiable at common law, and notes so made payable are recognized by the statute of Anne;<sup>43</sup> and bills or notes to pay A or bearer are interpreted to be contracts to pay the person so mentioned, or the person to whom he may deliver the instrument. The phrase "bearer" is *descriptio personæ* for the legal possessor,<sup>44</sup> and the transfer of title according to the terms of the original instrument is therefore predicated upon delivery alone. "The courts," says Mr. Daniel,<sup>45</sup> "treat notes payable to bearer as if there were a direct line of contract between the maker and the holder, by whatever successive stages of transfer he may have derived it; and it is correct to hold that the maker is in direct contract with him, provided he becomes the bearer *bona fide*. He need not trace title through his predecessors, as possession is presumptive evidence of his right." But it is evidently the intention of the courts to construe this contract subject to the implied condition that the maker or acceptor will pay only the *bona fide* possessor. In other words, the original parties may be deemed to say, "We will not restrict the payment of this instrument to any particular person, but will pay it

<sup>41</sup> See *supra*, p. 110. If a bill be in legal effect payable to bearer, no subsequent holder can restrain its negotiability by special indorsement. *Smith v. Clarke, Peake*, 295.

<sup>42</sup> *BITZER v. WAGAR*, 83 Mich. 223, 47 N. W. 210.

<sup>43</sup> In *DE LA CHAUMETTE v. BANK OF ENGLAND* it appeared that a certain bank note had been stolen, and afterwards came into the possession of a party in France, who, in the course of business, sent the same to England. By the desire of the one from whom the note had been stolen, it was converted by the bank. In an action of trover, it was decided that by the statute of Anne such notes were negotiable, just as were inland bills, and thus delivery to a *bona fide* holder for consideration gave a good title as against original holder. 2 Barn. & Adol. 385.

<sup>44</sup> *GRANT v. VAUGHAN*, 3 Burrows, 1516.

<sup>45</sup> Daniel, *Neg. Inst.* footnote to § 729.

to anybody,<sup>46</sup> provided such person be the bona fide holder." They therefore may be deemed to contract that the instrument may be transferred subject to the rights and immunities of the transfer of an instrument transferred by negotiation, and that the transferee should have rights of an indorsee for value and without notice, so far as the admission of equities is concerned.<sup>47</sup> And the only difference between the transferrer by delivery and the indorser is that the transferrer, by declining to indorse, declines to enter into a contract of indemnity, and the transferee relies on the instrument itself, and upon the implied warranties, by not requiring an indorsement. The transferrer, unless he violates an implied warranty, cannot therefore be compelled to refund the money for which he sold the bill or note if it prove uncollectible. Of this fact the transferee takes the risk on himself,<sup>48</sup> for he might, by requiring an indorsement, acquire all the right acquired by indorsement.<sup>49</sup> But in other respects he derives the benefit of all the rights his transferrer or prior parties have acquired; he derives any benefit that may come from a purchase in due course for value and without notice, and thus is freed from liability to defenses.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>46</sup> *Bank of Kentucky v. Wister*, 2 Pet. 318; *Town of Thompson v. Perrine*, 106 U. S. 593, 1 Sup. Ct. 564, 568; *Thomson v. Lee Co.*, 3 Wall. 327.

<sup>47</sup> *City of Lexington v. Butler*, 14 Wall. 293; *Moran v. Commissioners of Miami Co.*, 2 Black, 722; *Mercer Co. v. Hackett*, 1 Wall. 83; *James v. Chalmers*, 6 N. Y. 209; *Beach v. Wise*, 1 Hill, 612; *Bedell v. Carll*, 33 N. Y. 581.

<sup>48</sup> *Fenn v. Harrison*, 3 Term R. 759; *Fyddell v. Clark*, 1 Esp. 447; *Emly v. Lye*, 15 East, 7; *BANK OF ENGLAND v. NEWMAN*, 1 Ld. Raym. 442. In this case it was held that: "If a man has a bill payable to him or bearer, and delivers it over for money received, without indorsement of it, this is a plain sale of the bill, and he who sells it does not become a new security; but, if he had indorsed it, he had become a new security, and then he had been liable upon the indorsement." Holt, C. J.

<sup>49</sup> *Bigelow v. Colton*, 13 Gray, 309.

<sup>50</sup> *MILLER v. RACE*, 1 Burrows, 452; *Mauran v. Lamb*, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 174; *GRANT v. VAUGHAN*, 3 Burrows, 1516. See, also, Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 814, and cases quoted; also section 4, c. 37, § 1191 et seq.

## OVERDUE PAPER.

**92. Negotiable paper may be transferred by indorsement or delivery when overdue.**

A bill or note does not lose its negotiability by dishonor;<sup>51</sup> and yet, by a curious anomaly as regards parties prior to the transfer, many of the privileges of a bona fide holder who receives the paper after maturity are destroyed.<sup>52</sup> Defenses of payment, of fraud, of illegality and failure of consideration,<sup>53</sup> in favor of the original par-

<sup>51</sup> In the case of *LEAVITT v. PUTNAM* it was held that, if originally negotiable, a bill or note does not lose such character by being dishonored, but may still pass from hand to hand ad infinitum until paid by the drawer. The indorser, after maturity, writes in the same form, and is bound only upon the same conditions of demand upon the drawer and notice of nonpayment, as any other indorser. Thus, the paper retains the main attributes of a proper bill or note. In *DEUTERS v. TOWNSEND* it was held that a bill was assignable after maturity, and even after an action had been begun upon the same. 5 Best & S. 613. In *AMES v. MERIAM* it was decided that the rule controlling bills or promissory notes, with respect to equities attaching, does not apply to checks on a bank, taken within a short time after their date. Although payable on demand, they are not treated as being dishonored or overdue on the day, or immediately after the day, of their date. In this case it was held that a check dated January 2d and delivered to a person on January 12th was not overdue and subject to defenses between original parties. 98 Mass. 294; *BASSENHORST v. WILBY*, 45 Ohio St. 333, 13 N. E. 75; *Johns. Cas. Bills & N.* 45; *Carpenter v. Greenop*, 74 Mich. 664, 42 N. W. 276.

<sup>52</sup> *McCaffrey v. Dustin*, 43 Ill. App. 34, *Johns. Cas. Bills & N.* 144. See *Neg. Inst. L.* § 91. Cf. § 92.

<sup>53</sup> See collated cases, footnote to 1 Ames, *Cas. Bills & N.* p. 747. In *BROWN v. DAVIES* it was held that an overdue note taken with notes for nonpayment on it was subject to the defense of payment by the maker, on the ground that its being so noted for nonpayment when the plaintiff received it should have put him on inquiry. 3 Term R. 80. It was held in *CROSSLEY v. HAM* that the plaintiff, by taking a note after dishonor by nonacceptance, took subject to infirmities and defenses between previous parties. 13 East, 498. In *Ashurst v. Royal Bank of Australia* it was held that where a note was indorsed by one who was bankrupt at the time, and when overdue, the indorsee takes no better title than that of his transferrer. 27 Law T. 168; *Howard v. Ames*, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 308; *Bond v. Fitzpatrick*, 4 Gray (Mass.) 89; *Fish v. French*, 15 Gray (Mass.) 520. It is very generally held, however, that paper transferred after maturity is not subject to set-off or counterclaim available against the

ties, may be successfully interposed in an action on a bill or note brought by the transferee of overdue paper when they would have availed against his transferrer. As Professor Ames points out, a negotiable instrument overdue becomes a mere assignable chose in action.

These are some things to be noted concerning overdue paper viewed as a chose in action. Prominent among these is the fact that it is transferred by indorsement or delivery, as the case may be, and not by assignment.<sup>54</sup> The reason for this is that the parties to the original contract contemplated a payment to order. An indorsement signifies that order, and transfers the instrument. In *COLT v. BARNARD*<sup>55</sup> Chief Justice Shaw explains that each indorsement is in the nature of a new draft by which the holder orders the maker to pay the contents to the indorsee, not, indeed, when the instrument by its terms became due, but within a reasonable time. Other authorities deem it similar to an inland bill of exchange drawn by the indorser on the acceptor of the bill or the maker of the note, payable to the indorsee at sight or on demand. And, by analogy, the duty of the indorsee of such an instrument, if he would hold the

transferrer. Thus in the leading case of *BURROUGH v. MOSS*, 10 Barn. & C. 558, Bailey, J., said: "The indorsee of an overdue bill or note is liable to such equities only as attach to the bill or note itself, and not to claims arising out of collateral matters." And this rule has been applied even where the transferee had notice of the set-off. *OULDS v. HARRISON*, 10 Exch. 572. The English rule has been widely followed in this country. *National Bank v. Texas*, 20 Wall. 72, per Swayne, J.; *ROBINSON v. LYMAN*, 10 Conn. 30; *Renwick v. Williams*, 2 Md. 356; *Young v. Shriner*, 80 Pa. St. 463; *Richards v. Daily*, 34 Iowa, 427; *Haley v. Congdon*, 56 Vt. 65; *Sargent v. Southgate*, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 312; *Robinson v. Perry*, 73 Me. 168; *Edney v. Willis*, 23 Neb. 56, 36 N. W. 300. Even where set-off is allowed, it does not extend to debts arising after the transfer. In some states the matter is regulated by statute. See, generally, Daniel, *Neg. Inst.* §§ 1435-1437; 4 *Am. & Eng. Enc. Law* (2d Ed.) 315 et seq.; 1 Ames, *Cas. Bills & N.* 759.

<sup>54</sup> 2 Ames, *Bills & N.* p. 853.

<sup>55</sup> 18 Pick. (Mass.) 260. In this case a note was indorsed by the defendant, who was the payee, to plaintiff, after maturity. There was no evidence of demand of payment on the maker, or of notice to the defendant. The maker was insolvent when the indorsement was made, and had absconded to New York, in which state a judgment had been obtained against him, which was unsatisfied. It was held that without demand and notice the action could not be maintained.

indorser, is generally determined.<sup>56</sup> An indorser is liable as such if the holder performs his duty in demanding the payment in a reasonable time.<sup>57</sup> By this is meant such a time as would, from the particular circumstances of each case, be allowed in the general conduct of affairs by business men.

The indorsee of a negotiable bill or note after maturity takes the same, and only the same, interest that his indorser had.<sup>58</sup> This is because it is a mere assignable chose in action. He buys the right of action which the indorser had to sell. He buys not only the right of its enforcement, but also the defenses which the original parties may have to it.<sup>59</sup> To give expression to common business phrase, he buys a lawsuit for whatever it is worth, with the chances of its success or failure, as events may turn. The reason, as will be shown

<sup>56</sup> Byles, Bills, p. 169, note; *Patterson v. Todd*, 18 Pa. St. 426.

<sup>57</sup> *BERRY v. ROBINSON*, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 121; *LEAVITT v. PUTNAM*, 3 N. Y. 494. "Where an instrument is issued, accepted, or indorsed when overdue, it is, as regards the persons so issuing, accepting or indorsing it, payable on demand." Neg. Inst. L. § 26.

<sup>58</sup> In *PINE v. SMITH*, it was decided that one who takes a promissory note indorsed on the last day of grace does so subject to all defenses available in the hands of the payee, and in a suit against the maker the defendant may prove any illegality in the origin of the note. 18 Gray (Mass.) 82. A mortgage given to secure a note for the payment of four installments was taken when one installment was due and not yet paid. It was held that, in a suit to foreclose, the defendant might prove duress as a defense to the whole note. The note was dishonored by non-payment of the first installment, and this put plaintiff on inquiry. *VINTON v. KING*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 562. In an action by the indorsee against the maker of a note for \$55, it was held that the defendant might show, under a plea of non assumpsit, that he had given the payee \$50 shortly after the assignment, which the latter had agreed to credit on the note. The note in this case was payable on demand, and was negotiable two and a half months after date. *LOSEE v. DUNKIN*, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 70. See, also, the case of *HOLMES v. KIDD*, 3 Hurl. & N. 891. As to negotiability of a note payable on demand after the lapse of time, see *BROOKS v. MITCHELL*, 9 Mees. & W. 15. As to burden of proof in case of transfer after maturity, see *Eames v. Crosier*, 101 Cal. 260, 35 Pac. 873; *Tyler v. Young*, 30 Pa. St. 144.

<sup>59</sup> *Folsom v. Bartlett*, 2 Cal. 163; *Wheeler v. Barret*, 20 Mo. 573; *MORGAN v. U. S.*, 113 U. S. 500, 5 Sup. Ct. 588; *Harrell v. Broxton*, 78 Ga. 129, 3 S. E. 5; *Money v. Ricketts*, 62 Miss. 209; *SPECK v. CAR CO.*, 121 Ill. 57, 12 N. E. 213; *CHURCH v. CLAPP*, 47 Mich. 257, 10 N. W. 362; *Wood v. McKean*, 64 Iowa, 18, 9 N. W. 817; *Marsh v. Marshall*, 53 Pa. St. 396; *Hays v. Kingston* (Pa.) 16 Atl. 745.

under the subject of "Notice," is that, when an indorsee takes an instrument overdue, it is presumed he was acquainted with, or had notice of, the circumstances which would affect the validity of it as against original parties<sup>60</sup> had it been in the hands of the person who was the holder at that time.<sup>61</sup> He cannot be treated as a purchaser without notice, because the fact that the instrument has not been paid when the acceptor or maker promised it should be paid implies that there is some reason on their part for its nonpayment. And whether he has inquired for this reason or not is immaterial. He should have made such inquiry, and the law will hold him to have made it. He is charged with notice of all facts and defenses he would have found out had he made the inquiry.<sup>62</sup>

It follows, conversely, from the rule that the transferee after maturity takes the interest of his transferrer, that, if defenses are not available against the transferrer or indorser of the overdue paper, then the transferee or indorsee is protected against them. If the right of action is perfect in the transferrer or indorser, the transferee or indorsee buys that right of action, and all of it.<sup>63</sup> It is immaterial that indorsers and transferrers prior to the indorser after maturity had notice, and were not in the position of the bona fide holder. If the indorser after maturity was a bona fide holder for value, the instrument was good in his hands, and was free from these defenses. A part of his title to the instrument was his power of transferring to others with the same immunity. At the first bona fide negotiation, all defenses between original parties and parties having notice cease to be valid.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>60</sup> *Hayword v. Stearns*, 39 Cal. 58; *Nay v. Lamb*, 15 Iowa, 79; *Etheridge v. Gallagher*, 55 Miss. 458.

<sup>61</sup> *Williams v. Matthews*, 3 Cow. 252.

<sup>62</sup> *Fisher v. Leland*, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 456; *HINCKLEY v. RAILROAD CO.*, 129 Mass. 61; *Marsh v. Marshall*, 53 Pa. St. 396; *Greenwell v. Haydon*, 78 Ky. 333; *Kellogg v. Schaake*, 56 Mo. 137; *Simpson v. Hall*, 47 Conn. 417.

<sup>63</sup> It was held in *BANK OF FT. EDWARD v. WASHINGTON CO. BANK* that a certificate of deposit was not dishonored until it was presented. The transferee of such certificate would take free from equities. 5 Hun (N. Y.) 605.

<sup>64</sup> *Haskell v. Whitmore*, 19 Me. 102; *CHALMERS v. LANION*, 1 Camp. 383. In this action by indorsees of a bill of exchange against the acceptor, one of the grounds of defense was that the bill had been accepted for a debt contracted in a smuggling transaction, and though indorsed for value, before ma-



In some jurisdictions, as we have seen,<sup>65</sup> the fact that paper is accommodation paper, without other reason, constitutes a defense when that paper is transferred when overdue. This is, indeed, opposed to the law as laid down in England and in many cases in other jurisdictions, which declare that it is not to be inferred from the fact that paper is given for accommodation that there is any agreement not to negotiate it after maturity.<sup>66</sup> There is, however, a criticism to be made upon this doctrine. It came up before the English courts on questions of pleading, and it certainly seems not too much to say that the courts appear to have decided the matter without giving it a very thorough consideration. In *Sturtevant v. Ford* the judges held themselves bound by the principle of *stare decisis*, though they criticised the rule; and it is submitted, with deference to the weight of authority on the point, that the English doctrine, as it is followed in several states of the Union, is not the wiser view.

A reasonable presumption as to the intention of the parties would be rather that there was an understanding between them that the accommodated party should pay the bill or note when due, and hence that he should not use it after it became due; in other words, that

turity, to a bona fide holder, yet that it had been indorsed by him to the present plaintiffs after maturity. It was held, however, that if the bill was received from one who might maintain an action upon it, the fact that indorsement was after maturity would not let in such defense. *Smith v. Hiscock*, 14 Me. 449; *SOLOMONS v. BANK*, 13 East, 135, note; *Miller v. Talcott*, 54 N. Y. 114; *Britton v. Hall*, 1 Hilt. 528.

<sup>65</sup> Ante, p. 179.

<sup>66</sup> *CHARLES v. MARSDEN*, 1 Taunt. 224. In this case it was held that, in an action by an indorsee for value against an acceptor, it was no defense that the bill was accepted for the accommodation of the maker, and that the plaintiff knew this when he took the bill after maturity. The decision in *STEIN v. YGLESIAS* also sustains the rule that a bill which has been accepted when overdue is good in the hands of one to whom it was transferred when overdue. This will not be true, however, when the bill was accepted before maturity, and transferred afterwards, if there was an express or implied agreement between acceptor and the one accommodated that such bill should not be negotiated after maturity. 3 Dowl. 252. To the same effect, see *STURTEVANT v. FORD*, 4 Man. & G. 101; *BROWN v. MOTT*, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 361; *GRANT v. ELLICOTT*, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 227; *DUNN v. WESTON*, 71 Me. 270; *Davis v. Miller*, 14 Grat. (Va.) 1; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 786.



the accommodation party intended to lend his credit only until maturity. If the instrument were transferred after maturity it would then be subject to the defense that it was used without authority.<sup>67</sup> This in no way varies the rule that, if the title to the accommodation paper when it becomes due has vested in a holder against whom the defense of want of consideration will not avail, then, on his transfer of the paper after maturity, his assignee takes the title which he himself had. An accommodation party cannot raise the defense of want of consideration against a transferee of overdue paper who procured it from a bona fide holder, who, in his turn, acquired it before it became due.<sup>68</sup>

### RIGHT TO SUE.

**92a. The person to whom a bill or note is negotiated, or to whom it is transferred by operation of law, acquires the right to sue thereon in his own name.**

As we have seen, while the equitable title to a bill or note is transferred by mere assignment, the legal title can be transferred only by negotiation or by operation of law. It follows upon principle that only the transferee by negotiation or by operation of law can maintain an action upon the instrument in his own name;<sup>69</sup> but, as will be seen, the authorities are by no means agreed upon this question. There is, indeed, no conflict of authority upon the proposition that where an instrument is in effect payable to order, and has not been indorsed in blank, only the original payee or the person to whom the instrument has been specially indorsed can maintain an action upon it.<sup>70</sup> It is in respect to instruments in effect payable to bearer that the authorities are in disagreement. The better view is that where an instrument is payable to bearer the action must be brought in the name of the original holder, or of some one to whom the legal title has been transferred by delivery of

<sup>67</sup> CHESTER v. DORR, 41 N. Y. 279; Bower v. Hastings, 86 Pa. St. 285; Hoffman v. Foster, 43 Pa. St. 137; Battle v. Weems, 44 Ala. 105.

<sup>68</sup> ECKHERT v. ELLIS, 26 Hun (N. Y.) 663.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Neg. Inst. L. § 90.

<sup>70</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 692; 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 342.

the instrument.<sup>71</sup> This includes all persons who are rightfully in actual or constructive possession. Possession, actual or constructive, is necessary. Thus in *EMMETT v. TOTTENHAM*,<sup>72</sup> where the holder of a bill which had been indorsed in blank died, and his executor, not wishing his own name to appear, procured Emmett to bring action in his name against the acceptor, but did not deliver the bill until after action brought, it was held that the plaintiff, having neither actual nor constructive possession, could not maintain the action. But where the holder of a bill indorsed it in blank, and delivered it to A, it was held that A, B, and C might maintain an action, the possession of A being the possession of all.<sup>73</sup> Delivery for the purpose of enabling the transferee to sue is enough to constitute him a proper plaintiff.<sup>74</sup> Thus where the payee indorsed a bill in blank, and delivered it to the manager of a bank to cover advances by the bank, it was held that the manager might sue upon the bill. Byles, J., said: "To whomsoever the bill was intended to be indorsed, it clearly was perfectly indorsed. It could only have been intended to have been indorsed to the plaintiff or to his principals, the bank. If it was intended to be indorsed to the plaintiff, *cadit quæstio*: if to the bank, inasmuch as the indorsement was in blank, it was competent to them to hand over the bill to their agent or manager for the purpose of suing upon it on their behalf."<sup>75</sup> On the other hand, many cases in the United States have held in effect that the holder of a bill or note payable to bearer could maintain

<sup>71</sup> *EMMETT v. TOTTENHAM*, 8 Exch. 884; *Coleman v. Bledman*, 7 C. B. 871; *Moore v. Maple*, 25 Ill. 341; *Watson v. New England Bank*, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 313. *Hovey v. Sebring*, 24 Mich. 232. See 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 880.

<sup>72</sup> 8 Exch. 884.

<sup>73</sup> *ORD v. PORTAL*, 8 Camp. 239. Where a note is specially indorsed to A, he cannot strike out his name, and insert that of his vendee, and thereby enable the latter to maintain suit. *GRIMES v. PIERSOL*, 25 Ind. 245.

<sup>74</sup> *Law v. Parnell*, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 282; *LOVELL v. EVERTSON*, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 52; *Haxtun v. Bishop*, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 13; *Guernsey v. Burns*, 25 Wend. 411; *Ancona v. Marks*, 7 Hurl. & N. 686; *Jenkins v. Tongue*, 29 Law J. Exch. 147; *Orr v. Lacy*, 4 McLean, 243, Fed. Cas. No. 10,589; *French v. Jaryls*, 29 Conn. 347; *Lafin v. Sherman*, 28 Ill. 391; *La Coste v. De Armas*, 2 La. 263; *Southard v. Wilson*, 29 Me. 56; *LITTLE v. O'BRIEN*, 9 Mass. 423; *Brigham v. Marean*, 7 Pick. 40; *Brigham v. Gurney*, 1 Mich. 349.

<sup>75</sup> *Law v. Parnell*, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 282.

an action thereon in the name of a stranger.<sup>76</sup> For example, in New York,<sup>77</sup> where a note was payable to C or bearer, and the holder and owner brought suit in the name of his transferrer without his knowledge or consent, it was held that the action could be maintained, the court saying that the owner had a right to insert over the blank indorsement any name he pleased, and that the person whose name was inserted would be deemed on the record the legal owner, and could sue as trustee for the real party in interest.

In many states the question in whose name action may be brought is affected by the enactments of the various Codes to the general effect that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except that an executor, administrator, or trustee of an express trust may sue without joining with him the person for whose benefit the action is brought. The mere holder of a bill or note, who has no interest in it, is clearly not the real party in interest, and cannot in the Code states maintain an action as such upon it.<sup>78</sup> But the courts have construed this section to mean that it is still ordinarily no defense to a party sued upon commercial paper to show that the transfer under which the plaintiff holds it is without consideration or subject to equities between him and his assignor, or colorable or merely for the purpose of collection or to secure a debt contracted by an agent without sufficient authority. It is sufficient if the plaintiff have the legal title, either by written transfer or delivery, whatever be the equities between him and his assignor. But he must have the right of possession, and ordinarily be the legal owner. Such ownership may be as an equitable trustee,

<sup>76</sup> Gage v. Kendall, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 640; Mauran v. Lamb, 7 Cow. 174; Hartwell v. McBeth, 1 Har. (Del.) 363; Lewis v. Hodgdon, 17 Me. 267; Gray v. Wood, 2 Har. & J. (Md.) 328; Hodges v. Holland, 19 Pick. 43. In ROBINSON v. CRANDALL, the notes on which the action was brought were made by defendants, payable to H. W. or bearer. Upon death of payee the plaintiffs, his administrators, appointed in that state, declared in New York on the notes as bearers. It was held that, although the plaintiffs could not sue as foreign administrators, yet, being the real owners of the notes, they had the right to declare and recover as bearers, and that it did not lie with defendants to object to the plaintiffs' want of interest. 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 425.

<sup>77</sup> Gage v. Kendall, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 640. The rule followed in this case has been changed by the Code. HAYS v. HATHORN, 74 N. Y. 486.

<sup>78</sup> Parker v. Totten, 10 How. Prac. 233; Clark v. Phillips, 21 How. Prac. 87.

or it may have been acquired without adequate consideration, but it must be sufficient to protect the defendant upon a recovery against him from a subsequent action by the assignor.<sup>79</sup> Thus a receiver may sue,<sup>80</sup> but an agent to collect may not, because he has neither the legal title nor is the trustee of an express trust,<sup>81</sup> although, if the agent were named as payee in the note, he would be the trustee of an express trust.<sup>82</sup> But a donee may sue, because the legal title passes by gift, irrespective of the question of consideration;<sup>83</sup> or a person holding collaterals for the benefit of creditors, because the legal title passes by assignment, and he also is a trustee of an express trust;<sup>84</sup> and each and all of these persons may legally discharge the liability of the defendants upon the instrument.

<sup>79</sup> *HAYS v. HATHORN*, 74 N. Y. 486; *Eaton v. Alger*, 47 N. Y. 345; *Webb v. Morgan*, 14 Mo. 428; *Boyd v. Corbitt*, 37 Mich. 52.

<sup>80</sup> *Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Clair*, 86 Hun, 362.

<sup>81</sup> *Iselin v. Rowlands*, 30 Hun, 488; *Rock Co. Nat. Bank v. Hollister*, 21 Minn. 385; *Third Nat. Bank v. Clark*, 23 Minn. 263. As to right of agent for collection to sue, see ante, p. 125, note 65. "A restrictive indorsement confers upon the indorsee the right \* \* \* to bring any action thereon that the indorser could bring." *Neg. Inst. L.* § 67.

<sup>82</sup> *Hollingsworth v. Moulton*, 53 Hun, 91, 6 N. Y. Supp. 362; *Hoxie v. Kennedy*, 10 N. Y. St. Rep. 786.

<sup>83</sup> *Pritchard v. Hirt*, 89 Hun, 378.

<sup>84</sup> *Nelson v. Edwards*, 40 Barb. 279.

## CHAPTER VII.

### DEFENSES COMMONLY INTERPOSED AGAINST A PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE.

93.	Real and Personal Defenses.
94-107.	Real Defenses.
108-121.	Personal Defenses.

#### REAL AND PERSONAL DEFENSES.

93. The defenses interposed by a party to a bill or note in a suit brought by a holder against him are commonly of two classes:

- (a) REAL—Or those that attach to the instrument itself and are good against all persons.
- (b) PERSONAL—Or those that grow out of the agreement or conduct of a particular person in regard to the instrument which renders it inequitable for him, though holding the legal title, to enforce it against the defendant, but which are not available against bona fide purchasers for value without notice.<sup>1</sup>

The next two chapters develop, so far as can here be developed, the position in contract law of the purchaser for value without notice. He stands alone, in that the law will enforce his rights against certain defenses, which would avail against him were they interposed in any other kind of contract than a negotiable instrument. It is not sought to give a statement of all the defenses involved in cases of commercial paper. It is neither desirable nor possible to give an adequate statement of all the defenses which are interposed against even a bona fide holder. It is sought to classify only the common defenses, and to state the main rules concerning them, and the reasons for these rules.

In general, this classification shows that a bona fide holder can

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. p. 812. The classification of Prof. Ames has been adopted. Id. p. 866.

recover when the defense interposed is a personal defense, but cannot recover when the defense is real. In the case of immediate parties, all defenses are available, because each independent contract is governed by the general laws of contract. In the case of remote parties, where the holder enforcing the instrument is a purchaser for value without notice, a personal defense cannot be successfully interposed, and only the real defenses are allowed by the courts.

With real defenses the right sought to be enforced has never existed, or has ceased to exist. They are called "real defenses" because they attach to the res or thing, irrespective of the conduct or agreement of the parties to it. It cannot be enforced by the holder because there is no contract to enforce. Personal defenses, in contrast to this, are founded upon the act, conduct, or agreement of the parties with reference to the instrument. The instrument with them has a legal inception, and, as an instrument, is a binding obligation. But, as between immediate parties, the courts will not grant a remedy, because the plaintiff in the action—the party seeking its enforcement in the suit—has violated some right, or failed in some duty, so that he has no standing in court. Hence, while the instrument is in form a binding instrument, the person enforcing it has no rights which a court of justice will recognize. The reason for the failure in its enforcement is therefore not real, but personal. But remote parties stand upon another footing so far as personal defenses are concerned. The elements which distinguish them in legal theory from immediate parties are consideration and notice. In this the principle of the law merchant is the ancient principle of equity that where, in the transfer of title, a person has acquired a title and paid a valuable consideration without any notice of an equity actually existing in favor of another, the former may by that means obtain a perfect title, and holds the property freed from the prior outstanding equity.\* "One who purchases a legal title," says Professor Ames,\* "for value and without notice, takes the title discharged of all equities to which it was subject in the hands of his vendor. \* \* \* For an equity, being in its nature a claim in personam, and not in rem, can be en

\* Pom. Eq. Jur. § 591; *Le Neve v. Le Neve*, 2 Amb. 436, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. (4th Am. Ed.) 109.

\* 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. p. 886.

forced only against a party to the transaction in which the equity arises, or some one in privity with that party. The transfer of bills and notes by virtue of their negotiability is governed by the same principle." A purchaser for value without notice, therefore, acquires a title free from so-called "personal" defenses.

#### **SAME—REAL DEFENSES.**

##### **94. Common real defenses are—**

(a) The incapacity of the defendant to make the contract.

(b) Illegality, when the contract is declared void by statute.

(c) The discharge of the instrument by alteration.

The incapacity of the defendant is usually due to infancy, coverture, lack of understanding, or incapacity of a corporation to contract.

**INFANCY.**—A negotiable instrument or its indorsement made by an infant is voidable, not void.

It was the opinion of Lord Mansfield <sup>4</sup> and of the bench of which Chancellor Kent was chief judge <sup>5</sup> that a negotiable instrument given by an infant was void, even though it was given for necessities. The reason upon which these great jurists and the judges who followed them <sup>6</sup> based their opinion was that, if the instrument be valid as a negotiable one in the first instance, the consideration could not be inquired into when it came into the hands of a bona fide holder, and the infant would thereby be precluded from questioning the consideration. Thus, the instrument could not be voidable and remain negotiable. It must be either void or good.

<sup>4</sup> **BURGESS v. MERRILL**, 4 Taunt. 468; **WILLIAMSON v. WATTS**, 1 Camp. 552. In this case, Lord Mansfield said: "This action certainly cannot be maintained. The defendant is allowed to be an infant; and did any one ever hear of an infant being liable as acceptor of a bill of exchange? The replication is nonsense, and ought to have been demurred to."

<sup>5</sup> **Swasey v. Vanderheyden**, 10 Johns. 83.

<sup>6</sup> **M'Crillis v. How**, 3 N. H. 348; **McMinn v. Richmonds**, 6 Yerg. 9; **Morton v. Steward**, 5 Ill. App. 533.

This doctrine is certainly not now the law in its entirety. It is settled that between immediate parties, the infant being one, the instrument is voidable, and not void.<sup>7</sup> This means that the infant may ratify or repudiate it, as he sees fit. But in case of remote parties the question is a more complicated one. The rule undoubtedly is, that a bill or note, to be negotiable, must be payable absolutely and at all events. And one argument is that, since an infant's bill or note is voidable and contingent upon his ratification of it, it cannot be negotiable. Yet it is admitted that if the infant, on his majority, choose to ratify the instrument to an indorsee, there is no reason why he should not be bound.<sup>8</sup> The reasons of the text writers thus confronted with conflicting principles are not clear. On the one hand, there can be no doubt that the position of the purchaser for value without notice is inferior in grade of right to that of an infant. The purchaser cannot maintain that the contract, although voidable, nevertheless is still valid on reaching his hands, because not disaffirmed, and that, therefore, his equity is superior to that of the infant. In all of the cases where this doctrine has been applied to voidable contracts transferred to a bona fide transferee, its fundamental reason is laches, and laches is not allowed to prejudice an infant's rights. In analogous cases, too, the decisions of courts are against the purchaser for value without notice. For example, the equity of such a purchaser in cases of personal property<sup>9</sup> or of real property<sup>10</sup> does not prevail against the right of the infant to rescind the contract. And a similar doctrine is probably applied to the purchaser for value of a negotiable instrument.<sup>11</sup> And thus the facts stand that the instrument cannot be negotiable, and yet it may vest by indorsement a perfect title in the transferee,

<sup>7</sup> *GOODSELL v. MYERS*, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 480; *Everson v. Carpenter*, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 419; *Martin v. Mayo*, 10 Mass. 137; *Whitney v. Dutch*, 14 Mass. 457; *Reed v. Batchelder*, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 559; *Taft v. Sergeant*, 18 Barb. 320; *Hodges v. Hunt*, 22 Barb. 150.

<sup>8</sup> *Hunt v. Massey*, 5 Barn. & Adol. 902; *Lawson v. Lovejoy*, 8 Greenl. 405; *Edgerly v. Shaw*, 5 Fost. (N. H.) 514.

<sup>9</sup> *Hill v. Anderson*, 5 Smedes & M. 216.

<sup>10</sup> *Mustard v. Wohlford's Heirs*, 15 Grat. 329; *Harrod v. Myers*, 21 Ark. 592; *Jenkins v. Jenkins*, 12 Iowa, 195; *Miles v. Lingerian*, 24 Ind. 385; *Sims v. Smith*, 86 Ind. 577; *Buchanan v. Hubbard*, 96 Ind. 1.

<sup>11</sup> *Howard v. Simpkins*, 70 Ga. 322.



and may be enforced provided the infant ratify it on coming of age; otherwise if he disaffirm it, and return the consideration. This rule does not include a bill or note given for necessities, which is probably binding in every one's hands,<sup>13</sup> or cases when the infant himself does not raise in his own behalf the point of non-age;<sup>14</sup> and, of course, it does not apply where the infant ratifies the instrument on coming of age.

The infant, as an indorser, is no more liable than as maker or acceptor. His indorsement in such case is also voidable, and not void. This means not only that the infant is not liable upon the implied contract of indemnity unless he chooses to be; but, according to Judge Story,<sup>14</sup> it means also that the infant may intercept the payment to the indorsee by disaffirming the contract, and returning the consideration, and recover the money called for in the instrument of the maker or acceptor. If the disaffirmance is made before payment to an indorsee, it is a defense against the indorsee. If made after payment, and the infant is payee, the acceptor or maker must pay the money twice, because they have warranted the capacity of the infant. If parties prior to the infant receive notice of the infant's disaffirmance, they are discharged as to the parties subsequent to the infant, because these persons have lost their title to the paper by the avoidance of the indorsement, and they must look to their intermediate warranties to protect themselves. But, except as against himself, the indorsement is effectual as to all parties; and neither the maker, acceptor, nor any other party can refuse to pay the instrument on the ground that an intermediate indorser is an infant.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Earle v. Reed, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 387; Dubose v. Wheddon, 4 McCord (S. C.) 221; Haine's Adm'rs v. Tarrant, 2 Hill (S. C.) 400. See, contra, TRUEMAN v. HURST, 1 Term R. 40; WILLIAMSON v. WATTS, 1 Camp. 552.

<sup>14</sup> Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195; NIGHTINGALE v. WITHINGTON, 15 Mass. 272.

<sup>15</sup> Story, Prom. Notes, § 80.

<sup>16</sup> GREY v. COOPER, 3 Doug. 65; Frazier v. Massey, 14 Ind. 382. Story, Prom. Notes, §§ 80-85; Tied. Com. Paper. § 49; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 228. "The indorsement or assignment of the instrument by \* \* \* an infant passes the property therein, notwithstanding that from want of capacity the \* \* \* infant may incur no liability thereon." Neg. Inst. L. § 41.

**95. COVERTURE.**—At common law a negotiable instrument or an indorsement made by a married woman was not voidable, but void. This rule has been modified by statutes in most jurisdictions.

The above is an enunciation of the rule of the common law, now almost obsolete. The reason for the rule wherever it exists is that, according to the former doctrine of the marriage relation, the wife merged her personality in that of her husband, and had therefore no capacity to contract apart from him. If a bill or note was made payable or indorsed to her before marriage, it became her husband's property on marriage; and if after marriage, then, by virtue of the operation of the law, it became her husband's. So a married woman could not indorse, not only because she had no capacity to do so, but also because the instrument was not hers to indorse, but was the property of her husband.<sup>18</sup> But the legal relations of married women at the present day are changing. The statutes of the various states are constantly enlarging their property rights, and it will, without doubt, soon be the law in most of the states of the Union that married women may contract in all respects as if single, and that coverture will be no defense to suits upon negotiable instruments.

<sup>18</sup> Thus, in *CONNOR v. MARTIN*, 1 Strange, 516, where the plaintiff declared upon a promissory note made to a feme covert, and indorsed by her to him, judgment was given for the defendant, the right being in point of law vested in the husband, and the wife having no power to dispose of it. In *BARLOW v. BISHOP*, 1 East, 432, it was held that though a note were given to a married woman, knowing her to be such, with intent that she should indorse it to the plaintiff in payment of a debt which she owed him (in the course of carrying on a trade in her own name by the consent of her husband), yet the property in the note vested in the husband by the delivery to the wife, and no interest passed by her indorsement to the plaintiff. Where a bill of exchange was payable to a feme sole, who intermarried before the same was due, it was held that the husband might sue in his own name without joining the wife, although the latter had not indorsed the bill. *McNEILAGE v. HOLLOWAY*, 1 Barn. & Ald. 218.

**96. CORPORATIONS.**—In the United States private corporations, unless restrained by charter, have capacity to draw, accept, make, and indorse bills and notes.

**97.** The bill or note of a corporation, and its indorsement thereon, although it have capacity to issue negotiable paper, is unenforceable, except in favor of a bona fide purchaser, unless made or transferred for the purposes of its incorporation.

**98.** The indorsement or assignment of the instrument by a corporation passes the property therein, notwithstanding that from want of capacity the corporation may incur no liability thereon.\*

A corporation is defined as an artificial being created by law, composed of individuals united into one body under a collective name, with the capacity of perpetual succession, and of acting as a natural person within the scope of its charter. It is one of the business methods by which men enlarge the effectiveness of property. For in business property or capital is the motive power; men's brains and hands the great machinery for earning money. And by the business contrivances of agencies, partnerships and corporations, a man's capital may be busy earning money in ways of which the owner knows nothing. The agent and partner is a man's other business self in the enterprise in which the agency or partnership is involved. But a corporation is of a somewhat different character. Frequently a large number of persons having money whose investment they cannot personally supervise, aggregate their separate capitals in one enterprise, some furnishing more, some less, the capital being evidenced by what is called "stock," the owners being called the "stockholders." This aggregate capital is invested in given business enterprises, and employed in ways expressly formulated by legislatures. For the purpose of carrying out these legislative designs, officers are chosen by the stockholders from among their own number, called "trustees" or "directors," and from these in turn, generally, the administrative function is created, consisting of an execu-

\* This is the language of Neg. Inst. L. § 41. See, also, Chalm. Bills & N. art. 68.

tive called a "president" or a "secretary" or "managing agent," or some similar name, to supervise and direct the investment of the capital furnished by the stockholders, and execute generally the business of the corporation. The business of the corporation is not, however, carried on in the name of its administrative or executive officers, directors, or stockholders. The aggregate capital is created into a distinct legal being and becomes like an ordinary person in all its legal dealings. It takes a name of its own. It acts through the instrumentality of its executive officers, as though it had a mind of its own. And people buy from and sell to it, and contract with it, as though it were itself an acting sentient person.

The law which creates this artificial person makes it the authorized agent of the investing capitalist to do certain things only. These general purposes are found in its charter, which is the legislative act creating it, and is the commission of the corporation to do business. And it is fair to suppose that the only intention of the capitalist in investing his money in stock is that his money is to be devoted to carrying out the purposes of the incorporation, and nothing else, and that he intended by such investment only to get what proportionate profit his money earned, and incur a proportionate share of the total loss suffered in the enterprise. But for anything outside of this, he did not intend to be bound. Naturally, therefore, when any act is not within the scope of its charter, or the purposes of its incorporation, the power of agency of the corporation ceases. In law phrase the act is "ultra vires." And because the individual stockholders, for whose collective body the corporation is but another name, and whose agent the corporation is, cannot be presumed to have intended to incur any liability not contemplated by its charter, and not necessary to carry on its business, such an act is void. Hence the meaning of the rules that a corporation has power to make such contracts as are either expressly or impliedly authorized by its charter or act of incorporation, or are necessary or not foreign to the carrying on of its business,<sup>17</sup> but that

<sup>17</sup> Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 82; Perrine v. Canal Co., 9 How. 184; Bank v. Godfrey, 23 Ill. 579; Western Cottage Organ Co. v. Reddish, 51 Iowa, 55, 49 N. W. 1048; Richardson v. Massachusetts Charitable Mechanic Ass'n, 131 Mass. 174; Weckler v. First Nat. Bank, 42 Md. 581; Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419; Wayland University v. Boorman, 56 Wis. 657, 14 N. W. 819; State v. Rice, 65 Ala. 83; Cleveland & M. R. Co. v. Hinrod Furnace

it has no capacity to perform acts beyond these express or implied powers. Therefore an executory contract ultra vires is void. It can be enforced neither by nor against the corporation.<sup>18</sup>

The power of a corporation to make contracts necessary to carry on its business implies that it may borrow money, make debts and issue negotiable paper for the purposes of its business.<sup>19</sup> So that the rule is that wherever a corporation may contract a debt, it may draw a bill or give a note in payment of it.<sup>20</sup> It may also borrow money to pay the debt, and in furtherance of this may execute a bill or note to secure the borrowed money.<sup>21</sup> Also, it has power to take a bill or note for a debt due to it. And what it may receive, it may transfer.<sup>22</sup> And this means that instruments may be indorsed in full or in blank by corporations, including also the power to enter into the collateral contract which an indorser assumes.<sup>23</sup>

Co., 37 Ohio St. 321; CURTIS v. LEAVITT, 15 N. Y. 64; Spear v. Crawford, 14 Wend. 22; Page v. Helneberg, 40 Vt. 81; Rivanna Nav. Co. v. Dawsons, 8 Grat. 19; Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich. 222; MOSS v. AVERELL, 10 N. Y. 449; Aull Sav. Bank v. City of Lexington, 74 Mo. 104.

<sup>18</sup> Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341; Bank of Michigan v. Niles, 1 Doug. 401; Nassau Bank v. Jones, 95 N. Y. 115.

<sup>19</sup> Mining Co. v. Anglo-Californian Bank, 104 U. S. 192; Moss v. Harpeth Academy, 7 Helsk. 285; Rockwell v. Elkhorn Bank, 13 Wis. 653; Smith v. Eureka Flour Mills, 6 Cal. 1; Munn v. Commission Co., 15 Johns. 44; CURTIS v. LEAVITT, 15 N. Y. 173; Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419; Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 490.

<sup>20</sup> 1 Pars. Notes & B. 164, 165. The rule in England is not so broad. Chalm. Bills & N. art. 67.

<sup>21</sup> Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. 513; Safford v. Wyckoff, 4 Hill, 442; Moss v. Oakley, 2 Hill, 265; Mead v. Keeler, 24 Barb. 20; Partridge v. Badger, 25 Barb. 146; Hamilton v. Newcastle & D. R. R., 9 Ind. 359; Came v. Brigham, 39 Me. 35; Clarke v. School Dist., 3 R. I. 199; Buckley v. Briggs, 30 Mo. 452.

<sup>22</sup> Lucas v. Pitney, 27 N. J. Law, 221; McIntire v. Preston, 10 Ill. 48; HARDY v. MERRIWEATHER, 14 Ind. 203.

<sup>23</sup> BANK OF GENESEE v. PATCHIN BANK, 13 N. Y. 309. The following is a portion of the opinion of Denio, J., in this case: "I entertain no doubt but that a bank may lawfully indorse the commercial paper which it holds, with a view to raise money upon it by way of discount, or for any other lawful purpose. In this respect it has the same right as any other holder of such paper. \* \* \* The contract of indorsement is incident to the negotiation of mercantile paper, and the right to transfer such paper includes the power to enter into the collateral contract which an indorser assumes." MARVINE

The converse of these propositions is not what might be expected. The limit of the rule apparently is that, provided the corporation is not incapacitated from contracting, a bill or note, although ultra vires, is unenforceable only as between immediate parties; but a bill or any other negotiable security, which is not upon its face illegal and unauthorized, is valid in the hands of a purchaser for value without notice. The reason for this is, that one who deals directly with a corporation, or who takes its negotiable paper, is presumed to know the extent of its corporate power. But when the paper is upon its face in all respects such as the corporation has authority to issue, and its only defect consists in some extrinsic fact, such as the purpose or object for which it was issued, and a bona fide holder for value receives it, he may enforce it against the corporation. He is not bound to inquire into such extrinsic fact. He is in no way apprised of it from the paper itself. And the burden should not be cast upon him of suffering loss under such circumstances, and it is not.<sup>24</sup> This rule applies both to making or accepting notes and bills and to their indorsement.<sup>25</sup> And of course its necessary implication is, that if the want of authority is known to the purchaser, the instrument or the indorsement is unenforceable against the corporation.

The general scope of this work does not admit of the discussion of interesting questions concerning commercial paper of public corporations, the execution of bills and notes by the agents of corporations, and lastly the character of acts within the power of corporations. For these the students must refer to more extensive treatises.

**v. HYMERS**, 12 N. Y. 223; **Planters' Bank v. Sharp**, 6 How. 301. The power to indorse does not, as a rule, extend to accommodation paper. **BANK OF GENESEE v. PATCHIN BANK**, *supra*; **National Bank of Commerce v. Atkinson** (C. C.) 55 Fed. 465; **Rand. Com. Paper**, § 334.

<sup>24</sup> **Genesee Bank v. Patchin Bank**, 13 N. Y. 309; **Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank**, 16 N. Y. 125.

<sup>25</sup> **Mechanics' Banking Ass'n v. New York & S. W. L. Co.**, 35 N. Y. 505. See, also, for general doctrine, **Bank of New York v. Muskingum Branch Bank of Ohio**, 29 N. Y. 619; **Barker v. Mechanics' Fire Ins. Co.**, 3 Wend. 94; **Olcott v. Tloga R. Co.**, 27 N. Y. 546; **Supervisors v. Schenck**, 5 Wall. 772; **Bird v. Daggett**, 97 Mass. 494; **MONUMENT NAT. BANK v. GLOBE WORKS**, 101

It remains under this head to speak of the effect of indorsements ultra vires upon the transfer of title. The rule is that an indorsement is a good transfer of the instrument, although for want of capacity the corporation may incur no liability as indorser.<sup>26</sup> The reason is that, to be an indorser, the corporation must be either the payee or an indorsee of the instrument. And being such payee or indorsee, the parties liable on the paper are estopped from pleading ultra vires, because they have made the paper payable to, or else have indorsed it to, the corporation, and have received its funds. The defense of ultra vires is for the protection of the stockholders of a corporation, and not for the benefit of the other parties to the paper.<sup>27</sup> It is like the defense of illegality of incorporation, which is not meant as an excuse for the nonpayment of indebtedness, but as a protection to those whose money is invested in the stock of the enterprise.<sup>28</sup> Thus, the transfer, though ultra vires, transfers title, because prior parties are estopped from taking advantage of the defense. The principle of estoppel applies also to the corporation to the extent of precluding it from repudiating the transfer.

**99. PERSONS NON COMPOS MENTIS.**—Total lack of understanding in persons non compos mentis or drunken is a defense to the enforcement of a bill or note, both as between immediate parties and as against a bona fide holder, when the party sought to be charged was an adjudged incompetent. It is doubtful whether in itself it is such a defense to an instrument sought to be enforced by a holder if the holder was one in good faith for value, and without notice. It is in itself a defense as between the

Mass. 57; *Mitchell v. Rome R. Co.*, 17 Ga. 574; *Hall v. Auburn Turnpike Co.*, 27 Cal. 255.

<sup>26</sup> *Smith v. Johnson*, 8 Hurl. & N. 222; *Brown v. Donnell*, 49 Me. 421. Cf. *Neg. Inst. L.* § 41.

<sup>27</sup> *Farmers' & Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Needles*, 52 Mo. 17; *Snyder v. Studebaker*, 19 Ind. 462; *Griener v. Ulerey*, 20 Iowa, 266; *Massey v. Paola Bldg. & Sav. Ass'n*, 22 Kan. 634.

<sup>28</sup> *Veeder v. Mudgett*, 95 N. Y. 295; *Eaton v. Aspinwall*, 19 N. Y. 119; *Wright v. Pipe Line Co.*, 101 Pa. St. 204; *Union Nat. Bank v. Hunt*, 7 Mo. App. 42; *In re Kings Co. El. R. Co.*, 105 N. Y. 97, 13 N. E. 18.



immediate parties, unless, perhaps, the contract was fair and the other party had no knowledge of the lunatic's incompetency.

The views of courts are changing with reference to bills or notes, upon which persons non compos mentis have incurred an obligation. They are departing from a position which was sustained by consistent theory, but at the expense of justice and common sense. This theory was that such executory contracts would not be enforced by courts, because persons non compos mentis had no assenting mind, and therefore no capacity to contract,<sup>20</sup> and also because the courts would protect such persons from the results of their own incapacity, whether designedly injured or even not injured at all. And while probably the majority of the decisions and very many of the text writers do in truth declare this to be the rule,<sup>20</sup> it is generally felt, whenever it is applied, that it is, as a working rule, impracticable. The consensus of opinion in regard to executed contracts, at least, is that the contract of a lunatic is voidable at his option, provided it can be shown that at the time of making the contract it was unfair, that the parties can be restored to their former condition, and that the lunatic was absolutely incapable of understanding what he was doing, and the other party knew of his condition.<sup>21</sup> But with executory con-

<sup>20</sup> *SENTANCE v. POOLE*, 3 Car. & P. 1. In this case Lord Tenterden, C. J., delivered the following charge: "The question in this case is whether the defendant John Poole, at the time he put his name to this note, which is drawn in an unusual form, it being 'to your order,' and not addressed to any one, was or was not conscious of what he was doing, for, if he was, there must be a verdict for the plaintiff; but should you be satisfied that he was not conscious of what he was doing, and that he was imposed upon by reason of his imbecility of mind, you ought to find for the defendant." *SEAVER v. PHELPS*, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 304; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. 210; *Edw. Neg. Inst.* § 24; *In re Desilver's Estate*, 5 Rawle, 111; *Van Deusen v. Sweet*, 51 N. Y. 378; *Dexter v. Hall*, 15 Wall. 9. See, also, *Brigham v. Fayerweather*, 144 Mass. 52, 10 N. E. 735; *Hovey v. Hobson*, 53 Me. 451; *EDWARDS v. DAVENPORT* (C. C.) 20 Fed. 753.

<sup>20</sup> *MOORE v. HERSHEY*, 90 Pa. St. 196; *VAN PATTEN v. BEALS*, 46 Iowa, 63.

<sup>21</sup> *MOLTON v. CAMROUX*, 4 Exch. 17; *Elliot v. Ince*, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 478; *BROWN v. JODRELL*, 3 Car. & P. 30; *Beals v. See*, 10 Pa. St. 56;



tracts, and among them negotiable instruments, the law has not gone so far. There is still great weight of authority holding that a lunatic's contract is voidable, at his option, whether fair or unfair, or whether the other party is ignorant of or acquainted with his mental condition;<sup>22</sup> and it must be said that any other doctrine than this is not yet established. But more advanced views, based on business needs and the practical administration of law, are changing or perhaps developing this rule into rules which may be formulated as follows:

(1) After inquisition duly found, the courts will refuse to enforce the bill or note of an adjudged lunatic, or an indorsement by him against him directly, even in favor of a bona fide holder, but will direct his committee to pay the amount thereof, if it is a just claim. This rule applies to the bills, notes and indorsements of adjudged habitual drunkards.

(2) If no inquisition has been found, but the incompetency is known to the other party, then as between the parties the note is void.

(3) If no inquisition has been found, and if the incompetency is unknown to the other party, and the transaction is fair, and the parties cannot be replaced in statu quo, a recovery may be had upon the bill, note or indorsement against the incompetent.

An inquisition in lunacy is a judgment of the law which gives over the person and estate of the lunatic to the custody of court, and takes from him all competency to contract until his rights are restored by the court itself. By virtue of it, contracts of lunatics, made after inquisition found, create no binding legal tie, because it rests with the court in whose hands their property is to allow or disallow their enforcement.<sup>23</sup> The redress for claimants in obtaining

*Behrens v. McKenzie*, 23 Iowa, 333; *SHOULTERS v. ALLEN*, 51 Mich. 530, 16 N. W. 888; *Matthiessen v. McMahon*, 38 N. J. Law, 536; *Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone* [1892] 1 Q. B. 599.

<sup>22</sup> *SENTANCE v. POOLE*, 3 Car. & P. 1; *SEAVER v. PHELPS*, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 304; *Hovey v. Hobson*, 53 Me. 451; *Rogers v. Blackwell*, 49 Mich. 192, 13 N. W. 512; *VAN PATTEN v. BEALS*, 46 Iowa, 63; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 210; *Tied. Com. Paper*, 53.

<sup>23</sup> *Fitzhugh v. Wilcox*, 12 Barb. 236; *Crippen v. Culver*, 13 Barb. 424; *Clarke v. Dunham*, 4 Denio, 262; *In re McLaughlin*, *Clarke*, Ch. 113. It must be borne in mind that the contractual capacity of a lunatic under guardianship,

payment of claims, is to present them to the officer of the court commissioned to conduct the affairs of the lunatic, who is usually called the "committee," of his person and estate. This committee upon their presentment investigates the transaction, and ascertains its justice. If the committee refuses payment, the claimant must then go into court, and ask permission to prosecute his claim by suit. If the court is satisfied of the justice of the debt, it will order it paid out of the funds in the hands of its committee; if doubtful, it will appoint a referee or master in chancery to ascertain its justice, or else direct it to be tested by a suit to be brought.<sup>34</sup> The law, to protect its own machinery, declares that an inquisition found is like a proceeding in rem, conclusive on all the world, and all are bound to take notice of it. Actual notice is not necessary, and, whether given or not, is immaterial. The inquisition is conclusive against subsequent acts and dealings, and presumptive against prior ones. And this is the rule irrespective of notice.<sup>35</sup> It must be noted that in England the inquisition is only presumptive evidence of lunacy,<sup>36</sup> and that in some states it is conclusive only as to parties, and others may rebut it by clear evidence.<sup>37</sup> It is not meant to say, however, that the lunatic by inquisition is relieved from debts or liabilities incurred either before or after the inquisition. All that is meant is that he can no longer buy or sell or enter into any contract or dealing binding him or his estate. The court administers his estate for the protection of creditors, and will apply it to the payment of his debts and the satisfaction of all obligations and charges which legally ought to be satisfied out of his property.

This rule and the reasons for it apply to the bills, notes and indorsements of those adjudged to be habitual drunkards. If a per-

as well as the procedure for enforcement of claims, depends upon statute, and differs in different states. *Bish. Cont.* § 977; *Clark, Cont.* 268.

<sup>34</sup> *Williams v. Cameron*, 26 Barb. 172; *In re Hopper*, 5 Paige, 489, 491; *L'Amoureux v. Crosby*, 2 Paige, 428; *In re Wing*, 2 Hun, 671.

<sup>35</sup> *Hughes v. Jones*, 116 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. 446; *Banker v. Banker*, 63 N. Y. 409; *Van Deusen v. Sweet*, 51 N. Y. 378; *Ripley v. Grant*, 4 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 443; *McGinnis v. Com.*, 74 Pa. St. 245; *Lancaster Co. Bank v. Moore*, 78 Pa. St. 407.

<sup>36</sup> *Sergeson v. Sealey*, 2 Atk. 412; *Faulder v. Silk*, 3 Camp. 126.

<sup>37</sup> *Den v. Clark*, 10 N. J. Law, 217; *Rogers v. Walker*, 6 Pa. St. 371; *MOORE v. HERSHEY*, 90 Pa. St. 196; *Carter v. Beckwith*, 128 N. Y. 312, 28

son is adjudged incompetent to manage his own affairs by reason of drunkenness, such person is not liable upon his bill, note or indorsement even when the instrument is in the hands of a bona fide holder. The holder and purchaser is bound to take notice of the public judicial act of taking a man's property out of his hands, and putting it into that of a committee.\* The creditor must have his recourse against the committee, and not against the drunkard. And if the remedy is thus taken, and the court is satisfied upon the whole that the claim is just, it will allow it to be paid.\*\*

If no inquisition has been found, the validity of the bill, note or indorsement depends, first, upon the degree of understanding possessed by the party sought to be charged. A man of weak mind, if not a lunatic or a fool, can contract.\*\* An epileptic or enfeebled mind has been held competent to convey property.<sup>40</sup> A person born deaf and dumb is not necessarily an idiot.<sup>41</sup> And no mere want of business capacity,<sup>42</sup> nor even monomania,<sup>43</sup> will, in the absence of fraud, prevent a party from being bound upon a bill, note, or indorsement. The mental incompetency, to avoid such a contract, must amount to inability to understand the nature of the contract, and to appreciate its probable consequences;<sup>44</sup> and this only, upon being established, will be allowed as a defense. But, once established, the question of the binding liability of this contract depends

N. E. 582; *People v. Tax Com'rs*, 100 N. Y. 215, 3 N. E. 85; *Southern Masonic Relief Tier Ass'n v. Laudenbach* (Sup.) 5 N. Y. Supp. 901.

\* The contractual capacity of a habitual drunkard under guardianship depends upon the statute. *Supra*, note 33.

\*\* *Wadsworth v. Sharpsteen*, 8 N. Y. 388; *L'Amoureux v. Crosby*, 2 Paige, 427.

\*\* *Odell v. Buck*, 21 Wend. 142.

<sup>40</sup> *Sprague v. Duel, Clarke*, Ch. 90, affirmed 11 Paige, 480.

<sup>41</sup> *Brower v. Fisher*, 4 Johns. Ch. 441.

<sup>42</sup> *Farnum v. Brooks*, 9 Pick. 212; *Osmond v. Fitzroy*, 3 P. Wms. 129; *STEWART v. LISPENARD*, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 255; *Lawrence v. Willis*, 75 N. C. 471; *Lewis v. Pead*, 1 Ves. Jr. 19.

<sup>43</sup> *Burgess v. Pollock*, 53 Iowa, 273, 5 N. W. 179; *WEST v. RUSSELL*, 48 Mich. 74, 11 N. W. 812; *Boyce v. Smith*, 9 Grat. 704.

<sup>44</sup> *Titcomb v. Vantyle*, 84 Ill. 371; *Wall v. Hill*, 1 B. Mon. 290; *Hovey v. Chase*, 52 Me. 305; *Davren v. White*, 42 N. J. Eq. 569, 7 Atl. 682; *Young v. Stevens*, 48 N. H. 133; *Farnam v. Brooks*, 9 Pick. 212; *Jackson v. King*, 4 Cow. 207.

upon the fact whether the party dealing with him knew or did not know that he was dealing with a lunatic. In the absence of anything being shown upon the subject, the courts lean to the presumption that the party had this knowledge.<sup>45</sup> And if he possessed such knowledge, then the bill, note or indorsement as between the parties is void, and will not be enforced.<sup>46</sup> But if he did not possess such knowledge, then the position of the parties has not as yet been fully developed and settled by the courts; but so far as it has, it depends, in the first place, upon whether the contract is fair. The courts have not defined what is meant by this, and its meaning naturally would be determined largely by the circumstances of each case. But in the absence of any expression on the subject, it is reasonable to suppose that a fair contract would mean such as business men of ordinary prudence would make, taking into consideration the circumstances of each case, and that the presence or absence of any intent to defraud, overreach or cheat would be an important element in determining the point. The next consideration in the relations of the parties, is whether upon repudiation of the contract by the lunatic the other party can be replaced in statu quo. This is because the right of cancellation, being an equitable one, must be governed by equity precedents, and among equity precedents one of the most important is that "he who seeks equity must do equity." The lunatic cannot keep the benefits of a contract, and at the same time rescind it. And these two considerations lead up to the rule, which is without doubt the most practical yet determined upon, that bills, notes or indorsements entered into by an insane person are valid where the other party acted in good faith, without fraud or unfairness, and without knowledge of the insanity or notice or information calling for inquiry.<sup>47</sup> Wheth-

<sup>45</sup> *Riggs v. American Tract Soc.*, 84 N. Y. 330, reargued 95 N. Y. 503.

<sup>46</sup> *Westerfield v. Jackson*, 3 N. Y. St. Rep. 354; *Rice v. Peet*, 15 Johns. 503; *Johnson v. Stone*, 35 Hun, 380; *Hannahs v. Sheldon*, 20 Mich. 278; *McClain v. Davis*, 77 Ind. 419; *Lincoln v. Buckmaster*, 32 Vt. 652; *Burke v. Allen*, 29 N. H. 106.

<sup>47</sup> *MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. v. HUNT*, 79 N. Y. 541; *Browne v. Joddrell*, 1 Moody & M. 105; *In re Beckwith*, 3 Hun, 443; *Hirsch v. Trainer*, 3 Abb. N. C. 274, and note; *Dane v. Kirkwall*, 8 Car. & P. 679; *MOLTON v. CAMROUX*, 2 Exch. 487, affirmed 4 Exch. 17; *Elliot v. Ince*, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 475; *Young v. Stevens*, 48 N. H. 133; *Beals v. See*, 10 Pa. St. 56; *Behrens v. McKenzie*, 23 Iowa, 343.

er the other party has the full rights of a bona fide holder or not, and whether all presumptions are in his favor or not, is not clear. Declarations of courts within recent years imply that the presumptions are not in his favor, and that, lunacy being shown, the burden is upon the holder to show ignorance, fairness and irreparable loss.<sup>48</sup> But it is to be suspected that the courts in making these decisions were influenced more by the ancient doctrines than the modern tendencies of law. These modern tendencies, followed to their logical conclusion, would seem to require that it be shown affirmatively against the holder that in his dealing with the negotiable instrument he had violated some of the equities we have mentioned; and that the defendant should be called upon, not only to show the lunacy, but also the plaintiff's knowledge or suspicion of it, as well as the unfairness of the transaction. Such, however, at present, does not seem to be the rule.

The courts have arrived at rules regulating contracts of intoxicated persons by very similar steps. These rules depend upon the question whether the drunkard was adjudged incompetent to manage his affairs or not, and, if not, then the question arose in what stage of drunkenness the contract was made. They have classified the rules in cases where no committee has been appointed as follows:

(1) When a maker, acceptor or indorser is so intoxicated that he is entirely bereft of his senses, the weight of authority is that no recovery against him can be had by the bona fide holder; and, if no recovery can be had, then he may recover upon the original consideration.

(2) That when a maker, acceptor or indorser is slightly under the influence of liquor, a recovery can be had. Such a state can be used only to show fraud.

In cases of bills and notes made in a state of complete intoxication by persons not adjudged habitual drunkards, there is a difference of opinion in different jurisdictions. The majority of decisions of the courts and also the majority of the text writers declare that total drunkenness is a perfect defense to a drunkard's bill or note or the indorsement thereon. And these authorities imply that it is such even when prosecuted by a purchaser for value without notice, because, as they say, it is voidable.<sup>49</sup> But there are other opinions of

<sup>48</sup> Hicks v. Marshall, 8 Hud. 327; Goodell v. Harrington, 3 Thomp. & C. 345.

<sup>49</sup> GORE v. GIBSON, 13 Mees. & W. 623; Wigglesworth v. Steers, 1 Hen. & M. 70; Jenners v. Howard, 6 Blackf. 240; Hawkins v. Bone, 4 Fost. & F.

courts which consider such a bill or note perfectly good in his hands.<sup>50</sup> The English courts are governed in their rulings by the somewhat artificial differences growing out of their former system of pleading. In those courts it is held, with regard to contracts which it is sought to avoid on the ground of intoxication, that there is a distinction between "express" and "implied" contracts. When a right of action is grounded upon an express contract, requiring the assent of both parties, and one of them is incapable of assenting, there can be no binding contract. But in many cases the law does not require an actual agreement between the parties, but implies a contract from the circumstances, and itself makes the contract for the parties. A tradesman, for example, who supplies a drunken man with necessities may recover the price of them, if the party keeps them when he becomes sober.<sup>51</sup> And so with negotiable instruments, the defendant is still liable for the consideration of the instrument or of the indorsement, though he is not upon the instrument itself. Upon the other side of the question, it is urged in behalf of the bona fide holder that the equities are in favor of the bona fide holder. Drunkenness ought not to be regarded, because it is the man's own fault.<sup>52</sup> It is not to be placed on the footing of insanity, because it is temporary. The law protects, and ought to protect, the helpless infant and the God-stricken insane, but should not the vicious or foolish drunkard. And of two aggrieved parties—the drunkard and the bona fide holder—it would seem clearly that the equities of the latter should prevail.<sup>53</sup> When the intoxicated person is not bereft of his senses, there can be no doubt about the position. If the party were only in that state of pleasant exhilaration common in such cases, and was clear in his mind upon what he was doing, then intoxication is no defense. It may only be used as a means of showing fraud, for intoxication may have been used as a means of imposing upon the party to the instrument. But here

311; Byles, Bills, 64; Tied. Com. Paper, § 57; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 214. But see *WILSON v. NISBET*, Mor. Dict. 1509.

<sup>50</sup> *Johnson v. Medlicott*, 3 P. Wms. 130, note; *STATE BANK v. McCOY*, 69 Pa. St. 204; *Neeley v. McSparran*, 91 Pa. St. 17.

<sup>51</sup> Pollock, C. B., in *GORE v. GIBSON*, 13 Mees. & W. 623.

<sup>52</sup> *WILSON v. NISBET*, 2 Mor. Dict. 1509.

<sup>53</sup> *Berkley v. Cannon*, 4 Rich. Law, 136; *Northam v. Latouche*, 4 Car. & P. 145. And see *Smith v. Williamson*, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 193.

the fraud, and not the intoxication, is the basis of defense.<sup>54</sup> The party had capacity to incur an obligation, and the courts will enforce the obligation he has incurred. That his senses were clouded would be no excuse. The court could no more take that into consideration than it could that one party was sharper than another in making a bargain.<sup>55</sup>

**100. STATUTES.**—Statutes which avoid instruments are of the following varieties:

- (a) Those which in words declare the contract void.
- (b) Those which annex a penalty to the consideration or performance of the act for which the bill, note, or indorsement is given.

This section is properly but a part of the latter one of this chapter upon "Illegality of Consideration." And both of these sections are but extracts of the positions taken upon the subject of the legality of the object of contracts in the elementary works upon that subject. The scope of this work does not admit of a thorough discussion of the statutes which render the consideration of bills, notes and indorsements illegal. To pursue that subject with any thoroughness, the student must examine works on the general subject of contracts. It is our purpose only to state the leading principles concerning the application of statutes avoiding contracts to bills and notes, and then to discuss somewhat more at length the statutory doctrine of usury, which of all the statutes avoiding negotiable instruments is most often before the courts.

Statutes may avoid a bill or note in two ways. The first is where in words it declares them to be void.<sup>56</sup> Such a declaration means

<sup>54</sup> *Say v. Barwick*, 1 Ves. & B. 195; *Willcox v. Jackson*, 51 Iowa, 208, 1 N. W. 513.

<sup>55</sup> *MILLER v. FINLEY*, 26 Mich. 249; *Caulkins v. Fry*, 35 Conn. 170; *Reinicker v. Smith*, 2 Har. & J. 421; *Reynolds v. Dechaums*, 24 Tex. 174.

<sup>56</sup> An instance of this is found in the case of *BOWYER v. BAMPTON*, 2 Strange, 1155, where it was held that the innocent indorsee of a gaming note can maintain no action against the drawer. He may, however, sue the indorser upon his indorsement. This case was decided in accordance with St. 9 Anne, c. 14, § 1, which says "that all notes, where the whole or any part of



that it was the object of the legislature entirely to prevent the circulation of a bill or note as commercial paper. And this object the courts will enforce despite any equities that a bona fide purchaser may have. The reason for this is that the public good, evidenced by this intention to prevent circulation, overrides any private right.<sup>57</sup> The student must note carefully that this reasoning does not apply when the statute merely declares the consideration of a bill or note to be illegal. An illegal consideration is one which may be in itself valid. Yet courts will not enforce it, because the legislature has declared in its statute that the people deem it against the public welfare to allow it to be enforced. Therefore, in view of the legislative act, it is an invalid consideration, or, in other words, no consideration at all. Hence, against a bill or note in the hands of a bona fide holder, mere illegality of consideration can no more be urged than lack of consideration can.<sup>58</sup> For, in declaring a consideration illegal merely, the legislature will not be presumed to intend to prevent the circulation of the bill or note, but merely to forbid its enforcement between immediate parties.<sup>59</sup>

The second general class of statutes which avoid bills and notes are those which inflict penalties. It is thought by the courts that the intention of the legislature in affixing penalties is to suppress a mode of dealing which it regards as injurious to society by attainting the contract, and attaching penal consequences to it whenever set up as a proof of debt.<sup>60</sup> Such at least is the early doctrine, and it the consideration is money knowingly lent for gaming, shall be void to all intents and purposes whatever." For other cases in which bills or notes are void by virtue of a statute, see *Easter v. Minard*, 26 Ill. 494; *Taylor v. Atchison*, 54 Ill. 196; *Bayley v. Taber*, 5 Mass. 286; *Wiggin v. Bush*, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 306; *First Nat. Bank v. Grindstaff*, 45 Ind. 158; *Wyatt v. Wallace* (Ark.) 55 S. W. 1105. Under statute declaring contracts on gambling consideration void, notes given on sale of dice-throwing machines held void in hands of innocent purchaser. *Kuhl v. Press Co.* (Ala.) 26 South. 535.

<sup>57</sup> *Bayley v. Taber*, 5 Mass. 286; *CITY OF AURORA v. WEST*, 22 Ind. 88; *Cazet v. Field*, 9 Gray, 329; *TOWNE v. RICE*, 122 Mass. 67; *Glenn v. Farmers' Bank*, 70 N. C. 191; *BOWYER v. BAMPTON*, 2 Strange, 1155.

<sup>58</sup> *ROCKWELL v. CHARLES*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 499; *Hill v. Northrup*, 4 Thomp. & C. 120; *Grimes v. Hillenbrand*, 4 Hun, 354.

<sup>59</sup> *VALLETT v. PARKER*, 6 Wend. 615.

<sup>60</sup> *Shaw, C. J.*, in *Kendall v. Robertson*, 12 Cush. 156; *Griffith v. Wells*, 3 Denio, 226; *Woods v. Armstrong*, 54 Ala. 150.

would seem to be the view of the courts at present that a penalized consideration renders the bill or note void, and not merely illegal. And because it is void, and because its circulation is against the public welfare, no bona fide holder can enforce it. But this rule also has its limitation. A penalty is only a prohibition when the object of the statute is to protect the public. And if it is clear that this is not the object of the penalty, but that it is enforced for administrative purposes, then this rule does not apply.<sup>61</sup> And with these very general remarks upon statutes avoiding negotiable instruments, let us turn to the statute of usury.

**101. USURY** — In many states usury is by statute made a real defense. Usury is taking or receiving, with corrupt intent, money, goods, or things in action at a rate of interest upon the loan or forbearance of money, in a greater amount than is allowed by statute.

**102.** In many states the holder of a bill or note, even if he be a purchaser for value without notice, cannot recover the amount of the instrument from persons who were parties to the instrument at its inception, when the instrument was negotiated in its inception at a rate greater than the legal rate of interest.

**103.** Where an indorsee acquires a bill or note by way of discount at a rate greater than the legal rate of interest, such transfer is a sale by the indorser and a purchase by the indorsee, for which the indorsee may recover the full amount of the maker, acceptor, or other prior parties, but (in some jurisdictions) only the amount paid for the bill of his prior indorser.

Usury is of that class of evils called in law "*malum prohibitum*." By this is meant something that is in itself not intrinsically wrong, but something which the people, through their legislatures, have declared inexpedient as a business practice, and therefore not to be allowed. It is a wrong which is created by statute, and in deroga-

<sup>61</sup> Anson. Cont. p. 172; Pol. Cont. pp. 253, 254; Clark, Cont. p. 387, and cases.

tion of common law. And the first thing to be noticed is, that the statutes which create it are strictly construed and their operation is confined in every possible way. To constitute usury three elements are necessary: (1) More than the lawful rate of interest must have been received or reserved. (2) It must be the effect of a corrupt agreement. (3) The subject of the contract must be a loan. And in discussing the subject in the brief space permitted here, it is purposed in the first place to outline very generally the nature of usury, and then to consider the commonest instances in which it arises in cases of bills and notes.

*Intent.*

Usury is the effect of a corrupt agreement. There must exist the intention knowingly to commit usury.<sup>62</sup> This intent of the parties, when the contract is not upon its face usurious, is to be gathered from such circumstances as the situation and object of the parties at the time of the loan, the character and use to be made of the funds or article transferred, and the time and manner and place of payment. Designedly taking and receiving interest greater than the legal rate, although there be no corrupt agreement other than that which is manifested by one party allowing and the other receiving interest, is sufficient evidence of intent. In fact, this is generally the way in which the corrupt agreement is shown.

*Loan or Forbearance of Money.*

It is a well-settled rule that the loan must be of money,<sup>63</sup> unless otherwise expressly provided by statute. An agreement, for example, whereby the parties loaned cattle, upon the understanding that during the loan the lessee was to pay a stipulated sum for the use of the property, with the further stipulation that the lease might terminate in sale, but, if the sale was not carried out, the cattle were to

<sup>62</sup> Price v. Campbell, 2 Call (Va.) 110; Condit v. Baldwin, 21 N. Y. 219; Nourse v. Prime, 7 Johns. Ch. 77; Bank of U. S. v. Waggener, 9 Pet. 399; Tyson v. Rickard, 3 Har. & J. 109; Bearce v. Barstow, 9 Mass. 45; Scott v. Lloyd, 9 Pet. 418; Duncan v. Maryland Sav. Inst., 10 Gill & J. 299.

<sup>63</sup> Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Insurance & Trust Co., 3 N. Y. 344; Bull v. Rice, 5 N. Y. 315; Perrine v. Hotchkiss, 2 Lans. 416; Dunham v. Dey, 13 Johns. 40; Suydam v. Westfall, 4 Hill, 211; Ketchum v. Barber, Id. 225; Tardeveau v. Smith's Ex'rs, Hardin (Ky.) 185; Foote v. Emerson, 10 Vt. 333; Spencer v. Tilden, 5 Cow. 144.

be returned, was held not a usurious one. The case turned upon the principle that, where the agreement was for the loan of chattels, it was immaterial whether the compensation fixed by the agreement exceeded the statutory rate, because the subject of the loan, since it was not money, was not within the statute of usury. An agreement where sheep were loaned, and, by the contract, the same number were to be returned, of the same age and quality, with interest of 15 to 25 per cent. upon their cash value,<sup>64</sup> and another agreement where a heifer was loaned at an interest of 25 per cent., to be returned in kind,<sup>65</sup> were considered not usurious. These differ from money, in that money is supposed to have a fixed value. Chattels vary according as the market rises or falls. Therefore a loan of animals to be returned in animals is not usury, usury being confined to money only. The courts construe this out of the term usually employed in the statutes, "the rate of interest." They take the ground that interest and forbearance cannot be predicated of any other than a loan of money, actual or presumed, because money has the same value when the loan is made and when returned; whereas chattels, measured by the standard of money, so fluctuate that taking the chattels borrowed and returned with the compensation for the use of the same at the time of returning the borrowed property may or may not aggregate in money value the value of the property loaned in the first instance. In the case of negotiable instruments, where an accommodation party makes, accepts, or indorses an instrument, and receives a commission for so doing, deducted from the avails of the note itself, there is no usury.<sup>66</sup> The statute forbids an illegal rate of interest upon the loan or forbearance of money. This is a loan of credit, and not of money, credit being a distinct property from money. So lenders may, in addition to lawful interest on the discount of bills and notes, take a reasonable commission by way of compensation for trouble and expense, provided such commission be not intended as a device to cover a usurious loan.<sup>67</sup> In all of these things, the moneys paid or deduct-

<sup>64</sup> Hall v. Haggart, 17 Wend. 280.

<sup>65</sup> Cummings v. Williams, 4 Wend. 680.

<sup>66</sup> Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y. 531; Kitchel v. Schenck, 29 N. Y. 515.

<sup>67</sup> Thurston v. Cornell, 38 N. Y. 281; Morton v. Thurber, 85 N. Y. 551; Eaton v. Alger, 2 Abb. Dec. 5; Trotter v. Curtis, 14 Johns. 160; Dayton v.

ed were for some other reason than the mere loan of money itself. Something was done in addition to handing over the money, and that something was paid for. Such payment was not interest, but rent or compensation.<sup>66</sup>

*Interest in Advance—Compound Interest.*

Another thing to mention is the common practice by which interest is taken in advance upon the face value of the paper. The lender here has the use of his own discount, and this, in case of discount of paper in large amounts, aggregates sometimes very large sums of money. This is, in fact, usurious, but, time out of mind, it has been the custom, and is allowed for the benefit of trade.<sup>67</sup> It is confined in its operation to negotiable instruments, because of their importance in commercial affairs, and because it is the established custom of banks, which play so important a part in discounting them that on all hands it is deemed necessary for the circulation of the instrument in the course of trade. Again, compound interest is not usury.<sup>70</sup> There is this distinction, however: An agreement for compounding future interest is illegal, not because such agreements are obnoxious to the usury laws, but because they may serve as a temptation to negligence on the part of the creditor and a snare to the debtor, and

Moore, 30 N. J. Eq. 543; Atlanta Mining & Rolling Mill Co. v. Gwyer, 48 Ga. 11; Cockle v. Flack, 93 U. S. 344; De Forest v. Strong, 8 Conn. 513. In KENT v. WALTON, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 256, it was held by Savage, C. J., that, "to make out the defense of usury, it was necessary to show that the note was not a valid instrument when discounted. \* \* \* It is well settled that discounting a business note at more than seven per cent. interest is not usury." "The principle is too well settled to be questioned that a bill free from usury in its concoction may be sold at a discount; because, as it was free from usury between the original parties to it, no subsequent transaction can, as it respects those parties, invalidate it." Sutherland, J., in CRAM v. HENDRICKS, Id. 569, 572. And see WIFFEN v. ROBERTS, 1 Esp. 261. But see Clofflin v. Boorum, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 168.

<sup>66</sup> Ketchum v. Barber, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 225.

<sup>67</sup> New York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Sturges, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 664; Bank of Alexandria v. Mandeville, 1 Cranch, C. C. 552, Fed. Cas. No. 850; Warren Deposit Bank v. Robinson (Ky.) 35 S. W. 275.

<sup>70</sup> Stewart v. Petree, 55 N. Y. 621; Guernsey v. Rexford, 63 N. Y. 631; Culver v. Bigelow, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 171; Miner v. Paris Exch. Bank, 53 Tex. 559; Hamilton v. Le Grange, 2 H. Bl. 144; Fobes v. Cantfield, 3 Ohio, 17.

prove in the end oppressive and ruinous.<sup>71</sup> But where the interest has already accrued, then the parties may lawfully agree to turn such interest into principal, and to carry the interest, and the forbearance will constitute a consideration. As a matter of fact, there is no new loan, and the interest is in excess of the legal rate. But the law implies a loan, and, an agreement being made, it declares the contract free from the taint of usury.

*Effect of Usury.*

But, usury being once present, the next question is, how far does the statute operate in avoidance of contracts where it in words declares the contract void or penalizes the transaction. The general rule in such cases is that, as between immediate parties in respect to all persons seeking enforcement of the contract, it is void. Usury being a purely statutory defense, the statutes must be examined in each instance to know just the extent of its effect. The taint of usury in the original contract is carried forward and enters into all subsequent contracts taken in renewal of it. And if it appears that a contract in the first instance is void, and is sought to be renewed by changing its form, so that the contract still stands upon the original loan, then the loan given in renewal is also void.<sup>72</sup> This general rule is also very much confined, the exceptions being probably more numerous than the application of the rule itself. A mortgage, for instance, may be void for usury, but a bona fide purchaser of the property under its foreclosure acquires good title.<sup>73</sup> A party is estopped from setting up usury where, by his representations, he has persuaded an innocent party to discount a negotiable instrument. Contracts voidable for usury may be ratified and become valid contracts.<sup>74</sup> And also, where a renewal note is void for usury, the parties may sue upon the original consideration.<sup>75</sup> And, lastly, usury is a defense which can only

<sup>71</sup> Quackenbush v. Leonard, 9 Paige, 334; Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162.

<sup>72</sup> Campbell v. Sloan, 62 Pa. St. 481; Pickett v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 32 Ark. 346.

<sup>73</sup> JACKSON v. HENRY, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 195; Elliott v. Wood, 53 Barb. (N. Y.) 285.

<sup>74</sup> Dix v. Van Wyck, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 522, and cases cited.

<sup>75</sup> Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Joslyn, 37 N. Y. 353; Winsted Bank v. Webb, 39 N. Y. 325, 476, and note; Knights v. Putnam, 3 Pick. 184; OATES v. BANK, 100 U. S. 239. See, also, Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Kasson, 37 N. Y. 218;

be availed of by parties to the contract, or those connected in interest with them. A mere stranger, or one who has no legal interest in the question, may not take advantage of the statute, because the intent of the statute was to relieve oppressed debtors. They alone may claim its protection, and declare the contract, usurious in its inception, void.<sup>76</sup>

*Same—As Applied to Bills and Notes.*

It only remains to apply the theories of usury where they avoid the instrument, to the doctrines of bills and notes. The more common situations to which the rules of usury have been applied are these: (1) Where an instrument is usurious in its inception;<sup>77</sup> (2) where a contract is valid in its inception, but usury is alleged in a subsequent indorsement or transfer of it; (3) where one indorser seeks to avail himself of it as a defense where either the note had a usurious inception, or prior indorsements have been corrupted by usury.

Where a bill or note is delivered to the payee for consideration, the question of usury in the inception of the instrument depends of course upon the nature of the transaction between the original parties. But in the case of accommodation paper a different question is presented. If the accommodated payee negotiates the instrument to one who pays less than the amount due upon it after deducting lawful interest, it has been held by numerous cases<sup>78</sup> that the instrument has its inception when delivered to such person, and the transaction is deemed to be a loan, and usurious, although he

DE WOLF v. JOHNSON, 10 Wheat. 367; Ward v. Sugg, 113 N. C. 489, 8 S. E. 717, and Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 163.

<sup>76</sup> Mason v. Lord, 40 N. Y. 490.

<sup>77</sup> As to conflict of laws, see ante, p. 185.

<sup>78</sup> SWEET v. CHAPMAN, 7 Hun, 576. It was held by Noxon, J., in this case that "the rule appears to be settled that a promissory note, to be the subject of sale, must be an existing valid note in the hands of the payee, and given for some actual consideration, so that it can be enforced against the original parties, and, if not valid in the hands of the payee, cannot be rendered valid by a sale to a bona fide purchaser at a rate of interest exceeding seven per cent." HALL v. WILSON, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 548; Hall v. Earnest, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 588; Rapelye v. Anderson, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 483; Bossange v. Ross, 29 Barb. 576; Belden v. Lamb, 17 Conn. 452; Holeman v. Hobson, 8 Humph. 129; Corcoran v. Powers, 6 Ohio St. 19; Bock v. Lauman, 24 Pa. St. 448; Van Schaack v. Stafford, 12 Pick. 565.



was ignorant of the character of the paper. The test is held to be whether the person so discounting the instrument takes it from one who could have maintained an action upon it against the prior parties. It is difficult, however, if not impossible, to reconcile these cases with the rule that, aside from usury, accommodation paper has its inception, as against a bona fide purchaser, when delivered to the payee, and that as against such a holder lack of consideration between the original parties is no defense. The correct rule appears to be that as against one who purchases, even for a sum which in case of a loan would be usurious, without knowledge that the paper is accommodation paper, it must be deemed to have had its inception when delivered to the payee.<sup>79</sup> The latter rule is supported by Mr. Daniel, who maintains that "in all cases, if the holder at the time he received the note did not know the fact that it was not a valid and subsisting security, there is no intention of borrowing and lending, which is necessary to create usury; and the holder may recover upon it against the maker."<sup>80</sup>

When the paper is usurious in its inception, then it is void as to the maker, acceptor, and parties prior to the discount, and no subsequent transaction can make it valid.<sup>81</sup> Void in its inception, it continues void forever, whatever its subsequent history may be. It is as void as to these parties in the hands of an innocent holder for value as it was in the hands of those who made the usurious contract. No vitality can be given it by sale or exchange, because

<sup>79</sup> *Holmes v. Bank*, 53 Minn. 350, 55 N. W. 555; *Jackson v. Travis*, 42 Minn. 438, 44 N. W. 316; *Veazie Bank v. Paulk*, 40 Me. 109; *May v. Campbell*, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 450; *Whitworth v. Adams*, 5 Rand. (Va.) 333; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 751; 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 882.

<sup>80</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 752.

<sup>81</sup> In the case of *LOWE v. WALLER*, 2 Doug. 736, a bill was drawn by W., who was also payee, and by him indorsed to H. & S., who indorsed to plaintiff. In an action against the acceptor the defense was that the bill was given upon a usurious contract between H. & S. and defendant. It was held that the defense was good, though plaintiff was a purchaser for value, without notice of the usury. As to the rule when there is no usury in the inception of the bill, see *PARR v. ELIASON*, 1 East, 92, and *Cardwell v. Martin*, 9 East, 191. Where a negotiable instrument is free from usury in its inception, it may not be afterwards tainted with usury, save as between the immediate parties thereto. *Knights v. Putnam*, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 184.

that which the statute has declared void cannot be made valid by passing through the channels of trade.<sup>82</sup>

Where the instrument is not usurious in its inception, the question arises whether a transfer for an amount less than the face of the instrument, after deducting legal interest, is in turn usurious. It is no doubt true that, if a bill or note be indorsed as collateral security for a usurious loan, the indorsement is affected by the usury.<sup>83</sup> In such case the indorsement is void, and no action can be maintained thereon, even by a bona fide purchaser for value, against the indorser; nor, it seems, can an action be maintained thereunder against prior parties,<sup>84</sup> though there is authority for the position that such a holder can trace title under the indorsement, and thereby maintain an action against prior parties who were not parties to the usury.<sup>85</sup> It has even been held by some courts that whenever the instrument is transferred for less than face value deducting legal interest the transfer is usurious;<sup>86</sup> but this view cannot be maintained upon principle, since it confounds a transaction which is really a sale with a loan. It is generally held; therefore, that the mere discount of the instrument for more than legal interest is not usurious, and that the transferee may recover against all parties.<sup>87</sup> Yet, conceding the right of the indorsee to recover, an-

<sup>82</sup> *CLAFLIN v. BOORUM*, 122 N. Y. 385, 25 N. E. 360; *POWELL v. WATERS*, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 669; *Wilkie v. Roosevelt*, 3 Johns. Cas. 206; *Bennett v. Smith*, 15 Johns. 335-357; *Miller v. Hull*, 4 Denio, 104, 107; *Miller v. Zelmer*, 111 N. Y. 441-444, 18 N. E. 716; *LOWE v. WALLER*, 2 Doug. 736; *Atlanta Sav. Bank v. Spencer*, 107 Ga. 629, 33 S. E. 878; *LOWES v. MAZZAREDO*, 1 Starkie, 385. In this case it was held that, where the payee of a bill of exchange indorses it upon a usurious contract at the time of the contract, a bona fide holder cannot afterwards recover upon it against the acceptor. *CHAPMAN v. BLACK*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 590.

<sup>83</sup> *Levy v. Gadsby*, 3 Cranch, 180. Whether a loan or a sale, held to be a question of fact. *Becker's Investment Ag. v. Rea*, 63 Minn. 459, 65 N. W. 928.

<sup>84</sup> *LOWES v. MAZZAREDO*, 1 Starkie, 385; *Nichols v. Fearson*, 7 Pet. 103.

<sup>85</sup> *Knights v. Putnam*, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 185; *Armstrong v. Gibson*, 31 Wis. 66. Mr. Daniel supports this view. Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 760.

<sup>86</sup> *LOWES v. MAZZAREDO*, 1 Starkie, 385; *CHAPMAN v. BLACK*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 588; *Whitworth v. Adams*, 5 Rand. (Va.) 419.

<sup>87</sup> *PARR v. ELIASON*, 1 East, 92; *CRAM v. HENDRICKS*, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 569; *Crane v. Price*, 35 N. Y. 494; *Corning v. Pond*, 29 Hun, 129; *Nichols v.*

other question upon which the authorities are in conflict has arisen, —whether he may recover the face of the instrument, or merely the amount which he paid for the indorsement. It is generally admitted that from prior parties he may recover the full amount of the bill or note, but many cases limit the amount of his recovery against his indorser to the amount paid.<sup>88</sup> No good reason for such a distinction is apparent, and other cases hold, upon what it seems is the correct principle, that the indorsee may recover the face value as well from his indorser as from prior parties.<sup>89</sup> This right of the indorsee is not to be confounded with the right of the indorsee, as well as of the transferee by delivery, to recover for breach of the implied warranty of validity of the instrument, for the recovery for breach of this warranty is limited, as we have seen, to the amount of the consideration paid.<sup>90</sup>

In conclusion it must be repeated that usury is purely a statutory defense, and that the statutes differ in different jurisdictions. In some states, for example, the statute expressly saves the rights of bona fide purchasers, and hence in these jurisdictions the defense of usury is not real, but merely personal.<sup>91</sup>

**104. FAILURE TO STAMP.**—Failure to affix a revenue stamp to a negotiable instrument is sometimes by statute made a real defense.

Failure to stamp a bill or note in accordance with the requirements of a revenue law imposing a penalty for such failure, and de-

*Fearson*, 7 Pet. 109; *Newman v. Williams*, 29 Miss. 222; *French v. Grindle*, 15 Me. 163; *Ayer v. Tilden*, 15 Gray (Mass.) 178.

<sup>88</sup> *Munn v. Commission Co.*, 15 Johns. 44; *Ingalls v. Lee*, 9 Barb. 651; *CRAM v. HENDRICKS*, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 569; *Noble v. Walker*, 32 Ala. 456; *Coye v. Palmer*, 16 Cal. 158; *French v. Grindle*, 15 Me. 163.

<sup>89</sup> *Roark v. Turner*, 29 Ga. 455; *NATIONAL BANK v. GREEN*, 33 Iowa, 140; *Nichols v. Fearson*, 7 Pet. 103; *Belden v. Lamb*, 17 Conn. 441; *Turner v. Brown*, 3 Smedes & M. 425. Such is the rule under *Neg. Inst. L. § 96*, which provides that "a holder in due course \* \* \* may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon."

<sup>90</sup> *Ante*, p. —.

<sup>91</sup> *Robinson v. Smith*, 62 Minn. 62, 64 N. W. 90; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 525.

declaring that instruments, if not stamped, shall not be admissible in evidence, has been held in England to be a real defense.<sup>92</sup> Thus, where a bill was declared on as drawn in Bombay, it was held that the acceptor could show that it had been drawn in England, and hence was not receivable in evidence for want of being stamped as an inland bill, although the plaintiff was an innocent indorsee, for value, without notice.<sup>93</sup> Whether failure to stamp is a real defense depends, of course, upon the construction of the particular statute. Under the federal act of July 1, 1862, it was held that only fraudulent omissions rendered the instrument inadmissible in evidence,<sup>94</sup> and that the defense that the instrument was not stamped till after it was issued was not available against a bona fide purchaser who received it after it was stamped.<sup>95</sup> The provision against the reception of the instrument was in most jurisdictions held to apply only to the federal, and not to the state, courts, for the reason that for congress to prescribe rules regulating the administration of justice by the state courts would be to trench upon the independent existence of the state governments.<sup>96</sup> Similar rulings have been made under the so called "War Revenue Act," which took effect July 1, 1898,<sup>97</sup> and which follows in its general features the earlier act. The present act provides for revenue stamps as follows: On bank checks, drafts, and certificates, two cents; on inland bills and promissory notes, two cents per \$100; and on foreign bills, four cents per \$100, or, if drawn in sets, two cents per \$100. A discussion of the various, and often conflicting, decisions involving the

<sup>92</sup> *BENNISON v. JEWISON*, 12 Jur. 485; *Ex parte Manners*, 1 Rose, 68; *Bartlett v. Smith*, 11 Mees. & W. 483. As to conflict of laws, see ante, p. 183.

<sup>93</sup> *BENNISON v. JEWISON*, supra.

<sup>94</sup> *Campbell v. Wilcox*, 10 Wall. 421; *Green v. Holway*, 101 Mass. 243; *Dudley v. Wells*, 55 Me. 145; *Whigham v. Pickett*, 43 Ala. 140; *State v. Hill*, 30 Wis. 416; *Cabbott v. Radford*, 17 Minn. 320 (Gil. 296).

<sup>95</sup> *Sperry v. Horr*, 32 Iowa, 184; *LATHAM v. SMITH*, 45 Ill. 25; *Chaffe v. Ludeling*, 27 La. Ann. 607.

<sup>96</sup> *Carpenter v. Snelling*, 97 Mass. 452; *People v. Gates*, 43 N. Y. 40; *Griffin v. Ranney*, 35 Conn. 239; *Bowen v. Byrne*, 55 Ill. 467; *Sammons v. Halloway*, 21 Mich. 162. Contra, *City of Muscatine v. Sterneman*, 30 Iowa, 526; *Chartiers & Robinson Turnpike Co. v. McNamara*, 72 Pa. St. 281.

<sup>97</sup> *Dawson v. McCarty* (Wash.) 57 Pac. 816. See, also, *People v. Fromme*, 35 App. Div. 459, 54 N. Y. Supp. 833; *Loring v. Chase*, 26 Misc. Rep. 318, 56 N. Y. Supp. 312.

construction and effect of the federal revenue laws is beyond the scope of this book.<sup>98</sup>

**105. ALTERATION.**—Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except as against a party who has himself made, authorized, or assented to the alteration, and subsequent indorsers.<sup>99</sup>

The reason that a material alteration of a negotiable instrument discharges a party who has not consented thereto is founded upon what is or was deemed to be public policy, the law imposing this severe penalty as a safeguard against tampering with written instruments.<sup>100</sup> The alteration is, of course, inoperative as such, for an alteration of the instrument, or, in other words, the substitution of a new contract, could be effected only by the consent of the parties. The alteration, however, by force of a positive rule of law, is operative to nullify the instrument, even as against a bona fide purchaser.<sup>101</sup> Thus, if an action were brought, based upon the instrument as attempted to be altered, the defendant would have a perfect defense by simple denial of execution of the instrument declared on. In an action based upon the original instrument, on the other hand, the defense strictly would be, not by way of denial, but by pleading the alteration, whereby the instrument, although actually executed by defendant, had been rendered a nullity.

In England the rule that alteration nullifies the instrument has

<sup>98</sup> Rand. Com. Paper, §§ 209–215; Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 118–127.

<sup>99</sup> This is the language of Neg. Inst. L. § 205.

<sup>100</sup> Wood v. Steele, 6 Wall. 80; ANGLE v. INSURANCE CO., 92 U. S. 330; Mersman v. Werges, 5 Sup. Ct. 65, 112 U. S. 139; GREENFIELD SAV. BANK v. STOWELL, 123 Mass. 196.

<sup>101</sup> MASTER v. MILLER, 4 Term R. 320, 2 H. Bl. 140; Burchfield v. Moore, 3 El. & Bl. 683; WAIT v. POMEROY, 20 Mich. 425; CITIZENS' NAT. BANK v. RICHMOND, 121 Mass. 110; HORN v. NEWTON CITY BANK, 32 Kan. 518, 4 Pac. 1022; Burrows v. Klunk, 70 Md. 451, 17 Atl. 378; GETTYSBURG NAT. BANK v. CHISOLM, 169 Pa. St. 564, 32 Atl. 730; Exchange Nat. Bank v. Bank of Little Rock, 7 C. C. A. 111, 58 Fed. 140. The rule has been changed in many states by the Negotiable Instruments Law (post, p. 248), and in England by the Bills of Exchange Act (section 64).

been carried to extreme limits; and upon the ground that the party seeking to enforce must preserve the integrity of the instrument it has been held that the rule applies even though the alteration be the act of a stranger.<sup>102</sup> In the United States an early departure from the severity of this rule was taken, and it has been generally held that an alteration by a stranger is a mere spoliation or trespass, and does not deprive the holder of his right to enforce the instrument.<sup>103</sup> This is in accord with the fundamental principles of contract. Equally so is the rule that alterations made with the consent of the parties, or which do not change the effect or tenor of the instrument, do not affect the validity. If the parties consent upon a new consideration it is a new contract, and therefore in itself valid. Where there is no benefit derived from either party by the change, and yet they have knowledge of and assent to the change, each party makes the person making the change his agent, and ratifies his act.<sup>104</sup> Where the legal effect of the instrument is not changed by an alteration, the alteration is immaterial. The liability sought to be enforced against the party is the one which he in the first place assumed. The fact that the verbiage or appearance of the instrument is changed is unimportant. The courts look to the obligation, and, if that be unaltered in effect, then it is enforced. The courts will not allow justice to be obstructed for the light reason that the form of the agreement is altered when its substance remains. But,

<sup>102</sup> *DAVIDSON v. COOPER*, 11 Mees. & W. 795, 13 Mees. & W. 343; *Pattinson v. Luckley*, L. R. 10 Exch. 330, 44 Law J. Exch. 180; *Pigot's Case*, 11 Coke, 27.

<sup>103</sup> *Rees v. Overbaugh*, 6 Cow. 746; *Lewis v. Payn*, 8 Cow. 71; *Nichols v. Johnson*, 10 Conn. 192; *Wickes v. Caulk*, 5 Har. & J. 36; *Den v. Wright*, 7 N. J. Law (2 Halst.) 176; *Waring v. Smyth*, 2 Barb. Ch. 119. See, also, *Bridges v. Winters*, 42 Miss. 135; *PIERSOL v. GRIMES*, 30 Ind. 129; *Hunt v. Gray*, 35 N. J. Law, 227; *Lubbering v. Kohlbrecher*, 22 Mo. 596; *DRUM v. DRUM*, 133 Mass. 568; *WHITE SEWING MACH. CO. v. DAKIN*, 86 Mich. 581, 49 N. W. 583. The authorities are divided as to the question upon whom rests the burden of proof when an alteration is apparent on the face of the instrument. *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. §§ 1417-1421a.

<sup>104</sup> *National State Bank v. Rising*, 4 Hun, 793; *Commercial Bank of Buffalo v. Warren*, 15 N. Y. 577; *Greenfield Bank v. Crafts*, 4 Allen, 447; *Huntington v. Ballou*, 2 Lans. 120; *Humphreys v. Gullow*, 13 N. H. 385; *Bell v. Mahin*, 69 Iowa, 408, 29 N. W. 331; *Camden Bank v. Hall*, 14 N. J. Law, 583; *Jackson v. Johnson*, 67 Ga. 167; *Canon v. Grigsby*, 116 Ill. 151, 5 N. E. 362.

provided the alteration be material, it is not of importance whether the intent with which it was made was fraudulent or innocent.<sup>106</sup> A distinction in respect to the intent, however, is to be observed. While it is conceded that any material alteration, however innocent the intent, avoids the instrument, and, moreover, that where the holder has been guilty of making a fraudulent alteration he cannot recover even upon the original consideration for which the bill or note was given,<sup>106</sup> yet it has been held by many cases that, if the alteration was innocently made by the holder, he can recover upon the original consideration,<sup>107</sup> provided the remedy over of the person sued has not been prejudiced by the alteration.<sup>108</sup>

It is of importance to observe that in those states which have adopted the Negotiable Instruments Law the effect of alteration upon the rights of innocent purchasers has been substantially changed by the provision that "when an instrument has been materially altered and is in the hands of a holder in due course, not a party to the alteration, he may enforce payment thereof according to its original tenor."<sup>109</sup> In other words, under this enactment alteration has ceased to be a real defense.

## 106. Alterations are material

(a) Which purport to lessen or place an additional burden on any of the parties. Such are changes in the date, time, place, amount, or medium of payment and the rate of interest.

<sup>106</sup> Booth v. Powers, 56 N. Y. 22; EVANS v. FOREMAN, 60 Mo. 449; Heath v. Blake, 5 S. E. 842, 28 S. C. 406; First Nat. Bank v. Fricke, 75 Mo. 178; Eckert v. Pickel, 13 N. W. 708, 59 Iowa, 545; Vanauken v. Hornbeck, 14 N. J. Law, 178. See, contra, Van Brunt v. Eoff, 35 Barb. 501.

<sup>106</sup> Meyer v. Huneke, 55 N. Y. 412; Smith v. Mace, 44 N. H. 553; Warder, Bushnell & Glessner Co. v. Willyard, 49 N. W. 300, 46 Minn. 531; Ballard v. Insurance Co., 81 Ind. 239; Walton Plow Co. v. Campbell, 52 N. W. 883, 35 Neb. 174.

<sup>107</sup> Sloman v. Cox, 1 Crompt., M. & R. 471; Hunt v. Gray, 35 N. J. Law, 227; Matteson v. Ellsworth, 33 Wis. 488; SULLIVAN v. RUDISILL, 18 N. W. 856, 63 Iowa, 158; Keene v. Weeks, 33 Atl. 446, 19 R. I. 309.

<sup>108</sup> ALDERSON v. LANGDALE, 3 Barn. & Adol. 660.

<sup>109</sup> Neg. Inst. L. § 205.



- (b) Which purport to change the liabilities and obligations of all or any of the parties. Such are the addition or removal of the signature of a maker, drawer, indorser, payee, or co-surety
- (c) Which purport to change the operation of the instrument, or its effect in evidence. Such are adding words of negotiability or of a special consideration after value received, or changing the form of the indorsement, or changing the liability from joint to several, or from joint to joint and several, as the case may be.<sup>110</sup>

The absence of a date upon a negotiable instrument at its inception, or the fact that it is postdated or antedated, may not be material upon the question of its validity. But when a date has once been inserted, and its time of payment has thus been fixed, such date is material, and cannot be altered without consent.<sup>111</sup> The reason for this is, in the words of Justice Swayne,<sup>112</sup> that the agreement is no longer the one into which the parties entered. Its identity is changed. Another is substituted. There is no longer the necessary concurrence of minds. To prevent and punish such tampering, the law does not permit the holder to fall back upon the contract as it was originally. In pursuance of a stern, but wise, policy, it annuls the instrument as to the party sought to be wronged. The

<sup>110</sup> Cf. Neg. Inst. L. § 206. See, also, Id. § 33.

<sup>111</sup> STEPHENS v. GRAHAM, 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 505; Walton v. Hastings, 4 Camp. 223; Jacobs v. Hart, 2 Starkie, 45; Outhwaite v. Luntley, 4 Camp. 179; MASTER v. MILLER, 4 Term R. 320 (in this case it was held that an alteration of the date of a bill of exchange, after acceptance, whereby the payment would be accelerated, avoids the instrument, and no action can be maintained upon it, even by an innocent holder for valuable consideration); Britton v. Dierker, 46 Mo. 592; Owings v. Arnot, 33 Mo. 406; Crawford v. West Side Bank, 2 N. E. 881, 100 N. Y. 50. In LANGTON v. LAZARUS, 5 Mees. & W. 629, which was an action in assumpsit by the indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, it was pleaded as a defense that before the bill came due, and while it was "in full force and effect," the date was altered by the drawer, whereby it became void. The plea was held bad, but only for the reason that it did not allege the alteration to have been made after acceptance.

<sup>112</sup> Wood v. Steele, 6 Wall. 80.

date is obviously a material part of the order or promise. It indicates the time of its inception. It shows the time of its performance. And its alteration, if operative, would place a different liability upon the party sought to be charged. For much the same reason, an alteration in a note or bill which changes the time of its payment is material, and discharges those parties who did not authorize the change.<sup>113</sup> This is true whether the payment is hastened or delayed. It is no argument that such acceleration or delay may be a benefit to the acceptor, maker, or indorsers, in any particular case. The rule also applies where the place of payment is obliterated, or where a place of payment is inserted, or where the place of payment is otherwise altered. Properly enough, the law does not permit even a bona fide holder to recover upon a bill or note so altered against the parties prior to the one making the alteration.<sup>114</sup> The place, as well as the time, of payment, is an essential and material part of the contract entered into; for on their proximity or remoteness must depend, in point of time, the indorser's knowledge of non-payment, which in most cases must be to him a matter of great importance, and he cannot be charged with liability unless payment of the instrument is demanded at the time when and the place where it is due; and, when this is changed without the indorser's consent, the alteration avoids the instrument.<sup>115</sup>

<sup>113</sup> Lee v. Murdoch, 4 Pat. App. 261; Long v. Moore, 3 Esp. 155, note. In the case of ALDERSON v. LANGDALE, 3 Barn. & Adol. 660, the vendee of goods paid for them by a bill of exchange drawn by him on a third person; and, after it had been accepted, the vendor altered the time of payment mentioned in the bill, and thereby vitiated it. It was held that by so doing he made the bill his own, and caused it to operate as a satisfaction of the original debt, and consequently that he could not recover for the goods sold. MILLER v. GILLELAND, 19 Pa. St. 119; Lewis v. Kramer, 3 Md. 265; Bathe v. Taylor, 15 East, 412; Benedict v. Miner, 58 Ill. 19; Lisle v. Rogers, 18 B. Mon. 528; Seebold v. Tatfle (Minn.) 78 N. W. 967.

<sup>114</sup> Cowle v. Halsall, 4 Barn. & Ald. 197, 3 Starkie, 36; Rex v. Treble, 2 Taunt. 328; Tidmarsh v. Grover, 1 Maule & S. 735; NAZRO v. FULLER, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 374; Sudler v. Collins, 2 Houst. 538; Burchfield v. Moore, 25 Eng. Law & Eq. 123; Morehead v. Parkersburg Nat. Bank, 5 W. Va. 74; McIntosh v. Haydon, Ryan & M. 362; Hill v. Cooley, 46 Pa. St. 259; White v. Haas, 32 Ala. 430; Oakey v. Wilcox, 3 How. (Miss.) 330.

<sup>115</sup> Woodworth v. Bank of America, 19 Johns. 391; Wolcott v. Van Santvoord, 17 Johns. 248; NAZRO v. FULLER, 24 Wend. 374.

The amount to be paid by the instrument cannot be changed, either by lessening or increasing it, without destroying the contract. Under this rule there can be no lessening or increasing the amount of principal,<sup>116</sup> nor adding words varying the interest to be paid on a bill or note, either by changing the per cent. or adding interest where the bill or note did not before provide for any;<sup>117</sup> nor by altering the currency in which payment is to be made, nor, if the bill or note is payable in merchandise, by modifying the character or qual-

<sup>116</sup> *Goodman v. Eastman*, 4 N. H. 455; *BANK OF COMMERCE v. UNION BANK*, 3 N. Y. 230; *STEPHENS v. GRAHAM*, 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 505. In the case of *CITIZENS' NAT. BANK v. RICHMOND*, 121 Mass. 110, the facts were as follows: A note for \$500 was indorsed for the maker's accommodation. Afterwards the maker, by means of chemicals, removed the original amount of the note, and inserted a larger amount, for which he got the note discounted. Before the note was due, the alteration was discovered, and the original writing restored. The note was protested, both as a \$500 note and a \$2,000 note, and two notices were accordingly sent. It was held that the indorser was not liable, never having indorsed the \$2,000 note, and the \$500 note having been rendered a nullity. See, also, *YOUNG v. GROTE*, 4 Bing. 253. A check drawn by a customer upon his banker for a sum of money described in the body of the check in words and figures was afterwards altered by the holder, who substituted a larger sum for that mentioned in the check, in such a manner that no one in the ordinary course of business could observe it. The banker paid to the holder this larger sum. It was held that he could not charge the customer beyond the sum for which the check was originally drawn. *HALL v. FULLER*, 5 Barn. & C. 750. In the case of *MARINE NAT. BANK v. NATIONAL CITY BANK*, 59 N. Y. 67, it was held that where a check which had been altered as to name of payee, date, and amount had been certified, and afterwards paid by the plaintiff, such amount could be recovered back as money paid through mistake. But this is inconsistent with the general rule as to the effect of certification. Post, p. 419.

<sup>117</sup> *Boalt v. Brown*, 13 Ohio St. 364; *Waterman v. Vose*, 43 Me. 504; *Lee v. Starbird*, 55 Me. 491; *NEFF v. HORNER*, 63 Pa. St. 327; *Dewey v. Reed*, 40 Barb. 16; *Brown v. Jones*, 3 Port. 420; *Whitmer v. Frye*, 10 Mo. 348; *FAY v. SMITH*, 1 Allen (Mass.) 477; *Patterson v. McNeeley*, 16 Ohio St. 348; *McGRATH v. CLARK*, 56 N. Y. 34. In this case a promissory note was indorsed by the defendant, but with time and place of payment left blank. Upon its delivery to him, the maker, having filled in the blanks, added the words "with interest." It was held that, by delivery to him, the maker was authorized to fill in the blanks as to time and place, as he wished, but that the addition of the "with interest" was not authorized, and was such a ma-

ity of the goods.<sup>118</sup> The reason for these rules is that, if the amount to be paid is increased or lessened, the identity of the contract is destroyed. If interest is added, it adds to the burden borne by the parties; if diminished, the effect of the contract is changed. The question to be determined is whether the words added or stricken out were mere surplusage, or whether they were material to the obligation assumed by the parties to the contract.<sup>119</sup>

The doctrine of the so-called "Pigot's Case,"<sup>120</sup> which is the source of the doctrine of alteration, has been extended to every situation where instruments are presented or sought to be used as evidence for the enforcement of an unexecuted obligation or contract. If there is added or withdrawn another maker or drawer, or if a person signs or withdraws his name as a surety to a note or bill after it is executed, such addition or withdrawal attempts to create a new contract, and hence is a material alteration.<sup>121</sup> In such case, too, it is not to the point that the alteration be or be not to the prejudice of the party against whom the liability is sought to be enforced. The courts will not sit in judgment upon the question

terial alteration as would invalidate the note, unless proof of authority beyond the mere fact of delivery be shown. "The addition of the words 'with interest' increased the liability of the indorser; and the maker had no more right to add those words than he had to increase the sum for which the note was given by adding the amount of the interest to it for the time the note had to run." Per Church, C. J. Where a payee or subsequent holder added after the printed words "with interest at," at the end of a promissory note, the following: "10 per cent.,"—without knowledge of the maker, it was held that such alteration would constitute a good defense by the maker against a bona fide purchaser, and would invalidate the note. *HOLMES v. TRUMPER*, 22 Mich. 427. *Ivory v. Michael*, 33 Mo. 398; *WARRINGTON v. EARLY*, 2 El. & Bl. 763; *Sutton v. Toomer*, 7 Barn. & C. 416.

<sup>118</sup> *Darwin v. Rippey*, 63 N. C. 318; *State v. Cilley*, quoted in 1 N. H. 97; *Martendale v. Follett*, 1 N. H. 95; *Schwalm v. McIntyre*, 17 Wis. 232.

<sup>119</sup> *GARDNER v. WALSH*, 5 El. & Bl. 83; *Suffell v. Bank of England*, 9 Q. B. Div. 555. The test is whether the legal damages contemplated by the parties were the same as those to be awarded by the contract in its changed condition. *Church v. Howard*, 17 Hun, 5.

<sup>120</sup> 11 Coke, 27.

<sup>121</sup> *Clark v. Blackstock*, Holt, N. P. 474; *Ex parte White*, 2 Deac. & C. 334; *Bank of Limestone v. Penick*, 5 T. B. Mon. 25; *Pulliam v. Withers*, 8 Dana, 98; *GARDNER v. WALSH*, 32 Eng. Law & Eq. 162.

whether it be to the prejudice of the party aggrieved or not.<sup>122</sup> This is also true where the operation or effect of the instrument is changed, and it operates differently from the original instrument. If, for example, a promissory note, negotiable, and for the payment of a sum of money absolutely on its face, is modified as to its negotiability, so that it is converted into a special contract, the alteration is material, and avoids the instrument.<sup>123</sup> Where there are memoranda upon the instrument which qualify it, and are intended as a substantive part of it, and these are changed, the alteration is material.<sup>124</sup> So, also, ingrafting upon a joint note a several obligation, or changing a joint and several to a joint note, destroys the operation of the original contract, and renders it void.

*Same—Negligence Facilitating Alteration—Estoppel.*

It is proper to add to the foregoing rules a statement of a limitation which has been recognized in many cases, but which has been adversely criticised or repudiated in others. The rule, briefly stated, is that where the party seeking to defend on the ground of alteration has by his negligence made the alteration possible,—as where he has left space before or after the words or figures expressing the amount, or written a part of the contract in such a way that it could be detached without exciting suspicion, or written part of the instrument with pencil,—the negligent party will be liable upon the instrument as altered to a bona fide holder.<sup>125</sup> This rule, if it can be

<sup>122</sup> Chappell v. Spencer, 23 Barb. 584; MONTGOMERY v. CROSTHWAIT, 8 South. 498, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 154, and 90 Ala. 553.

<sup>123</sup> HARTLEY v. WILKINSON, 4 Maule & S. 25; Cholmeley v. Darley, 14 Mees. & W. 343; Leeds v. Lancashire, 2 Camp. 205.

<sup>124</sup> BENEDICT v. COWDEN, 49 N. Y. 396; Johnson v. Heagan, 23 Me. 329; Burchfield v. Moore, 3 El. & Bl. 683; Simpson v. Stackhouse, 9 Pa. St. (9 Barr) 186; WHEELOCK v. FREEMAN, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 165. In the case of WAIT v. POMEROY, 20 Mich. 425, a memorandum which was written under a note, and by which the obligation was qualified, was shown to have been detached, and it was held that by such alteration a note, even though in the hands of a bona fide holder, is vitiated. "If it formed a part of the original contract, it was a material alteration to detach the memorandum, and leave the note as if it had been absolute. And it is a principle well settled that such an alteration avoids the entire obligation." Per Campbell, C. J.

<sup>125</sup> YOUNG v. GROTE, 4 Bing. 253; PAGAN v. WYLIE, 2 Mor. Dict. 1660; Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y. 538; Isnard v. Jones, 10 La. Ann. 103; Harvey

supported, must rest upon the broad principle that a man cannot complain of the consequences of his own default against a person who has been misled by that default without default of his own; in other words, upon the principle of estoppel.<sup>126</sup>

**107. FORGERY.**—Forgery of a negotiable instrument, or the indorsement thereon, except in case of ratification or estoppel, nullifies the instrument as to all parties against whom the forgery is committed.<sup>127</sup>

Forgery means either falsely making, counterfeiting, altering, erasing, or obliterating a genuine negotiable instrument, in whole or in part, or the false making or counterfeiting of the signature of a party thereto, with intent to defraud.<sup>128</sup> Its essential elements are

*v. Smith*, 55 Ill. 224 (condition written in pencil); *Yocum v. Smith*, 63 Ill. 321; *SEIBEL v. VAUGHAN*, 69 Ill. 257; *NOLL v. SMITH*, 64 Ind. 511; *PHELAN v. MOSS*, 67 Pa. St. 59; *Walsh v. Hunt*, 52 Pac. 115, 120 Cal. 46. In *BROWN v. REED*, 79 Pa. St. 370, the note in question had formed originally part of a contract so drawn that by cutting off a part of it a negotiable note was left. It was held that whether defendant was negligent in signing the contract was a question of fact for the jury. But see *GREENFIELD SAV. BANK v. STOWELL*, 123 Mass. 203; *CAPE ANN NAT. BANK v. BURNS*, 129 Mass. 596; *Walt v. Pomeroy*, *supra*; *Scholfield v. Earl of Loundesborough* [1896] App Cas. 514, affirming [1894] 2 Q. B. 660 [1895] 1 Q. B. 536; and cases cited in next note.

<sup>126</sup> *Halifax Union v. Wheelwright*, L. R. 10 Exch. 183, per Cleasby, B. There has been much conflict of opinion as to the principle on which *YOUNG v. GROTE*, *supra*, and like cases rest, if, indeed, they are to be supported. The principle of avoiding circuity of action has been suggested, but the negligence of the person issuing the instrument is not of such nature as to give rise to a cross action in favor of the party misled. See 1 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 491, note 1. The doctrine deduced from *Young v. Grote*, *supra*, has recently been severely criticised in *Scholfield v. Earl of Loundesborough*, *supra*, note 125. See, also, *Knoxville Nat. Bank v. Clark*, 1 N. W. 491, 51 Iowa, 264; *Burrows v. Klunk*, 17 Atl. 378, 70 Md. 451; *Exchange Nat. Bank v. Bank of Little Rock*, 7 C. C. A. 111, 58 Fed. 140; *Rand. Com. Paper*, §§ 187, 1770; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. §§ 1405–1409. Cases where spaces are negligently left so that it is thereby made possible to make a fraudulent alteration are to be distinguished from those in which the blanks are left for the purpose of being filled in. *McGRATH v. CLARK*, 56 N. Y. 34. See post, p. 258.

<sup>127</sup> Cf. Neg. Inst. L. § 42.

<sup>128</sup> Pen. Code N. Y. § 520.

intent to defraud,<sup>129</sup> the forging of the instrument, and its utterance or delivery by the forger.<sup>130</sup> In some of its aspects it is closely akin to alteration, but is distinguished from it in that its essential element is fraudulent intent, while material alterations may be innocently made. If innocently made, though the alteration be material, recovery can be had upon the original consideration, but, if fraudulently made, and the alteration be material, no recovery can be had upon the instrument or upon the consideration.<sup>131</sup> This rule, though harsh, is deemed wise, all things considered, because forgery ought to shut the doors of courts to the forger. It is deemed the wisest policy to punish his fraud by causing him to lose all remedy for the enforcement of his rights.

Forgery creates no legal right or obligation against the party whose name is forged, even though the instrument be sought to be enforced by a purchaser for value without notice.<sup>132</sup> The forgery is in no wise the legal act of this party. It is the act of some one else personating him without authority. In case of an indorser there is the further reason that legal title to an instrument negotiable by indorsement can be transferred only by the indorsement of the legal holder.<sup>133</sup> So, that, except in case of ratification or estoppel,<sup>134</sup> in no event is a maker, acceptor, drawer, or indorser lia-

<sup>129</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1349; Edw. Bills & N. § 268; *People v. D'Argencour*, 32 Hun, 178, affirmed 95 N. Y. 624; *Phelps v. People*, 72 N. Y. 371.

<sup>130</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1350.

<sup>131</sup> *Booth v. Powers*, 56 N. Y. 22; *Meyer v. Huncke*, 55 N. Y. 412; *Kennedy v. Crandell*, 3 Lans. 1; *Trow v. Glen Cove Starch Co.*, 1 Daly, 280; *Blade v. Noland*, 12 Wend. 173; *Clute v. Small*, 17 Wend. 238; *ATKINSON v. HAWDON*, 2 Adol. & El. 628 (In this case it was held that if the drawer sues the acceptor upon the bill, and fails in consequence of having altered the bill in a material part, he may still recover upon the counts on the original consideration); *Hunt v. Gray*, 35 N. J. Law, 227; *Vogle v. Ripper*, 34 Ill. 100; *Matteson v. Ellsworth*, 33 Wis. 488. See, contra, *Martendale v. Follett*, 1 N. H. 99; *BIGELOW v. STILPHEN*, 35 Vt. 525. Ante, p. 246.

<sup>132</sup> In the case of *SMITH v. SHEPPARD*, Chit. Bills (10th Ed.) note, it was said by Lord Mansfield that "he that takes a forged bill must abide by the consequence, for the man whose name is forged knows nothing of it."

<sup>133</sup> *SMITH v. CHESTER*, 1 Term R. 654; *GRAVES v. BANK*, 17 N. Y. 205; *COLSON v. ARNOT*, 57 N. Y. 253; *Palm v. Watt*, 7 Hun, 317; *MEAD v. YOUNG*, 4 Term R. 28; *LANCASTER v. BALTZELL*, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 468.

<sup>134</sup> As to estoppel of acceptor, see ante, p. 146.



ble upon an instrument forged as to him. Ratification and estoppel, however, take the case from the operation of the rule. Ratification means the adoption by a party of a forged signature as his own. Estoppel means the refusal to allow a party to deny a forged signature purporting to be his because by his words or conduct he has induced some other party to the instrument to act to his detriment upon the belief that the forged signature is a valid one. Ratification binds the party because, according to the general principles of contract as adopted in this country, a ratification made with full knowledge binds a principal although no antecedent authority was given.<sup>135</sup> For there is no sufficient reason why, upon the fact of forgery alone, a person whose name has been forged may not adopt and affirm the forgery or signature as his own act and thereby subject himself to whatever civil liability may follow it.<sup>136</sup> Estoppel binds the party because his treating the instrument as genuine fixes the right, and he may not overset the right by afterwards disputing it. Thus if the maker of a note or the drawer of a bill issues it to a bona fide holder with forged or fictitious names upon it,<sup>137</sup> or if an indorser transfer an instrument upon which the name of the drawer, maker, acceptor, or of a prior indorser is forged, then each of these parties is bound because of estoppel by virtue of the reasons already discussed under the head of "Warranties."<sup>138</sup>

It often happens, however, that the forgery of the instrument is

<sup>135</sup> Howard v. Duncan, 3 Lans. 174; Union Bank v. Middlebrook, 33 Conn. 95; Thorn v. Bell, Lalor, Supp. 430; WELLINGTON v. JACKSON, 121 Mass. 157. See, contra, Shisler v. Vandike, 92 Pa. St. 449; Brook v. Hook, L. R. 6 Exch. 89; McKenzie v. British Linen Co., 44 Law T. (N. S.) 431; Workman v. Wright, 33 Ohio St. 495; Henry Christian Building & Loan Ass'n v. Walton, 87 Atl. 261, 181 Pa. St. 201.

<sup>136</sup> The student must carry in mind that this doctrine is by no means settled. There is authority against it, which Mr. Daniel has characterized as based upon views of force. Neg. Inst. §§ 1351, 1352, et seq.

<sup>137</sup> HORTSMAN v. HENSHAW, 11 How. 177 (in this case the bill had upon it the forged indorsements of the payee, and it was put in circulation by the drawers. "By doing so, they must be understood as affirming that the indorsement is in the handwriting of the payees, or written by their authority. \* \* \* The drawers must be equally liable to the acceptor who paid the bill." Taney, C. J.); Burgess v. Northern Bank, 4 Bush, 600; COGGILL v. BANK, 1 N. Y. 113; Meacher v. Fort, 8 Hill (S. C.) 227.

<sup>138</sup> See *supra*, p. 162.

not detected until the cash called for in it is paid to the ostensible holder. In such case diverse rights arise. The party paying may recover the amount paid from the person paid on the ground of payment under a mistake of fact.<sup>139</sup> And this is so despite any laches or negligence which may be charged by the person paid to the person paying.<sup>140</sup> There are two exceptions to this rule. One is when this payment is made through negligence which results in loss.<sup>141</sup> The other is when a drawee pays a bill upon the forged signature of the drawer to a bona fide holder for value, in which case he is held to a knowledge of his correspondent's signature,<sup>142</sup> and therefore unable to recover from the bona fide holder. If the payment of paper negotiable only by indorsement is made by the drawee of a draft in good faith under a forged indorsement, it is, as to the true owner of the draft, no payment at all, because the forged indorsement does not pass title to commercial paper, and the true owner may therefore recover the amount of the draft from the drawee,<sup>143</sup> as though the drawee had not already made payment of it.<sup>144</sup> This rule is extended to persons claiming under the forged indorsement who have no title as against the true owners, and to whom for the same reason payment cannot be lawfully made.\* Such persons must rely for their protection upon the warranties implied in the indorsements of prior parties, already explained. Thus the general rules summarized are:

(1) That the payor can recover of the payee claiming through a forgery.

<sup>139</sup> *FRANK v. LANIER*, 91 N. Y. 112; *Kingston Bank v. Eltinge*, 40 N. Y. 391; *Helser v. Hatch*, 86 N. Y. 614; *MARINE NAT. BANK v. NATIONAL CITY BANK*, 59 N. Y. 67.

<sup>140</sup> *FRANK v. LANIER*, 91 N. Y. 112; *Lawrence v. American Nat. Bank*, 54 N. Y. 432; *Young v. Lehman*, 63 Ala. 523; *Fraker v. Little*, 24 Kan. 598; *U. S. v. National Park Bank*, 6 Fed. 852.

<sup>141</sup> *Welch v. Goodwin*, 123 Mass. 77.

<sup>142</sup> *Goddard v. Merchants' Bank*, 4 N. Y. 147; *WHITE v. BANK*, 64 N. Y. 316.

<sup>143</sup> *Citizens' Nat. Bank of Davenport v. Importers' & Traders' Bank*, 119 N. Y. 195, 23 N. E. 540; *GRAVES v. BANK*, 17 N. Y. 205.

<sup>144</sup> *Bank of British North America v. Merchants' Nat. Bank*, 91 N. Y. 106.

\* *CANAL BANK v. BANK OF ALBANY*, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 287; *Talbot v. Bank of Rochester*, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 295; *DICK v. LEVERICH*, 11 La. 573.

(2) The forgery does not destroy the title of the true owner to the instrument, nor the right to collect it; and

(3) The sole recourse of parties claiming under the forgery is upon the warranties of parties prior to them and subsequent to the forgery.

*Same—Blanks—When may be Filled.*

We have already seen that, although a bill be imperfect for lack of the name of a drawer, if it be accepted and delivered in that form, it operates as authority to the legal holder to insert the name of a drawer, and thus perfect the instrument.<sup>145</sup> This principle is generally applicable where negotiable instruments are issued, but spaces have been left for the insertion of material particulars;<sup>146</sup> for example, the date,<sup>147</sup> the name of the payee,<sup>148</sup> or the amount,<sup>149</sup> or even where all material terms remain to be filled

<sup>145</sup> Ante, p. 57.

<sup>146</sup> The rules here stated are substantially enacted by Neg. Inst. L. §§ 33, 34. It seems, however, that the English rule that an unfilled blank charges the purchaser with notice, rather than the rule that he may rely upon the apparent authority of the person to whom the instrument is intrusted to fill it in, is adopted. Section 33 provides: "But if any such instrument, after completion, is negotiated to a holder in due course, it is valid and effectual for all purposes in his hands, and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time." Compare section 91, which defines a holder in due course as one "who has taken the instrument under the following conditions: (1) That it is complete and regular upon its face," etc.

<sup>147</sup> MITCHELL v. CULVER, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 336; PAGE v. MORRELL, 3 Abb. Dec. (N. Y.) 433; Michigan Bank v. Eldred, 9 Wall. 544; Shultz v. Payne, 7 La. Ann. 222; First State Sav. Bank v. Webster (Mich.) 79 N. W. 1068.

<sup>148</sup> CRUCHLEY v. CLARANCE, 2 Maule & S. 90 (bill payable "to the order of ———." "The issuing of the bill in blank without the name of the payee was authority to a bona fide holder to insert the name"). CRUCHLY v. MANN, 5 Taunt. 529; RICH v. STARBUCK, 51 Ind. 87; Dinsmore v. Duncan, 57 N. Y. 573; Dunham v. Clogg, 30 Md. 284; IVES v. BANK, 2 Allen (Mass.) 236.

<sup>149</sup> RUSSEL v. LANGSTAFFE, 2 Doug. 514; Griggs v. Howe, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 100; FULLERTON v. STURGES, 4 Ohio St. 529; FRANK v. LILLIENFELD, 33 Grat. (Va.) 377; Greenfield Sav. Bank v. Stowell, 123 Mass. 196; MARKET & FULTON NAT. BANK v. SARGENT, 27 Atl. 192, 85 Me. 349; Weidman v. Symes (Mich.) 79 N. W. 894 (interest clause).

in.<sup>150</sup> Thus in *RUSSEL v. LANGSTAFFE*,<sup>151</sup> already referred to, where the defendant indorsed for G copper-plate checks made in the form of promissory notes, but in blank, without any sum, date, or time of payment, and G filled up the blanks as he chose, and the plaintiff discounted the notes, it was held that the defendant was liable as indorser; Lord Mansfield saying, "The indorsement on a blank note is a letter of credit for an indefinite sum." It may be, however, that the authority of the person to whom the instrument is intrusted is limited to filling the blanks in a particular way, and in such case, if he exceeds his express authority, of course neither he nor any holder with knowledge that the authority has been exceeded can recover. But any one purchasing the instrument as filled in, in reliance upon its terms, would be protected.<sup>152</sup> Moreover, a bona fide purchaser is protected, and may enforce the instrument as filled in, even if he had knowledge that the instrument had been delivered in its imperfect state, for he may rely upon the apparent authority of the person to whom it was delivered to fill in the blanks as he sees fit;<sup>153</sup> and as against such a holder the fact that the actual authority was exceeded is no defense. Such is the general rule, at least in the United States, although in England it is held that an unfilled blank charges the purchaser with notice, and that he must at his peril ascertain the extent of the authority conferred.<sup>154</sup> The instrument, when completed, takes effect as of the time of delivery by the maker.<sup>155</sup>

It is essential to its validity that it be delivered as a negotiable instrument, that is, that it be signed and delivered with authority to

<sup>150</sup> *RUSSEL v. LANGSTAFFE*, 2 Doug. 514; *VIOLETT v. PATTON*, 5 Cranch, 142; *Patton v. Shanklin*, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 13.

<sup>151</sup> 2 Doug. 514. Ante, p. 112.

<sup>152</sup> *MONTAGUE v. PERKINS*, 22 Law J. C. P. 187; *Barker v. Sterne*, 9 Exch. 684; *BANK OF PITTSBURGH v. NEAL*, 22 How. 107; *First Nat. Bank v. Manufacturing Co.*, 63 N. W. 731, 61 Minn. 274.

<sup>153</sup> *Huntington v. Bank*, 3 Ala. 186; *MITCHELL v. CULVER*, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 336; *Daniel, Neg. Inst.* § 148.

<sup>154</sup> *AWDE v. DIXON*, 6 Exch. 869; *HATCH v. SEARLES*, 2 Smale & G. 147; 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 868.

<sup>155</sup> *BARKER v. STERNE*, 9 Exch. 684 (a bill delivered in Bavaria with blanks afterwards filled in England is a foreign bill); *Snaith v. Mingay*, 1 Maule & S. 87. Blanks must be filled within a reasonable time. *Temple v. Pullen*, 8 Exch. 389; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 183.

perfect it as such, for otherwise it can never take effect as such, even in the hands of an innocent purchaser.<sup>156</sup> Thus, if a man deliver a blank sheet of paper, with his signature thereon, to another, with authority to write over it a note, and the person to whom it is delivered does so, the signer is liable to an innocent purchaser of the note, although its amount exceed the sum authorized. On the other hand, if a man gives to another a blank sheet, with his signature thereon, but without authority to write over it a negotiable instrument,—for example, for the purpose of furnishing means of identifying the signer's signature,—and the other writes a note over the signature, and negotiates it, the signer is not liable, even to a bona fide purchaser for value.<sup>157</sup> As has been pointed out, an instrument with blanks purposely left to be filled is to be distinguished from one in which spaces have been carelessly left, so that it is thereby made possible to raise the amount, or make other fraudulent additions.<sup>158</sup> In the latter case, if advantage is taken of the maker's negligence, the addition is an alteration or forgery, and operates as a real defense, unless the person who issued the instrument is estopped by his negligence,—a question upon which the authorities disagree.<sup>159</sup>

**108. Common personal defenses are:**

- (a) Fraud.
- (b) Duress.
- (c) Want or failure of consideration.
- (d) Illegality, unless the contract is declared void by statute.
- (e) Payment, or renunciation or release, before maturity.
- (f) Discharge of party secondarily liable by release of prior party.

<sup>156</sup> *BAXENDALE v. BENNETT*, 3 Q. B. Div. 525 (where blank acceptance was stolen); *Ledwich v. McKim*, 53 N. Y. 307. Cf. *Neg. Inst. L.* § 34.

<sup>157</sup> *CAULKINS v. WHISLER*, 29 Iowa, 495; *NANCE v. LARY*, 5 Ala. 370.

<sup>158</sup> Ante, p. 254, note 126.

<sup>159</sup> Ante, p. 253.

The student has already seen the reason of the classification of defenses into real and personal. Real defenses avail against a bona fide holder; personal defenses do not. Real defenses avail because the right sought to be enforced never existed or has ceased to exist, and therefore the bona fide holder can acquire none.<sup>160</sup> Personal defenses do not avail because they do not invalidate the instrument, and a bona fide purchaser, having acquired the legal title to it, without notice, may enforce it irrespective of the existence of circumstances which would have made enforcement by prior holders inequitable. For example, bills or notes whose execution or indorsement was procured by fraud are not enforceable between the original parties, because, but for the fraud, the defrauded party would not have executed or indorsed the instrument. If they are defective in point of consideration there is nothing to sustain the contract, and it must fall to the ground. If the consideration of the instrument or that of its indorsement is illegal, then to allow the enforcement of the contract in violation of law would be a legal absurdity, and so in these and many other cases relief, as between immediate parties, is allowed by courts to the person wronged. But throughout them the student will notice that there is running one common characteristic. They all are based upon some personal act or omission of a nature such that to enforce the instrument as between parties would be to enable the prosecuting party to profit by his own fraud, or take advantage of his own wrong, or found a claim upon his own iniquity. Courts will not lend their active aid to one guilty of such unconscientious conduct, or to one who is in equal wrong with the defendant touching the transaction as to which relief is sought. By allowing the defense this will leave the parties where they find them, without interfering in behalf of either. The maxim is that "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands," and the courts, as between immediate parties, will not enforce the contract in favor of one who is not justly and legally entitled to its enforcement. But this principle does not apply to the bona fide holder who is not a party to the transaction. He has committed no wrong. He knows of no wrong. He has paid value for the instrument, and pur-

<sup>160</sup> The above statement is subject to qualification, for in certain cases the defendant is estopped as against a bona fide purchaser from denying the execution of the instrument, although he in fact never executed it. Post, p. 268.

chased what he supposed was a good legal title to enforce all the rights it contained or evidenced. Therefore, so far as the act of any third party is concerned, both he and the party complaining of the wrong are equally innocent. But the bona fide holder has the superior equity, in that he has the legal title to the instrument, and for the further reason that of two innocent parties—the party wronged and the bona fide holder—he whose act or omission has caused the loss must bear it. Therefore, as between these two innocent parties, a defense caused by the act, omission, conduct, or agreement of the wronged person with reference to the instrument is not allowed to the wronged person against the bona fide holder. And thus, in dealing with defenses to actions upon bills and notes in the hands of bona fide holders, the first question for the student to ask himself is whether the defense is real and valid, or personal and not available.

**109. FRAUD.**—Where a person is induced by fraud to execute a bill or note, he is liable thereon as against a bona fide purchaser for value.

**110.** Where a person is induced by fraud to sign a bill or note under the belief that he is signing a different instrument, his signature is null and void, and he is not liable thereon, even as against a bona fide purchaser for value, provided that in so signing he acted without negligence.<sup>161</sup>

It is very difficult to furnish the student with any clear and certain tests to determine in all cases the meaning of the defense of fraud in the inception, making, or transfer of a negotiable instrument. The principal reason why fraud is ordinarily a personal defense is that it renders the contract voidable at the option of the defrauded party, because, but for the fraud, he would not have entered into it. But the acts, omissions, concealments, or conduct which go to make up the legal conception of fraud are in their nature so multiform that to cover their many phases by a set of concise definitions is well-nigh impossible. Mr. Pomeroy says of

<sup>161</sup> Chalm. Bills & N. art. 52. Cf. article 94.



fraud generally that it includes "all willful or intentional acts, omissions, or concealments which involve a breach of either legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, and are injurious to another, by which an undue or unconscientious advantage over another is obtained."<sup>162</sup> Sir William Anson declares the test in determining fraud to be whether under the circumstances an action for deceit against the party committing the fraud will lie, and speaks of a fraud "as a false representation of fact, made with a knowledge of its falsehood, or in reckless disregard whether it be true or false, with the intention that it should be acted upon by the complaining party, and actually inducing him to act upon it."<sup>163</sup> And the text writers upon Contracts generally,<sup>164</sup> treating it as a matter of misrepresentation, which it usually is, analyze fraud along the lines of Sir William Anson's definition, and, resolving it into the constituent elements, say that there must be (1) false representation of a past or existing material fact, (2) such that the other party has a right to rely upon it, (3) made with either knowledge of its falsity, or with reckless disregard whether it be true or false, (4) intended to be brought to the knowledge of the other party, (5) and that it must deceive the other party, and (6) result in injury to him.<sup>165</sup> Suffice it to say, with regard to these general statements, that they often furnish the test in determining fraud in the case of the giving of negotiable instruments as well as of their indorsements. Their meaning and practical application, however, are so fully discussed in elementary works on Contracts that it is unwise to give further space to the question here.<sup>166</sup>

<sup>162</sup> Pom. Eq. Jur. § 873.

<sup>163</sup> Anson, Cont. pp. 153, 154.

<sup>164</sup> Chit. Cont. p. 750 et seq.; Pol. Cont. p. 512 et seq.; 2 Pars. Cont. 769 et seq.; Lawson, Cont. § 226 et seq.; Clark, Cont. p. 324 et seq.

<sup>165</sup> Clark, Cont. p. 324.

<sup>166</sup> Civ. Code N. Y. 1879, §§ 757, 758. The proposed New York Civil Code classified and defined fraud thus: "Actual fraud consists in any of the following acts committed by a party to the contract, or with his connivance, with intent to deceive another party thereto, or to induce him to enter into the contract. Its elements are (1) the suggestion as a fact of that which is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) the positive assertion in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it of that which is not true, though he believes it to be true; (3) the suppression of

With negotiable instruments the question that principally concerns us is the position of the bona fide holder. Fraud is always a defense against immediate parties or subsequent holders with notice of the fraud, but it is not, in general, a defense against purchasers for value without notice.<sup>167</sup> This is because a contract once entered into, although induced by fraud, is voidable, and not void. The defrauded party has the right to disaffirm, but his right to disaffirm is conditional upon his restitution of the other party to the condition in which he would have been if the contract had not been made; and, if the contract be one of sale, the right of rescission is not available against one who has, for value, acquired an interest in the thing sold without notice. This rule is an application of the principle that, when one of two innocent parties must suffer for the fraud of another, the loss shall fall upon the one who enabled the third party to commit the fraud. Hence a bill or note once executed is none the less valid because obtained by fraud. The defrauding party to whom it is delivered acquires a title to the instrument, which, although defeasible while in his hands, is legal, and which he may transfer, and which, when transferred to a bona fide purchaser, becomes thereby indefeasible. It may, therefore, be laid down broadly that, when a man executes a negotiable instrument understandingly, it is never a defense, as against a bona fide purchaser, that the maker's consent to the execution was obtained by fraudulent representation, or was otherwise induced by fraud.<sup>168</sup>

that which is true by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (4) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (5) any other act fitted to deceive. Constructive fraud consists (1) in any breach of duty which, without an actually fraudulent intent, gives an advantage to the person in fault, or any one claiming under him, by misleading another to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of any one claiming under him; (2) in any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent, without respect to actual fraud."

<sup>167</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 94.

<sup>168</sup> *Vosburgh v. Diefendorf*, 119 N. Y. 357, 23 N. E. 801; *Justh v. National Bank of the Commonwealth*, 56 N. Y. 478; *First Nat. Bank of Cortland v. Green*, 43 N. Y. 298; *Farmers' & C. Bank v. Noxon*, 45 N. Y. 762; *Ocean Nat. Bank v. Carll*, 55 N. Y. 440; *GROCERS' BANK v. PENFIELD*, 69 N. Y. 502; *Nickerson v. Ruger*, 76 N. Y. 279; *Stewart v. Lansing*, 104 U. S. 505; *SMITH v. LIVINGSTON*, 111 Mass. 342; *Sullivan v. Langley*, 120 Mass. 437; *HAYES v. CAULFIELD*, 5 Q. B. 81; *Southwick v. First Nat. Bank of Memphis*, 84 N. Y. 420; *GRIDLEY v. BANE*, 57 Ill. 529; *Ormsbee v. Howe*, 54 Vt. 182;

A different question is presented, however, when the fraud or misrepresentation relates to the character of the instrument, and the maker is thereby induced to sign and deliver it in the belief that it is an instrument of a different character. In such case the minds of the parties never meet, for the defrauded party thinks he is signing one instrument, and the defrauding party is aware that the signer is signing a different instrument. The case is, in effect, one of mistake, induced by fraud.<sup>169</sup> Under these circumstances the signer is not a party to the instrument actually delivered, and cannot be held liable upon it, even by a bona fide purchaser, unless he is estopped from maintaining the defense of fraud by reason of his negligence.<sup>170</sup> This defense is frequently successfully interposed by persons who, from infirmity, blindness, or illiteracy, are unable to read what they sign, and who are thereby imposed upon.<sup>171</sup> It is evident, however, that cases in which the qualification of this rule does not apply, namely, in which the party imposed upon has not been guilty of negligence, are rare; and the majority of the cases properly lay down the rule that the failure of the maker or acceptor to use all means to ascertain the nature and character of the instrument he signs is negligence which makes him liable to the bona fide holder.<sup>172</sup>

*Clark v. Tanner*, 38 S. W. 11, 100 Ky. 275; *David v. Bank* (Ky.) 45 S. W. 878; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 1891.

<sup>169</sup> A mere mistake as to one of the terms of the instrument—as inserting a wrong date—is not a defense against a bona fide purchaser. *HUSTON v. YOUNG*, 33 Me. 85.

<sup>170</sup> *FOSTER v. MACKINNON*, L. R. 4 C. P. 704 (leading case); *PUTNAM v. SULLIVAN*, 4 Mass. 45; *National Exch. Bank v. Veneman*, 43 Hun, 241. Misrepresentation as to nature and effect, where maker knew he was signing a note, held no defense against bona fide holder under statute substantially enacting doctrine of *FOSTER v. MACKINNON*. *Yellow Medicine Co. Bank v. Tagley*, 59 N. W. 486, 57 Minn. 391.

<sup>171</sup> *Walker v. Ebert*, 29 Wis. 194 (defendant unable to read or write English); *Whitney v. Snyder*, 2 Lans. (N. Y.) 477; *Fenton v. Robinson*, 4 Hun (N. Y.) 252; *Puffer v. Smith*, 57 Ill. 527; *GREEN v. WILKIE*, 66 N. W. 1046, 98 Iowa, 74; *Lindley v. Hofman*, 53 N. E. 471, 22 Ind. App. 237.

<sup>172</sup> *CHAPMAN v. ROSE*, 56 N. Y. 137; *National Exch. Bank v. Veneman*, 43 Hun, 241; *DOUGLASS v. MATTING*, 29 Iowa, 498; *Snirts v. Overjohn*, 60 Mo. 315; *Ort v. Fowler*, 31 Kan. 478, 2 Pac. 580; *Mackey v. Peterson*, 29 Minn. 298, 13 N. W. 132. But see, contra, *Hubbard v. Rankin*, 71 Ill. 129,

In the class of cases last considered the liability of the defendant upon an instrument which he never executed rests upon the principle of estoppel, whereby he is precluded, by reason of his negligence, from denying that the instrument which he in fact signed and delivered was really executed by him. The principle of estoppel is also invoked in favor of bona fide purchasers in cases where the defendant signed the instrument upon which he is sought to be charged, but never delivered it. This principle is generally applied (1) where delivery is wrongfully made by a person to whom the instrument is intrusted by the maker; and (2) in many jurisdictions, where there is in fact no delivery, but the completed instrument is wrongfully taken from the possession of the maker.

governed by statute; *Gibbs v. Linabury*, 22 Mich. 492. It seems that the rule where the maker is induced to sign by fraud under the belief that he is signing an instrument of a different character would be the same under the Negotiable Instruments Law. Section 94 (post, p. 451) provides that "the title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective \* \* \* when he obtained the instrument, or any signature thereto, by fraud," etc.; and section 96 provides that a "holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties," etc.; but these sections should be read in the light of the existing law. Such has been the ruling in England under the somewhat different language of the Bills of Exchange Act, § 29, subd. 2, which reads: "The title of a person who negotiates a bill is defective \* \* \* when he obtained the bill, or the acceptance thereof, by fraud," etc. *LEWIS v. CLAY*, 42 Sol. J. 151. This, however, was not the case of a "holder in due course," but of a payee who took notes for value, and in good faith. Defendant's signature was obtained by an elaborate fraud, practiced by a friend, in the belief that he was signing private family documents of the other as a witness. The jury found that defendant was not negligent, and that he signed in misplaced confidence in the statements of his friend. The court held that he was not estopped from setting up the facts, and that they afforded a defense. Lord Russell said: "There is nothing in the act which prevents the defendant from setting up the defense that he never made the promissory notes in question,—which is the real defense here. \* \* \* It was admitted that the case of *FOSTER v. MACKINNON* [supra] is in point, and is an authority binding on me if the Bills of Exchange Act of 1882 has not altered the law as there declared. I find that the law has not been so altered. \* \* \* They [the authorities cited] are all cases where the bills or notes had been negotiated to persons now called 'holders in due course.' It follows. If such a holder cannot, in a case like the present, recover, a fortiori, that the plaintiff—who, as named payee, is one of the immediate parties—cannot recover."

In case of delivery through fraud or violation of the trust reposed in, or of the instructions given to, an agent or to a third party who holds the instrument, the cases are of two classes. The person holding the bill or note may be either an agent, or merely its custodian. In case of agency, the principal has parted with the paper with the intention of disposing of it, though in its disposition the agent has committed a fraud, breach of trust, or acted in violation of his principal's instructions. In case of paper held by a custodian, there is no intention of the person sought to be charged to part with the paper until some event or contingency has happened, in which case the holder is empowered and becomes an agent to deliver. In both of these classes the balance of equities is, on the one hand, between the undoubted legal proposition that no man can be divested of his own property without his own consent, and that consequently even the honest purchaser of personal property cannot hold against the true proprietor, and, on the other hand, the fact that the party sought to be charged and the bona fide purchaser are equally innocent of wrong, and one of them must suffer a loss. The adjustment of these conflicting equities turns upon the point that the party sought to be charged has by his voluntary act conferred upon the agent or custodian through whom the bona fide purchaser derives his title either the apparent right of property, as owner, or of disposal, as agent, or else has clothed him with such evidence of the right to transfer as to imply authority of disposal. And the principle applies that where one of two innocent parties must suffer by the fraud or wrong of a third person, the one who put it in the power of such third person to commit such fraud or wrong must bear the loss.<sup>178</sup>

In the second class of cases just mentioned,—that is, where the completed instrument is stolen or otherwise wrongfully taken from the possession of the maker, and afterwards indorsed by the payee, or if the paper is payable to bearer negotiated by delivery,—it is forcibly urged, on the one hand, that the instrument never had an

<sup>178</sup> *Redlich v. Doll*, 54 N. Y. 234; *Salton v. Everett*, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 267; *VALLETT v. PARKER*, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 615; *Smith v. Moberly*, 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 269; *Passumpsic Bank v. Goss*, 31 Vt. 315; *Bonner v. Nelson*, 57 Ga. 438; *FEARING v. CLARK*, 16 Gray (Mass.) 74 (note delivered in escrow); *Yellow Medicine Co. Bank v. Tagley*, 59 N. W. 486, 57 Minn. 391.

inception, and hence cannot be the foundation of any liability; and for this reason it has been held by some cases that the want of delivery is a defense even against a bona fide purchaser.<sup>174</sup> On the other hand, it is urged that the bona fide purchaser under such circumstances is entitled to the same protection that he receives when he has purchased paper payable to bearer, which, having been duly issued, was afterwards stolen from the legal holder, and negotiated; and it is accordingly held by other cases that against a bona fide holder it is no defense that the paper was stolen from the maker.<sup>175</sup> It is impossible to support these decisions upon any theory of negligence attributable to the maker, for in many cases there was no negligence, or upon any theory of contract; but they are rather to be supported as an application or extension of the policy of the law which seeks to secure the free and unrestrained circulation of commercial paper. As we have seen,<sup>176</sup> where the instrument has been signed, but not filled out, this exception does not apply; although it is difficult to distinguish this case from the last. Of course, if the maker actually delivers the paper, leaving blanks, another principle applies, for the bona fide purchaser is justified in relying upon the apparent agency of the person to whom the paper is intrusted to fill it out as he sees fit.<sup>177</sup>

### *Duress.*

Duress, as applied to bills and notes, consists in actual or threatened violence or imprisonment. The subject of it must be the con-

<sup>174</sup> HALL v. WILSON, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 548; BURSON v. HUNTINGTON, 21 Mich. 415; PALMER v. POOR, 121 Ind. 135, 22 N. E. 984.

<sup>175</sup> GOULD v. SEGEE, 5 Duer (N. Y.) 260; SHIPLEY v. CARROLL, 45 Ill. 285; Clarke v. Johnson, 54 Ill. 296; KINYON v. WOHLFORD, 17 Minn. 239 (Gil. 215); WORCESTER CO. BANK v. DORCHESTER & M. BANK, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 488 (bank notes stolen); COOKE v. U. S., 91 U. S. 389 (United States treasury notes surreptitiously put into circulation). See Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 837-840.

<sup>176</sup> Ante, p. 260.

<sup>177</sup> Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y. 234; MITCHELL v. CULVER, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 336; PAGE v. MORRELL, \*42 N. Y. 117; GARRARD v. HADDAN, 67 Pa. St. 82; YOUNG v. GROTE, 4 Bing. 253; Kitchen v. Place, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 465; DOUGLASS v. MATTING, 29 Iowa, 498; McDonald v. Muscatine Nat. Bank, 27 Iowa, 319; Harris v. Berger, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 389; Town of Solon v. Williamsburgh Sav. Bank, 114 N. Y. 122, at page 136, 21 N. E. 168; DAVIS SEWING MACH. CO. v. BEST, 105 N. Y. 59, 11 N. E. 146. See ante, p. 258.

tracting party himself, or his wife, parent, or child. It must be inflicted or threatened by the other party, or else by one acting with his knowledge and for his advantage.<sup>178</sup>

The doctrine of some of the authorities is that a bona fide purchaser for value does not acquire a good title to paper which he has bought from one who has procured it by duress. They distinguish duress from fraud in that in case of fraud there is ordinarily a voluntary execution of the instrument, and an uncontrolled volition to pass the title. But in case of duress, where there exists coercion, threats, or compulsion, there is no such volition. There is no intention nor purpose but to yield to moral pressure for relief from it, and therefore it is maintained that a case is thus presented more analogous to a parting with property by robbery, and that no title can be made through a possession thus acquired.<sup>179</sup> This position is certainly logical. But in criticism of the authorities cited it may be said that, so far as they relate to negotiable paper, they do not bear out what is claimed for them by the text writers.<sup>180</sup> *Loomis v. Ruck* and *Barry v. Equitable Life Assurance Society* are illustrations. In *Loomis v. Ruck* the signature of a married woman was given under duress to a note for the sole benefit of her husband, to the plaintiff, who, at the time of the duress, was present. It is true that the statement of the New York court of appeals was that a bona fide holder cannot enforce a note against the maker which was given by him under duress, but this statement is, in fact, obiter dictum, because the plaintiff in the case was not a bona fide holder. Neither does the case of *Barry v. Equitable Life Assurance Society* affect the position, because that relates to the assignment of a life insurance policy, which is a mere chose in action, to which the doctrines of negotiability do not attach. On the other hand, the rule generally laid down in the text-books and supported by a majority of the decisions is that negotiable instruments

<sup>178</sup> Anson, Cont. p. 164.

<sup>179</sup> *Barry v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.*, 59 N. Y. 587; *Loomis v. Ruck*, 56 N. Y. 462; *Huguenin v. Baseley*, 14 Ves. 273, 3 Lead. Cas. Eq. 94, 463; *Eadie v. Slimmon*, 26 N. Y. 9; *Gardner v. Gardner*, 34 N. Y. 155; *Voorhees v. Voorhees*, 39 N. Y. 463; *Tyler v. Gardiner*, 35 N. Y. 559; *Kinne v. Johnson*, 60 Barb. 69; *Ferris v. Brush*, 1 Edw. Ch. 572; *Fry v. Fry*, 7 Paige, 461.

<sup>180</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 857, 858; Tied. Com. Paper, § 287.



executed under duress are voidable, and not void, and hence that the defense is merely personal, and not available against an innocent purchaser.<sup>181</sup> Clearly, if the cases which hold that a bill or note stolen from the maker is good in the hands of an innocent purchaser are correct, an instrument executed under duress should stand upon the same footing. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law,<sup>182</sup> as well as the English Bills of Exchange Act,<sup>183</sup> duress is a personal defense.

**111. CONSIDERATION.**—Any consideration which will support a simple contract is sufficient to support a negotiable bill or note, or the transfer or indorsement thereof.<sup>184</sup>

In case of negotiable instruments consideration is presumed, but this presumption may be rebutted.

Text writers in their definitions of "consideration" unite in quoting that given by the exchequer chamber:<sup>185</sup> "A valuable consideration in the sense of law may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the other."<sup>186</sup> And this declaration of Lush, J., is perhaps the best categorical statement of the subject yet made. But it does not explain the part that consideration plays in the general theory of contract. And therefore we purpose to explain briefly the meaning of consideration and what its necessary elements are, and then show its application to the theory of bills and notes.

<sup>181</sup> *Hogan v. Moore*, 48 Ga. 156; *Ormes v. Beadel*, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 333. In *DUNCAN v. SCOTT*, 1 Camp. 100, it was held that, where the defendant was not a free agent when he drew the bill, it was the duty of the plaintiff to produce evidence of consideration. In the case of *CLARK v. PEASE*, 41 N. H. 414, it was held that, where duress is shown in the making or in the circulation of the note, there is imposed upon the plaintiff the burden of showing that he is a bona fide holder for value.

<sup>182</sup> Section 94.

<sup>183</sup> Section 29, subd. 2.

<sup>184</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 51.

<sup>185</sup> *Currie v. Misa*, L. R. 10 Exch. 153.

<sup>186</sup> Com. Dig. "Action on the Case," bk. 1, p. 15.

Consideration is the accepted evidence of the fact that the parties to a contract intend to enter into a binding legal obligation. In examining all contracts the courts first ask themselves whether there was a mutually communicated intention common between the parties to act or forbear towards one another, and if they find there was, then they ask whether the agreement made between the parties was such that it must be enforced. And the other terms, elements, and conditions of the agreement being according to law, the test whether it is a binding legal obligation and one to be enforced turns upon the question whether or not there was present a legal consideration. The consideration, in law, therefore, is the reason for making the contract. If it is present the courts assume that the parties intended to enter into a legal obligation; if absent, then, although there may have been a promise or meeting of the minds, yet there is no legal reason why this promise should not be retracted or this consensus revoked, because neither party has lost or gained anything of substantial value. The agreement is too frivolous for courts to consider, and is said to be "*nudum pactum ex quo non oritur actio*."

The first element of a consideration is that it must have value. According to Sir William Anson,<sup>187</sup> the matter of a legal obligation must possess or must be reducible to a pecuniary value. This merely means that there must be some ascertainable *quid pro quo*. Mr. Langdell, in his summary of the law of contracts, shows the evolution of the theory of consideration from the exact *quid pro quo* necessary to create a debt to the varieties of consideration stated in the definition of Lush, J., which are sufficient to support an *assumpsit*. There it appears that the doctrine of consideration originated in the action of debt, which originally was an action to recover an exact sum of money loaned belonging to the creditor, but in fact in the possession of the debtor. The right was in the creditor to recover of the debtor the possession of his money which the debtor thus held. From these rudimentary notions the idea of consideration as a basis of the action of debt was developed through various stages until it reached the point that the consideration of contracts of debt required (1) that the consideration given or done should be given or done to the obligor directly, (2) and for

<sup>187</sup> Anson, *Cont.* pp. 6, 7; *Poll. Cont.* p. 3.

him directly; (3) that it should be received by the obligor as the full equivalent for the obligation assumed, and (4) be actually executed. But at all times the contract which was the basis of debt required that there be an exact quid pro quo between its parties. And in case of debt, unless all these elements of consideration were present, the creditor or obligee could not have his remedy in an action of debt, because all of these considerations were of the essence of debt. By the statute of Edw. I.,<sup>188</sup> the action of assumpsit was created to reach that large class of cases which were not debts, but yet were analogous to them. These were seen to be a class of rights which were evidently rights based upon some sort of an agreement, which, however, was not in its turn based upon a consideration complying with all the requisites we have stated. The contract had not a consideration sufficient for it to support an action of debt. By the later rules the agreements for which assumpsit lay need not have an exact quid pro quo, but there was, nevertheless, required some exchange of values in it for the agreement to be binding in law, or so that it could be enforced by courts in assumpsit. Hence the doctrine of consideration sufficient to support an assumpsit was developed into its present stage, its necessary elements being those stated in the definition of Lush, J., already given. And thus we find that the courts have held a sufficient consideration to be a cross acceptance,<sup>189</sup> or the forbearance of the debt of a third person,<sup>190</sup> or the compromise of a disputed liability,<sup>191</sup> or a promise to give up a bill thought to be invalid,<sup>192</sup> or a debt barred by the statute of limitations,<sup>193</sup> or a debt discharged in bankruptcy.<sup>194</sup>

<sup>188</sup> 13 Edw. I. c. 24.

<sup>189</sup> *Rose v. Sims*, 1 Barn. & Adol. 526.

<sup>190</sup> *Balfour v. Sea Fire Life Assur. Co.*, 3 C. B. (N. S.) 300; *Meltzer v. Doll*, 91 N. Y. 365.

<sup>191</sup> *Cook v. Wright*, 30 Law J. Q. B. 321.

<sup>192</sup> *SMITH v. SMITH*, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 418.

<sup>193</sup> *LA TOUCHE v. LA TOUCHE*, 3 Hurl. & C. 576 (It was held in this case that a promissory note given by a married woman as a security for advances made to her husband, and which in equity binds her separate estate, is a good consideration for another promissory note given by her after her husband's death for a balance then due, although the former note is barred by the statute of limitations); *Wilton v. Eaton*, 127 Mass. 174.

<sup>194</sup> *Trueman v. Fenton*, Cowp. 544.

The courts, on the other hand, have held insufficient considerations to be a mere moral obligation,<sup>195</sup> or a debt represented to be due, though not really due,<sup>196</sup> or the giving up a void note,<sup>197</sup> or a voluntary gift of money.<sup>198</sup> And the distinction between these cases rests upon whether the different considerations are or are not of any actual value.<sup>199</sup>

If there is actual value it will suffice, irrespective of the fact of its adequacy. The courts do not sit to make bargains for the parties. Their only inquiry is whether one has been made. And whether, therefore, the party making the bargain has gained or lost by it is immaterial, so far as its legality as an obligation is concerned.<sup>200</sup> And the rule is well settled that the consideration need not be adequate, though it must be of value. But there is the distinction<sup>201</sup> made between a valuable consideration other than money and a money consideration. With a valuable consideration other than money, the slightest consideration will support a promise to pay the largest amount to the full extent of the promise, while with a money consideration the consideration will support a promise to pay money only to the extent of the money forming the consideration. The law is deemed to leave the measure of the value of a valuable consideration other than money for a promise to pay money to the parties to the contract; but money, being the standard of

<sup>195</sup> *Eastwood v. Kenyon*, 11 Adol. & El. 438.

<sup>196</sup> *Southall v. Rigg*, 11 C. B. 481.

<sup>197</sup> *Coward v. Hughes*, 1 Kay & J. 443.

<sup>198</sup> *Hill v. Wilson*, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 894.

<sup>199</sup> Prof. Ames maintains that a bill or note, even between the original parties, is valid without consideration, and that the contrary notion "is erroneous upon principle, and also upon the authorities; for, although it must be conceded that the courts have sanctioned the defense of absence of consideration in certain cases [where a bill or note is executed as a gift,—post, p. 278, note 211], these decisions should be regarded as anomalous exceptions to the rule that a bill, being in the nature of a specialty, is obligatory without consideration, rather than as illustrations of the opposite doctrine that a bill, being a simple contract, requires consideration to support it." His classification of the authorities in support of this position should be consulted. 2 Ames, *Cas. Bills & N.* 876.

<sup>200</sup> *Pilkington v. Scott*, 15 Mees. & W. 660; *Bainbridge v. Firmstone*, 8 Adol. & El. 743; *Darrow v. Walker*, 48 N. Y. Super. Ct. 6.

<sup>201</sup> *SAWYER v. McLOUTH*, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 350; *Johns. Cas. Bills & N.* 175.  
NEG.BILLS.—18

value, is not subject to be changed by contract, and will support a promise to pay money only to the amount of the consideration.

Consideration is also classified as to the time at which it is given, as executory, executed, and past. An executory consideration is something to be given or done in the future; an executed consideration is some act or forbearance done at the time of making the contract;<sup>202</sup> and a past consideration is one fully performed before the agreement or transaction which is the basis of the contract relation sought to be created has come into existence. The two former satisfy the test of a consideration that it be sufficient to create a legal obligation. Each of them is a sufficient legal reason for supporting a contract relation. But the third does not satisfy that test. Whatever the transaction constituting the past consideration may have been, it is no part of the transaction upon which the contract is based. There may have been some moral obligation created by it. It may have been the motive for making the new contract. But neither of these cases has the pecuniary value which is required for a consideration, and neither can be treated as a consideration sufficient to support a new contract,<sup>203</sup> although it may be their outgrowth. A past consideration is therefore to be rejected from considerations sufficient to support contracts,—a fact to be kept in mind in the examination of the question commonly known as the theory of the antecedent indebtedness, hereinafter discussed.<sup>204</sup>

### *Presumption of Consideration.*

Before taking up the phases of want, failure, or illegality of consideration, so common in cases of bills and notes, it remains to speak briefly of the meaning of that common phrase that with negotiable instruments, in the first instance, consideration is presumed.<sup>205</sup> This relates to controversies between immediate parties,

<sup>202</sup> Leake, Cont. 181.

<sup>203</sup> Lawson, Cont. § 100; Anson, Cont. pp. 77-81; Clark, Cont. §§ 84-90.

<sup>204</sup> See page 310, post.

<sup>205</sup> Whether this presumption applies to non-negotiable promissory notes is a question upon which the cases differ, and is affected by statute. Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 162, 163. It was held not to prevail in *BRISTOL v. WARNER*, 19 Conn. 7. *CARNWRIGHT v. GRAY*, 127 N. Y. 92, 27 N. E. 835 (under 1 Rev. St. 768, repealed by Neg. Inst. L. § 320), contra. Neg. Inst. L. § 50, provides that "every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been

and means that the instrument itself is prima facie evidence of consideration sufficient to sustain the plaintiff's case.<sup>206</sup> But where the issue between immediate parties specifically pleaded is want of consideration, and the defendant introduces evidence in rebuttal of the presumption, the burden of evidence is on the plaintiff, and it remains for him to satisfy the jury that there was a consideration by preponderance of evidence.<sup>207</sup> The fact that a consideration has been given is stated in the instrument, and that the instrument is in writing does not exclude oral evidence concerning the consideration. And if the instrument was without consideration in fact, although it is stated on its face to have been given for a consideration, this may be shown by extrinsic testimony<sup>208</sup> when the issue is as to the consideration. It seems to have been the early doctrine that, in order to enable the defendant to put the plaintiff on proof of consideration, he must give the plaintiff notice. But it is the rule of practice at present that a notice to prove consideration is unnecessary, and it is not now given. An allegation in the answer that the note is without consideration is sufficient. At present the plaintiff makes out his prima facie case; the defendant then gives evidence in dispute of the consideration,—whereupon the plaintiff calls his witnesses in rebuttal of this, to prove it.<sup>209</sup>

issued for a valuable consideration," etc. Section 320 defines "a negotiable promissory note" as "an unconditional promise \* \* \* to pay \* \* \* a sum certain in money to order or bearer." In the English Bills of Exchange Act, on the other hand, in the definition of a "promissory note" (section 83), the words are, "to, or to the order of, a specified person or to bearer." It is not essential that the instrument should recite that it is for value received. *Emery v. Bartlett*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1556; *Franklin v. March*, 6 N. H. 364; *MEHLBERG v. TISHER*, 24 Wis. 607. See Neg. Inst. L. § 25. Ante, p. 73.

<sup>206</sup> *CARNWRIGHT v. GRAY*, 127 N. Y. 92, 27 N. E. 835. A general denial is insufficient to raise the issue of consideration. *Sprague v. Sprague*, 80 Hun, 285, 30 N. Y. Supp. 162.

<sup>207</sup> *Bruyn v. Russell*, 60 Hun, 280, 14 N. Y. Supp. 591; *Perley v. Perley*, 144 Mass. 104, 10 N. E. 726; *Simpson v. Davis*, 119 Mass. 269; *Delano v. Bartlett*, 6 Cush. 364; *Anthony v. Harrison*, 14 Hun, 198. But possibly a contrary doctrine is held in *Bottum v. Scott*, 11 N. Y. St. Rep. 514; *Olsen v. Ensign*, 7 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 682, 28 N. Y. Supp. 38.

<sup>208</sup> Abb. Tr. Ev. pp. 404, 405.

<sup>209</sup> See Wood's notes to Byles, Bills & N. pp. 121, 122.

**112. Defenses interposed by reason of some defect in the consideration are usually want or failure of consideration, and illegality of consideration, where it does not avoid the instrument.**

**113. As between immediate parties, a partial want or failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto, but the part alleged to have failed must be clearly ascertained. But these are not defenses to an action brought by a purchaser of the instrument for value without notice.**

**114. When there is a total want of consideration between immediate parties, or the consideration of the note, though good in the first instance, entirely fails, this is a defense between immediate parties. But these are not defenses to an action brought by a purchaser of the instrument for value without notice.**

In the preceding section, in attempting to outline the fundamental theory underlying that very large branch of the subject of negotiable instruments,—consideration,—we endeavored to show that the rule was that the first test of a legal consideration was that it must have substantial value, and that if there was substantial value, and an agreement, then there was a legal contract. From this it naturally follows that the converse of this rule is also true, and that if there is not a consideration to support the contract, or if there is what seems to be, but in fact is not, a consideration, then the contract itself fails, and the contract will not be enforced by the courts. The doctrines of want or failure of consideration divide themselves into the questions arising from total want or failure of consideration, partial want or failure of consideration, and the comparative equities of the rights of immediate parties and of the bona fide holder. The doctrine of failure or want of consideration is to be scrutinized to distinguish between failure of consideration and inadequacy of consideration; between whole and partial failure of consideration; and between definite and indefinite want or failure of consideration. And, while it cannot be said that these positions are fully settled by authority, the general doctrines of the cases classify the rules relating to want or failure of consideration as follows:



(1) Total failure or want of consideration is a defense in an action between immediate parties.

(2) In case of a pecuniary consideration or of property having an agreed pecuniary standard, failure of a definite part of the consideration is a defense pro tanto between immediate parties.

(3) In case of partial failure of an unliquidated consideration, recoupment or counterclaim may be allowed.

(4) A want of a defined part of a consideration is a defense pro tanto.

(5) Defenses of total or partial failure or want of consideration do not avail against the purchaser for value without notice.

Failure or want of consideration is not the same thing as its inadequacy. Inadequacy means that where values are exchanged one value does not equal the other; failure of consideration means a diminution of value from that expressly or impliedly agreed to be the values exchanged in transfer; and want of consideration means no value at all given for value received. In the transfer of property the fact that the property was not worth what it was supposed to be, if there is no fraud, is no defense in an action for the purchase price. And when the question is one of adequacy, courts will not inquire into the actual pecuniary value of a consideration, but will leave the parties to such estimates thereof as they have formed in making their contract. A party will not be allowed to interpose as a defense the fact that the property was not pecuniarily worth what he supposed it to be, or that he has received no actual benefit from it, or that the other party derives greater benefit from the consideration than he does. And inadequacy is distinguished from failure or want of consideration in that at the time of making the bill or note no part of the consideration was wanting, or that no part of it had subsequently failed. It was complete on making the contract, and had changed in no respect at the time of bringing the action. The amount agreed to be paid in the bill or note was the value set by the parties upon the consideration itself, and courts do not sit to change this and to make contracts, but only to enforce those the parties have already made.<sup>210</sup>

<sup>210</sup> WORTH v. CASE, 42 N. Y. 362; Earl v. Peck, 64 N. Y. 596; Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538, 27 N. E. 256; Anson, Cont. 63; Shadwell v. Shadwell,

Except, then, where money is paid for a bill or note, any other valuable thing will suffice as a reason for the enforcement of the instrument. In such cases as a voluntary gift of a note;<sup>211</sup> or its indorsement as a gift;<sup>212</sup> or where a plaintiff and defendant, as executors of an estate, exchanged notes with the intent of assuring payment against each other in an impending arbitration, and it was sought to construe these notes as promises which charge them personally;<sup>213</sup> or where two persons gave notes contingent upon the fact that, if they were paid in the future, the payee would convey to him certain lands, which in fact were never conveyed,—in all such cases, we say, there is no consideration for the promise. In them the promise is a nudum pactum. The courts will not compel parties to pay money to a party from whom they, in turn, had received nothing. Hence the entire want of consideration between immediate parties destroys all remedy upon the bill or note, because, as between immediate parties, the negotiable instrument is governed in this respect by the general rules of contract law.

These reasons, however, do not apply where the consideration has changed in whole or in part from that in contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. Its change may have rendered it either totally or partially worthless. In case of partial

9 C. B. (N. S.) 159; *Lindell v. Rokes*, 60 Mo. 249; *Trickey v. Larne*, 6 Mees. & W. 278; *Tye v. Gwynne*, 2 Camp. 346.

<sup>211</sup> *Pearson v. Pearson*, 7 Johns. 26. A gift of the donor's own note or bill is not valid either as a gift *inter vivos* or as *donatio mortis causa*. *HOLLIDAY v. ATKINSON*, 5 Barn. & C. 501; *Harris v. Clark*, 3 N. Y. 93; *RAYMOND v. SELICK*, 10 Conn. 480; *Warren v. Durfee*, 126 Mass. 338; *SHAW v. CAMP*, 160 Ill. 425, 43 N. E. 608; *Tracy v. Alvord*, 118 Cal. 654, 50 Pac. 757. But a man may make a valid gift of a bill or note made by a third person, and the property will pass, although, for lack of consideration, the donor will not be liable as indorser. *Easton v. Pratchett*, 1 Crompt., M. & R. 808. The holder may make a valid gift as *donatio mortis causa*, nor need the instrument be indorsed. *RANKIN v. WEGUELIN*, 27 Beav. 309; *Grover v. Grover*, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 264; *Jones v. Deyer*, 16 Ala. 226; *Stephenson v. King*, 81 Ky. 425. In such case the donee may recover against the prior parties, although not against the donor or his representatives upon the indorsement. *Weston v. Hight*, 17 Me. 287. As to *donatio mortis causa*, see *Rand. Com. Paper*, §§ 454, 805-810; *Daniel*, *Neg. Inst.* §§ 24-26a.

<sup>212</sup> *Schoonmaker v. Roosa*, 17 Johns. 801.

<sup>213</sup> *Winter v. Livingston*, 13 Johns. 54. See preceding note.

worthlessness, the worthless part may be a clearly defined part of the whole, or be indissolubly bound up with it. And these aspects of failure of consideration, when complicated with the various different systems of the administration of remedies, have presented problems of some difficulty for the courts to decide, and this difficulty has resulted in some confusion in the decisions of various jurisdictions. The rules are the same whether the consideration which fails be executed or executory. Examples of an executed consideration which has failed are property for which a note has been given, but which has been taken in execution,<sup>214</sup> or notes given for insurance premiums upon the policy of a company which has no legal right to insure.<sup>215</sup> In both of these cases it was held that there was a total failure of consideration, and that, as between immediate parties, it was a sufficient defense.<sup>216</sup> The availability of this as a defense, however, seems to depend upon two alternatives. The transaction either must be at once rescinded, the consideration

<sup>214</sup> CHENAULT v. BUSH, 84 Ky. 528, 2 S. W. 160.

<sup>215</sup> Barbor v. Boehm, 21 Neb. 450, 32 N. W. 221.

<sup>216</sup> Lightbody v. Ontario Bank, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 9. This was a case where bank bills were received in payment, and the bank issuing the bills had stopped payment at the time when the bills were so received, but the fact of the bank's failure was not then known to the parties. In his decision, Savage, C. J., said: "The question is which of these parties shall sustain the loss which has happened in this case. \* \* \* In the case of the payment of a counterfeit or forged bill, it is settled that the debtor is not discharged, and it is not perceived why the same principle should not prevail where the payment is made in the bill of a bank which has stopped payment. In each case the debtor parts with that which has no value, and the creditor does not receive value for his debt." In the case of CAMIDGE v. ALLENBY, 6 Barn. & C. 373, 9 Dowl. & R. 391, it appeared that a vendee delivered to the vendor, in payment for goods, promissory notes on the bank of D. & Co. This occurred at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and D. & Co. stopped payment at 11 o'clock in the forenoon of the same day (December 10th). The vendor never presented the bills, but on December 17th he required the vendee to take back the notes, and pay him the amount. This was refused, and on trial it was held that the vendor was guilty of laches, and had thereby made the notes his own, and consequently that they operated as a satisfaction of the debt. In the case of BAYARD v. SHUNK, 1 Watts & S. (Pa.) 92, it was held that the debt was discharged by a payment in bank notes, though the bank had previously failed, both parties being ignorant of the fact.

returned, and the parties placed as nearly as may be in statu quo,<sup>217</sup> or else the consideration must be proved to be completely worthless. for otherwise, if the consideration be retained, the question is sometimes treated as one of inadequacy, and the obligation may be deemed binding.<sup>218</sup> Cases of executory consideration are where the purchaser of a patent gave his note for it and the patent subsequently proved void,<sup>219</sup> or where a vendee bought goods of a certain kind which the vendee failed to deliver.<sup>220</sup> In such cases the rules are also either that there must be instant rejection of the goods after an opportunity to examine them, or else the goods must be shown to have been valueless. Of course, if there was involved in the facts of the case a breach of warranty which survives the acceptance of the goods, it lays the basis for a cross action or counterclaim, and is an exception to the principle stated.<sup>221</sup> It is the better rule in case of executory considerations that, as between immediate parties, a partial performance of the consideration allows only a recovery for the part performed upon the bill or note given for the consideration itself,<sup>222</sup> though this rule is disputed by many cases.<sup>223</sup> This conflict of authorities is due not so much perhaps to the actual merits of the question as to rules of practice arising upon questions of recoupment, offset, cross demand, and counterclaim, and whether these remedies may be administered in the action in which recovery upon the bill or note is sought. But these questions are happily becoming obsolete as state after state substitutes the civil action and code procedure for the common-law action and equity suit. The provision of the Codes that a defendant may avail himself of any defense which tends to defeat or diminish the

<sup>217</sup> *Burton v. Stewart*, 3 Wend. 236; *Lewis v. Cosgrave*, 2 Taunt. 2; *Leggett v. Cooper*, 2 Starkie, 103; *Fisher v. Samuda*, 1 Camp. 191.

<sup>218</sup> *Burton v. Stewart*, 3 Wend. 236; *Johnson v. Titus*, 2 Hill, 606.

<sup>219</sup> *Dickinson v. Hall*, 14 Pick. 217.

<sup>220</sup> *Wells v. Hopkins*, 5 Mees. & W. 7.

<sup>221</sup> *Norton v. Dreyfuss*, 106 N. Y. 91, 12 N. E. 428; *Brigg v. Hilton*, 99 N. Y. 517, 3 N. E. 51; *Day v. Pool*, 52 N. Y. 416.

<sup>222</sup> *Sawyer v. Chambers*, 44 Barb. 43; *Union Foundry & P. C. W. Works v. New York L. D. Co.*, 13 N. Y. St. Rep. 701; *Fisher v. Sharpe*, 5 Daly, 214; *Murphy v. Lippe*, 35 N. Y. Super. Ct. 542.

<sup>223</sup> *Fletcher v. Chase*, 16 N. H. 38; *Stone v. Peake*, 16 Vt. 218; *Harrington v. Lee*, 32 Vt. 249; *Evans v. Williamson*, 79 N. C. 96.

plaintiff's recovery and which is a cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim or connected with the subject of the action, or that it may be any new matter constituting a defense, it is hoped will allow the establishment of a rule that a failure of a part of the consideration, if definite, will allow a recovery pro tanto; if indefinite, a recoupment of damages. Now, however, the rules seem to be somewhat ill-defined, but as nearly as may be stated are as follows:

(1) If there is entire failure to give good title to chattels or land it is a defense;<sup>224</sup> if it is a mere defect of title capable of ascertainment in money, and the loss is borne by the purchaser, it is a defense pro tanto;<sup>225</sup> if it is a defect in which the loss is not borne by the purchaser, it is not a defense.<sup>226</sup>

(2) If the failure is of part of a money consideration, or one capable of definite computation, it is a good defense pro tanto.<sup>227</sup>

(3) If the failure is in the value of goods delivered, and is incapable of ascertainment, it is no defense, being in the nature of inadequacy of consideration, as already shown. But if this failure in value is a distinct part of the consideration, and is due either to a failure of the quality or the quantity of the goods, it is a defense pro tanto.<sup>228</sup>

<sup>224</sup> *Rock v. Nichols*, 8 Allen, 342; *Morrow v. Brown*, 31 Ind. 378; *Peterson v. Johnson*, 22 Wis. 21; *Stewart v. Insall*, 9 Tex. 397.

<sup>225</sup> *Doremus v. Bond*, 8 Blackf. 368; *Holman v. Creagmiles*, 14 Ind. 177.

<sup>226</sup> *Bringham v. Lighley*, 61 Ind. 524.

<sup>227</sup> *Byles, Bills*, 132; *Chlt. Bills*, 86; 1 Edw. *Bills & N.* 469; *DARNELL v. WILLIAMS*, 2 Starkie, 166; *JEFFERIES v. AUSTIN*, Strange, 674; *GAMBLE v. GRIMES*, 2 Ind. 392; *Morgan v. Fallenstein*, 27 Ill. 31; *Black v. Ridgway*, 131 Mass. 80.

<sup>228</sup> *AGRA & MASTERMAN'S BANK v. LEIGHTON*, L. R. 2 Exch. 56. It was held in this case that, in an action by the indorsee of a bill of exchange against the acceptor, a plea stating that the bill was given for goods to be supplied by the drawer, and that only part of the goods were supplied, of which the defendant accepted a part, and that by reason of the noncompletion of the contract the part supplied became valueless to him, and also showing that the plaintiff is not a holder for value, will be good. And see *Dunnent v. Tuttle*, Johns. Cas. *Bills & N.* 178; *Hammett v. Barnard*, 1 Hun, 198. Though see cases holding no defense unless there was a warranty. *Welch v. Carter*, 1 Wend. 185; *Reed v. Prentiss*, 1 N. H. 174; *Bryant v. Pember*, 45 Vt. 487; *Detrick v. McGlone*, 46 Ind. 291; *Richards v. Betzer*, 53 Ill. 466.

(4) If the failure of consideration arises from failure to perform an agreement, it is a defense pro tanto.<sup>229</sup>

These reasons apply to want of consideration,<sup>230</sup> or want of a defined part of it.<sup>231</sup> In the former event the contract is unenforceable; in the latter, enforceable only pro tanto.<sup>232</sup> And this leaves us to consider the position of the bona fide holder when confronted with these defenses raised against him.

The purchaser for value without notice purchases upon a consideration an order or promise to pay money. He is not bound in any way to inquire into the circumstances which gave the paper birth. If, for example, the maker defends that the consideration for a note is a contract which is wholly or partly unperformed, and the consideration has so far failed, the answer is that the maker has issued to the world a negotiable promise to pay money absolutely in consideration of the promise of the payee to do some act for his benefit in the future. That the payee has failed to do this is no reason why the bona fide holder should be deprived of the benefit of the maker's promise, which he has bought. He has taken no part in the delinquencies of the payee, and they therefore cannot be charged against him. In other words, his equities are superior to those of the maker, who must look for his remedy to the payee.<sup>233</sup> And so in the other cases involving want or failure of consideration, the defenses consist of personal transactions between immediate parties, in which the bona fide holder has no part, and with which he is not chargeable. The reasons for holding accommodation parties have been already explained.<sup>234</sup> And in other cases already mentioned, as for patents proven void,<sup>235</sup> or for the pur-

<sup>229</sup> *Watson v. Russell*, 3 Best & S. 84; *Miller v. Wood*, 23 Ark. 546; *Jeffries v. Lamb*, 73 Ind. 202; *STACY v. KEMP*, 97 Mass. 166. See Neg. Inst. L. § 54.

<sup>230</sup> *Anthony v. Harrison*, 14 Hun, 198.

<sup>231</sup> *Seeley v. Engell*, 13 N. Y. 542.

<sup>232</sup> *Aubert v. Maze*, 2 Bos. & P. 373; *Forman v. Wright*, 11 C. B. 481; *PARISH v. STONE*, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 198.

<sup>233</sup> *DAVIS v. MCCREADY*, 17 N. Y. 230.

<sup>234</sup> See *supra*, p. 173.

<sup>235</sup> *Smith v. Hilscock*, 14 Me. 449. See the provision of the New York Negotiable Instruments Law, § 330, *post*, p. 488, as to negotiable instruments given for patent rights.

chase of lands to which the title fails,<sup>236</sup> or for goods purchased and partly delivered,<sup>237</sup> the answer is the same,—that an absolute promise or acceptance to pay to order has been issued, and must be lived up to, when in the hands of a purchaser who has bought it in reliance upon the promise. Neither total nor partial want or failure of consideration is a defense against a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.<sup>238</sup>

**115. ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION.** — A consideration may be rendered illegal by statute, or by the rules of common law, or because it is against public welfare to treat the consideration as a valid legal consideration. An illegal consideration, whether total or partial, renders the instrument unenforceable, as between immediate parties, but it is not in general a defense to the action of the purchaser for value without notice.<sup>239</sup>

A brief statement of that broad topic of the general law of contracts known as “illegal consideration” is as follows:

Since every contract is but an agreement enforceable by law, to be enforceable it must be for some object which the law can recognize. The law refuses to recognize rights arising out of three general classes of subjects, and to enforce contracts made with reference to them. They are:

- (1) Those prohibited by statute.
- (2) Those prohibited by express rules of common law with reference to objects which the law deems evil or immoral.
- (3) Those which contravene public policy.

*Statutory Prohibition.*<sup>240</sup>

The statutes which prohibit considerations and render them illegal are commonly classified as follows:

- (1) Those which forbid a transaction constituting a consideration, and declare the contract growing out of it void.

<sup>236</sup> VALLETT v. PARKER, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 615.

<sup>237</sup> Baldwin v. Killian, 63 Ill. 550.

<sup>238</sup> Robinson v. Reynolds, 2 Q. B. 196; HOFFMAN v. BANK, 12 Wall. 181; HEUERTEMATTE v. MORRIS, 4 N. E. 1, 101 N. Y. 63. See Neg. Inst. L. § 54.

<sup>239</sup> Cf. Neg. Inst. L. §§ 94–96.

<sup>240</sup> As to conflict of laws, see ante, p. 183.



(2) Those which, for the public welfare, attach a penalty to a transaction constituting a consideration, and thus by implication forbid the making of any contract growing out of it.

(3) Those which declare a consideration illegal, but do not say that it shall avoid the contract.

(4) Those which attach no penalty to a consideration, but which enact that the consideration is illegal, and that the agreement resting upon it shall not be enforced.

(5) Those which enjoin certain penalties, conditions, or regulations upon the conduct of a business or profession, but which attach no specific penalty to any specific transaction.<sup>241</sup>

These five classes of statutes are in turn distinguished as those which avoid the consideration, either by express declaration, or by imposing a penalty upon it, and those which merely declare the consideration illegal. The important difference between these two classes is that, as already shown, the former is a defense to the instrument in the hands of a bona fide holder,<sup>242</sup> while the latter is not. The statutes of the latter class, however, so generally outnumber those of the former, that it may be said to be the rule that the title of an innocent holder for value cannot be impeached by any illegality in the transactions between prior parties,<sup>243</sup> the exceptions being, of course, where the statutes expressly forbid the consideration and avoid the contract growing out of it, or where the plain intention of the penalty affixed by the statute to the transaction is to forbid it, and thus the contract is avoided. The reason

<sup>241</sup> Pol. Cont. pp. 254-261.

<sup>242</sup> See supra, p. 234. It was said by Christlancy, J., in *PATON v. COLT*, 5 Mich. 505, that whenever the consideration of the paper between the original parties has been illegal, especially if in violation of a positive prohibition of statute, proof of such illegality throws upon the holder the burden of proving that he got it bona fide, and gave value for it. To the same effect, see *BAILEY v. BIDWELL*, 13 Mees. & W. 73; *HARVEY v. TOWERS*, 6 Exch. 656; *Northam v. Latouche*, 4 Car. & P. 140; *VALLETT v. PARKER*, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 615; Story, Bills, § 193.

<sup>243</sup> Thus, in *POTTER v. TUBB*, 1 Chit. Jr. Bills, 430, which was an action against the acceptor of a bill, by the payee, it was held that the fact the consideration for the acceptance was a debt due to the drawer by the acceptor for smuggled goods was no defense against the plaintiff, unless the bill were given him for a smuggling debt.

for this rule is the one so general in cases involving consideration, that when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it.<sup>244</sup> It is true that the innocent maker or acceptor may suffer from the violation of a statute which was perhaps meant to protect him. Either or both of these prior parties may have done something forbidden, and the court in enforcing the bill or note may be enforcing a violation of the statutes, yet the bona fide holder is no accessory to the illegality, nor can the statute be used to shield the wrongdoer. The transaction, whatever it may have been, was one of which the bona fide holder knew nothing, and in which he took no part. The only thing with which he had to do was the purchase of a promise or order to pay money, which he asks the court to enforce. And the courts respond to his suit by saying to the prior parties who have suffered by or committed the illegality that their wrongs must be settled elsewhere than in his suit,<sup>245</sup> and are no answer to his claim.

The statutes which declare a consideration illegal vary widely in their topics and language in the different states. Very common examples are a bill or note executed on Sunday,<sup>246</sup> or a bill or note given for intoxicating liquors.<sup>247</sup> These cases are but examples of the general principle, whatever be the wording of the particular statute. Thus, from the New York point of view, before the repeal of the Sabbath observance act,<sup>248</sup> a contract made on Sunday was not void at common law.<sup>249</sup> And in New York it was declared to be good unless it was in contravention of some express statute forbidding it.<sup>250</sup> The statute in that state regulating the Sabbath observance was meant to be in harmony with the religion of the state

<sup>244</sup> VALLETT v. PARKER, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 615; Willmarth v. Crawford, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 341.

<sup>245</sup> City Bank v. Barnard, 1 Hall, 80; Gould v. Armstrong, 2 Hall, 265; Hill v. Northrup, 4 Thomp. & C. 120; Grimes v. Hillenbrand, 6 Thomp. & C. 620.

<sup>246</sup> Saltmarsh v. Tuthill, 13 Ala. 390; VINTON v. PECK, 14 Mich. 287.

<sup>247</sup> Cazet v. Field, 9 Gray, 329; Norris v. Langley, 19 N. H. 423; PINDAR v. BARLOW, 31 Vt. 529.

<sup>248</sup> Laws 1886, c. 593.

<sup>249</sup> A bill or note executed on Sunday is not invalid at common law. Begbie v. Levi, 1 Crompt. & J. 180; Murphy v. Collins, 121 Mass. 6.

<sup>250</sup> Boynton v. Page, 13 Wend. 425; Sayles v. Smith, 12 Wend. 57.

and the religious sentiment of the public, and for the support and maintenance of public morals and good order. Acts which did not violate the purpose of this statute, and did not disturb and hinder those who for themselves desired to enjoy Sunday, were not prohibited.<sup>251</sup> Bargains made on Sunday were enforceable. And it is to be inferred that bills and notes given on Sunday were good unless they were for something prohibited by statute to be done, as for the enforcement of work done on Sunday exclusively.<sup>252</sup> So that in New York, although there is little express authority on the point, it seems safe to say that since the Sunday laws in the majority of instances would probably not be treated as defenses to actions upon bills and notes between immediate parties, they would be still less apt to be allowed in case of a suit by the bona fide holder. In other states, as between immediate parties, the question turns first upon the wording and interpretation of the statute itself. If the statute expressly prohibits the making of contracts on Sunday, then it is a defense as between immediate parties. Again, if it provides that no person shall do any work, labor, or business on Sunday, then the making of a bill or note is the making of a contract, is secular business within the meaning of the statute, and is a defense between immediate parties. But if it prohibits only servile work, or the work, labor, or business of a person's ordinary calling, then the making of a bill or note is not within the prohibition of the statute, and the statute does not apply.<sup>253</sup> Where, however, it is conceded that the statute does apply to the case of the bill or note, then the question becomes one of the delivery of the instrument. The bill, note, or indorsement is not executed until delivered.<sup>254</sup> And though dated or signed on Sunday,<sup>255</sup> it has no life as a contract until the day of its delivery. But if dated and signed and delivered on Sunday, or dated and signed on a secular day and delivered on Sunday,<sup>256</sup>

<sup>251</sup> *Smith v. Willcox*, 24 N. Y. 354.

<sup>252</sup> *Merritt v. Earle*, 31 Barb. 38, affirmed 29 N. Y. 115; *Batsford v. Every*, 44 Barb. 620; *McNamee v. McNamee*, 9 N. Y. St. Rep. 720; *Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. Tribune Ass'n*, 44 N. Y. Super. Ct. 136.

<sup>253</sup> *Clark*, Cont. pp. 394, 395.

<sup>254</sup> See *supra*, p. 67.

<sup>255</sup> *Conrad v. Kinzle*, 105 Ind. 281, 4 N. E. 863.

<sup>256</sup> *Allen v. Deming*, 14 N. H. 133; *Bank of Cumberland v. Mayberry*, 48 Me. 198.

the instrument is unenforceable between immediate parties,<sup>257</sup> unless the party prosecuting it shows that it was delivered on a secular day.<sup>258</sup> The presumption from its being dated on Sunday is that it was delivered on that day, and its date is notice to all parties of its delivery on Sunday, and its invalidity.<sup>259</sup> It is this notice which destroys its validity in the hands of the purchaser for value. For if the instrument is dated on Sunday, he is presumed to know it was delivered on that day, and so is a purchaser with notice. But, on the other hand, if the contract was actually made on Sunday, but there is no legal reason for charging the purchaser for value with knowledge of this fact, then the illegality of the contract is no defense against the bona fide purchaser, and he takes the bill or note free from equities.<sup>260</sup> Or in other words, to apply the tests given, the Sunday laws are in general of that class which render the consideration illegal, not void, and are therefore not a defense against the purchaser for value, unless he has notice that the bill or note was given in violation of the statute. These tests apply and reasons govern in the application of the statutes which render the bill or note unenforceable, or which seek to regulate the conduct of a business or profession. Examples are the traffic in intoxicating liquors,<sup>261</sup> or statutes requiring lawyers, physicians, and surgeons to procure a license, certificate, or diploma as a condition precedent to the right to practice in their profession, or statutes regulating dealings in articles of commerce. These statutes

<sup>257</sup> *Bank of Cumberland v. Mayberry*, 48 Me. 198; *Pope v. Linn*, 50 Me. 88; *STATE CAPITAL BANK v. THOMPSON*, 42 N. H. 370; *Ball v. Powers*, 62 Ga. 757; *Brimhall v. Van Campen*, 8 Minn. 13 (Gil. 1).

<sup>258</sup> *DRAKE v. ROGERS*, 32 Me. 524; *LOVEJOY v. WHIPPLE*, 18 Vt. 379; *Aldridge v. Branch Bank*, 17 Ala. 45; *Trieber v. Commercial Bank*, 31 Ark. 128.

<sup>259</sup> *HILTON v. HOUGHTON*, 35 Me. 143; *Winchell v. Carey*, 115 Mass. 560; *Clough v. Davis*, 9 N. H. 500; *KING v. FLEMING*, 72 Ill. 21; *Cranson v. Goss*, 107 Mass. 439; *Sinclair v. Baggeley*, 4 Mees. & W. 312.

<sup>260</sup> *Pope v. Linn*, 50 Me. 84; *STATE CAPITAL BANK v. THOMPSON*, 42 N. H. 370; *Cranson v. Goss*, 107 Mass. 439; *Greathead v. Walton*, 40 Conn. 226; *Ball v. Powers*, 62 Ga. 757; *Trieber v. Commercial Bank*, 31 Ark. 128; *Clinton Nat. Bank v. Graves*, 48 Iowa, 228; *KNOX v. CLIFFORD*, 38 Wis. 651.

<sup>261</sup> *Cazet v. Field*, 9 Gray, 329; *Norris v. Langley*, 19 N. H. 423; *PINDAR v. BARLOW*, 31 Vt. 529. Some statutes, however, render void a bill or note given for intoxicating liquors. *Streit v. Sanborn*, 47 Vt. 702; *Hannum v. Richardson*, 48 Vt. 508.

are in general not a defense to negotiable instruments prosecuted by the bona fide holder.

*Common-Law Prohibition.*

Evil or immoral considerations affecting negotiable instruments are those which are made in breach of the well-settled rules of the common law. Bills and notes based upon them are either instruments given in consideration of committing a crime or a civil wrong, or else instruments given upon a consideration in fraud of the rights of third persons. Instances of the first kind are orders or promises in consideration of committing a trespass likely to lead to a breach of the peace, as an assault upon a third person,<sup>262</sup> or of printing a libel,<sup>263</sup> or of committing a civil wrong by fraud or false pretenses.<sup>264</sup> Wherever such are the considerations of a negotiable instrument, the court will refuse to enforce the instrument, as between immediate parties. The agreements based upon a consideration in fraud of the rights of third persons most common in the case of negotiable instruments are when one creditor takes a bill or note for some advantage to himself over other creditors who have united with him in a composition of their debts against some common debtor.<sup>265</sup> In such a case each creditor acted on the faith that the engagement made with the others would be binding upon them, and each had the undertaking of the rest as a consideration for his own undertaking. The beneficial consideration to each creditor was the engagement of the rest to forbear. "Every composition deed," says Mr. Justice Duer,<sup>266</sup> "is in its spirit, if not in its terms, an agreement between the creditors themselves, as well as between them and the debtor. It is an agreement that each shall receive the sum of the security which the deed stipulates to be paid and given, and nothing more." A private agreement, evidenced by a bill or note, therefore, by any one creditor, to receive more than his composite share, is a fraud upon the rest, and the courts will not enforce it.<sup>267</sup>

<sup>262</sup> *Allen v. Rescous*, 2 Lev. 174.

<sup>263</sup> *Poplett v. Stockdale*, 1 Ryan & M. 337; *Arnold v. Clifford*, 2 Sumn. 238, Fed. Cas. No. 555; *Atkins v. Johnson*, 43 Vt. 78.

<sup>264</sup> *Materne v. Horwitz*, 101 N. Y. 470, 5 N. E. 881; *Bloss v. Bloomer*, 23 Barb. 604; *Jerome v. Bigelow*, 66 Ill. 452.

<sup>265</sup> *White v. Kuntz*, 107 N. Y. 518, 14 N. E. 423.

<sup>266</sup> *Breck v. Cole*, 4 Sandf. 79-83.

<sup>267</sup> *Bliss v. Matteson*, 45 N. Y. 22.

*Contravention of Public Policy.*

The commonest cases of bills and notes given in contravention of public policy are those based upon considerations tending either to injure the public service, or obstruct the public justice, or else based upon considerations in restraint of trade.

"All contracts or agreements," says Comyn, "which have for their object anything against the general policy of the common law are void."<sup>268</sup> This general principle is particularly applied to contracts which have for their object the perversion of the operations of the government.\* Every citizen owes to his government and all its officers, while executing their official duties, truth and fidelity. All the actions of the government and its officers are based upon certain facts assumed or proved, and falsehoods with reference to those facts are moral wrongs, injurious to the whole state whose government it is, and therefore against public policy. Thus, a note given for forbearing to make a bid on a government mail contract,† or a note given to procure the passage of a legislative act by sinister means, is void.<sup>269</sup> It is public policy for the courts to put the stamp of their disapprobation on every act, and pronounce void every contract, the ultimate or probable tendency of which would be to sully the purity or mislead the judgments of those to whom the high trust of legislation is committed. These are also the reasons of the common-law rules with reference to considerations touching the administration of public justice.<sup>270</sup> The public welfare requires that crimes, for example, should be investigated and punished, and it is the duty of a citizen paramount to all others to give every assistance to this end.<sup>271</sup> Every instrument given in pursuance of an agreement to obstruct justice as between immediate parties is void. Therefore a note given to stop an intended prosecution for felony

<sup>268</sup> 1 Com. Cont. 301; Fonbl. Eq. bk. 1, c. 4, § 4.

\*Gray v. Hook, 4 N. Y. 449.

† Gullick v. Ward, 10 N. J. Law, 87.

<sup>269</sup> Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543; Lyon v. Mitchell, 36 N. Y. 235; Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 479; Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y. 289; Frost v. Inhabitants of Belmont, 6 Allen (Mass.) 159; TOOL CO. v. NORRIS, 2 Wall. 45; MARSHALL v. RAILROAD CO., 16 How. 314.

<sup>270</sup> Henderson v. Palmer, 71 Ill. 579; ROLL v. RAGUET, 4 Ohio, 400, 418; Gorham v. Keyes, 137 Mass. 583; Harris v. Brisco, 17 Q. B. Div. 504.

<sup>271</sup> Haynes v. Rudd, 83 N. Y. 251. See, also, Id., 102 N. Y. 372, 7 N. H. 237.

and not to appear as a witness before the grand jury, and to dismiss an action for assault and battery,<sup>272</sup> or a note given upon a consideration not to prosecute the maker's son for forgery,<sup>273</sup> is illegal, and cannot be enforced. Agreements based upon a consideration in restraint of trade are held against public policy because they deprive the public of the services of men in the spheres in which they are likely to be most useful, and expose the community to the evils of monopoly. At least such, according to the text writers, was the doctrine of the early common law. The cases were classified into three divisions, and the rules pertaining to them were as follows: (1) When the contract was unlimited in time and space and in total restraint of trade, it was void. (2) When the restraint was limited as to space, but unlimited as to time, it was valid. (3) When the contract was unlimited as to space, but limited as to time, it was void. And these were the tests applied in determining whether bills and notes were void or valid as between immediate parties in cases when the defense that the consideration was in restraint of trade was interposed. So coal combinations are in restraint of trade, and a check given for a balance due on such a combination agreement is illegal.<sup>274</sup> And so a bill or note given to further the objects of an association for the regulation of freight and passage rates on the Erie canal is illegal.<sup>275</sup> In these cases it is obvious that such contracts are public in their nature and against the public welfare. With them the reason for the application of the general rule is clear. But when the consideration involves a transaction between private individuals, the early doctrines of the common law are not those at present accepted by the courts. Thus instruments based upon a consideration in partial restraint of trade between individuals are undoubtedly allowed, the distinguishing point being that the restriction must not go beyond what is reasonable to protect the favored party, regard being had to the nature of the business and the interests of the public.<sup>276</sup> And it is worthy of remark that

<sup>272</sup> *GARDNER v. MAXEY*, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 90.

<sup>273</sup> *National Bank of Oxford v. Kirk*, 90 Pa. St. 49.

<sup>274</sup> *Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co.*, 68 Pa. St. 173.

<sup>275</sup> *Stanton v. Allen*, 5 Denio, 434.

<sup>276</sup> *Mitchel v. Reynolds*, 1 P. Wms. 181. See cases chronologically arranged in 2 Para. Cont. p. 748, note; *Nobles v. Bates*, 7 Cow. 307; *Chappel v. Brock-*



the tendency of recent decisions is to relax even further the rigor of the doctrine that all contracts in general restraint of trade are void. In England<sup>277</sup> it is denied that such has, in fact, ever been the law, and that such a rule is the true public policy is doubted. "If," said Sir George Jessel,<sup>278</sup> "there is one thing more than any other which public policy requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held good, and shall be enforced by courts of justice. The theory that such contracts create monopolies is also to be questioned. Competition is not stifled. The business is open to all other persons. And it seems a sounder legal theory to say that a party may legally purchase the trade and business of another for the very purpose of preventing competition. The validity of the contract, if supported by a consideration, will depend upon the reasonableness between the parties."<sup>279</sup>

*Effect of Illegality.*

Such are the most important classifications of the very large number of cases involving bills and notes given upon considerations in violation of statutes, of rules of common law, and in contravention of public policy. It remains to speak of the effect of the illegality of considerations being total or partial, of the illegality being known to all the parties, and the rule governing illegal or immoral considerations, and those in contravention of public policy, when used as defenses to actions brought by a purchaser of the instrument for value and without notice.

*Same—Illegality as being Total or Partial.*

Partial illegality of consideration is to be distinguished from partial lack or failure of consideration, in that illegality, whether it goes

way, 21 Wend. 157; *Dunlop v. Gregory*, 10 N. Y. 241; *Alger v. Thacher*, 19 Pick. 51; *Arnot v. Plattston & E. Coal Co.*, 68 N. Y. 558.

<sup>277</sup> *Rousillon v. Rousillon*, 14 Ch. Div. 351.

<sup>278</sup> *Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson*, 19 Eq. Cas. 462.

<sup>279</sup> *Whittaker v. Howe*, 3 Beav. 383; *Jones v. Lees*, 1 Hurl. & N. 189; *Leather Cloth Co. v. Lonsont*, 9 Eq. Cas. 345; *Collins v. Locke*, 4 App. Cas. 674; *Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor*, 20 Wall. 64; *Morse Twist Drill & Mach. Co. v. Morse*, 103 Mass. 73; *Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber*, 106 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419; *Leslie v. Lorillard*, 110 N. Y. 519, 18 N. E. 363.

to the whole consideration or only part thereof, avoids the whole bill or note. If any part of a contract is void for illegality, all of it is void. The courts will not unravel and separate considerations which are good and considerations which are illegal, and allow recovery for those which are good. In this, illegal considerations which avoid the instrument differ from instruments which cannot be enforced because of partial lack or failure of consideration, the latter being, as has already been said, good pro tanto. And this is so because it is impossible to say whether the legal or illegal portion of the consideration most affected the mind of the maker or acceptor in making his promise. The law will not permit him thus to seek to evade its provisions and yet stand upon and recover for the valid part of the original consideration. Negotiable instruments are not contracts consisting of several parts based on several transactions. They are not of the kind called in ordinary contract law "severable." As to them the general rule of contracts that, where the promises and considerations are severable, an illegal consideration is a partial defense, does not apply. But on the contrary, the undoubted rule is that any of the foregoing kinds of illegal considerations, whether total or partial, are defenses to the recovery upon any part of the instrument between immediate parties.

*Same—Knowledge of Consideration—Intention.*

It must be admitted that comparatively few cases directly involving bills and notes are to be found in examining the question of the knowledge of a party of the illegality of a consideration. But there seems to be no reason why the well-settled rules of contract should not be applied to the case of immediate parties to negotiable instruments. The combinations of circumstances to which these rules of contract apply are where the consideration consists of some illegal act, which it is the mutual intention of the parties to perform; where it consists of some act legal in itself, but mutually intended to further some illegal purpose; where one party intends an illegal act, but the other is innocent of any knowledge concerning it; and, lastly, where one party intends an illegal act and the other party knows of it, but is innocent of any participation in it. In the case of the consideration consisting of some illegal act in which both of the parties participate, courts will not enforce the instrument, because

courts cannot enforce a violation of law.<sup>280</sup> This rule is broad enough to cover the case of a legal consideration intended to further an illegal intent, because the parties may not use a legal act to cover a wrong, provided that their intention to commit a wrong was mutual,<sup>281</sup> and the loan of money evidenced by the bill or note was in furtherance of the parties' unlawful purpose.<sup>282</sup> But, on the other hand, if the contract was innocent in itself, and if the party enforcing the bill or note was ignorant of the illegal intention of the other party, he is entitled to its full benefits,<sup>283</sup> and the courts will not shield the other party, because he alone has attempted to further some illegal purpose of his own. But the purpose and consideration of the instrument must be innocent and legal, for if illegal, although its illegality was unknown to the prosecuting party, it is unenforceable, for the courts, from their very constitution, cannot enforce negotiable instruments upon an illegal consideration, and the ignorance of the party himself of the fact that that consideration was in violation of the law does not excuse him.<sup>284</sup> Where, however, the instrument is founded upon a consideration legal in itself, but intended by one party to further an illegal purpose, and the other party knows of it, but takes no part in this illegal purpose, the law is much more difficult of interpretation. It is the opinion of writers<sup>285</sup> and courts<sup>286</sup> of great authority that no recovery can be had by a party whose rights are thus tainted with his knowledge of its illegal purpose. But with all deference to the opinions of such distinguished jurists it is submitted that they are not founded upon the better reason. This would seem to be that as long as the transaction is a fair and honest one between the two

<sup>280</sup> *McKinnell v. Robinson*, 3 Mees. & W. 434; *Cutler v. Welch*, 43 N. H. 497; *Mordecai v. Dawkins*, 9 Rich. Law, 262.

<sup>281</sup> *Blont v. Proctor*, 5 Blackf. 265; *Cannan v. Bryce*, 3 Barn. & Ald. 179.

<sup>282</sup> *Ernst v. Crosby*, 140 N. Y. 364, 35 N. E. 603; *Tyler v. Carlisle*, 79 Me. 210, 9 Atl. 356; *Ruckman v. Bryan*, 3 Denio, 340; *Cutler v. Welch*, 43 N. H. 497; *Wright v. Crabbs*, 78 Ind. 487.

<sup>283</sup> *Pixley v. Boynton*, 79 Ill. 351; *Quirk v. Thomas*, 6 Mich. 76.

<sup>284</sup> *Pol. Cont.* 322; *Anson, Cont.* 192; *Favor v. Philbrick*, 7 N. H. 328.

<sup>285</sup> *Daniel, Neg. Inst.* § 200.

<sup>286</sup> *Hubbell v. Flint*, 13 Gray, 277; *Hanauer v. Doane*, 12 Wall. 342; *Tatum v. Kelley*, 25 Ark. 209; *Graves v. Johnson*, 156 Mass. 211, 30 N. E. 818.

parties before the court, and one which they had a perfect right to enter into, the subsequent illegal acts of one of them should not invalidate the contract, as to the other, although that other knew of them, unless he, too, directly or indirectly, participated in them. Wrongful intent is not punishable by law when nothing is done to carry that intent into effect, and much less bare knowledge of such an intent, without any participation in it. The subsequent acts of the other party are something with which he has no concern.<sup>287</sup> And the true rule would seem to be that, unless there was evidence of some act of the party prosecuting the instrument showing that he was a *particeps criminis* to the illegal acts of the other, the bare knowledge of the holder of the other's intention to perpetrate some illegal act would not be a defense to the instrument as against him.

*Same—As Against Bona Fide Holder.*

A consideration illegal because it is evil or immoral or against public policy is not a ground of defense to an action brought by a purchaser of the instrument for value and without notice. The reasons we have already given in this section as those which have governed courts in dealing with considerations made illegal by statute prevail in these cases also. It is therefore needless to repeat them.<sup>288</sup>

**116. DISCHARGE OF THE INSTRUMENT.**—A negotiable instrument may be discharged by payment, or by act of the holder, or by operation of law.

**117.** When the instrument has been discharged, it ceases to be negotiable.

“Discharge” of an instrument means the extinguishment of all rights of action thereon. Discharge is usually effected by payment by the principal debtor at maturity, by the principal debtor becoming the holder at maturity, by renunciation or release by the holder

<sup>287</sup> *Kreiss v. Seligman*, 8 Barb. 439; *Tracy v. Talmage*, 14 N. Y. 162; *Falkney v. Reynous*, 4 Burrows, 2069; *Holman v. Johnson*, Cowp. 341; *Pellecat v. Angell*, 2 Crompt., M. & R. 311. See *Tiffany, Sales*, pp. 134–136.

<sup>288</sup> *Tied. Com. Paper*, § 178; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 1887; *Daniel, Neg. Inst.* § 198; *Edw. Bills & N.* § 516.

at maturity, and by cancellation.\* It may also be discharged by alteration.<sup>289</sup> In some cases, though rarely, the instrument is discharged by operation of law. The instrument, when discharged, is no longer negotiable; and even when transferred to a purchaser without notice cannot be enforced, because it is merely a right to enforce money, which, upon discharge of the instrument, no longer exists. Discharge of the instrument must be distinguished from discharge of a party thereto.

**118. PAYMENT.**—A bill or note is discharged by payment at or after maturity by or on behalf of the acceptor or maker to the holder, in good faith and without notice that his title is defective.

*Payment.*

Payment in due course by the principal debtor—that is, by the acceptor or maker—discharges the instrument, because it is a performance of the contract according to its terms by the person primarily liable.<sup>290</sup> Payment by a co-maker or co-acceptor has the

\*See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 200–206. Prof. Ames says that, if title has vested in the payee, “nothing short of a physical destruction, cancellation, or alteration of the instrument, or its retransfer to the acceptor or maker (or the drawer or drawee, if the bill was not accepted), can afterwards extinguish it.” 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 821. This has reference to extinguishment at law, as distinguished from equity. Yet although the instrument be not retransferred, and hence is not extinguished at law, any transferee after maturity acquires the legal title subject to equities of the acceptor or maker acquired by him at or after maturity, and hence the acceptor or maker is for all practical purposes in the same position as if the instrument were extinguished at law. See 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 824. This distinction between extinguishment at law and in equity is not generally taken in the cases or the text-books, and the rule is broadly stated that payment or renunciation at or after maturity, with or without retransfer, discharges the instrument.

<sup>289</sup> Ante, p. —.

<sup>290</sup> *Elsam v. Denny*, 15 C. B. 87; *BARTRUM v. CADDY*, 8 Law J. Q. B. 31; *Ballard v. Greenbush*, 24 Me. 336; *Suydam v. Westfall*, 2 Denio, 205; *Gordon v. Wansey*, 21 Cal. 77; *Gardner v. Maynard*, 7 Allen, 456. On this, see *SWOPE v. ROSS*, 40 Pa. St. 186, which holds that, since the acceptor of a bill is really the debtor, the drawer and indorser being merely sureties, the debt is extinguished by its payment by the acceptor; and, save where the acceptance

same effect.<sup>291</sup> Payment by an accommodated party, although he be drawer or indorser, is also in effect a discharge, because, as between himself and the accommodation acceptor or maker, he is primarily liable.<sup>292</sup> Payment by the accommodation acceptor or maker also discharges the instrument,<sup>293</sup> although the acceptor or maker paying under such circumstances could compel the accommodated party to refund the amount paid. Likewise the instrument is discharged if, when it matures, the acceptor or maker is or becomes the holder,<sup>294</sup> since the right and liability are coincident in one and the same person. In all such cases payment is a defense, even as against subsequent purchasers without notice, for any purchaser thereafter would necessarily acquire the instrument after maturity, and hence subject to defenses.<sup>295</sup> In order that payment or coincidence of right and liability should operate as a discharge, it is essential that the instrument should have matured; for an acceptor or maker may acquire it before maturity, as purchaser, and may then further negotiate it.<sup>296</sup> Moreover, although the acceptor or maker intends the transaction to take effect as payment and discharge, such payment would be no defense against a purchaser for value without notice; as in case the acceptor, after paying the money to the holder, had allowed him to retain the instrument, and he had negotiated it; or in case the acceptor, after thus taking up a bill payable to bearer, had, before it matured, lost it, and it had come into the hands of an innocent purchaser.<sup>297</sup>

was *supra* protest, no right of action remains against such drawer or indorser. See Neg. Inst. L. § 200. Cf. sections 77, 90, 148.

<sup>291</sup> *HARMER v. STEELE*, 4 Exch. 1; *Cox v. Hodge*, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 146; *Swem v. Newell*, 19 Colo. 397, 35 Pac. 734.

<sup>292</sup> *COOK v. LISTER*, 32 Law J. C. P. 127; *Lazarus v. Cowie*, 8 Q. B. 459; *Woods v. Woods*, 127 Mass. 141; *Blenn v. Lyford*, 70 Me. 149.

<sup>293</sup> *HARMER v. STEELE*, 4 Exch. 1; *BARTRUM v. CADDY*, 9 Adol. & E. 275.

<sup>294</sup> *HARMER v. STEELE*, 4 Exch. 1; *Stewart v. Hlidden*, 13 Minn. 43 (Gil. 29); *Chalm. Bills & N.* art. 238.

<sup>295</sup> *GARDEN v. MAYNARD*, 7 Allen (Mass.) 456. Ante, p. 295.

<sup>296</sup> *ATTENBOROUGH v. MACKENZIE*, 25 Law J. Exch. 244; *Swope v. Ross*, 40 Pa. St. 186; *Mishler v. Reed*, 76 Pa. St. 76.

<sup>297</sup> *BURBRIDGE v. MANNERS*, 3 Camp. 193. It was held in this case that, although a bill cannot be reissued after it has arrived at maturity and been

It is to be observed that an acceptor or maker purchasing before maturity is not a purchaser in due course; and, therefore, although the paper be transferable by delivery, he acquires only the title of his transferrer, and hence, unlike an ordinary purchaser, he could not acquire title from a finder or a thief.<sup>298</sup> Again, in order that payment should operate as a discharge, it must be made to the holder, and in good faith.<sup>299</sup> The acceptor or maker must occupy, in this respect, substantially the position of a purchaser for value without notice. If paper be transferable by indorsement, payment can be made only to the payee named, or to one holding under his indorsement.<sup>300</sup> Payment under a forged indorsement, for example, would be no discharge.<sup>301</sup> But, if the paper be transferable by delivery, payment in good faith to the bearer would be a discharge, whatever the infirmity of his title.<sup>302</sup>

Payment by one secondarily liable, on the other hand, although at or after maturity, is not a discharge of the instrument. The drawer and indorser are liable to subsequent parties, but prior par-

paid, yet if paid and afterwards indorsed before it becomes due, it is a valid security in the hands of a bona fide indorsee. In the case of *Morley v. Culverwell*, 7 Mees. & W. 174, it was shown that the drawer of a bill of exchange, before it became due, agreed with the acceptor that, on his giving a certain mortgage security for the amount, he, the drawer, would deliver the bill up to him, and the acceptor accordingly executed the mortgage and received back the bill uncanceled. It was held that the drawer was liable on the bill to a party to whom the acceptor afterwards indorsed it for value before it came due; and that the plea that the bill was paid by the acceptor before it came due, and afterwards reissued by him without a new stamp, could be supported only by proof of actual payment at maturity in cash, and not by evidence of an arrangement between the drawer and acceptor, whereby the bill was treated as being satisfied. *WHEELER v. GUILD*, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 545.

<sup>298</sup> *DE SILVA v. FULLER*, 1 Chit. Bills, p. 392; 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 823.

<sup>299</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 148. Cf. sections 314, 315, as to payment of bills drawn in sets.

<sup>300</sup> *Doubleday v. Kress*, 50 N. Y. 410.

<sup>301</sup> *SMITH v. SHEPARD*, Chitty, Bills (10th Ed.) 180, note.

<sup>302</sup> *ANONYMOUS*, Style, 366; *Eastman v. Plumer*, 32 N. H. 238; *Bank of U. S. v. U. S.*, 2 How. 711; *Greve v. Schweitzer*, 36 Wis. 554; *Chappelear v. Martin*, 45 Ohio St. 132, 12 N. E. 448; *STODDARD v. BURTON*, 41 Iowa, 582.



ties are liable to them. Payment by the drawer or indorser, therefore, unless he be an accommodated party, does not discharge the instrument, but operates as against prior parties by way of purchase.<sup>303</sup> The drawer or indorser is remitted to his former position, and may enforce the instrument against prior parties, or he may again indorse and transfer it; with this exception, however, so far as concerns the drawer: that, if the instrument be payable to the order of a third person, the drawer cannot, of course, upon making payment, again indorse and transfer.<sup>304</sup> Payment by the drawer or indorser does not inure to the benefit of the acceptor or maker; and, therefore, if the drawer or indorser pays to the holder part of the amount due, or even the whole amount, and the holder retains possession of the instrument, he may recover from the acceptor or maker the whole amount. He would then hold the amount recovered as trustee for the drawer or acceptor, or as trustee pro tanto in case partial payment had been made by them.<sup>305</sup>

It is well, perhaps, to append to this statement a few scattered principles usually added by the text writers to their remarks upon this branch of the subject. It is advisable for any party making payment to assure himself that there has been due presentment, protest, and notice, because in default of these he could not recover against the antecedent indorsers or the drawer under liability to him. It is also advisable for him to look to the identity of the holder, and that he traces a legal title to the instrument. And lastly that he take the instrument itself into his possession, because

<sup>303</sup> As to indorser, *West Boston Sav. Bank v. Thompson*, 124 Mass. 506; *Howe Mach. Co. v. Hadden*, 8 Bliss. 208, Fed. Cas. No. 6,785; *Hayling v. Mullhall*, 2 W. Bl. 1235; *Morgan v. Reintzel*, 7 Cranch, 273. As to drawer, *CALLOW v. LAWRENCE*, 3 Maule & S. 95; *Benj. Chalm. art. 234*; *Story, Bills*, § 422; *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 427. In *CALLOW v. LAWRENCE* the drawer of a bill payable to his own order, and indorsed by him to T., and by T. to B., upon the bill being dishonored, paid the amount to B., who struck out his own and T.'s indorsement, and returned it to the drawer, and the drawer afterwards passed it to the plaintiff. It was held that the plaintiff might recover against the acceptor.

<sup>304</sup> *Beck v. Robley*, 1 H. Bl. 89, note; *GARDNER v. MAYNARD*, 7 Allen (Mass.) 599. See *Neg. Inst. L.* § 202.

<sup>305</sup> *JONES v. BROADHURST*, 9 C. B. 173; *MADISON SQUARE BANK v. PIERCE*, 137 N. Y. 444, 33 N. E. 557.

that is prima facie evidence of payment, and also that he strengthen this evidence by taking a separate voucher as a receipt.<sup>306</sup> This last course is especially desirable in case of an indorser making payment, because, in his action against prior parties, possession of the instrument is in some cases not sufficient evidence of its payment by him, and it is necessary for him to show the fact of payment by himself affirmatively. For this purpose a receipt, while not conclusive, is yet very strong proof.<sup>307</sup> The person to whom payment must be made is the legal holder or his duly-authorized agent. This legal ownership depends upon two principles. If the instrument is payable to bearer or indorsed in blank, its possession is presumptive evidence of right to collect it.<sup>308</sup> But if it is made payable to order or indorsed to order, the order of the payee is necessary to confer title and right to collect, and mere possession is not presumptive evidence of title.<sup>309</sup> In such cases, where it is lawfully in the holder's possession, there must be shown, in addition, some evidence of agency or legal right to receive the money, as that the holder is the assignee of a bankrupt, or the representative of the dead owner, or the guardian of an infant.<sup>310</sup> The subject of payment by negotiable instrument has already been discussed.<sup>311</sup>

*Same—Payment or Purchase.*

The question sometimes arises whether a transaction amounts to a payment and discharge or to a purchase. For example, while payment in due course by the principal debtor necessarily discharges the instrument, he might pay over the money as agent for another, who intended to become a purchaser of the instrument; and, if the instrument were indorsed to such purchaser, or if, being

<sup>306</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. c. 38, § 2; Tied. Com. Paper, c. 19, §§ 372, 373.

<sup>307</sup> Mendez v. Carreroon, 1 Ld. Raym. 742.

<sup>308</sup> Mauran v. Lamb, 7 Cow. 174; Merritt v. Cole, 14 Hun, 324; Bachellor v. Priest, 12 Pick. 406; Bank of U. S. v. U. S., 2 How. 711.

<sup>309</sup> Doubleday v. Kress, 50 N. Y. 410; PORTER v. CUSHMAN, 19 Ill. 572; Pease v. Warren, 29 Mich. 9.

<sup>310</sup> Bayley, Bills (2d Am. Ed.) 320; 2 Para. Notes & B. 211; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1230; Tied. Com. Paper, § 374.

<sup>311</sup> Ante, p. 19.

payable to bearer, it were delivered to the person paying over the money as agent for the purchaser, the transaction would take effect as a purchase. Whether such a transaction is a payment or a purchase depends upon the intention of the parties. In the case supposed, if the instrument were transferable by delivery, it might have been the intention of the holder simply to receive payment, and to deliver up the instrument to the person discharging it, or it might have been his intention to make a sale of the instrument. So far as the acts of the parties go, the transaction might take effect either as payment or as purchase. But the seller even of paper transferable by delivery incurs liability by virtue of his implied warranties, and, in order that the transaction may take effect as a sale, there must be evidence, either by his words or his acts, of his intention to sell. In the case supposed, since his acts would not necessarily indicate any intention to assume such liability, the transaction would take effect as payment and discharge.<sup>312</sup> So if a stranger pays the amount due to the holder, and he delivers over the instrument, the transaction will take effect as payment, unless the holder has in some way evidenced his intention to transfer the instrument to the payor as purchaser.<sup>313</sup> If the facts are in dispute, the question is for the jury, to be determined according to the intention of the parties as evidenced by their words and acts.<sup>314</sup>

*Same—Payment Supra Protest.*

Ordinarily one who, without request, pays the debt of another, acquires thereby no right of reimbursement against the debtor. By the law merchant, however, an exception exists in the case of what is known as "payment supra protest," or "for honor," introduced in aid of the credit and circulation of bills of exchange, but not ex-

<sup>312</sup> LANCEY v. CLARK, 64 N. Y. 209; Burr v. Smith, 21 Barb. 262; Eastman v. Plumer, 82 N. H. 238; Greening v. Patten, 51 Wis. 150, 8 N. W. 107.

<sup>313</sup> Burr v. Smith, *supra*. Where notes were surrendered by collection bank, uncanceled, to one under no obligation to pay, who stated that he wished to purchase, and not to pay, them, and who gave full value, not knowing that the bank held them for collection, the transaction was a purchase. Cussen v. Brandt, 97 Va. 1, 32 S. E. 791.

<sup>314</sup> Kyne v. Erskine, 7 Mo. App. 591; Dougherty v. Deeney, 45 Iowa, 443; Swope v. Leffingwell, 72 Mo. 348.

tended to promissory notes. Where a bill has been protested for non-payment, any party, whether drawer, drawee, payee, or indorser, and also a mere stranger, may pay it, without request, for the honor of any party or parties. In case of such payment the payor has a right of reimbursement against the party for whose honor he intervenes and against all prior parties.<sup>315</sup> Subsequent parties are thereby discharged. His position is the same in effect as if he were the indorsee of the person for whose honor he intervened, and had himself paid the bill to the holder. If he pays for honor generally,—that is, for the honor of all parties to the bill,—he may recover against all parties. If he pays for the honor of the acceptor, he may sue him alone. If he pays for the honor of the drawer, he may sue the drawer and the acceptor. The cases are in conflict, however, as to whether he may in such case recover from an accommodation acceptor. That he may so recover has been finally established in England,<sup>316</sup> upon the ground that “the person who takes up a bill *supra* protest for the honor of a particular party succeeds to the title of the person from whom, not for whom, he receives it, and has all the title of such person to sue upon it, except that he discharges all the parties to the bill subsequent to the one for whose honor he takes it up, and that he cannot indorse it over.”<sup>317</sup> The contrary doctrine is maintained by Mr. Daniel upon the ground that he succeeds as against parties anterior to the one for whose honor he pays to the rights of that party.<sup>318</sup> The payment must be preceded or accompanied by a declaration for whose honor he pays, to be made in the presence of a notary public, and the declaration must be recorded by the notary in the protest or in a separate instrument. The payor must also notify the party for whose honor he intervenes.<sup>319</sup>

<sup>315</sup> *MERTENS v. WINNINGTON*, 1 Esp. 113; *In re Overend*, L. R. 6 Eq. 344.

<sup>316</sup> *In re Overend* (overruling *Ex parte LAMBERT*, 13 Ves. 179), *supra*; *Ex parte Wackerbarth*, 5 Ves. 574.

<sup>317</sup> *In re Overend*, *supra*, per Sir R. Malins, V. C.

<sup>318</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1255. See, also, *McDowell v. Cook*, 14 Miss. 420; *Gazzam v. Armstrong*, 3 Dana (Ky.) 554. It would seem that the English rule is adopted by Neg. Inst. L. § 304, but this is perhaps not free from doubt.

<sup>319</sup> As to payment *supra* protest, see, generally, Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 1254–1258; Rand. Com. Paper, §§ 1194–1197, 1437; Neg. Inst. L. §§ 300–306.

**119. DISCHARGE BY ACT OF HOLDER.**—The holder may discharge the instrument by

- (a) Renunciation or release at or after maturity;
- (b) Cancellation.

The holder may waive his right to payment, and if, at or after maturity, he absolutely and unconditionally renounces or releases his right against the acceptor or maker, he thereby discharges the instrument.<sup>320</sup> A renunciation before maturity, like payment before maturity, does not affect the rights of innocent purchasers.<sup>321</sup> The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that a renunciation must be in writing, unless the instrument is delivered up to the person primarily liable thereon.<sup>322</sup> The requirement that the renunciation must be in writing changes the law, for at common law the renunciation may be by way of gift evidenced in any way.<sup>323</sup> So, too, the holder may waive his right to payment by an intentional cancellation of the instrument. If the cancellation be made unintentionally, or under a mistake, it is inoperative; but the burden lies upon the party who alleges that it was unintentional to establish the fact.<sup>324</sup> Cancellation may be made by destruction of the instrument,<sup>325</sup> and it may doubtless be made in any other way that evi-

<sup>320</sup> FOSTER v. DAWBER, 6 Exch. 839.

<sup>321</sup> DOD v. EDWARDS, 2 Car. & P. 602 (general release); MORLEY v. CULVERWELL, 7 Mees. & W. 174.

<sup>322</sup> Section 203.

<sup>323</sup> FOSTER v. DAWBER, 6 Exch. 839, 20 Law J. Exch. 385, per Willes, J. This is an exception to the common-law rule that simple contracts cannot be discharged after breach except by deed or for consideration. Byles, Bills (Wood's Ed.) \*199. But many cases have refused to recognize such an exception, holding that the renunciation may be by way of gift, but that to constitute a gift there must be delivery with intention of passing title. Bragg v. Danielson, 141 Mass. 195, 4 N. E. 622; SLADE v. MUTRIE, 156 Mass. 19, 30 N. E. 168; Henderson v. Henderson, 21 Mo. 379; Benj. Chalm. Bills & N. art. 239, and notes; 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 503. Of course, renunciation accompanied by surrender is sufficient. Sherman v. Sherman, 3 Ind. 337; Hale v. Rice, 124 Mass. 292; Stewart v. Hadden, 13 Minn. 43 (Gil. 29).

<sup>324</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 200, 204.

<sup>325</sup> Blade v. Noland, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 173; Larkin v. Hardenbrook, 90 N. Y. 333.

dences upon the face of the instrument that it is canceled, as by obliteration, writing, stamping, or tearing. It may be made before maturity; but, in order that it may be a defense in such case against a bona fide purchaser for value, it must be of such a character as to carry notice to him on the face of the instrument.<sup>326</sup>

*Discharge by Operation of Law.*

The instrument is discharged in certain cases by operation of law, irrespective of the intention of the parties.<sup>327</sup> For example, when the holder appoints the acceptor or maker his executor, though this common-law rule is generally abolished by statute;<sup>328</sup> or where the payee of a note, being a woman, intermarries with the maker, the note is discharged, and cannot be revived by the husband's

<sup>326</sup> In *INGHAM v. PRIMROSE*, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 82, defendant accepted a bill, and delivered it to M to get it discounted. M, failing to obtain a discount, returned it to defendant, who, in M's presence, tore it in half, with the intention of canceling it, and threw it away in the street. M picked it up, and afterwards pasted the pieces together, and passed it to a bona fide purchaser, who indorsed it to plaintiff. A verdict was directed for defendant, with leave to plaintiff to move to enter verdict for him, the court to be at liberty to draw inferences of fact. It was held that the bill was good in the hands of a bona fide purchaser, and that it was for the jury whether the bill on its face indicated that it had been canceled; and the court, performing the function of a jury under the rule, found that the purchaser was not so affected with notice by the appearance of the bill. Defendant's treatment of the bill was clearly a cancellation, but it seems that the appearance of the bill was such as to affect him with notice, even if the defense were personal. Cf. *Scholey v. Ramsbottom*, 2 Camp. 485. In *BAXENDALE v. BENNETT*, 3 Q. B. Div. 525, Brett, B., said that in *INGHAM v. PRIMROSE* the acceptor was held liable "because, said the court, although he did intend to cancel it, yet he did not cancel it. It seems to me difficult to approve that case, and the correct mode of dealing with it is to say we do not agree with it." If a bill or note were canceled by obliteration or stamping, and the cancellation marks were subsequently fraudulently erased, so that the question of notice from the face of the instrument did not arise, it is clear that the defense of cancellation would be good against a bona fide purchaser. *District of Columbia v. Cornell*, 130 U. S. 655, 9 Sup. Ct. 694. The English Bills of Exchange Act provides (section 63): "Where a bill is intentionally canceled by the holder or his agent, and the cancellation is apparent thereon, the bill is discharged."

<sup>327</sup> *FREAKLEY v. FOX*, 9 Barn. & C. 130.

<sup>328</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 1283, 1285.

death;<sup>829</sup> and where a note made by a single woman, who afterwards marries, is transferred to her husband, the note is discharged, and cannot be revived by a retransfer by the husband to the payee.<sup>830</sup> These rules are doubtless affected in many states by legislation concerning the property rights of married women. Other instances of discharge commonly cited are discharge of the debtor by an insolvent or bankruptcy act, and merger of the right of action against a party to the instrument in a judgment against him. These discharges, however, are not discharges of the instrument. Nor does the discharge of a bankrupt release a party secondarily liable.

**120-121. DISCHARGE OF PARTIES SECONDARILY LIABLE.**—Where the holder of a negotiable instrument does any act which will impair any right of the drawer or of any indorser against other parties to the instrument liable to him, it operates as a discharge of the obligation of the drawer or indorser. This does not apply if, subsequent to such discharge, a purchaser for value without notice before maturity acquires the instrument.

In addition to the methods of discharge extinguishing the instrument itself as an obligation must be mentioned the methods of discharge extinguishing the several contracts of the drawer and indorsers in their character of a surety thereupon by operation of the general rule of suretyship applied to the law of negotiable bills and notes.<sup>831</sup> The principle underlying this method is that if the holder of a bill or note does any act which will impair any right of the drawer or indorsers against other parties to the instrument liable to him, the drawer or indorser will be discharged. The reason for this rule is the promise implied in law, that, if either the drawer or indorser pays the instrument, parties liable to him will reimburse him for such payment, and that to effect such end upon payment the

<sup>829</sup> ABBOTT v. WINCHESTER, 105 Mass. 115.

<sup>830</sup> CHAPMAN v. KELLOGG, 102 Mass. 246.

<sup>831</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. § 201.



drawer or indorser is entitled to demand its possession from the creditor, and to be subrogated to all remedies possessed by him against the prior parties thereon, unimpaired by any act of such creditor,—a promise which the creditor also impliedly ratifies in making his contract with the indorser.<sup>332</sup> If the creditor violates any part of this contract, this violation releases the indorser. From this principle flow several principles which are of very common application. They are as follows:

(1) Whatever discharges the acceptor or maker discharges the drawer or indorsers, because the ultimate remedies of the drawer or indorsers are against these parties, and releasing them extinguishes the obligation which in turn they, as sureties, undertook should be performed.<sup>333</sup>

(2) Any act of the holder which discharges a prior indorser discharges subsequent ones, because such prior indorser guaranteed subsequent indorsers that he would pay if the maker or acceptor did not. As far as they were concerned, he stood in the position of a principal upon the contract, and the release of their principal also releases them. A discharge of a prior indorser therefore is like a discharge of the maker or acceptor, and the holder violates this contract with them.<sup>334</sup>

<sup>332</sup> *SHUTTS v. FINGAR*, 100 N. Y. 539, 3 N. E. 588; *Goodyear v. Watson*, 14 Barb. 481; *Clason v. Morris*, 10 Johns. 524. A valid tender, like payment, discharges parties secondarily liable. *Spurgeon v. Smitha*, 114 Ind. 453, 17 N. E. 105; *Joslyn v. Eastman*, 46 Vt. 258; *Neg. Inst. L. § 201*. A release of the principal debtor with an express reservation of the holder's right of recourse against the party secondarily liable does not discharge the latter, his rights against the principal debtor being reserved by implication. *STEWART v. EDEN*, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 121; *ROCKVILLE NAT. BANK v. HOLT*, 58 Conn. 526, 20 Atl. 669; *Daniel*, *Neg. Inst. § 1310*; *Neg. Inst. L. § 201*.

<sup>333</sup> *Sargent v. Appleton*, 6 Mass. 85; *Couch v. Waring*, 9 Conn. 261; *Gunnis v. Welgley*, 114 Pa. St. 194, 6 Atl. 465.

<sup>334</sup> *Newcomb v. Raynor*, 21 Wend. 108. In this case it was held by Nelson, C. J., that, "as between the first and subsequent indorsers, the former must be regarded in the light of principal. He stands behind them upon the paper, and is bound to take it up, in case of default of the maker. A discharge of him, therefore, by the holder (regarding the relative position of the parties), on general principles, operates to release them." *SHUTTS v. FINGAR*, 100 N. Y. 539, 3 N. E. 588.

(3) If the holder releases securities held by him as collateral to claims against parties against whom the indorser would have recourse, it releases the indorser pro tanto. This is because the surety, upon payment of the claim against his principal, has a right to be put in the place of the creditor. He has a right to enforce every means of payment against the principal debtor the creditor had. These securities were a means of such enforcement, and he has a right to them. Every remedy the creditor had, upon payment by the surety, belongs to him. And if the creditor impairs the rights of the surety in this respect, he breaks his contract with him and releases him.<sup>335</sup>

(4) Where the holder of the instrument upon a valid consideration makes a definite promise to extend the time or forbear suit against a party liable to a drawer or indorser, this discharges the drawer or indorser. The reasons for this rule are that it creates a contract different from the one the surety guaranteed, and that it prevents the surety from protecting himself by paying forthwith the principal's debt and immediately bringing suit against him.<sup>336</sup> But it

<sup>335</sup> *Goodyear v. Watson*, 14 Barb. 481; *Clason v. Morris*, 10 Johns. 539; *Craythorne v. Swinburne*, 14 Ves. 169; *Mathews v. Alkin*, 1 N. Y. 595.

<sup>336</sup> *Siebeneck v. Anchor Sav. Bank*, 111 Pa. St. 187, 2 Atl. 485; *Batavian Bank v. McDonald*, 77 Wis. 486, 46 N. W. 902; *Stevens v. Oaks*, 58 Mich. 343, 25 N. W. 309; *English v. Darley*, 2 Bos. & P. 61. In the case of *Okie v. Spencer*, 2 Whart. 253, the holder of a note took a check from the maker, dated six days subsequent to the maturity of the note, and with the understanding that the check was to be in full satisfaction of such note, if paid. It was held that this constituted an extension to the maker, and discharged an indorser. In the case of *Tiernan v. Woodruff*, 5 McLean, 350, Fed. Cas. No. 14,028, a bankrupt obtained for a valuable consideration, from a creditor, two months' time, during which the creditor's right to bring suit was suspended. It was claimed by the indorser that this operated to discharge him from his indorsement, but it was held that since, by the bankrupt law, the bankrupt was discharged of all liability, and since the sole remedy of the indorser lay in his presentation of his future liability against the bankrupt's estate, his right was not prejudiced by the extension of time, and there was no discharge. In *LAXTON v. PEAT*, 2 Camp. 185, it was held that if the indorsee of a bill of exchange, having notice that it was accepted without consideration, receive part payment from the drawer, and give him time to pay the residue, he thereby discharges the acceptor. In the case of *Pannell v. M'Mechen*, 4 Har. & J. (Md.) 474, "the drawer and indorser of a note, being unable to meet their engagements,

must be a new contract which is created and substituted for the old one. It must be with the principal himself,<sup>337</sup> and must have a valid consideration.<sup>338</sup> It must be absolute,<sup>339</sup> and not indefinite.<sup>340</sup> And it must have all other requisites necessary to create a contract. The surety must not assent to it,<sup>341</sup> and it must be with-

proposed to compound with their creditors, and executed a deed of trust to trustees, of whom the defendant was one, to be applied to the payment of debts in the order directed, thereby securing to the defendant the payment of the note in question, on the terms that such creditors as should become parties to the deed should have an interest in the property conveyed. The deed contained a clause releasing the drawer and first indorser, on the express terms that the release should extend to no other terms. The plaintiff and defendant assented, and signed the instrument. \* \* \* Therefore \* \* \* the court are clearly of the opinion that the release in this case cannot discharge the defendant." (Per Johnson, J.) In *Callott v. Haigh*, 3 Camp. 281, it was held that the drawer of an accommodation bill was not discharged by time being given the acceptor, and in *FENTUM v. POCOCK*, 5 Taunt. 192, it was held that, if the holder of a bill accepted for the accommodation of the drawer takes a cognovit from the drawer for payment by installments, he does not thereby discharge the acceptor, whether the holder knew at the time of taking the bill that it was an accommodation bill or not. As to the effect of release, where the paper was made or accepted for accommodation, see Daniel, *Neg. Inst.* §§ 1332a-1338a; Benj. Chalm. *Bills & N.* p. 259.

<sup>337</sup> *Harbert v. Dumont*, 3 Port. (Ind.) 346.

<sup>338</sup> *McLemore v. Powell*, 12 Wheat. 554. It was held by Justice Story, in this case, that: "The case then resolves itself into this question,—whether a mere agreement with the drawers for a delay, without any consideration for it, and without any communication with, or assent of, the indorser, is a discharge of the latter, after he has been fixed in his responsibility by the refusal of the drawee, and due notice to himself, and we are all of opinion that it does not. \* \* \* In order to produce such a result, the agreement must be one binding in law upon the parties, and have sufficient consideration to support it." *Davis v. Graham*, 29 Iowa, 514; *Galbraith v. Fullerton*, 53 Ill. 126.

<sup>339</sup> *Hansberger v. Gelger*, 3 Grat. 144.

<sup>340</sup> *Gardner v. Watson*, 13 Ill. 347; *Blackstone Bank v. Hill*, 10 Pick. 133; *Abel v. Alexander*, 45 Ind. 523; *People's Bank v. Legrand*, 103 Pa. St. 309; *Beach v. Zimmerman*, 106 Ind. 498, 7 N. E. 237.

<sup>341</sup> *Gloucester Bank v. Worcester*, 10 Pick. 528; *Prouty v. Wilson*, 123 Mass. 297; *Smith v. Hawkins*, 6 Conn. 444; *ROCKVILLE NAT. BANK v. HOLT*, 58 Conn. 526, 20 Atl. 669.

out reservation as to him.<sup>342</sup> It is to be added, by way of caution, that this rule must not be understood to mean mere delay,<sup>343</sup> nor part payment,<sup>344</sup> nor the receipt by the creditor of collateral security to protect his claim.<sup>345</sup> For these in no wise prejudice the surety in his position.

## SUMMARY OF DEFENSES.

### Real Defenses.

- (1) Incapacity to contract: (a) infancy; (b) coverture, in some jurisdictions; (c) insanity; (d) intoxication; (e) corporate incapacity.
- (2) Illegality, when the contract is declared void by statute.
- (3) The discharge of the instrument by (a) alteration; (b) cancellation; (c) payment, or renunciation or release, at or after maturity.

### Personal Defenses.

- (1) Fraud, whereby the defendant was induced to execute the instrument;
- (2) Duress;
- (3) Want or failure of consideration;
- (4) Illegality, unless the contract is declared void by statute;
- (5) Payment, or renunciation or release, before maturity;
- (6) Discharge of party secondarily liable by discharge of prior party.

---

<sup>342</sup> *Muir v. Crawford*, L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 456; *Owen v. Homan*, 4 H. L. Cas. 997; *Neg. Inst. L.* § 201.

<sup>343</sup> *POWELL v. WATERS*, 17 Johns. 176; *Sterling v. Marietta & S. Trading Co.*, 11 Serg. & R. 179; *Freemans Bank v. Rollins*, 13 Me. 202; *Sohn v. Morton*, 92 Ind. 170.

<sup>344</sup> *Greenawalt v. McDowell*, 65 Pa. St. 464; *Hill v. Bostick*, 10 Yerg. 410.

<sup>345</sup> *Beard v. Root*, 4 Hun, 357; *Cary v. White*, 52 N. Y. 138; *Andrews v. Marrett*, 58 Me. 539; *CONTINENTAL LIFE INS. CO. v. BARBER*, 50 Conn. 567.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE.

- 122. What Constitutes.
- 123-124. Value.
- 125-127. Notice.
- 128-131. Presumption and Burden of Proof—Order of Proof.

#### WHAT CONSTITUTES.

**122. To constitute a purchaser of a negotiable instrument a purchaser for value without notice, the purchase must be:**

- (a) For a valuable consideration.
- (b) Without notice of facts which impeach its validity between antecedent parties.

It remains in this chapter to examine consideration and notice, the two other elements of bona fide title yet undiscussed. The purchaser, in order to entitle him to the immunities of negotiability, must be both a holder for value, and also a holder without notice.<sup>1</sup> Both of these factors must concur in his holding. A purchaser for value may or may not be a purchaser without notice. A purchaser without notice irrespective of the rights he may acquire upon transfer, cannot overcome equities if he has paid no value. In the former case it makes little difference that the holder took the instrument and paid its face for it; in the latter, that he took the instrument in the truest faith.<sup>2</sup> In the present chapter we shall consider the questions: What consideration is necessary to make the holder a purchaser for value,<sup>3</sup> and how far "antecedent" or "pre-ex-

<sup>1</sup> Paper transferred after maturity, see ante, p. 207. As to what constitutes a "holder in due course," see Neg. Inst. L. § 91. Cf. §§ 90-98.

<sup>2</sup> Northampton Nat. Bank v. Kidder, 106 N. Y. 221, 12 N. E. 577; Weaver v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 286.

<sup>3</sup> "The rule appears to be settled, that a promissory note, to be the subject

isting" indebtedness is sufficient; what constitutes notice; and, lastly, what presumptions of evidence attach to a negotiable bill or note in the hands of a bona fide holder<sup>4</sup> upon trial.

### VALUE.

123. Value, as a consideration for transfer, means any legal consideration sufficient to support a contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt in most jurisdictions constitutes value sufficient for a consideration for a negotiable bill or note or the transfer thereof.

124. THE TRANSFER.—A bill or note transferred as collateral to an indebtedness is in most jurisdictions transferred for value and upon a sufficient consideration.

"Value" in the term "purchaser for value" means "either money or money's worth."<sup>5</sup> It may be cash paid out. It may be goods given. It may be rights surrendered. It may be liabilities incurred. Any-

of sale, must be an existing valid note in the hands of the payee, and given for some actual consideration, so that it can be enforced between the original parties." Noxon, J., in *SWEET v. CHAPMAN*, 7 Hun (N. Y.) 576. Where a note is discounted by a bank to extinguish a debt which is owed to the bank by the holder, or where it applies the proceeds for the purpose of discharging his liabilities, the acts of the bank amount to the payment of value at the time, and the bank is a holder for valuable consideration. *BANK OF SANDUSKY v. SCOVILLE*, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 115. To the same effect, see *BANK OF SALINA v. BABCOCK*, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 499. In *BROWN v. LEAVITT*, 31 N. Y. 113, it was held that where a note is indorsed and delivered to a party, before it falls due, in payment of a note already due, such transaction constitutes the party a holder for value. And see *Rice v. Grange* (N. Y. App.) 30 N. E. 46, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 174.

<sup>4</sup> "Bona fide holder," "innocent indorsee," "bona fide holder without notice and for value," "purchaser in the usual course of business," "purchaser in due course," "holder in due course," "purchaser without notice," are terms indifferently and synonymously, though loosely, applied to what is in this section termed "the purchaser for value without notice." The Negotiable Instruments Law, like the English Bills of Exchange Act, uses the term "holder in due course." "The act has substituted the term 'holder in due course' for the cumbersome equivalent 'bona fide holder for value without notice'; and its synonyms 'bona fide holder,' 'innocent holder,' etc." Chalm. Bills Exch. (4th Ed.) 89.

<sup>5</sup> 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. p. 867.

thing which men in business call "property," anything for which a court, on some one being deprived of it, would award damages, is value; and the purchaser who gives it in exchange for a bill or note is a purchaser for value, or a purchaser for a valuable consideration.

Antecedent indebtedness means a debt already existing at the time of the execution of a contract, whatever it may be. Such, for example, are a note for which a renewal note is given, or a debt created in buying goods for which, at the expiration of the terms of credit for which the goods were sold, a note is given in extension. The importance of the doctrine relates almost always to the question whether the purchaser of the paper is a holder for value or not. If he is to be treated as a holder for value, then the defenses in favor of prior parties are ruled out; if not, then any prior party may raise such defenses as he has against the person who has taken the instrument without notice, but in consideration of the alleged antecedent indebtedness.

The wisest theory, all things being considered, is the doctrine of Judge Story.\* He lays down the doctrine that receiving such paper in payment or as security for a pre-existing debt is receiving it for a valuable consideration. "It is for the benefit and convenience of the commercial world," he says, "to give as wide an extension as practicable to the credit and circulation of negotiable paper, that it may pass, not only as security for new purchases and advances, made upon the transfer thereof, but also in payment of and as security for pre-existing debts. The creditor is thereby enabled to realize or to secure his debt, and thus may safely give a prolonged credit, or forbear from taking any legal steps to enforce his rights.

\* *SWIFT v. TYSON*, 14 Curt. Dec. 166, 16 Pet. 1, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 179. The opinion in *SWIFT v. TYSON*, so far as it declared that paper taken as collateral security for an antecedent debt is taken for value, has been the subject of adverse criticism; but it has been affirmed after full discussion in *Brooklyn City & N. R. Co. v. National Bank*, 102 U. S. 14. Harlan, J., said: "Our conclusion, therefore, is that the transfer, before maturity, of negotiable paper, as security for an antecedent debt merely, without other circumstances, if the paper be so indorsed that the holder becomes a party to the instrument, although the transfer is without express agreement by the creditor for indulgence, is not an improper use of such paper, and is as much in the usual course of commercial business as its transfer in payment of such debt. In either case, the bona fide holder is unaffected by equities or defenses between prior parties, of which he had no notice."



The debtor also has the advantage of making his negotiable securities of equivalent value to cash. \* \* \* The [opposite] doctrine would strike a fatal blow at all discounts of negotiable securities for pre-existing debts." This doctrine is followed by the weight of authority throughout the United States. And it certainly seems the sounder business policy to maintain that the transfer of a negotiable security both in payment and as security for an antecedent debt is a transfer for value.<sup>1</sup> However, the courts of some jurisdictions, and particularly of the state of New York, have taken issue with the doctrine of Judge Story. The reasoning of these courts is based not so much upon the practical doctrines of commercial convenience as upon the strict logic of the law itself. Their doctrine is that the position of the bona fide holder rests its foundations upon the equitable doctrine that a purchaser who holds the legal title to property merely as security or as the payment of a pre-existing debt, without parting with anything of value, is not entitled to hold as against the prior equitable owner. The two elements of absence of knowledge and value given must concur to make the holder's equity a superior one. And taking the instrument as a mere security or in nominal payment of a pre-existing debt is not giving value for it. Hence, the position of the holder, lacking the element of value given,

<sup>1</sup> Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 1 How. 234; Barney v. Earle, 13 Ala. 106; BRUSH v. SCRIBNER, 11 Conn. 388; Meadow v. Bird, 22 Ga. 246; Conkling v. Vall, 31 Ill. 166; McKnight v. Knisely, 25 Ind. 336; Homes v. Smyth, 16 Me. 177; Blanchard v. Stevens, 3 Cush. 162; Thacher v. Pray, 113 Mass. 291; OUTHWITE v. PORTER, 13 Mich. 533; Stevenson v. Hyland, 11 Minn. 198 (Gil. 128); Struthers v. Kendall, 41 Pa. St. 214; Dixon v. Dixon, 31 Vt. 450. See, also, Bridgeport Bank v. Welch, 29 Conn. 475; Manning v. McClure, 36 Ill. 490; Washington Bank v. Lewis, 22 Pick. 24; FISHER v. FISHER, 98 Mass. 303; Armour v. McMichael, 36 N. J. Law, 92; Cobb v. Doyle, 7 R. I. 350; Newman v. Aultman, Miller & Co. (Tenn.) 51 S. W. 198. In the case of CURRIE v. MISA, L. R. 10 Exch. 153, it was held that the title of a creditor to a negotiable security given to him on account of a pre-existing debt, and received by him bona fide and without notice of any infirmity of title on the part of the debtor, is indefeasible, whether that security be payable at a future time or on demand. In the case of FRANZIA v. JOSEPH, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 182, it was held that where a note was given to A to get it discounted, and he gave it to B in payment of a pre-existing debt of his own, he who took the note could not hold it as against the owner, even though he was ignorant of the manner in which it came into the possession of A, and though the note was received as a consideration for his forbearance.

does not entitle him to overthrow the defenses which other parties may interpose.<sup>8</sup> There must be value given or allowed on his part on the strength of the identical paper on which the action is brought to make the holder a purchaser for value.<sup>9</sup> The comparative equities of prior parties and the holder turn upon this point. In case of payment the question is whether he has taken the instrument in nominal payment, without other evidence of intention to discharge it than the ordinary business transaction of accepting it, or receiving it in payment, or crediting it on account. In each of these latter cases he stands in the position he held before receipt of the paper, with the added property of the paper in his hands, for which he has neither given nor suffered anything. His right to proceed upon the original indebtedness after the maturity of the paper is unimpaired. And equity will not tolerate his holding the additional paper to the prejudice of those parties who have prior rights or defenses which render his claim a wrongful one. Hence, the rule is established in many states, in contradiction to the wiser theory of Judge Story, that one who receives paper before it is due, without any notice or knowledge of any fraud in its inception or transfer, but for a precedent debt, and without parting with any value or valuable consideration, does not acquire a valid title to the paper, but takes it subject to all its infirmities.<sup>10</sup> The courts who have adopted this position have, however, confined the scope of the rule to narrow limits. If it appears that the holder has in any wise given value for the transfer, his title has been supported. This has given rise to a large number of decisions as to the meaning of value in taking paper, both in payment of and as collateral security for a precedent debt, which may be approximately<sup>11</sup> classified as follows:

(1) Value is given upon transfer when the instrument is transferred

<sup>8</sup> *STALKER v. McDONALD*, 6 Hill, 93. In this case it was held that where the person receiving the bill has taken it merely in payment or security of an antecedent debt, having neither parted with value on the credit of it nor given up a previous security, he will not be entitled to hold the bill against the former rightful owner, in case of an unauthorized transfer.

<sup>9</sup> *BAY v. CODDINGTON*, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 54, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 183.

<sup>10</sup> *PHOENIX INS. CO. v. CHURCH*, 81 N. Y. 218; *Comstock v. Hler*, 73 N. Y. 269; *Turner v. Treadway*, 53 N. Y. 650; *Weaver v. Barden*, 49 N. Y. 286;

---

<sup>11</sup> The term "approximately" is used because many of the decisions are apparently irreconcilable.

in satisfaction of a pre-existing debt, whether it is in whole or part payment of the debt,<sup>12</sup> or whether the instrument surrendered has matured, or is not yet due.<sup>13</sup> This is because the creditor, in surrendering his rights under the old debt in exchange for the new paper, parts with value.<sup>14</sup>

(2) Value is given upon transfer when, at the time thereof, security is surrendered by the holder in consideration of the receipt by him of the instrument. Such a holder takes the instrument free from the defenses of antecedent parties, to the extent of the collaterals surrendered.<sup>15</sup>

The situation of the creditor discharging a pre-existing debt or surrendering securities in consideration of the transfer of paper to him, from a legal point of view, is not similar to that of a creditor receiving paper as collateral security for a debt due from the transferrer to him. In taking the paper as collateral security, the creditor still retains all his rights upon the original indebtedness. The paper is received by him merely to further assure the certainty of the recovery of his debt. He may or may not recover it in full, and if he does not he may proceed upon his collateral. Therefore, in weighing the comparative equities of such persons and those from whom the paper has been derived through wrong, the turning point is naturally value. This renders the equity superior or inferior according as it has or has not been given. And in determining the question, the cases have been classified as follows:

(1) Where the debt is contracted at the time of transfer and on the faith of the bill or note, or indorsement of a third party as col-

Lawrence v. Clark, 36 N. Y. 128; Farrington v. Frankford Bank, 24 Barb. 554; Moore v. Ryder, 65 N. Y. 438; Potts v. Mayer, 74 N. Y. 594; Rosa v. Brotherson, 10 Wend. 85; Payne v. Cutler, 13 Wend. 605; Goggerly v. Cuthbert, 2 Bos. & P. (N. R.) 170; Evans v. Kymer, 1 Barn. & Adol. 528; Jones v. Fort, 9 Barn. & C. 764; Wormley v. Lowry, 1 Humph. 468; Ingham v. Vaden, 8 Humph. 51; Rhea v. Allison, 3 Head, 176; Hickerson v. Raiguel, 2 Helsk. 329.

<sup>12</sup> CHRYSLER v. RENOIS, 43 N. Y. 209.

<sup>13</sup> Day v. Saunders, 1 Abb. Dec. 495; Youngs v. Lee, 12 N. Y. 551.

<sup>14</sup> Mayer v. Heidelbach, 123 N. Y. 332, 25 N. E. 416; American Exch. Nat. Bank v. New York B. & P. Co., 74 Hun, 446, 26 N. Y. Supp. 822; WARD v.

---

<sup>15</sup> Goodwin v. Conklin, 85 N. Y. 21; PHOENIX INS. CO. v. CHURCH, 81 N. Y. 218; Park Bank v. Watson, 42 N. Y. 490; BANK OF SALINA v. BABCOCK, 21 Wend. 499.

lateral security, that debt itself forms a part of the consideration of the transfer and constitutes value. This is because the holder may be supposed to part with his property upon the faith not only of the principal instrument, but also of the instrument put up as collateral. The two, as elements of the consideration, are inseparable. The courts will not inquire whether the holder parted with value because of the original or because of the collateral paper. They consider such value given for both.<sup>16</sup>

(2) Where the instrument is accommodation paper, that fact is no defense to a holder who receives it as collateral to a pre-existing debt. This is because the delivery of the instrument as collateral is in furtherance of the purpose of the accommodation, which was to obtain credit. The equity of the holder, who so takes it, is therefore superior to that of the accommodation party who gives it.<sup>17</sup> But the reason of this rule ceases to apply, and the rule itself is otherwise, when the instrument has been diverted or procured through fraud.<sup>18</sup>

(3) Where the pre-existing debt has fallen due, and there is a transfer of a bill or note as collateral security with an express agreement for delay. The forbearance is a sufficient consideration. This is because such forbearance is a surrender by the holder of his valuable right of immediate prosecution.<sup>19</sup> But the rule only applies for the reason that the holder, by valid agreement, has estopped himself from prosecuting. If, therefore, the agreement is invalid, and there is no legal reason why the holder should not prosecute, the

HOWARD, 88 N. Y. 74; CHRYSLER v. RENOIS, 43 N. Y. 209; BROWN v. LEAVITT, 31 N. Y. 113; Youngs v. Lee, 12 N. Y. 551; MIX v. NATIONAL BANK OF BLOOMINGTON, 91 Ill. 20; BARDSLEY v. DELP, 88 Pa. St. 420; Norton v. Walte, 20 Me. 175; BRUSH v. SCRIBNER, 11 Conn. 388; Dixon v. Dixon, 31 Vt. 450; Kellogg v. Fancher, 23 Wis. 21; McKnight v. Knisely, 25 Ind. 336; Mayberry v. Morris, 62 Ala. 116.

<sup>16</sup> Bank of New York v. Vanderhorst, 32 N. Y. 553; Bank of Chenango v. Hyde, 4 Cow. 567; WILLIAMS v. SMITH, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 301.

<sup>17</sup> CONTINENTAL NAT. BANK v. TOWNSEND, 87 N. Y. 8; GROCERS' BANK v. PENFIELD, 69 N. Y. 502; Schepp v. Carpenter, 51 N. Y. 602.

<sup>18</sup> Schepp v. Carpenter, 51 N. Y. 602; Spencer v. Ballou, 18 N. Y. 331; Bank of Rutland v. Buck, 5 Wend. 66.

<sup>19</sup> Mechanics' & F. Bank v. Wixson, 42 N. Y. 438; Traders' Bank v. Bradner, 43 Barb. 379; BURNS v. ROWLAND, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 368; Watson v. Randall, 20 Wend. 201.

receipt of the paper is upon a consideration which is worthless in law, and the holder is deemed to have given no value.<sup>20</sup>

(4) In addition to these rules are the principles already discussed, which apply to the position of the holder taking the instrument as collateral, as well as when he takes it in payment. They are (a) where the note is received in payment of one then surrendered and canceled, or in absolute payment, (b) and where securities are surrendered.

The principles upon which the title of the holder of collateral security rests regulate also the amount which may be collected out of it. The holder, taking paper as collateral, can only recover upon it to the amount of the loss which he suffers upon the original paper; that is to say, the amount for which the paper is itself put up as collateral.<sup>21</sup> If the principal paper is entirely worthless, and in amount equal or in excess of the paper put up as collateral, then he may recover the entire amount of the collateral; but otherwise, it is only what he loses on the principal paper which can measure his damages.<sup>22</sup> The amount which a purchaser who has paid less than the face value may recover, however, depends upon other considerations. It is clear that it would impair the utility of commercial paper as a medium of exchange if the maker or acceptor could interpose even a partial defense against a bona fide purchaser, and could prevent him from recovering the face value of the instrument, because of fraud or other circumstances in its inception, which would have been available between the original parties; and many courts, including the supreme court of the United States, hold that

<sup>20</sup> *Atlantic Nat. Bank of New York v. Franklin*, 55 N. Y. 235.

<sup>21</sup> Where a promissory note has been transferred before maturity by way of collateral security for future indorsements to be made to the transferee, which are afterwards made to him, the transferee is to be treated as a bona fide holder. He cannot recover upon the note beyond the amount of the indorsements it was designed to secure the holder against. *Williams v. Smith*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 301.

<sup>22</sup> *Park Bank v. Watson*, 42 N. Y. 490; *Platt v. Beebe*, 57 N. Y. 339; *Huff v. Wagner*, 63 Barb. 215; *Cardwell v. Hicks*, 37 Barb. 458; *Duncan v. Gilbert*, 29 N. J. Law, 527; *Atlas Bank v. Doyle*, 9 R. L. 76; *Maitland v. Citizens' Nat. Bank*, 40 Md. 540; *Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Barnett*, 27 La. Ann. 177; *Brown v. Callaway*, 41 Ark. 420; *Bell v. Bean*, 75 Cal. 87, 16 Pac. 521. See *Neg. Inst. L.* § 53.

a purchaser may recover the full amount, though he may have paid less than the face value, whatever the equities between the original parties.<sup>23</sup> Such also is the rule as declared by the Negotiable Instruments Law.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, other courts have held that equity will not give the purchaser the benefit of a speculative bargain, but will only protect the purchaser to the extent of his loss.<sup>25</sup>

In conclusion it is to be pointed out that the New York rule that a pre-existing debt is not a consideration sufficient to constitute the holder a bona fide purchaser for value has been abolished in that state by the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which provides that "an antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value, and is deemed such whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time."<sup>26</sup>

#### NOTICE.

**125. Notice is either actual or constructive.**

**126. ACTUAL NOTICE**—Means either knowledge or means of knowledge to which the purchaser dishonestly shuts his eyes.

**127. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE**—Means knowledge to be derived from the face of the instrument. The purchaser is charged with notice of whatever appears thereon.

<sup>23</sup> *Cromwell v. County of Sac*, 96 U. S. 60; *Florida Cent. R. Co. v. Schutte*, 103 U. S. 118; *LAY v. WISSMAN*, 36 Iowa, 305; *KITCHEN v. LOUDENBACK*, 48 Ohio St. 177, 26 N. E. 979

<sup>24</sup> Section 96.

<sup>25</sup> *HOLCOMB v. WYCKOFF*, 35 N. J. Law, 35; *Huff v. Wagner*, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 215; *Harger v. Wilson*, Id. 237; *Oppenheimer v. Farmers' & M. Bank*, 97 Tenn. 19, 36 S. W. 705. Mr. Daniel supports this view. Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 757-758c. The decisions are collected in 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 346. Even in this view a distinction may properly be drawn in case of accommodation paper. *Daniels v. Wilson*, 21 Minn. 530; ante, p. 182.

<sup>26</sup> Section 51. Under this section an indorsee of a note taken as collateral to a pre-existing indebtedness is a holder for value, unaffected by equities between the original parties. *Brewster v. Shrader*, 26 Misc. Rep. 480, 57 N. Y. Supp. 606. See, also, *Rosenwald v. Goldstein* (City Ct. N. Y.) 57 N. Y. Supp. 224.

The second element necessary to support the title of the purchaser to the instrument is that it must be without notice. This, like the doctrine of value, rests upon the principles of equity. It is a long-established equity precedent that when several different and successive claims upon the same subject-matter exist, and there is a contest between the owners of these interests, the person who acquires a right to the property with knowledge that another person has already a claim to it is deemed to take it subject to that claim. The first-named person has the superior right to the property, while the last-named person owns in subordination to this right. Lord Hardwicke has explained the reason to be that "the taking of a legal estate after notice of a prior right makes a person a mala fide purchaser. "This," he says, "is a species of fraud and *dolus malus* itself; for he knew the first purchaser had the clear right of the estate, and, after knowing that, he takes away the right of another person by getting the legal estate. Now, if a person does not stop his hand, but gets the legal estate when he knew the right was in another, *machinatur ad circumveniendum*."<sup>27</sup> Or, in other words, to express the principle in the language of our later day, and to apply it to the subject-matter of bills and notes, the rule is that when a purchaser takes a bill or note by negotiation, without any knowledge of the equities of prior parties, he takes it on an independent title by the negotiation, and will not be affected by these equities, because he is not in privity with such prior party, does not claim under him, and is not bound by his acts, frauds, or admissions.<sup>28</sup> But if he has knowledge of these things at the time of the purchase of the instrument, and is privy to them, then, because of his knowledge, his title must be in subordination to their rights.

<sup>27</sup> *Le Neve v. Le Neve*, 2 Amb. 436.

<sup>28</sup> *Fisher v. Leland*, 4 Oush. (Mass.) 456. In the opinion delivered by Shaw, C. J., in this case, he held that, "when an indorsee takes a bill or note, by indorsement, before it is due, and without notice of fraud or other matter of defense, he takes it on an independent title by the indorsement, and will not be affected by any payment, set-off, fraudulent consideration, or other matter of defense, which the acceptor or promisor might have had against any previous party." *JOHNSON v. WAY*, 27 Ohio St. 374, Johns. Cas Bills & N. 185. As holding that an attachment is unavailable against a bona fide holder for value of negotiable paper who obtains it after attachment before maturity, and without notice, see *KIEFFER v. EHLER*, 18 Pa. St. 388.



This is the fundamental reason for the effect of notice upon the title of the purchaser; and accordingly we find "notice" defined as "the information concerning a fact, actually communicated to a party, by an authorized person, or actually derived by him from a proper person, or else presumed by law to have been acquired by him, which information is regarded as equivalent in its legal effects to full knowledge of the fact, and to which the law attributes the same consequences as would be imputed to knowledge."<sup>29</sup> And in our examination of the question of notice, we shall direct our inquiry to the facts and rules which, according to the law merchant, charge the purchaser with knowledge of the equities of prior parties, and make his title subject to these equities.

Notice may be actual or constructive. Under the classification here adopted,<sup>30</sup> actual notice means not merely knowledge, but means of knowledge to which the party willfully shuts his eyes.<sup>31</sup> In the degree of knowledge necessary to be possessed by the purchaser to charge him with notice, the law merchant departs from the rules of equity. In equity jurisprudence notice may be knowledge of any fact sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to the existence of some right or title in conflict with that he is about to purchase. Such knowledge being shown, the court presumes the purchaser either to have made the inquiry or else holds him guilty of negligence equally fatal to his claim to be considered a bona fide holder. It is the duty of each purchaser of other property, if facts are brought directly home to him such as would put a reasonably prudent man upon his guard, to prosecute an inquiry. And if the facts of defense, existing, but latent, would have been discovered if the investigation of the purchaser had been pursued to its natural, logical end, then the purchaser, if he did not pursue the inquiry, cannot be deemed to have taken his title in good faith.<sup>32</sup> This doctrine the law merchant rejects. And it is now the rule of the law merchant that mere knowledge of any facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man on inquiry is not sufficient.

<sup>29</sup> Pom. Eq. Jur. § 594.

<sup>30</sup> 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 868. It is to be noted that "constructive notice" is sometimes used with a broader meaning than that here given, so as to include means of knowledge whether to be derived from the face of the instrument or from other sources.

<sup>31</sup> May v. Chapman, 16 Mees. & W. 355.

<sup>32</sup> Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354.

but that to defeat his claim to be considered a bona fide holder he must be guilty of bad faith.<sup>33</sup> Actual mala fides must be shown to the satisfaction of the jury to deprive a holder for value of the character of bona fide holder,<sup>34</sup> and negligence in not inquiring into facts which ought to have put him on inquiry is not sufficient. Gross carelessness, even, on the part of the holder is not conclusive of notice, though it is, of course, perfectly competent evidence to go to the jury on the question of bad faith.<sup>35</sup> So that in case of bills and notes the purchaser for value is not bound, at his peril, to be on the alert for circumstances which might possibly excite the suspicions of a wary, vigilant man.<sup>36</sup> He does not owe to the party

<sup>33</sup> The test of bona fides has varied greatly. "Previous to 1820 the law was much as it is at present, but under the influence of Lord Tenterden due care and caution was made the test. *GILL v. CUBIT*, 3 Barn. & C. 466. In 1834 the king's bench held that nothing short of gross negligence would defeat the title of a holder for value. *CROOK v. JADIS*, 5 Barn. & Adol. 909. Two years later Lord Denman states it as settled law that bad faith alone could disentitle a holder for value. Gross negligence might be evidence of bad faith, but was not conclusive of it. *GOODMAN v. HARVEY*, 4 Adol. & E. 870. This principle has never been shaken in England, and it seems now finally established in America." Benj. Chalm. Bills & N. 102, note; *Backhouse v. Harrison*, 5 Barn. & Adol. 1098; *MAGEE v. BADGER*, 34 N. Y. 247; *Belmont Branch of State Bank v. Hoge*, 35 N. Y. 65; *Parker v. Conner*, 93 N. Y. 118. Such is, in substance, the provision of Neg. Inst. L. § 95.

<sup>34</sup> "The proper inquiry is, did the party seeking to enforce the payment have knowledge, at the time of the transfer, of the facts and circumstances which impeach the title, as between the antecedent parties to the instrument? And, if the jury finds that he did not, then he is entitled to recover, unless the transaction was attended by bad faith, even though the instrument had been lost or stolen." Clifford, J., in *GOODMAN v. SIMONDS*, 20 How. 343.

<sup>35</sup> *Canajoharie Nat. Bank v. Diefendorf*, 123 N. Y. 191, 25 N. E. 402; *Seybel v. National Currency Bank*, 54 N. Y. 288.

<sup>36</sup> "An individual negotiating for the purchase of a bill or note from one having it in possession, and whose name appears upon it, must assume that the title of the holder, as well as the liability of all the parties, is precisely that indicated by the instrument; that is, he cannot assume that the person in possession has any other or different rights, or that the liability of the parties is other or different from that which the law would imply from the form or character of the instrument." Per Curiam in *Central Bank v. Hammett*, 50 N. Y. 158.

who puts negotiable paper afloat the duty of active inquiry to avert the imputation of bad faith. And the speculative issue of his diligence or negligence does not enter into the question. The question is one simply of good faith in the purchaser; and, unless the evidence makes out a case upon which the jury would be authorized to find fraud or bad faith in the purchaser, it is the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the holder.<sup>87</sup>

Constructive notice is a legal inference from established facts. When the alleged defect appears on the face of the instrument, and is a mere matter of ocular inspection, the question becomes, not one of fact for the jury, but of law for the court. The court determines whether these conceded facts constitute in themselves notice.<sup>88</sup> If so, the notice is not actual, but constructive. In taking such instruments the purchaser is charged with knowledge of the defect, whether he knows of it or not. Instances of this are a restrictive<sup>89</sup> or a

<sup>87</sup> In the case of *LAWSON v. WESTON*, 4 Esp. 56, it was shown that a bill indorsed in blank had been lost, and the loser had advertised it in the newspaper. The bill was discounted by the plaintiffs for the finder, who was unknown to them. It was held that the plaintiffs could recover if they acted in good faith, and that they were not bound to make inquiries. *MAGEE v. BADGER*, 34 N. Y. 247; *Welch v. Sage*, 47 N. Y. 147; *GOODMAN v. SIMONDS*, 20 How. (U. S.) 343; *BANK OF PITTSBURGH v. NEAL*, 22 How. (U. S.) 99; *MURRAY v. LARDNER*, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 110; *Comstock v. Hannah*, 76 Ill. 530; *Spitler v. James*, 32 Ind. 202; *Worcester Co. Bank v. Dorchester & M. Bank*, 10 Cush. 488; *Spooner v. Holmes*, 102 Mass. 503; *MILLER v. FINLEY*, 26 Mich. 249; *CROSBY v. GRANT*, 36 N. H. 273; *JOHNSON v. WAY*, 27 Ohio St. 374; *PHELAN v. MOSS*, 67 Pa. St. 59.

<sup>88</sup> *Birdsall v. Russell*, 29 N. Y. 220; *Claffin v. Lenheim*, 66 N. Y. 301.

<sup>89</sup> See *supra*, pp. 124-127; *ANCHER v. BANK OF ENGLAND*, 2 Doug. 63. In this case a bill was drawn by A on B, payable to C or order, and indorsed by C, thus: "The within must be credited to D, value in account." D being indebted to B, and the bill being sent to B, and accepted by him, and he having given D notice that he had received it and placed it to D's account, it was held that this was such a special indorsement as to restrain the negotiability of the bill. Should a forged indorsement be afterwards written upon it, purporting to be by D to pay to E or order, and the bill be discounted, the one discounting must bear the loss. *TREUTTEL v. BARANDON*, 8 Taunt. 100. A bill drawn in America on a London house, payable to order, was indorsed by payee generally to A, and by him thus: "Pay to B, or his order, for my use." B applied to his bankers to discount the bill, which they did without inquiry, and applied the proceeds to the use of B. It was held that the indorsement was restrictive, and that the prop-

conditional<sup>40</sup> indorsement, which being on the face of the instrument, the purchaser must take at his peril. Another example is paper which shows on its face that there is something irregular or wrong about it.<sup>41</sup> So where paper bears the irregular indorsement of a firm, thereby indicating that the indorsement was for accommodation.<sup>42</sup> In all such circumstances it is a part of the legal duty of the purchaser to inquire and ascertain concerning the facts of which the face of the bill or note gives him notice.<sup>43</sup> If he fails to make

erty in the bill remained in A, who could recover its amount from the bankers. *LLOYD v. SIGOURNEY*, 5 Bing. 525. In *BUCKLEY v. JACKSON*, L. R. 3 Exch. 135, it was held that an indorsement of a bill of exchange, "Pay J. S., or order, value in account with H. C. D.," was not restrictive. An indorsement of a note without recourse does not affect its negotiable quality. *EPLER v. FUNK*, 8 Pa. St. 468. As to the effect of unfilled blanks as notice, see ante, p. 258.

<sup>40</sup> *ROBERTSON v. KENSINGTON*, 4 Taunt. 30.

<sup>41</sup> *MILLER v. CRAYTON*, 3 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 360.

<sup>42</sup> *West St. Louis Sav. Bank v. Bank*, 95 U. S. 557; *NATIONAL BANK v. LAW*, 127 Mass. 72; ante, p. 182. Thus, since "there is no implied authority for one member to indorse or affix the name of the firm to negotiable paper, in which the partnership has no interest [for third persons] \* \* \* the holder of such paper so indorsed, who takes it with notice that the indorsement was made for the accommodation of the maker, cannot hold the firm liable. \* \* \* The partners are liable to a bona fide holder without notice, in such case, only because he has the right to presume that the indorsement was made in the usual course of the partnership business." *FIELDEN v. LAHENS*, 2 Abb. Dec. 111. But though a partner may not sign the firm name to paper for payment of his own debt, and a note so made by him and payable to the debtor would put him upon inquiry whether it was made with authority, a purchaser is not charged with notice that the firm name was wrongfully used where he purchases a note made in the firm name to the order of one partner, who transfers it for his own debt, since there is nothing upon the face of the paper inconsistent with its having been duly issued to such partner. *Ridley v. Taylor*, 13 East, 175. In *CHEEVER v. RAILROAD CO.*, 150 N. Y. 59, 44 N. E. 701, where a note duly executed on the part of a corporation, and signed in its name "By M. S. Frost, President," was indorsed by the payee to "M. S. Frost & Son," and negotiated by Frost to a purchaser for value, it was held that there was nothing on the face of the paper to warrant the court in holding that he received it mala fide.

<sup>43</sup> Thus in *FOWLER v. BRANTLY*, 14 Pet. 318, it was held that a note overdue, or bill dishonored, is a circumstance of suspicion, to put those dealing for it afterwards on their guard.

his inquiry, he fails in his full legal duty, and the equities of the case are with the prior parties, who are allowed to interpose them.

These definite positions were not arrived at until after many changes in the law as it was from time to time administered. And in all the states the law has not yet developed into the settled positions we have given, regulating the degree of knowledge to be possessed by the holder to deprive him of the privileges of the purchaser for value without notice. The old tests are applied, which are not always in terms whether there was actual notice consisting either of direct knowledge of the defense or willful ignorance of it or whether there was constructive notice of the facts. The question is sometimes whether the holder was a bona fide transferee or a purchaser in the due or usual course of business. But these tests mean pretty much the same thing, though it involves a classification a little less exact.

"Bona fides or good faith" is a term used as a mere distinction from mala fides or bad faith. If paper be purchased without anything which the law can construe into notice, it is spoken of as being purchased in good faith. Where, on the contrary, the purchaser has what the law construes to be notice of defects or equities, then he is a purchaser in bad faith, and can secure to himself none of the advantages given to the bona fide purchaser. But bad faith means nothing more than participation in the fraud, and resolves itself into a question of honesty or dishonesty, for guilty knowledge and willful ignorance alike involve the result of bad faith.<sup>44</sup> "It is predicated," said Chief Justice Church, "upon a variety of circumstances, some of them slight, and others of more significance. A perfectly upright, honest man might sell a bond which had been stolen, and the explanation might prevent even the taint of wrong on his part, while the explanation, although falling far short of proof of actual guilt, might leave upon the mind an apprehension that he either directly or impliedly connived at the wrong, or, at least, that he was willing to deal in securities, and keep his eyes and ears closed, so that he should not ascertain the real truth."<sup>45</sup> Good faith, then, is absence of knowledge or means of knowledge on the part of the purchaser

<sup>44</sup> MURRAY v. LARDNER, 2 Wall. 121.

<sup>45</sup> Dutchess Co. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hachfield, 73 N. Y. 228.

of the facts which constitute the defense to the instrument. It is evidenced by the facts of each transaction.

So also the term "due or usual course of business" means "according to the usages and customs of commercial transactions." Negotiable paper is taken in the regular course of business when received in transfer in the manner in which mercantile paper is ordinarily used, and when a business man would ordinarily have received the paper under the circumstances in which it was offered, and have parted with his property for it.<sup>46</sup> The meaning of this expression has been somewhat discussed by the courts of Iowa.<sup>47</sup> The view of those courts seems to be that, when a man of ordinary business experience would have been willing to purchase paper circumstanced as the paper was in the cases before them with the expectation of an easy and safe recovery, it was taken in the usual course of business. Thus neither an instrument found unindorsed in the hands of one not the payee and transferred by such holder, nor paper which is overdue, nor a draft in the possession of the acceptor,<sup>48</sup> nor a bill or note taken by operation of law would be taken in course of business.<sup>49</sup> For, in the last case, to acquire title by legal process is not in the regular course of dealing in commercial paper. The transferee pays no value for it. He can only be deemed as occupying exactly the position of the person from whom he derived the instrument, because he is in law his representative. It has been held that where the holder has offered to take for a negotiable instrument a sum so small that the only reasonable interpretation could be that there is something wrong about it, it was willful blindness, and an abstinence from inquiry, so great that the court would treat it as bad faith. The reason is that it is in contravention of the habit of business men to sell valuable rights for almost nothing, and the courts deem an act such as this is a necessary implication of fraud. But a modified form of this rule as found in New York courts is probably the true view.<sup>50</sup> It appeared

<sup>46</sup> Edw. Bills & N. § 519.

<sup>47</sup> *Moore v. Moore*, 39 Iowa, 461; *Iowa College v. Hill*, 12 Iowa, 462.

<sup>48</sup> *Central Bank of Brooklyn v. Hammett*, 50 N. Y. 158.

<sup>49</sup> *BRIGGS v. MERRILL*, 58 Barb. (N. Y.) 399.

<sup>50</sup> *Vosburgh v. Diefendorf*, 48 Hun, 619, 1 N. Y. Supp. 58; *Richmond v. Diefendorf*, 51 Hun, 537, 4 N. Y. Supp. 375.

from the evidence that notes obtained through a gross swindle were bought for half price, but no evidence was offered of the good faith of the plaintiff in buying the notes, and it was held that good faith under such a purchase was not presumed, but the plaintiff must show his good faith. Soon afterwards the same point came up in a little different form, and, the plaintiff showing by the evidence his good faith, it was held he was entitled to recover. Thus, the New York courts hold what seems the wiser doctrine, that the smallness of the consideration is a circumstance of suspicion which throws the burden of proof on the holder. But it is not conclusive evidence of notice. It is merely evidence which, if undenied, will destroy the bona fides of the transaction. And it is for the jury to finally decide whether or not the purchaser had such knowledge of the fraud that his purchase of the instrument was a participation in it.<sup>51</sup>

There are two principles to be added to the discussion of the general doctrine of notice. They are: (1) Notice to the purchaser, actual or constructive, must exist at the time of the acquirement of the paper for value, and that (2) notice does not destroy the equities of a purchaser if he in turn is the transferee of a purchaser for value without notice. In regard to the first of these rules, the element of value determines the comparative superiority of the equities of the purchaser and the prior party suffering through fraud or wrong. For unless the purchaser has parted with value for the instrument he has acquired, he is in no worse position than if he had not acquired the instrument at all. If, therefore, before he has parted with value, he receives notice of the defenses of a prior party, according to the well-settled doctrines of equity already referred to he takes in subordination to the prior party's rights. But the payment of a valuable consideration changes the balance of the equities in his favor, and his right to a superior equity becomes fixed, and can be at all times asserted. He is then equipped with all the rights of a bona fide purchaser.<sup>52</sup> And so it is that knowledge of the fraud or wrong suffered by prior parties brought home to the purchaser after the transfer to him for a valuable consideration can-

<sup>51</sup> Potts v. Mayer, 74 N. Y. 594.

<sup>52</sup> Weaver v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 286; De Mott v. Starkey, 3 Barb. Ch. 403; Crandall v. Vickery, 45 Barb. 156.



not shake the title he has acquired on his purchase.<sup>53</sup> And this rule goes to the extent that if a valuable consideration is partly paid and partly unpaid, the purchaser is to be protected to the amount which he has in good faith paid,<sup>54</sup> because his equity is to that extent superior to that of the prior party. The reason for the second rule is that the purchaser for value without notice, when he transfers the instrument, transfers without reservation all the rights he had in it. The transferee is subrogated to all these rights. And if such a transferrer could have maintained an action upon the bill or note, the purchaser from him is not affected by notice of the defenses of prior parties. In such a case the necessities of the law merchant prevail over the doctrines of equity. The comparative rights of the prior party and the holder are not allowed to come into question. For otherwise the right of the bona fide holder to recover would amount to a property consisting of a right which he could not sell and transfer, and the right of sale and transfer is one of the most important incidents of property. Hence, as soon as the paper comes into the hands of a holder, unaffected by any defect, its character as a negotiable security is established. And subsequent notice of that defect to his transferee cannot affect the right of action upon the paper any more than subsequent notice of any equity to himself.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>53</sup> Hoge v. Lansing, 35 N. Y. 136; Howard Banking Co. v. Welchman, 6 Bosw. (N. Y.) 280; Perkins v. White, 36 Ohio St. 530; WOODWORTH v. HUNTOON, 40 Ill. 131, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 150.

<sup>54</sup> Dows v. Kidder, 84 N. Y. 121; DRESSER v. CONSTRUCTION CO., 93 U. S. 93, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 187. This was a case where partial payment only had been made when notice of fraud was given, and payment prohibited. It was held by Justice Hunt that: "The case before us is governed by the rule that the portion of an unperformed contract which is completed after notice of a fraud is not within the principle which protects a bona fide purchaser." Hubbard v. Chapin, 2 Allen, 328; LAY v. WISSMAN, 36 Iowa, 309. See Neg. Inst. L. § 93.

<sup>55</sup> Northampton Nat. Bank v. Kidder, 106 N. Y. 221, 12 N. E. 577; Miller v. Talcott, 54 N. Y. 114; Farmers' & Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Noxon, 45 N. Y. 762; CHALMERS v. LANION, 1 Camp. 383. This was an action by the second indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange. It was held that if the person who indorsed the bill to the plaintiff could himself have maintained an action upon it, the defendant cannot give in evidence that it was accepted for a debt contracted in smuggling, although it was indorsed to the plaintiff

## PRESUMPTION AND BURDEN OF PROOF—ORDER OF PROOF.

128. The holder of a bill or note is, in the first instance, presumed to be a holder for value and without notice; but, if it is proved on the trial that the bill or note, in its issue or negotiation, was affected by the defenses hereinafter specified, it is incumbent for the holder to prove that he is such a purchaser.

129. The usual order of proof on a trial is:

- (a) To produce the paper sued on.
- (b) To prove the signatures of the defendant and of all persons whose indorsement is necessary to establish the plaintiff's title.
- (c) To prove, as against the drawer or indorsers, presentment, demand, dishonor, and notice of dishonor to them, or circumstances to excuse these acts.

130. Upon proof of the facts specified in the foregoing section, the holder may rest for his recovery until evidence is adduced showing:

- (a) That the holder when he took the paper had notice of the equities.
- (b) Or that there was fraud, duress, or illegality in the issue or subsequent negotiation of the instrument.

131. Upon proof of facts specified last above, the purchaser must show that he or some person under whom he claims was a purchaser for value without notice.

after it had become due. *Masters v. Ibberson*, 8 C. B. 100; *May v. Chapman*, 16 Mees. & W. 355; *Commissioners of Marion Co. v. Clark*, 94 U. S. 278; *Porter v. Pittsburg Bessemer Steel Co.*, 122 U. S. 267, 7 Sup. Ct. 1206; *SCOTLAND CO. v. HILL*, 132 U. S. 117, 10 Sup. Ct. 26; *Verbeck v. Scott*, 71 Wis. 63, 36 N. W. 600; *SHAW v. CLARK*, 49 Mich. 384, 13 N. W. 786; *SUFFOLK SAV. BANK v. CITY OF BOSTON*, 149 Mass. 365, 21 N. E. 665; *Riley v. Shawacker*, 50 Ind. 592; *Mornyer v. Cooper*, 35 Iowa, 257; *Hascall v. Whitmore*, 19 Me. 102; *WOODWORTH v. HUNTOON*, 40 Ill. 131; *BASSETT v. AVERY*, 15 Ohio St. 299. See Neg. Inst. L. § 97.

It is the purpose of this section to show the application of the rules set forth in this and the foregoing chapter in their actual administration in courts of law. These two chapters have attempted to show that, where negotiable instruments are negotiated to a third person, certain defenses will not be allowed to be interposed against him in his action upon the instrument, provided he is a purchaser for value and without notice. In asserting the instrument as a legal right, and enforcing it in court, these principles take the form of presumptions of evidence.<sup>56</sup> This may be made clearer, perhaps, if the meaning of a presumption is elaborated by showing its application. It must be kept in mind that a court is, so to speak, an invention or machine for administering justice; and that to put this machine in motion it is necessary to bring the facts constituting a wrong to the notice of a judge and jury by written evidence or the sworn testimony of persons who have seen or known the facts to be proved. If these facts are undenied, or controverted and proved, the court then administers a remedy. But this the court of law can only do, and the machinery of justice can only be set in motion, when the facts constituting a violated right are brought before it by competent evidence. Until that time the courts sit idly by, awaiting facts demonstrating affirmatively that some one has been wronged. These facts must be proved in extenso by the person prosecuting the remedy, or the plaintiff. In case of negotiable bills and notes, most of the affirmative proof necessary to establish other kinds of contracts is unnecessary, because the court, upon the production of the instrument, assumes certain facts as proved sufficiently to entitle the plaintiff to judgment, unless the defendant seeks to disprove them. So that in the first stage of the plaintiff's case the court, upon production of the instrument, assumes as proved and acts upon the following facts as true:

(1) That there was a sufficient consideration for the promise or order or transfer, whether the receipt of a consideration was stated or not.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>56</sup> The burden and order of proof must, of course, depend upon the pleadings and the issue raised. Ordinarily, the declaration or complaint is upon the

---

<sup>57</sup> Olsen v. Ensign, 7 Misc. Rep. 682, 28 N. Y. Supp. 38; Bottum v. Scott, 11 N. Y. St. Rep. 514; Anthony v. Harrison, 14 Hun, 198, affirmed 74 N. Y. 613; Andrews v. Chadbourne, 19 Barb. 147.

(2) That there was such a delivery of the instrument as is necessary to its legal inception.<sup>58</sup>

(3) That the written terms of the instrument state the facts as therein set forth, the date showing the time of execution<sup>59</sup> and fixing the time of payment;<sup>60</sup> the terms of payment<sup>61</sup> both as to its amount<sup>62</sup> and as to its place.

(4) Possession by the holder in case of an instrument payable to bearer, or indorsed in blank, or, in case of an indorsement in full, possession by the indorsee, presumes title upon a good consideration.<sup>63</sup>

instrument itself, varying in form according to the parties by or against whom the action is brought. The declaration describes the instrument, and sets forth in substance how the defendant became a party, and his contract, the mode by which the plaintiff derived his interest in and right of action on the instrument, and the breach of the defendant's contract. Chit. Bills (8th Ed.) 578. At common law, in an action between immediate parties, it was usual to declare not only on the instrument itself, but also on the original consideration; the practice being to declare on the money counts, and give the instrument in evidence under them, if adapted to the consideration. But this did not apply where there was no privity between the plaintiff and the defendant, as between indorsee and acceptor or maker. Chit. Bills (8th Ed.) 593, 594. *Whitwell v. Bennett*, 3 Bos. & P. 559; *Waynam v. Bend*, 1 Camp. 175; *Eales v. Dicker*, *Moody & M.* 324; *Pierce v. Crafts*, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 90. In the United States the doctrine has been extended to suits between other than immediate parties, and it has frequently been held that under the counts for money lent, money paid, and money had and received the holder might recover against the acceptor or a remote indorser. *Ellsworth v. Brewer*, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 316; *Pierce v. Crafts*, *supra*; *Penn v. Flack*, 3 Gill & J. (Md.) 369; *Tenney v. Sanborn*, 5 N. H. 537; *Howes v. Austin*, 35 Ill. 396; *Edw. Bills & N.* (3d Ed.) § 933; 2 Ames, *Cas. Bills & N.* 539, note 1, 874. It seems that the form of action did not affect the rights of the parties, nor lessen the proof required to establish the plaintiff's right to recovery. *Cruger v. Armstrong*, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 5; *HARKER v. ANDERSON*, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 372; *Edw. Bills & N.* (3d Ed.) § 934.

<sup>58</sup> *Sawyer v. Warner*, 15 Barb. 282.

<sup>59</sup> *Breck v. Cole*, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 80; *GERMANIA BANK v. DISTLER*, 4 Hun (N. Y.) 633; 1 Pars. Bills & N. 41.

<sup>60</sup> *Joseph v. Bigelow*, 4 Cush. 82-84.

<sup>61</sup> *Walker v. Clay*, 21 Ala. 797; *Blakemore v. Wood*, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 470.

<sup>62</sup> *NORWICH BANK v. HYDE*, 13 Conn. 282. Pars. Bills & N. 333-338; *Abb. Tr. Ev.* 411.

<sup>63</sup> *James v. Chalmers*, 6 N. Y. 209; *Kidder v. Horribin*, 72 N. Y. 159. In *PEACOCK v. RHODES*, 2 Doug. 633, it was held that, where a bill of exchange

(5) That the instrument is unpaid.<sup>64</sup>

(6) That in case of an undated indorsement the transfer and indorsement were made before the maturity of the instrument and without notice.<sup>65</sup> Thus the instrument itself is proof of most of the preliminary facts necessary to establish a right of action, and it remains to authenticate it as a valid instrument.

Having once produced the paper with these presumptions attached to it, it becomes necessary for this purpose to prove the following facts:

(1) If the action is by the payee against the maker or acceptor, prove the maker's or acceptor's signature.<sup>66</sup> It is unnecessary to prove a demand of the maker or acceptor because the suit is itself a sufficient demand.<sup>67</sup>

(2) In an action brought by an indorsee against the acceptor or maker, the holder must prove the signature of the defendant and also of the payee.<sup>68</sup> The proof of the latter signature is not for the

with a blank indorsement had been stolen and negotiated, the innocent indorsee might recover on it. In *PRICE v. NEAL*, 3 Burrows, 1355, it was held that an innocent indorsee could not be compelled to refund the money paid to him on a forged acceptance. If a bill of exchange be drawn in favor of a fictitious payee, and that circumstance be known as well to the acceptor as the drawer, and the name of such payee be indorsed on the bill, an innocent indorsee for a valuable consideration may recover on it against the acceptor, as on a bill payable to bearer. *MINET v. GIBSON*, 3 Term R. 481. If A deposit bills, indorsed in blank, with B, his banker, to be received when due, and the latter raise money upon them by pledging them with C, another banker, and afterwards become bankrupt, A cannot maintain trover against C for the bills. *COLLINS v. MARTIN*, 1 Bos. & P. 648. And see *MECHANICS' BANK v. STRAITON*, \*42 N. Y. 365.

<sup>64</sup> *McKyring v. Bull*, 16 N. Y. 297; *Daniel, Neg. Inst.* § 1200.

<sup>65</sup> *Hendricks v. Judah*, 1 Johns. 318; *Andrews v. Chadbourne*, 19 Barb. 147; *Lewis v. Lady Parker*, 4 Adol. & El. 838; *Parkin v. Moon*, 7 Car. & P. 408; *New Orleans Canal & Banking Co. v. Montgomery*, 95 U. S. 16; *Leland v. Farnham*, 25 Vt. 553; *Mason v. Noonan*, 7 Wis. 609; *Mobley v. Ryan*, 14 Ill. 51; *Webster v. Calden*, 56 Me. 204.

<sup>66</sup> *Edw. Bills & N.* § 465; *Abb. Tr. Ev.* p. 891. In many states proof of the defendant's signature is dispensed with unless put in issue by denial supported by affidavit. *Daniel, Neg. Inst.* § 1219.

<sup>67</sup> *Green v. Goings*, 7 Barb. 652.

<sup>68</sup> Where a bill is drawn in the name of a fictitious person, payable to the order of the drawer, the acceptor is considered as undertaking to pay to the

purpose of fixing the liability of the payee, but of proving that the title is in the holder.<sup>69</sup>

(3) In an action against an indorser of a bill or note, the plaintiff need not prove the signature of the maker,<sup>70</sup> drawer,<sup>71</sup> or prior indorsers, because, on proof of the defendant's signature, the indorser is deemed to warrant that of the prior indorsers.<sup>72</sup> In such case it is necessary to prove only the signatures of the persons sought to be recovered against and of persons whose indorsement is necessary to establish the plaintiff's title.

(4) In case of a note or bill payable in blank or to bearer, no proof of title by proving signatures of indorsers is necessary;<sup>73</sup> but, where it is sought to recover against a party from whom title is derived through special indorsements, the signatures of special indorsers must be proved.<sup>74</sup>

order of the person who signed as drawer; and therefore an indorsee may bring evidence to show that the signatures of the drawer, to the bill and to the first indorsement, are in the same handwriting. *COOPER v. MEYER*, 10 Barn. & C. 468. In *ROBINSON v. YARROW*, 7 Taunt. 455, it was held that the acceptance of a bill drawn by procuration admits the drawer's handwriting, and the procuration to draw. In an action by the indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, the witness called to prove the handwriting of the drawer stated that neither the drawing nor indorsement were of the handwriting of the person whose they purported to be. But it was proved that the defendant had acknowledged the acceptance to be his, and it was contended that, as the acceptance admitted the drawing to be correct, the jury might find for the plaintiff, if they thought, upon inspection of the bill, that the drawing and indorsement were of the same handwriting. It was held necessary, however, that some proof should be given as to whose the handwriting was. *ALLPORT v. MEEK*, 4 Car. & P. 267. A bill purporting to be drawn by B. & W. (a real firm), payable to their order, and indorsed by them, was negotiated by the acceptor with that indorsement upon it. Both drawing and indorsement were forgeries. It was held that if the bill was accepted, and negotiated by the acceptor with knowledge of the forgery, he was estopped to deny the indorsement, as well as the drawing, by B. & W. *BEEEMAN v. DUCK*, 11 Mees. & W. 251.

<sup>69</sup> *COGGILL v. BANK*, 1 N. Y. 115; *CANAL BANK v. BANK OF ALBANY*, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 287.

<sup>70</sup> *Dalrymple v. Hillenbrand*, 62 N. Y. 5.

<sup>71</sup> *Rosc. N. P. Ev.* 381-399.

<sup>72</sup> *Goddard v. Merchants' Bank*, 4 N. Y. 147; *TURNBULL v. BOWYER*, 40 N. Y. 456.

<sup>73</sup> *James v. Chalmers*, 6 N. Y. 209. See, also, *supra*, p. 110.

<sup>74</sup> *SMITH v. CHESTER*, 1 Term R. 654. See *supra*, p. 116.

(5) Where the recovery is sought against a drawer<sup>75</sup> or an indorser or indorsers,<sup>76</sup> the plaintiff, in addition to this fact, must prove that the paper was duly presented and dishonored, and that due notice thereof was given to the defendant.<sup>77</sup>

The plaintiff having established all that is necessary to entitle him to judgment, it becomes incumbent upon the defendant to prove his defense, which he does by proving in extenso whatever facts may constitute it. And here the presumptions vary accordingly as the action is between immediate parties or between a remote party and a bona fide holder. In case of an action litigated between immediate parties, the general rule is that the evidence produced upon the various issues is governed by the rules governing the production and establishment of those issues in case of ordinary contracts. But where the litigation is between a purchaser for value and a prior party, the further evidence depends upon whether the facts proved by the defendant are those constituting a real defense or a personal defense. If the defense is a real defense, the character of a purchaser for value without notice cannot avail the holder, and the question to be established is solely whether the real defense does or does not exist and is established according to the process in ordinary cases of contract. But where the defense is a personal one the cases divide themselves into two classes, and these are: (1) Cases where the defense proved shows lack or failure of consideration or premature payment or release of the bill or note; (2) cases where the defense proved shows fraud, duress,<sup>78</sup> or the illegality of consideration in the inception of the instrument. In the first class of cases the general presumption prevails that the indorsee of a negotiable bill or note is a bona fide holder for value.<sup>81</sup> This presumption is not repelled merely by proof that the bill or note, as be-

<sup>75</sup> Shultz v. Depuy, 3 Abb. Prac. 252.

<sup>76</sup> Clift v. Rodger, 25 Hun, 39.

<sup>77</sup> Conkling v. Gandall, 1 Abb. Dec. 423. Post, p. 336.

<sup>78</sup> In an action by the indorsee against the drawer of a bill of exchange, if it appears that the defendant drew the bill without consideration, and under duress, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that he gave value for it, although it was indorsed to him before it came due. DUNCAN v. SCOTT, 1 Camp. 100.

<sup>81</sup> Ross v. Bedell, 5 Duer (N. Y.) 462; Case v. Mechanics' Banking Ass'n, 4 N. Y. 166.



tween the immediate parties, was without consideration,<sup>82</sup> or that the consideration failed,<sup>83</sup> or was made, indorsed, or accepted by one for the sole accommodation of the other.<sup>84</sup> When no other proof is given, the holder is not bound to prove a valuable consideration. Thus, unless the defendant proves that the plaintiff had notice of the fact of such want or failure of consideration or of the payment or discharge of the bill or note, or proves that for some reason the plaintiff is not a bona fide holder for value,<sup>85</sup> then these facts are irrelevant, and the defense will not be received. But if the defendant first proves by evidence sufficient to go to the jury that the transfer to the plaintiff was in bad faith,<sup>86</sup> or without value,<sup>87</sup> he may then prove the facts of his defense. On such proof by the defendant it becomes incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that he is a holder in good faith and for value. And if he cannot prove this, he must disprove the facts of the defendant's defense, or else he cannot recover.

Cases where the defense is fraud or illegality of consideration are distinguished from the defenses first mentioned in that their proof by the defendant changes the presumption that the holder is one in good faith and for value, and throws the burden of proving these facts in the first instance upon the plaintiff. It being shown that the bill or note, or the transfer thereof, is tainted with fraud or illegality, the assumption is that the holder is a partaker in the fraud or illegality, and he must prove that he is not. In the often-quoted case of *DUNCAN v. SCOTT*,<sup>88</sup> where a bill was given by the defendant under coercion and fear of death, Lord Ellenborough said: "It

<sup>82</sup> "The maker of a negotiable instrument is not allowed to impair its value in the hands of a bona fide holder by denying the existence of a consideration, or by otherwise showing that it is not what it purports to be." Lewis, J., in *LENNIG v. RALSTON*, 23 Pa. St. 137.

<sup>83</sup> *Mechanics' & Traders' Nat. Bank v. Crow*, 60 N. Y. 85.

<sup>84</sup> *Harger v. Worrall*, 69 N. Y. 370.

<sup>85</sup> *Brookman v. Millbank*, 50 N. Y. 378; *Abb. Tr. Ev.* 441; *WRIGHT v. IRWIN*, 33 Mich. 32; *Gray v. Bank of Kentucky*, 29 Pa. St. 365; *Wilson v. Lazier*, 11 Grat. 478; *Whittaker v. Edmunds*, 1 Moody & R. 366; *COLLINS v. GILBERT*, 94 U. S. 753; *Holden v. Rattan Co.*, 168 Mass. 570, 47 N. E. 241.

<sup>86</sup> *Smith v. Sac Co.*, 11 Wall. 139-147.

<sup>87</sup> *First Nat. Bank v. Green*, 43 N. Y. 298; *Collins v. Gilbert*, 94 U. S. 753.

<sup>88</sup> (1807) 1 Camp. 100.

is incumbent upon the plaintiff to give some evidence of consideration;" and this principle has been followed in many cases in England, and in most of the states of the United States.<sup>89</sup> It has been explained to mean that a plaintiff suing upon a negotiable note or bill purchased before maturity is presumed, in the first instance, to be a bona fide holder. But when the acceptor or maker has shown the bill or note was obtained from him under duress, or that he was defrauded of it, the plaintiff will then be required to show under what circumstances and for what value he became a holder. The reason for this rule is that, where there is fraud, it is but reasonable to suppose that he who is guilty of it will part with the instrument for the purpose of enabling some third party to recover upon it. Such presumption operates against the holder, and devolves upon him the duty of showing value and lack of notice in rebuttal of the duress or fraud in order to maintain his action.<sup>90</sup> In the cases of illegality the rule is the same, and for the same reason. The burden is cast upon the plaintiff to show that he took the paper for value and in good faith. Some of the cases declare that the holder need not show he had lack of notice, but need only show value,<sup>91</sup> because the burden of showing notice is upon the party who seeks to impeach the title. But the other courts maintain, and properly, that, in addition to proving value, the holder should prove that he bought the note in good faith, and should show that he had no knowledge or notice of the fraud.<sup>92</sup> If value and notice are dis-

<sup>89</sup> CLARK v. PEASE, 41 N. H. 414; PATON v. COIT, 5 Mich. 505; Carrier v. Cameron, 31 Mich. 373; KELLOGG v. CURTIS, 69 Me. 212; SMITH v. LIVINGSTON, 111 Mass. 342; NATIONAL BANK v. KIRBY, 108 Mass. 497; Rock Island Nat. Bank v. Nelson, 41 Iowa, 563; REAMER v. BELL, 79 Pa. St. 292; BAILEY v. BIDWELL, 13 Mees. & W. 73; HARVEY v. TOWERS, 6 Exch. 656; SMITH v. BRAINE, 16 Q. B. 244.

<sup>90</sup> First Nat. Bank v. Green, 43 N. Y. 298; Wilson v. Rocke, 58 N. Y. 642; Harger v. Worrall, 69 N. Y. 370.

<sup>91</sup> JONES v. GORDON, 2 App. Cas. 16; KELLOGG v. CURTIS, 69 Me. 212; NATIONAL BANK v. KIRBY, 108 Mass. 497. See Benj. Chalm. Bills & N. art. 97, and note.

<sup>92</sup> Canajoharie Nat. Bank v. Diefendorf, 123 N. Y. 191, 25 N. E. 402; Vosburgh v. Diefendorf, 119 N. Y. 357, 23 N. E. 801. See, also, Northampton Nat. Bank v. Kidder, 106 N. Y. 221, 12 N. E. 577; Farmers' & Citizens' Bank v. Noxon, 45 N. Y. 762; Cummings v. Thompson, 18 Minn. 246 (Gil. 228); Sullivan v. Langley, 126 Mass. 437; SMITH v. LIVINGSTON, 111 Mass. 342. Such

puted as facts, they must be passed upon by the jury. Hence it follows that it is not necessary for the defendant, as in case of lack or failure of consideration, to show that the plaintiff did not pay value, or that he had notice of the facts of the defense, but these facts must appear affirmatively on the plaintiff's part. It is probable that this rule does not mean that the plaintiff must prove a direct negative,<sup>93</sup> but that, as a part of the direct case, he must show the facts of the transaction constituting the transfer, and then, if there is nothing in the transaction itself to show bad faith, and there is no proof from other sources of want of good faith, or actual or constructive notice of the defense, the plaintiff must prevail.

is the rule under Neg. Inst. L. § 98; and also under the English Bills of Exchange Act (section 29) as construed in *TATAM v. HASLAR*, 23 Q. B. Div. 345.

<sup>93</sup> *Sullivan v. Langley*, 120 Mass. 437; *NATIONAL BANK v. KIRBY*, 108 Mass. 497.

## CHAPTER IX.

## PRESENTMENT AND NOTICE OF DISHONOR.

- 132. In General
- 133-140. Presentment.
- 141-144. By Whom and to Whom Made—Effect of Failure to Present and Protest.
- 145-146. Notice of Dishonor.
- 147-147b. Excuses for Failure to Present or Give Notice.

## IN GENERAL.

132. To charge the drawer and indorsers, presentment for acceptance or for payment, as the case may be, to be followed in case of refusal by notice of dishonor, is necessary.

The doctrines of presentment, protest, and notice of dishonor relate peculiarly to the liabilities of the drawer and indorser. These acts, on the part of the holder, are a condition or stipulation which the law merchant embodies in the contracts of each of them. They are so much of the essence of the contract that, unless the holder fulfills them in exact accordance with the requirements of law, he cannot in most circumstances enforce the instrument. We have already pointed out<sup>1</sup> that the law construes the contract of the drawer and also of the indorser to be distinct promises to every party who subsequently takes the instrument, to pay the instrument if the acceptor or maker does not. And we have also pointed out<sup>2</sup> that the law implies as a condition of the enforcement of this contract of indemnity that the holder shall first seek the payment of the instrument from the persons primarily liable to pay it. If the instrument is not paid by them, then there is prescribed a system of formalities to be strictly followed to enable the holder to claim at the law's hands the enforcement of the drawer's or indorser's liability. These formalities are usually, though perhaps inaccurately,

<sup>1</sup> See supra, pp. 156-159.

<sup>2</sup> See supra, pp. 156-159.

known as "presentment," "demand," "protest," and "notice of dishonor," some or all of them to be followed according as the case may be. And it is our purpose to take up each of these steps in their order, to show their nature and the rules relating to them. We shall first examine the subject of presentment, stating the rules as to its nature and the time within which, the place where, and persons by whom and to whom it should be made.

### PRESENTMENT.

133. The presentment of a bill or note is commonly as follows:

- (a) Of a bill for acceptance.
- (b) Of a bill or note for payment.

134. A bill or note is presented by exhibiting it and requesting its acceptance or payment. When presented, the instrument must be in the possession of the person presenting the same.

134a. Presentment for acceptance is necessary in the case of bills payable at or after sight, or after demand. In other cases, in the absence of express stipulation, it is optional.

135. Presentment for acceptance may be made at any time before maturity, except in cases of bills payable at or after sight, or after demand.

136. Bills payable at or after sight, or on or after demand, or after any other uncertain event, must be presented within a reasonable time.

137. Presentment for payment must be made on the day when the bill or note is due. A bill or note properly presented for payment must be paid forthwith.

138. Presentment should be made during usual and reasonable hours.

139. The presentment for acceptance, if the bill is addressed to the drawee at a particular place, should be

made at that place. If the bill is not addressed to any particular place, presentment should be made either to the drawee personally, or at his dwelling or place of business at the time of presentment.

140. It is not necessary that a presentment for payment should be personal. It is sufficient if made at the place specified in the instrument, or personally if the maker or acceptor waives his right of having it made at the place stipulated in the contract; and, if no place is specified in the instrument, then if made at the place of business or residence of the maker or acceptor.

A proper legal presentment consists of an actual exhibition of the paper <sup>3</sup> to the drawee, acceptor, or maker. In case of a presentment for payment, the reasons for a personal presentment and an exhibition of the bill <sup>4</sup> are that the acceptor or maker may judge of the genuineness of the bill; that he may judge of the right of the holder to receive the contents; and that he may obtain immediate possession of the bill or note, upon paying its amount.<sup>5</sup> In case of pre-

<sup>3</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 462, 463; Edw. Bills & N. § 558. See Neg. Inst. L. § 134.

<sup>4</sup> MUSSON v. LAKE, 4 How. 262.

<sup>5</sup> In the case of HANSARD v. ROBINSON, 7 Barn. & C. 9, which was an action by an indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, it was shown that the bill was not presented for some time after it was due and that the defendant offered another bill, but before such bill was given, the first bill was lost by the plaintiff's clerk. It was said by Lord Tenterden, C. J., in his opinion, that it was the custom of merchants that: "The holder of the bill shall present the instrument, at its maturity, to the acceptor, demand payment of the amount, and upon receipt of the money deliver up the bill. The acceptor paying the bill has a right to the possession of the instrument for his own security, and as his voucher and discharge pro tanto in his account with the drawer." As to the acceptor's remedy should the holder refuse to deliver the bill after receipt of payment, see Alexander v. Strong, 9 Mees. & W. 733; Stone v. Clough, 41 N. H. 290; Otisfield v. Mayberry, 63 Me. 197. It has consistently been held in England and many states that no action at law lies against the acceptor or maker upon a bill or note which has been lost or destroyed, the plaintiff being left to his remedy in equity, which has power to secure the defendant against being called upon a second time to pay by requiring the plaintiff to furnish indemnity. PIERSON v. HUTCHINSON, 2

sentment for acceptance, the reasons for a personal presentment are that the acceptor has a right to see that the person demanding it has a right to do so before he is bound to answer whether he will accept or not,\* and that in those jurisdictions where it is required that the acceptance should be written on the paper, a demand for acceptance would clearly be futile unless the paper were at hand to write the acceptance upon it. But as these reasons show, this rule is for the protection of the drawee, acceptor, or maker, and he may therefore waive them by not insisting upon a personal presentment. If the holder is in a situation to comply with their demand for personal presentment it is sufficient. Hence, if the holder has the bill or note with him at the time of presentment, and so describes it as to leave no doubt but that the drawee, acceptor, or maker understands what the instrument in question is, and the drawee, acceptor, or maker does not require him to produce it, then a refusal or omission to accept or pay will subject all parties to the consequent penalties.† The sole requirement is that the instrument must be in the

Camp. 211; *HANSARD v. ROBINSON*, 7 Barn. & C. 90; *RAMUZ v. CROWE*, 1 Exch. 167; *Rowley v. Ball*, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 303; *Moses v. Trice*, 21 Grat. (Va.) 556. In some states, however, a recovery at law upon furnishing indemnity has been allowed. *Fales v. Russell*, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 315; *HINCKLEY v. RAILROAD CO.*, 129 Mass. 52; *Bridgeford v. Manufacturing Co.*, 34 Conn. 546; *Morgan v. Reinzel*, 7 Cranch, 273. And very generally it is held that a recovery may be had if it can be shown that the instrument has been actually destroyed. *Des Arts v. Leggett*, 16 N. Y. 582; *Blandin v. Wade*, 20 Kan. 251. In some states recovery without indemnity has been allowed where the instrument was destroyed, or overdue, or transferable only by indorsement, and shown to be unindorsed. In some states the matter is regulated by statute. *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 1699. As to whether the owner of a lost note may recover against the indorser, upon giving indemnity, it was held by Hoar, J., in *TUTTLE v. STANDISH*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 481, that "all the considerations against allowing such a recovery apply more forcibly to the case where payment is demanded of an indorser, for he is entitled to possession of the note in order to have recourse against the maker. See, generally, *Rand. Com. Paper*, §§ 1691-1703; *Daniel, Neg. Inst.* §§ 1475-1485.

\* *Fall River Nat. Bank v. Walton*, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 216.

† *Etheridge v. Ladd*, 44 Barb. 69; *OCEAN BANK v. FANT*, 50 N. Y. 475; *Crandall v. Schroepel*, 1 Hun, 557; *Freeman v. Boynton*, 7 Mass. 483; *Draper v. Clemens*, 4 Mo. 52; *Nailor v. Bowie*, 3 Md. 251; *King v. Crowell*, 61 Me. 244; *Fisher v. Beckwith*, 19 Vt. 31; *Fullerton v. Bank of U. S.*, 1 Pet. 604.



possession of the person presenting it whether exhibited or not.<sup>7</sup> The demand for acceptance or payment in ordinary cases should be verbal, but in some cases this may be impracticable or not in reason to be required. In such cases it may be in writing. But, however made, it should be absolute, requiring present actual acceptance or payment.<sup>8</sup>

The dishonor of a bill of exchange is the non-compliance on the part of the drawee or acceptor with the conditions which the law has construed to be embodied in the order contained in it. The order contained in a bill of exchange on the part of the drawer and indorser is (1) an order on the drawee to accept the bill on presentment; (2) an order on the drawee or acceptor to pay the bill at maturity. The refusal of the drawee or acceptor to do either of these things dishonors the bill.<sup>9</sup> The contract which the drawer and indorser thus make with the holder is that the drawee will, in the first place, accept the bill. It differs in cases of bills payable after sight or after demand and bills payable after a given date, because in the former cases from the terms of the contract the time for which the drawer or indorser indemnifies the holder is uncertain and indefinite. To prevent this from becoming a hardship to these parties, the law declares that in cases of bills made payable after sight, or after demand, or upon any other event not absolutely certain, the contract of the drawer and indorser is that the drawee, on the bill being presented to him in a reasonable time from the date, shall accept it, and, having so accepted, shall pay it when duly pre-

<sup>7</sup> In *ARNOLD v. DRESSER*, 8 Allen (Mass.) 435, which was an action against the indorser of a joint promissory note, the facts were that upon the day of maturity payment was demanded of the promisors, but the demandant did not have the note in his possession, and he did not receive payment. It was held by Bigelow, C. J., that "no valid presentment and demand can be made by any person without having the note in his possession at the time, so that the maker may receive it in case he pays the amount due, unless special circumstances, such as the loss of the note, or its destruction, are shown to excuse its absence."

<sup>8</sup> Story, Prom. Notes, § 242. "A demand of payment, at the place indicated in the note, on or after its maturity, is a prerequisite to the right of recovery." Martin, J., in *WOOD v. MULLEN*, 3 Rob. (La.) 395, 396.

<sup>9</sup> Ames, Bills & N. p. 787; Edw. Neg. Inst. §§ 529-535.

sented for payment.<sup>10</sup> Presentment for acceptance in such cases is hence essential. But in case of a bill payable a certain time after date, the contract of the drawer and indorser is that the drawee shall accept it if it is presented to him before the time of payment; and, having so accepted, shall pay it when it is in due course presented for payment. The contract of the drawer and indorser is distinguished from their contract on bills payable after demand, or after sight, in that the drawer, by fixing a day certain for payment, assumes the responsibility of providing funds at that time, and the indorser makes a new bill on the same terms, and waives his right of immediate acceptance by putting his bill into circulation without acceptance. Presentment for acceptance in this case is therefore optional,<sup>11</sup> for, if the bill is not presented for acceptance at all, never-

<sup>10</sup> ALLEN v. SUYDAM, 20 Wend. 321; AYMAR v. BEERS, 7 Cow. 705; ROBINSON v. AMES, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 146; Elting v. Brincherhoff, 2 Hall (N. Y.) 459; MUILMAN v. D'EGUINO, 2 H. Bl. 569; WALLACE v. AGRY, 4 Mason, 336, Fed. Cas. No. 17,096; Id., 5 Mason, 118, Fed. Cas. No. 17,097; MITCHELL v. DE GRAND, 1 Mason, 176, Fed. Cas. No. 9,661; Nichols v. Blackmore, 27 Tex. 586; Mullick v. Radakissen, 9 Moore, P. C. 46. See Neg. Inst. L. § 240. Cf. section 26. Under the act it seems that bills payable "at sight" need not be presented for acceptance.

<sup>11</sup> PHILPOTT v. BRYANT, 3 Car. & P. 244; Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Pet. 25; House v. Adams, 48 Pa. St. 261; Walker v. Stetson, 19 Ohio St. 400; Bank of Burlington v. Raymond, 12 Vt. 401; Bachellor v. Priest, 12 Pick. 399; ORR v. MAGINNIS, 7 East, 362; Goodall v. Dolly, 1 Term R. 713. "In relation to a bill payable at a day certain, as at a fixed time after its date, it is perfectly well settled not only in this country and in England, but also in Scotland, and in France, that the drawer or indorser of the bill is not discharged by the neglect of the holder to present the same for acceptance immediately, or until the time when it becomes due and payable." Opinion in ALLEN v. SUYDAM, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 321, 323. "Where presentment is optional, the object of presenting is: (1) To obtain the acceptance of the drawee, and thereby secure his liability as a party to the bill; (2) to obtain an immediate right of recourse against antecedent parties in case the bill is dishonored by non-acceptance." Chalm. Bills Exch. (4th Ed.) 132. In PLATO v. REYNOLDS, 27 N. Y. 586, where a bill payable one day after date was presented for acceptance on the day it matured, refusal to accept was held equivalent to refusal to pay, and to render a demand for payment unnecessary. Wright, J., said: "It is well settled that the holder of a bill payable a specified time after date, or on a certain day, need not, for the purpose of charging the drawers and indorsers, present it for acceptance until it becomes due and payable. It may be presented before or at the time of maturity."

theless the drawer and indorser make a contract that the drawee shall pay it when duly presented for payment.

Presentment for ~~non~~-acceptance, except in the case of sight bills, is thus only for the security of the holder. He has the option of seeking from the drawer and indorser a remedy for non-acceptance or a remedy for non-payment. If by protest and notice of non-acceptance he has put himself in a condition to sue the drawer and indorser, he may, as a matter of prudence, retain the bill, and endeavor to obtain payment from the drawee when the bill has arrived at maturity, and not involve himself in a litigation until there has been a failure of payment as well as of acceptance.<sup>12</sup> But by non-acceptance, followed by protest and notice of dishonor, an immediate right of action accrues to the holder against both the drawer and indorser.<sup>13</sup> And in all these cases the contracts of the drawer and indorsers stand upon a similar footing.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *WHITEHEAD v. WALKER*, 9 Mees. & W. 506. In this case it was held that the holder of a bill of exchange, on non-acceptance and protest, and notice thereof, has an immediate right of action against the drawer, and does not acquire a fresh right of action on the non-payment of the bill when due. The statute of limitations, therefore, runs against him from the former, and not from the latter, period.

<sup>13</sup> *Mason v. Franklin*, 3 Johns. 202; *Weldon v. Buck*, 4 Johns. 144; *Watson v. Loring*, 3 Mass. 557; *Union Bank v. Hyde*, 6 Wheat. 572; *Sterry v. Robinson*, 1 Day, 11; *Thompson v. Cumming*, 2 Leigh, 321; *Smith v. Roach*, 7 B. Mon. 17; *Bright v. Purrier*, 3 Burrows, 1687; *Milford v. Mayer*, 1 Doug. 55; *EVANS v. GEE*, 11 Pet. 80; *LUCAS v. LADEW*, 28 Mo. 342; *Exeter Bank v. Gordon*, 8 N. H. 66; *WINTHOP v. PEPOON*, 1 Bay (S. C.) 468. See *Neg. Inst. L.* § 248.

<sup>14</sup> *BALLINGALLS v. GLOSTER*, 3 East, 481. It was held in this case by Lord Ellenborough, C. J., that "there is no distinguishing the case of an indorser from that of the drawer, it having been long ago decided that every indorser is in the nature of a new drawer, every indorsement as a new bill, and that the indorser stands, as to his indorsee, in the law merchant, the same as the drawer." See, also, the case of *HEYLYN v. ADAMSON*, 2 Burrows, 669, where it is said by Lord Mansfield that when a bill of exchange is indorsed, "as between the indorser and indorsee, it is a new bill of exchange, and the indorser stands in the place of the drawer." See, also, the opinion in the case of *SUSE v. POMP*, 30 Law J. C. P. 75. In *PECK v. MAYO*, 14 Vt. 33, it was said by Redfield, J.: "No man, I apprehend, doubts that the indorser of a note or bill is liable, in regard to the principal debt, to the same extent as the original debtor."

The following rules are the principal ones relating to instruments payable at or after demand and at or after sight:

(1) Instruments payable on demand need not be presented for acceptance, but they must be presented for payment within a reasonable time.<sup>15</sup> In case of instruments payable after demand, the demand must be made within a reasonable time.

(2) Instruments payable at or after sight must be presented for acceptance or payment within a reasonable time.<sup>16</sup> What is a reasonable time within which to present for acceptance may be affected by the circumstance whether or not the bill has been placed in circulation, for when the bill has been transferred a wider latitude as to the time of presentment is allowed. This results from the fact that a party receiving a negotiable bill payable at sight has a right to sell it, or to send it elsewhere for sale, and by the exercise of this right the time of presentment is necessarily delayed.\*

<sup>15</sup> *Walker v. Stetson*, 19 Ohio St. 400, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 89. A purchased a draft on C, of New York, on March 17th, in Erie, Pa. On March 27th he sold the draft to a bank in Newark, N. J., and the bank presented it on the 28th of the same month. Payment was refused, and the draft protested. It was held that, under the circumstances, the presentment was in reasonable time. *NEWARK BANKING CO. v. NATIONAL BANK OF ERIE*, 63 Pa. St. 404. See Neg. Inst. L. § 4.

<sup>16</sup> "The law is settled by an unbroken line of decisions that all drafts, whether foreign or inland bills, must be presented to the drawee within a reasonable time. \* \* \* But what is a reasonable time, under all the circumstances, is sometimes a most difficult question. The general doctrine is, each case must depend on its own peculiar facts, and be judged accordingly." Scott, J., in *Montellus v. Charles*, 76 Ill. 303. See, also, *ROBINSON v. AMES*, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 147; *Jordan v. Wheeler*, 20 Tex. 698.

\* *MUILMAN v. D'EGUINO*, 2 H. Bl. 565, per Buller, J.; *MELLISH v. RAWDON*, 9 Bing. 416; *WALLACE v. AGRY*, 4 Mason, 336, Fed. Cas. No. 17,096; *ROBINSON v. AMES*, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 146. In *WALLACE v. AGRY*, supra, Story, J., said: "The party who receives a negotiable bill payable after sight has a right to sell it in the market where he resides, or to send it to any other place for sale. He is not bound personally to make a remittance of it, or to send it directly to the country on which it is drawn. He is at full liberty to put it in circulation, or to send it to any other place for sale or remittance; and the only limitation upon this right is that he shall have it presented within a reasonable time, be the conveyance direct or indirect. \* \* \* [He] is not at liberty to send it to very remote places, wholly out of the course of trade, if there be unreasonable delay thereby

*Time of Presentment.*

The reason why bills payable on demand and at sight differ in the necessity for their presentment for acceptance is from the difference of meaning of the terms embodied in the contract. The term "demand" is construed to mean forthwith upon presentment. The common-law theory was that even demand was unnecessary, because it evidenced a debt in *præsenti* where the debt itself was precedent to any demand.<sup>17</sup> Hence, demand notes and instruments of that character were not, in general, entitled to grace.<sup>18</sup> But "at sight" means the same thing as "upon acceptance." And, as a general thing, a bill or note payable at sight or after sight does not become due until it is seen or accepted.<sup>19</sup> Hence, bills payable at sight are held to be entitled to grace,<sup>20</sup> because they do not become in the presentment for acceptance, and thus fix the drawer with an indefinite responsibility. But, on the other hand, the transmission in a direct trade is not necessary. No one can doubt that by the course of trade many bills of exchange drawn in Havana on England are sent to the United States for remittance or sale. \* \* \* It would be a most inconvenient rule to hold that such a negotiation of bills was at the sole peril of the holder." The Negotiable Instruments Law provides (section 241) that the holder of such a bill "must either present it for acceptance or negotiate it within a reasonable time."

<sup>17</sup> *Capp v. Lancaster*, Cro. Eliz. 548; *Rumball v. Ball*, 10 Mod. 38; *Collins v. Denning*, 3 Salk. 227; 15 Vin. Abr. 103.

<sup>18</sup> 1 Pars. Notes & B. 407; Story, Prom. Notes, § 224; Story, Bills, § 342; *Cammer v. Harrison*, 2 McCord, 246; *First Nat. Bank of Davenport v. Price*, 52 Iowa, 570, 3 N. W. 639; *Luckey v. Pepper*, Morris (Iowa) 490.

<sup>19</sup> *Campbell v. French*, 6 Term R. 200, 2 H. Bl. 163; *Sutton v. Toomer*, 7 Barn. & C. 416; *Holmes v. Kerrison*, 2 Taunt. 323; *Sturdy v. Henderson*, 4 Barn. & Ald. 592. In *THORPE v. BOOTH*, Ryan & M. 388, it was held that the statute of limitations did not run against a note payable 24 months after demand until demand had been made. A promissory note was made in the following form: "I promise to pay M. A. D., or bearer, on demand, the sum of £16 at sight." Held, that no action was maintainable without a presentment for sight. *DIXON v. NUTTALL*, 1 Crompt., M. & R. 306. As holding that the statute of limitations runs from the date of a note payable on demand, and not from the time of demand, see *NORTON v. ELLAM*, 6 Law J. Exch. 121. In *SANDERSON v. BOWES*, 14 East, 500, which was an action in *assumpsit* on a promissory note, it was held that the declaration must aver presentment at the place. See, also, *AYMAR v. SHELDON*, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 439.

<sup>20</sup> *HART v. SMITH*, 15 Ala. 807; *Thornburg v. Emmons*, 23 W. Va. 325;

due until an opportunity for their acceptance is given, and, if accepted, the acceptor is entitled to the usual extension of time to pay them. As a consequence of the construction of these terms, bills payable on demand need not be presented at all for acceptance, but need only be presented for payment.<sup>21</sup> But the law nevertheless limits the time for which they may be held as a security, and bills or notes payable on demand must be presented for payment within a reasonable time, or else they will be treated as overdue.<sup>22</sup> If transferred after a reasonable time, they are subject to equities,<sup>23</sup> and the transferee is charged with constructive notice, because the term "demand" implies a short term. Such is the general rule, though there has been conflict of authority, and in England it has been held, at least in the case of demand notes, that they are not overdue until after demand, or the expiration of the statutory period of limitation.<sup>24</sup> There has also been much conflict as to the time when demand notes must be presented in order to charge indorsers. As to demand bills it is held that they must be presented within a reasonable time.<sup>25</sup> And the same rule is in the United States generally applied to demand notes; \* but in England and in some of the

*Janson v. Thomas*, 3 Doug. 421; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 617. Neg. Inst. L. § 145, as enacted in most states, abolishes grace. By the act (section 26) "at sight" is made equivalent to "on demand." Cf. *Id.* § 240.

<sup>21</sup> *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 454. See Neg. Inst. L. § 240.

<sup>22</sup> *HERRICK v. WOOLVERTON*, 41 N. Y. 581; *Crim v. Starkweather*, 88 N. Y. 339; *Furman v. Haskin*, 2 Calnes, 369; *Loomis v. Pulver*, 9 Johns. 244; *RANGER v. OARY*, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 369; *Cromwell v. Arrott*, 1 Serg. & R. 180. It is to be noted that the term "with interest" does not vary this construction as to the maker or acceptor. *HERRICK v. WOOLVERTON*, *supra*; *Crim v. Starkweather*, 88 N. Y. 339.

<sup>23</sup> *Wethey v. Andrews*, 3 Hill, 582; *Sice v. Cunningham*, 1 Cow. 397; *La Due v. Bank*, 31 Minn. 33, 16 N. W. 426. See Neg. Inst. L. § 92.

<sup>24</sup> *BROOKS v. MITCHELL*, 9 Mees. & W. 15; *Gascoyne v. Smith*, 1 McClell. & Y. 338.

<sup>25</sup> *National Newark Banking Co. v. Second Nat. Bank*, 63 Pa. St. 404; *PARKER v. REDDICK*, 65 Miss. 242, 3 South. 575; *MORGAN v. U. S.*, 113 U. S. 476, 5 Sup. Ct. 588.

\* *FIELD v. NICKERSON*, 13 Mass. 131; *Martin v. Winslow*, 2 Mason, 241, Fed. Cas. No. 9,172; *KEYES v. FENSTERMAKER*, 24 Cal. 329; *Lindsey v. McClelland*, 18 Wis. 481.

states demand notes,\*\* at least if payable with interest,† have been considered to be upon a different footing, upon the theory that they are intended to be continuing securities. The Negotiable Instruments Law ‡ provides that, where the instrument is payable on demand, "presentment must be made within a reasonable time after its issue, except that, in the case of a bill of exchange, presentment for payment will be sufficient if made within a reasonable time after the last negotiation thereof."

In cases of instruments payable at sight, or at a certain time after sight, where presentment for acceptance is a prerequisite, presentment for acceptance is needed in order to determine the day of payment.<sup>26</sup> In case of instruments payable after demand, presentment must be made for the same reason. Here the same rule is adopted for the measure of time allowed for presentment as in case of the presentment for payment of bills and notes payable on demand, namely, that such instruments must be presented within a reasonable time. The language of the cases implies a difference in the liability of the drawer and indorsers, though a sufficient reason for it does not appear. For it is said that otherwise the drawer or indorser will be discharged in case of presentment for acceptance, and that they have an interest in having the bill accepted immediately and paid according to the terms of the contract. It would be a wrong to subject them to indeterminate delay in the terms of payment which they have guaranteed. For they might not be able to protect themselves by other means before it is too late, if the bill or note is not accepted, or accepted and paid, within the time of payment contemplated by them.<sup>27</sup> It would seem also

\*\* BROOKS v. MITCHELL, 9 Mees. & W. 15; Gascoyne v. Smith, 1 McClel. & Y. 338.

† MERRITT v. TODD, 23 N. Y. 28; Parker v. Stroud, 98 N. Y. 379; SHUTTS v. FINGAR, 100 N. Y. 539, 3 N. E. 588. Thielman v. Gueble, 32 La. Ann. 260; TURNER v. MINING CO., 74 Wis. 355, 43 N. W. 149; Leonard v. Olson, 99 Iowa, 162, 68 N. W. 677, contra.

‡ Section 131.

<sup>26</sup> Mullick v. Radakissen, 9 Moore, P. C. 66, 28 Eng. Law & Eq. 86; Fry v. Hill, 7 Taunt. 397. And see cases cited supra, p. 341.

<sup>27</sup> ALLEN v. SUYDAM, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 321; AYMAR v. BEERS, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 705, and cases cited supra, p. 341.



that this rule applied also to cases of presentment of such instruments for their payment.

The exact application of the meaning of a reasonable time is not clear, for the question is as yet an unsettled one. It has been the subject of discussion in the courts. No absolute measure of this reasonable time has been fixed. The following times have been held reasonable: A day or two,<sup>28</sup> seven days,<sup>29</sup> a month;<sup>30</sup> the following unreasonable: Eight months,<sup>31</sup> three and one-half months,<sup>32</sup> two months and a half.<sup>33</sup> By some courts it is deemed a question of fact,<sup>34</sup> and the province of the jury to decide; by others, one of law, for the court to decide.<sup>35</sup> The better opinion would seem to be that it is a question for neither the jury nor the court to decide wholly, and yet a question in whose determination both the jury and the court must take part. "What is a reasonable time," said Judge Byles,<sup>36</sup> "depends on the circumstances of each particular case, and is a mixed question of law and fact, although reasonable time

<sup>28</sup> FIELD v. NICKERSON, 13 Mass. 131-137. In this case it was held that "the condition on which the indorser is liable is that payment shall be demanded within a reasonable time, and the earliest notice possible given of refusal. This time may therefore vary according to the circumstances and situation of the parties, to be determined by the jury, under the direction of the court. It is impossible to fix any precise period."

<sup>29</sup> Thurston v. M'Kown, 6 Mass. 428.

<sup>30</sup> RANGER v. CARY, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 369.

<sup>31</sup> American Bank v. Jenness, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 288.

<sup>32</sup> Stevens v. Bruce, 21 Pick. 193.

<sup>33</sup> LOSEE v. DUNKIN, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 70. See, also, collated cases, Tied. Com. Pap. § 216, note.

<sup>34</sup> WALLACE v. AGRY, 4 Mason, 336, Fed. Cas. No. 17,096; Fry v. Hill, 7 Taunt. 397. In MUILMAN v. D'EGUINO, 2 H. Bl. 553, the following was part of the opinion delivered by Eyre, C. J.: "I think, indeed, that the holder is bound to present the bill in reasonable time, in order that the period may commence from which the payment is to take place. The question what is reasonable time must depend on the particular circumstances of the case; and it must always be for the jury to determine whether any laches is imputable to the plaintiff." Fernandez v. Lewis, 1 McCord, 322; Nichols v. Blackmore, 27 Tex. 586; Barbour v. Fullerton, 36 Pa. St. 105.

<sup>35</sup> AYMAR v. BEERS, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 707; Edw. Bills & N. §§ 539-546; Sice v. Cunningham, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 397; POORMAN v. MILLS, 39 Cal. 345; Carll v. Brown, 2 Mich. 401; Sylvester v. Crapo, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 93.

<sup>36</sup> Wood's Byles, Bills, p. 183.

in general, and reasonable time for giving notice of dishonor in particular, is a question of law." In *Muilman v. D'Eguino*<sup>87</sup> Lord Chief Justice Eyre explains the meaning of this somewhat vague expression by saying that "what is a reasonable time must depend on the particular circumstances of the case; and it must always be for the jury to determine whether any laches is imputable to the plaintiff;" and the later cases have developed fully his meaning. That a reasonable time is a mixed question of law and fact means that the question is to be decided by the jury, under proper instructions from the court. It may vary much, according to the particular circumstances of each case. If the facts are doubtful or in dispute, it is the clear duty of the court to submit them to the jury; but, when they are clear and uncontradicted, then it is competent for the court to determine whether the time required by law for the presentment has been exceeded or not.<sup>88</sup>

Such being the rules with reference to the presentment for acceptance or payment of bills and notes payable at an uncertain time, contingent upon their being demanded or presented for sight or ac-

<sup>87</sup> *MUILMAN v. D'EGUINO*, 2 H. Bl. 565.

<sup>88</sup> *PRESCOTT BANK v. CAVERLY*, 7 Gray (Mass.) 217. In the case of *MOORE v. WARREN*, 1 Strange, 415, it was held that, if the party who receives a goldsmith's bill tenders it the next day, it is not his loss if the goldsmith fails. As holding that the common usage in such affairs is to be regarded, see *TURNER v. MEAD*, Id. 416. In *MANWARING v. HARRISON*, Id. 508, it was held that a person who did not demand a goldsmith's note in two days took the credit on himself. See, also, *COLEMAN v. SAYER*, 1 Barnard, 303. In the case of *HANKEY v. TROTMAN*, 1 W. Bl. 1, Lee, C. J., held that "it is a question of fact whether there was convenient time allowed for receiving the money"; and Denison, J., was of the opinion that "the question is whether the plaintiff has used a reasonable diligence or not. This the jury are to judge of." In *PATIENCE v. TOWNLEY*, 2 J. P. Smith (Eng.) 223, it was held that where it was impossible to present the bill in due time, but where such bill was afterwards presented with due diligence, and was refused for want of due presentation, the holder might recover against antecedent parties. In *RICKFORD v. RIDGE*, 2 Camp. 537, it was the opinion of Lord Ellenborough that "it is always to be considered whether, under the circumstances of the case, the cheque has been presented with due diligence. \* \* \* It seems to me to be convenient and reasonable that cheques received in the course of one day should be presented the next."

ceptance, it remains to speak of the rules regulating the presentment for payment of bills and notes due at a given time, at what time of day they are to be presented for payment, and the effect of the theory of grace in extending the time of the payment, as well as those payable at or after sight, beyond the time stipulated in the contract. The bills and notes payable at a given date, or at a given time after date, or after demand, or after sight, must be presented when by the terms of the contract they are due.<sup>39</sup> In general, this does not mean the day expressly stipulated in the contract, but it means that day with the additional days implied by the grace of the law merchant.

Lord Holt, in 1701, in *TASSELL v. LEWIS*,<sup>40</sup> thus expounds the rule: "In case of foreign bills of exchange, the custom is that three days are allowed for payment of them; and, if they are not paid upon the last of the said days, the party ought immediately to protest the bill and return it, and by this means the drawer will be charged. But, if he does not protest it on the last of the three days, which are called the 'days of grace,' there, although he upon whom the bill is drawn fails, the drawer will not be chargeable, for it shall be reckoned his folly that he did not protest. But if it happens that the last day of the said three days is a Sunday or a great holiday, as Christmas Day, upon which no money used to be paid, there the party ought to demand the money upon the second day; and, if it be not paid, he ought to protest the bill the second day; otherwise,

<sup>39</sup> Thus, in the case of *ANDERTON v. BEOK*, 16 East, 248, the plaintiff received on the 26th of December a bill due on the 28th, but kept it until the 29th, when he sent it for presentment. The bill was dishonored, and it was held that the plaintiff was guilty of laches in keeping the bill until the 29th. In *WILLIAMS v. SMITH*, 2 Barn. & Ald. 496, it was held that the true rule is that a party, in order to avoid laches, must give notice by the next day's post. In the case of *POCKLINGTON v. SILVESTER*, Chit. Bills (10th Ed.) 846, note 10, it was held to be established as a rule of law that a party receiving a check on a banker has the whole of the banking hours of next day in which to present such check for payment. As to the allowance of a reasonable time for presentment, by an administrator, of a bill found among papers of the deceased holder, see *WHITE v. STODDARD*, 11 Gray (Mass.) 258.

<sup>40</sup> 1 Ld. Raym. 743.

it will be at his own peril, for the drawer will not be chargeable." This doctrine, thus declared to be the law merchant in case of foreign bills, has been largely followed by courts of this country, and is probably the law, except when it is modified by statute.\* It is, however, very generally modified by statute. For as the common-law rule stands, since grace was a mere indulgence, and not a right, it was not extended beyond the term of indulgence allowed for grace. Thus, if grace expired on Sunday, the instrument would fall due on Saturday,<sup>41</sup> and if that Saturday was a public holiday the instrument would fall due on Friday.<sup>42</sup> But this has been changed by the statutes of the various states to the rule which governs bills or notes payable without grace, which allows payment on the next succeeding business day, because, the debtor not being compelled to do business or make payment on a holiday, the next day is the first legal time at which the creditor can demand payment.<sup>43</sup> These rules apply alike to foreign and inland bills and promissory notes,<sup>44</sup> and to paper payable in installments, grace being allowed upon each installment.<sup>45</sup>

The day at which presentment for acceptance or for payment is to be made being fixed, the courts lay down a series of rules which are quite explicit in stating the hours of the day at which, under various circumstances, presentment for acceptance or payment is to be made. The general rule is that presentment should be made dur-

\* See Neg. Inst. L. § 145.

<sup>41</sup> *BUSSARD v. LEVERING*, 6 Wheat. 102; *KUNTZ v. TEMPEL*, 48 Mo. 75; *BARRETT v. ALLEN*, 10 Ohio, 426; *Reed v. Wilson*, 41 N. J. Law, 29. "When days of grace are allowed on a bill or note, and the third day falls on Sunday, the bill or note is payable on the previous Saturday." Per Bronson, J., in *SALTER v. BURT*, 20 Wend. 205. In *BOWEN v. NEWELL*, 8 N. Y. 190, it was held that whether days of grace should be allowed was dependent upon whether the instrument was payable on demand or at a future date.

<sup>42</sup> Story, Bills, § 338.

<sup>43</sup> *AVERY v. STEWART*, 2 Conn. 69; *SALTER v. BURT*, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 205; *Colms v. Bank*, 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 422; *SANDS v. LYON*, 18 Conn. 18.

<sup>44</sup> *Bank of Washington v. Triplett*, 1 Pet. 25; *OGDEN v. SAUNDERS*, 12 Wheat. 213; *BROWN v. HARRADEN*, 4 Term R. 148; *Cook v. Darling*, 2 R. I. 385; *Beck v. Thompson*, 4 Har. & J. 531.

<sup>45</sup> *ORIDGE v. SHERBORNE*, 11 Mees. & W. 374.

ing usual and reasonable hours.† With business men the legal meaning of "usual and reasonable hours" is any time during the proper hours of business. These vary, and generally range through the whole day to bedtime, in the evening.<sup>46</sup> They are classified as follows:

(1) Presentment at a bank should be during banking hours,<sup>47</sup> but if made after banking hours, to the proper authorities in the bank, it is sufficient.<sup>48</sup>

(2) Presentment at a place of business, during the usual business hours,<sup>49</sup> though a demand to any proper person at a place of business after business hours is sufficient.<sup>50</sup>

(3) Presentment at one's residence between the usual hours of

† See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 182, 135 (presentment for payment); section 242 (for acceptance).

<sup>46</sup> CAYUGA CO. BANK v. HUNT, 2 Hill, 635.

<sup>47</sup> Elford v. Teed, 1 Maule & S. 28; PARKER v. GORDON, 7 East, 385 (in this case it was held that if a bill be accepted payable at A's, who is the acceptor's banker, the party taking such special acceptance, which he is not bound to do, thereby impliedly agrees to present it for payment within the usual banking hours at the place where it is made payable); Staples v. Franklin Bank, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 43; Thorpe v. Peck, 28 Vt. 127.

<sup>48</sup> In the case of SALT SPRINGS BANK v. BURTON, 58 N. Y. 432, it was shown that, upon the day the note was due, the indorser, being prepared to pay it, sent the maker to the bank during banking hours to ascertain the amount. The note was presented for payment, an hour after the close of banking hours, by the holder, to the cashier, and payment demanded. This was refused on the ground that there were no funds deposited for the purpose. It was held that the indorser was charged by such demand. And see Bank of Syracuse v. Hollister, 17 N. Y. 46; BANK OF UTICA v. SMITH, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 230; Flint v. Rogers, 15 Me. 67; CROOK v. JADIS, 6 Car. & P. 191; Commercial Bank v. Hamer, 7 How. (Miss.) 448; Cohea v. Hunt, 2 Smedes & M. 227; Shepherd v. Chamberlain, 8 Gray (Mass.) 225; BANK OF UTICA v. PHILIPS, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 408.

<sup>49</sup> Lunt v. Adams, 17 Me. 230; Wallace v. Crilley, 46 Wis. 577, 1 N. W. 301; Triggs v. Newnham, 1 Car. & P. 631; Strong v. King, 35 Ill. 9, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 93.

<sup>50</sup> Henry v. Lee, 2 Chit. 124; GARNETT v. WOODCOCK, 6 Maule & S. 44. In this case a presentment of a bill of exchange at the banking house where payable, after banking hours, is sufficient if a person be stationed at the banking house, and return answer of "No orders."

rising and retiring.<sup>51</sup> But it is sufficient if made upon the acceptor or maker personally at any time.<sup>52</sup>

In addition to this general classification, there are other considerations, depending largely upon the circumstances of each particular case. The principal ones are the usage of trade, and the location of the domicile of the person to whom presentment is to be made.<sup>53</sup> But the general principle underlying these considerations is that the person making the presentment should use due and proper diligence, and that the presentment should be made at such a time of day that the person expected to make the payment or give the acceptance, in the exercise of ordinary business prudence, cannot be supposed to have been taken off his guard or caught without funds. It is almost needless to add that presentment at an improper time, as a legal act, is a nullity.<sup>54</sup> And that the demand for payment may be made at any time within the proper period, although the acceptor or maker has the whole of the day to make the payment. If he is ready to pay on the same day after a demand has been made, at the proper time he must seek the creditor and tender payment.<sup>55</sup> The effect of the demand upon the liability of the distinct contracts of the maker and acceptor and of the drawer and indorser will be examined subsequently.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>51</sup> *SALT SPRINGS BANK v. BURTON*, 58 N. Y. 430; *Nelson v. Fotterall*, 7 Leigh, 179; *Skelton v. Dustin*, 92 Ill. 49. In the case of *BARCLAY v. BAILEY*, 2 Camp. 527, it was held that the presentment of a bill of exchange for payment at the house of a merchant at 8 o'clock in the evening of the day it became due was sufficient to charge the drawer. *Dana v. Sawyer*, 22 Me. 244.

<sup>52</sup> *FARNSWORTH v. ALLEN*, 4 Gray (Mass.) 453; *King v. Crowell*, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 91.

<sup>53</sup> Notes to Bigelow, Cas. Bills & N. 246.

<sup>54</sup> *JOHNSON v. HAIGHT*, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 470; *WIFFEN v. ROBERTS*, 1 Esp. 261; *Mitchell v. De Grand*, 1 Mason, 176, Fed. Cas. No. 9,661; *Walsh v. Dart*, 12 Wis. 635; *Kohler v. Montgomery*, 17 Ind. 220; *Leavitt v. Simes*, 3 N. H. 14. In the case of *Dana v. Sawyer*, 22 Me. 244, it was held that presentment at nearly midnight to the maker, after the latter had retired, would not be sufficient, unless there was a waiver, or unless it was shown that payment would not have been made on a demand at a proper hour.

<sup>55</sup> 1 Pars. 374; Rand. Com. Paper, § 1092.

<sup>56</sup> See post, p. 360 et seq.

*Place of Presentment.*

The next step in our examination of the subject of presentment is the place where it is made.\* The underlying principles are much the same in case of presentment for acceptance and of presentment for payment, though in case of presentment for payment a very prominent element is that some place of payment is usually indicated in the instrument which becomes an important stipulation and term of the contract.<sup>57</sup> But if, in case of a bill, some place where the drawee is to be found to accept the bill appear on its face, the specific direction as to the place is a warranty or contract on the part of the drawer that a drawee shall be found at that place capable of accepting, and a presentment there is sufficient, although the place is closed,<sup>58</sup> or the drawee has never resided in the place named, or although, if addressed to a city or town generally, his exact place of residence is unknown.<sup>59</sup> This last rule is, however, disputed, the adverse cases<sup>60</sup> holding that the drawer should not be subjected to the penalties of dishonor by the chance absence of the drawee from the place indicated, but that the holder should make diligent inquiry for him, and seek to present the bill personally before he protests it.<sup>61</sup> However this may be, if no place is indicated on the face of the bill for the presentment for its acceptance such presentment may be made either to the drawee personally,<sup>62</sup> or, this being impracticable, first at his place of business,

\*See Neg. Inst. L. § 133.

<sup>57</sup> In *HODGE v. FILLIS*, 3 Camp. 463, it was held that, where a particular place of payment is denoted in a bill by both drawers and acceptors, it is a term of the contract between the parties, and that an averment that the bill was presented there for payment must be made. In *Williams v. Waring*, 10 Barn. & C. 2, it was held that a memorandum, in the margin of a note, that it is payable at a certain place, is not to be considered part of the contract, and presentment at that place need not be averred or proved.

<sup>58</sup> *ANONYMOUS*, 1 Ld. Raym. 743; *Wolfe v. Jewett*, 10 La. 383; *Ratcliff v. Planters' Bank*, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 425.

<sup>59</sup> *Union Bank v. Fowlkes*, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 555.

<sup>60</sup> *Bank of Washington v. Triplett*, 1 Pet. 25, 34; *Wiseman v. Chiapella*, 23 How. 368-377.

<sup>61</sup> In the case of *Bank v. Orvis*, 42 Iowa, 691, it was held that, where the maker of a note has no place of business, a demand made at his place of residence is sufficient, even though he is not at home.

<sup>62</sup> *Mason v. Franklin*, 3 Johns. 201. A notice sent by a bank where a note

NEG.BILLS.—23



and then at his place of residence, if that is known.<sup>63</sup> Of these two places, it is thought that the place of business should be first sought out by the holder,<sup>64</sup> and it is generally agreed that, if the drawee's place of business or residence cannot be ascertained, the holder may treat the bill as dishonored, and protest for non-acceptance, provided, always, that he uses due diligence to ascertain them.<sup>65</sup> In case of presentment for payment, the rules are governed by the same general principles.† These rules are:

(1) If the instrument is made payable at a particular place, the presentment need not be personal, but is sufficient if made at the place stipulated.

has been left for collection, directing the maker to call and pay it, is not presentment. *BARNES v. VAUGHAN*, 6 R. I. 259. "The practice in Massachusetts and Maine to the contrary (*Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank*, 6 Metc. 24; *Warren Bank v. Parker*, 8 Gray, 221) must be regarded as provincial." 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 862.

<sup>63</sup> *ANDERSON v. DRAKE*, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 113. In this case, Thompson, C. J., said: "I am inclined to think that where a note is not made payable at any particular place, and the maker has a known and permanent residence within the state, the holder is bound to make a demand at such residence in order to charge the indorser."

<sup>64</sup> Tied. Com. Paper, § 213. "I have no doubt, where a person has an office or known and settled place of business for the transaction of his moneyed concerns, \* \* \* a presentment and demand at that place (as well as a presentment and demand at his residence) is good in law." Dayton, J., in *SUSSEX BANK v. BALDWIN*, 17 N. J. Law, 488.

<sup>65</sup> *Bateman v. Joseph*, 12 East, 433; *FREEMAN v. BOYNTON*, 7 Mass. 483; *Collins v. Butler*, 2 Strange, 1087; *Browning v. Kinnear*, 1 Gow, 81; *HINE v. ALLELY*, 4 Barn. & Adol. 624. In this case the bill was taken to the proper place, but the house was closed.

† "Comparing presentment for acceptance with presentment for payment, it is clear that the two cases are governed by somewhat different considerations. Speaking generally, presentment for acceptance should be personal, while presentment for payment should be local. A bill should be presented for payment where the money is. Any one can then hand over the money. A bill should be presented for acceptance to the drawee himself, for he has to write the acceptance; but the place where it is presented to him is comparatively immaterial, for all he has to do is to take the bill. Again (except in case of demand drafts), the day for payment is a fixed day; but the drawee cannot tell on what day it may suit the holder to present a bill for acceptance. These considerations are material as bearing on the question whether the holder has used reasonable diligence to effect presentment." Chalm. Bills Exch. (4th Ed.) 138.

(2) If no place of payment is stipulated, first at the maker's or acceptor's place of business, and then at his place of residence, and if, after due diligence, the maker or acceptor, or his place of business or of residence, cannot be found, then the bill or note may be treated as dishonored.

In the first of these rules the principle guiding the courts is that the acceptor or maker has contracted to have funds to pay the instrument when due at a particular place, and this contract the indorser has ratified. The holder has a right to rely upon this contract in taking the instrument, and therefore his duty is fulfilled if he is ready with the instrument to receive payment of it at the place stipulated. The question involved in the second rule is to formulate the degree of diligence which is necessary for a holder to exercise to charge an indorser in endeavoring to procure payment of the instrument from the acceptor or maker.<sup>66</sup> And thus the facts to be kept in mind are the express stipulation of contract, in the first instance, and, in the second, the degree of diligence necessary for the holder to avail against the right of the indorser to insist upon a presentment to hold him as a surety. When a place of payment is stipulated in the bill or note, presentment for payment is sufficient to charge all parties with liability, if made when the instrument is due at the place stipulated.<sup>67</sup> The presentment need not be personal.<sup>68</sup> The holder's part of the contract is performed if he, or any one for him, is at the place of payment with the paper,

<sup>66</sup> "The general rule that payment must be demanded from the maker of a note, and notice of its non-payment forwarded to the indorser within due time, in order to render him liable, is so firmly settled that no authority need be cited in support of it. \* \* \* Due diligence to obtain payment from the maker is a condition precedent, on which the liability of the indorser depends." Marshall, C. J., in *MAGRUDER v. BANK*, 8 Curt. Dec. 299, 3 Pet. 87. See, also, *CUNDY v. MARRIOTT*, 1 Barn. & Adol. 696.

<sup>67</sup> *Harris v. Packer*, 3 Tyrw. 370; *SAUNDERSON v. JUDGE*, 2 H. Bl. 509; *Buxton v. Jones*, 1 Man. & G. 83; *Bank of the Metropolis v. Breut*, 2 Cranch, C. C. 530, Fed. Cas. No. 900; *GALE v. KEMPER*, 10 La. 205. In the case of *SAUNDERSON v. JUDGE*, 2 H. Bl. 509, it was held by the court that: "It is not necessary that a demand should be personal. It is sufficient if it be made at the house of the maker of the note; and it is the same thing, in effect, if it be made at the place where he appoints it to be made."

<sup>68</sup> *Nichols v. Goldsmith*, 7 Wend. 162; *Gillett v. Averill*, 5 Denio, 85.

so that he may receive the money.<sup>69</sup> The mere presence of the instrument at the place of payment is enough.<sup>70</sup> By "place of payment" is meant either the particular place stipulated as an office, house,<sup>71</sup> or bank,<sup>72</sup> or the city or town stipulated,<sup>73</sup> provided perhaps, in the last case, that the holder make a reasonable inquiry for the acceptor's or maker's address in the city or town, and cannot find it.<sup>74</sup> The stipulation fixing a place of payment may be in writing, and created in a bill, either by the drawer making it payable at a particular place, or by like act of the acceptor, provided his acceptance does not change the tenor of the bill.<sup>75</sup> It may be created in writing in a note by the maker specifying the place at the time of execution. It may also be created by parol agreement of the parties if it does not change a written stipulation in the bill or note.<sup>76</sup> And it may specify several places, and designate any of them as the place of payment of the instrument.<sup>77</sup> If payment is to be made at any one of several places, presentment may also be made at any one of them, or presence of the instrument at

<sup>69</sup> *Woodin v. Foster*, 16 Barb. 146.

<sup>70</sup> *Bank of Syracuse v. Hollister*, 17 N. Y. 46; *Merchants' Bank v. Elderkin*, 25 N. Y. 178.

<sup>71</sup> *PHILPOTT v. BRYANT*, 3 Car. & P. 244.

<sup>72</sup> *Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank*, 8 Wall. 641.

<sup>73</sup> *Meyer v. Hibsher*, 47 N. Y. 265.

<sup>74</sup> *Rand. Com. Paper*, § 1114; *Daniel, Neg. Inst.* § 640.

<sup>75</sup> *Chalm. Dig. art. 166*; *Foden v. Sharp*, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 183; *TROY CITY BANK v. LANMAN*, 19 N. Y. 477; *Niagara Dist. Bank v. Manufacturing Co.*, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 403; *Blair v. Bank of Tennessee*, 11 Humph. 84.

<sup>76</sup> *Thompson v. Ketcham*, 4 Johns. 285; *Meyer v. Hibsher*, 47 N. Y. 265; *Pearson v. Bank of Metropolis*, 1 Pet. 89; *State Bank v. Hurd*, 12 Mass. 172.

<sup>77</sup> *BEECHING v. GOWER*, 1 Holt, N. P. 313. This was a case where a banker's promissory note was made payable at Tunbridge and also at London. The holder had a right to present it at either place, and if payment were refused in London it would be no evidence of laches on the part of the holder to prove that, if payment had been demanded at Tunbridge, the nearer and more convenient place, the bill would have been paid. *Daniel, Neg. Inst.* §§ 648-650; *Tied. Com. Paper*, § 314. Where a bill was addressed to the drawee at a particular place in the city, and so accepted, and it appeared that he had two places of business in the city, a certificate of presentment "at the place of business" of the acceptor in the city was insufficient. *BROOKS v. HIGBY*, 11 Hun (N. Y.) 235.

any one of them is sufficient. This is because the aim of the theory of negotiability is to put the least possible burden upon the holder. This stipulation is for his benefit. And the maker or acceptor, who is party to such a stipulation, must be ready to pay the instrument at any and all of the places named as places of payment in it.

When a bill or note is not made payable at any particular place, the general rule of law is that, in order to charge the indorser, payment must be demanded of the maker personally, or, if not personally, at his place of business, or at his dwelling place or other place of abode.<sup>78</sup> This is a rule which can be acted upon in the majority of instances, because a presentment can be made at one of these places. But the rule is not without exception. Under various circumstances, a demand in any form may be dispensed with. The test is whether due diligence to make a demand has been made, and if a demand is found to be impracticable, proper efforts for that purpose having been made, the indorser will still be liable, notice having been given him by the holder. Instances of this exception are when the acceptor or maker has absconded,<sup>79</sup> or is a seaman on a voyage,<sup>80</sup> or has no known place of residence or of business,<sup>81</sup>

<sup>78</sup> TAYLOR v. SNYDER, 3 Denio, 145; Holtz v. Boppe, 37 N. Y. 634; GATES v. BEECHER, 60 N. Y. 518; Meyer v. Hibsher, 47 N. Y. 265; COX v. BANK, 100 U. S. 713; MITCHELL v. BARING, 10 Barn. & C. 11; BARNES v. VAUGHAN, 6 R. I. 259; Farmers' Bank v. Duvall, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 78; Moore v. Walitt, 13 N. H. 415; SUSSEX BANK v. BALDWIN, 17 N. J. Law, 487; Draper v. Clemens, 4 Mo. 52. In the case of BARNES v. VAUGHAN, 6 R. I. 259, it was held by Bosworth, J., that, "if no place of payment is named in the note, at which the note is payable, it is necessary to present the note to the maker personally, or at his place of abode or business, before the indorser can be made chargeable." See, also, CHEEK v. ROPER, 5 Esp. 105; PARKER v. KELLOGG, 158 Mass. 90, 32 N. E. 1038.

<sup>79</sup> PUTNAM v. SULLIVAN, 4 Mass. 45-53; Lehman v. Jones, 1 Watts & S. (Pa.) 126; Ratcliff v. Planters' Bank, 2 Sneed, 425.

<sup>80</sup> Barrett v. Wills, 4 Leigh, 114. In DENNIE v. WALKER, 7 N. H. 199, it was held by Upham, J., that "a removal beyond the bounds of the government, after the making of a note, and before it comes due, and where no place of payment of the note is specified, renders a demand upon the maker unnecessary; but this is an exception to the general rule, and must be construed strictly."

<sup>81</sup> Whittier v. Graffam, 3 Greenl. 82; Duncan v. McCullough, 4 Serg. & R. 486. "If the maker has no known residence or place, the holder will be ex-

or after the giving of the note or bill, and before its maturity, the maker or acceptor has removed from the state or country.<sup>82</sup> In all of these instances a presentment and demand are excused. The reason of the rule is due diligence, and, where no place of payment is stipulated in the note, due diligence means what is consistent with ordinary business practice. Experience warrants the position that ordinary business practice and due diligence are the same. Where no place of presentment or payment is specified, due diligence would require that the instrument be presented where there might be supposed to be some one to care for it.<sup>83</sup>

The foregoing general statements as to the place of presentment are to be qualified by the other statement that their main importance is in their application to the enforcement of the contract of the drawer or indorser. A failure to present does not relieve the acceptor or maker from the principal debt, but does discharge the drawer and indorsers.\* His liability as a surety is *strictissimi juris*,

excused from making any demand whatever. So, if in the intermediate period between the time when the note was made and when it becomes due the maker has removed his domicile or place of business to another state. \* \* \* It will in such case be sufficient to present the note at his former residence or place of business." Per Wright, J., in *ADAMS v. LELAND*, 30 N. Y. 309. To the same effect, see *ERWIN v. ADAMS*, 2 La. 318; *SANDS v. CLARKE*, 8 C. B. 751.

<sup>82</sup> *McGRUDER v. BANK OF WASHINGTON*, 9 Wheat. 598; *Gillespie v. Hannahan*, 4 McCord, 503; *Reid v. Morrison*, 2 Watts & S. 401; *Wheeler v. Field*, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 290; *Central Bank v. Allen*, 16 Me. 41; *Grafton Bank v. Cox*, 13 Gray, 503. But if the maker of a note, when it is made or indorsed, has a known residence out of the state, which remains unchanged, demand must be made on him, or due diligence used. *BANK OF ORLEANS v. WHITTEMORE*, 12 Gray (Mass.) 469; *TAYLOR v. SNYDER*, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 150.

<sup>83</sup> *Woodworth v. Bank of America*, 19 Johns. 391; *Meyer v. Hibsher*, 47 N. Y. 265.

\*Neg. Inst. L. § 130, provides: "Presentment for payment is not necessary in order to charge the person primarily liable on the instrument; but if the instrument is, by its terms, payable at a special place, and he is able and willing to pay it there at maturity, such ability and willingness are equivalent to a tender of payment upon his part. But, except as herein otherwise provided, presentment for payment is necessary in order to charge the drawer and indorsers." This declares the law as laid down in this country. In England there was formerly great diversity of opinion as to the necessity of present-

and must be enforced according to the letter of the contract. The due diligence the holder owes to him is only satisfied by presentment at the place where it is to be presumed that funds have been provided to meet the bill or note at maturity.<sup>84</sup> And, if no place is specified, then a reasonable effort on the part of the holder to collect the paper of the maker or acceptor in ways which the law itself has prescribed and pointed out. This topic will be amplified in a subsequent section of this chapter.

ment to charge the acceptor when a bill was accepted payable at a particular place. It was finally settled by the house of lords (*ROWE v. YOUNG*, 2 Brod. & B. 165) that, where a bill was so accepted, presentment at the place must be proved. This led to the passage of Onslow's Act (1 & 2 Geo. IV., c. 78), which enacted that an acceptance payable at a particular place should be deemed a general acceptance unless payable there only. The effect of the act was that, except in the latter case, presentment was not necessary to charge the acceptor. *SELBY v. EDEN*, 3 Bing. 611; *Halstead v. Skelton*, 5 Q. B. E. 86. The act did not apply to notes, and, before and after the act, in case of a note payable at a particular place, presentment has been necessary to charge the maker. *SANDERSON v. BOWES*, 14 East, 500; 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 93, note 1. In the United States the courts have almost universally held that presentment of a bill or note, although payable at a particular place, is not necessary to charge the acceptor or maker; the only consequence of failure to present being that the acceptor or maker, if he was ready at the time and place, may plead the fact in bar of damages and costs. *WALLACE v. McCONNELL*, 13 Pet. 136; *Cox v. Bank*, 100 U. S. 704; *CARTER v. SMITH*, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 321; *Hills v. Place*, 48 N. Y. 520; *Lazier v. Horan*, 55 Iowa, 77, 7 N. W. 457; *Montgomery v. Tutt*, 11 Cal. 307; *MONTGOMERY v. ELLIOTT*, 6 Ala. 701; *Peabody Ins. Co. v. Wilson*, 29 W. Va. 543, 2 S. E. 888.

<sup>84</sup> *Bank of U. S. v. Smith*, 11 Wheat. 171; *Watkins v. Crouch*, 5 Leigh, 522; *Ferner v. Williams*, 37 Barb. 9; *Parker v. Stroud*, 98 N. Y. 379; *Brown v. Jones*, 113 Ind. 46, 13 N. E. 857. Where a bill is drawn payable at a particular place, and the drawee accepts it payable at that place, in an action against the drawer, presentment to the acceptor at that place must be proved. *GIBB v. MATHER*, 8 Bing. 214. An acceptance which makes a bill payable at a different place from that in which the drawee has his residence is a material departure from the tenor of the instrument, and presentment for payment at the place in which it is made payable by the acceptance, will not charge the drawer. *NIAGARA BANK v. MANUFACTURING CO.*, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 403.

**SAME—BY WHOM AND TO WHOM MADE—EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PRESENT—NOTICE OF DISHONOR—PROTEST.**

141. Presentment must be made by the lawful holder, or his authorized agent, to the drawee, acceptor, or maker, or his authorized agent.

142. A failure to make due presentment for acceptance, when it is incumbent on the holder to make the same, deprives him of his remedy both on the bill itself and on the consideration for which it was given.

143. A failure to present a bill or note for payment at the proper place or time—

(a) Relieves the acceptor or maker from payment of further interest and costs of suit, if he was ready with funds to meet the bill or note at the stipulated time and place of payment, but not from the principal sum of the bill or note.

(b) It discharges the drawer and indorsers from liability.

144. Upon presentment of a bill for acceptance, or of a bill or note for payment, and a refusal to accept the bill or to pay the bill or note, notice of its dishonor must be given to the drawer of the bill, and to the indorsers of the bill or note. It is usual to protest it, though this is necessary only with foreign bills.

In concluding the subject of "Presentment," and before taking up the subject of "Dishonor," it remains to mention the person to whom and by whom a bill may be presented for acceptance, or a bill or note may be presented for payment, the effect of the failure of the holder to present the instrument for acceptance and for payment, and the proceeding proper to be followed in case acceptance or payment is refused.



*By Whom.*

Presentment should be made by the lawful holder or by his duly-authorized agent.<sup>85</sup> The meaning of "a lawful holder" is determined by principles already given.<sup>86</sup> Where the instrument is payable to bearer or indorsed in blank, both in case of presentment for acceptance and of presentment for payment, the rule is that the drawee in case of acceptance, and the acceptor or maker in case of payment, is bound to consider the person in possession of the bill or note, with the ostensible legal title to it, as the person lawfully entitled to make the presentment and demand. This ostensible legal title is shown by the possession of the instrument. Where the instrument is indorsed in full, for reasons already given, it must be presented by the indorsee. Where, however, the instrument is unindorsed by the payee or indorsed in full, and not in the possession of the indorsee, then the person to whom it is presented is put upon his inquiry. If, without inquiry, he accepts and pays, it is at the risk of repayment, if he does not pay the true owner. The possessor certainly cannot be deemed, as is sometimes said,<sup>87</sup> to be the agent of the true owner by virtue of his possession.<sup>88</sup> Though this last position is modified by the rule that if it appears conclusively that the omission to indorse was through inadvertence, and that, although not indorsed, the instrument was transferred to the holder before maturity, for a valuable consideration, then such an instrument is in the possession of some party from whom it is proper to accept it, or to whom it is proper to pay it.<sup>89</sup>

The agent making the presentation is generally, but not necessarily, a notary public. A notary public is chosen to make presentment for purpose of protest. The distinction between presentment and protest is that presentment is the placing the bill so that those liable upon it can have it at hand to accept it or to pay it when due, but protest is an official act, held necessary

<sup>85</sup> *BANK OF UTICA v. SMITH*, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 230; *FREEMAN v. BOYNTON*, 7 Mass. 483; *AGNEW v. BANK*, 2 Har. & G. 478; *LEFTLEY v. MILLS*, 4 Term R. 170; *Bachelor v. Priest*, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 399; *SUSSEX BANK v. BALDWIN*, 17 N. J. Law, 487. See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 132, 242.

<sup>86</sup> See *supra*, p. 191 et seq.

<sup>87</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 573.

<sup>88</sup> *Doubleday v. Kress*, 50 N. Y. 413.

<sup>89</sup> *Franklin Bank v. Raymond*, 3 Wend. 89.

in case of foreign bills to charge the indorsers.\* Any person who is the lawful holder of the instrument may make a presentment. And while it is also true that any reputable citizen, in the absence of a notary public in the town or place, may make a protest, nevertheless the custom is practically limited to notaries public, because it is only the certificates or manifests of notaries public which by the statutes of the several states have been declared to be prima facie evidence of the facts contained in them.\*\* But, aside from the fact of protest, any person duly authorized may make a presentment,\*\* although it is doubtful, in case of payment of an instrument specially indorsed, whether or not the maker or acceptor may require a written authority or an indorsement to the agent before being compelled to make payment.\*\*

*To Whom.*

Subject to the provisions stated in the last sections of this chapter, a presentment must be made to the drawee or acceptor of a bill, or to the maker of a note, or to an authorized agent.\*\* In case of acceptance, the presentment must be made to the drawee in per-

\*While any person may present a foreign bill, and payment to him is a discharge, the drawer and indorsers cannot be charged in case of non-payment without protest, which must be made by a notary public, and cannot be based upon the act of another. *OCEAN NAT. BANK v. WILLIAMS*, 102 Mass. 141. Whether presentment by the notary's clerk is sufficient foundation for protest has been debated. The better rule appears to be that it is not. *OCEAN NAT. BANK v. WILLIAMS*, supra. But it has been held sufficient if warranted by usage. Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 579-587.

\*\* In the case of *LANGENBERGER v. KROEGER*, 48 Cal. 149, it was held that, where it was not specified in the instrument in what kind of money the draft was payable, a demand for payment in gold would not charge the drawer.

\*\* *MERCHANTS' BANK v. SPICER*, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 443; *Baer v. Leppert*, 12 Hun (N. Y.) 516; *Hartford Bank v. Barry*, 17 Mass. 94; *SHED v. BRETT*, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 401, 413; *Seaver v. Lincoln*, 21 Pick. 267; *Hartford Bank v. Stedman*, 3 Conn. 489.

\*\* See Tied. Com. Paper, § 311, and cases cited. Contra, Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 572, and cases cited.

\*\* In the case of *BROWN v. TURNER*, 15 Ala. 832, it was held that, where a bill was accepted by two partners, demand of payment made of the agent of one of them, in the absence from the city of both partners, was sufficient to charge the drawer.

son, if he be alive and can be found.<sup>94</sup> If he cannot be found, then inquiry should be made for some person authorized to accept for him, though it should be always kept in mind that it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that the agent was authorized to accept or refuse acceptance.<sup>95</sup> If the drawee is dead, the better opinion is that at once there may be a protest for non-acceptance.<sup>96</sup> In case of presentment for payment, if there is a stipulation for the payment of the instrument at any particular place, presentment should be made to the drawee, acceptor or maker, if he is to be found at the place of payment; if not, then presentment should be made to any person of discretion who can be found. It is the duty of the acceptor or maker to have funds at that place, and a person on the premises who may be reasonably supposed to know of them or to have charge of them is a proper person to whom to make a presentment.<sup>97</sup> If no place is stipulated, then presentment must be made either to the acceptor or maker personally, or at his place of business or of residence, for reasons already given.<sup>98</sup> And

<sup>94</sup> *CHEEK v. ROPER*, 5 Esp. 175. In this case it was held that, in order to charge the drawer of an unaccepted bill, some actual evidence of a demand to accept on the drawee must be proved. It is not sufficient to call at the residence of the drawee, and for an acceptance to be refused by a person who was unknown by the one making the demand. *SHARPE v. DREW*, 9 Ind. 281.

<sup>95</sup> *Nelson v. Fotterall*, 7 Leigh (Va.) 180; *STAINBACK v. BANK*, 11 Grat. (Va.) 260. It seems that a bill addressed to several persons should be presented to all unless one be authorized to accept for all. If addressed to a partnership, acceptance by one partner would be sufficient, but not after dissolution and notice thereof. *TOMBECKBEE BANK v. DUMELL*, 5 Mason, 56, Fed. Cas. No. 14,081. See Neg. Inst. L. § 242, subd. 1.

<sup>96</sup> Tied. Com. Paper, § 212; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 459. Neg. Inst. L. § 242, subd. 2, provides that "presentment may be made to his personal representative." Referring to the similar enactment of the Bills of Exchange Act, Judge Chalmers says: "Before this enactment the law on this point was very doubtful. *SMITH v. BANK*, 8 Moore, P. C. (N. S.) at pages 461, 462. Now the holder has an option." Chalm. Bills Exch. (4th Ed.) 137. Cf. Neg. Inst. L. § 245, subd. 1.

<sup>97</sup> *Matthews v. Haydon*, 2 Esp. 509; *Sanford v. Norton*, 17 Vt. 285; *Draper v. Clemens*, 4 Mo. 52; *Phillips v. Poindexter*, 18 Ala. 579; *BANK OF ENGLAND v. NEWMAN*, 12 Mod. 241. In this case it was held that a demand of a servant of the drawer, who used to pay money for him, was a good demand. *Whaley v. Houston*, 12 La. Ann. 585.

<sup>98</sup> See *supra*, p. 353 et seq. In the case of *BARNES v. VAUGHAN*, 6 R. I.

in making presentment in these ways the principles enunciated also apply. If the maker or acceptor is dead, presentment should be made to his personal representative, if one can be found.<sup>99</sup> But if none has been appointed, then at the acceptor's or maker's former place of residence.<sup>100</sup> Where the persons primarily liable on the instrument are liable as partners, and no place of payment is specified, presentment for payment may be made to any one of them, even though there has been a dissolution of the firm.\* Where there are several persons, not partners, primarily liable on the instrument, and no place of payment is specified, presentment must be made to them all.†

### *Effect of Failure to Present.*

A failure to present for acceptance is in general, unimportant.<sup>101</sup> But in case of bills payable at or after sight, transferred as col-

259, no place was named in the note in question, and it was held that payment must be demanded from the maker in person, or at his place of business or residence, on the last day of grace.

<sup>99</sup> *MAGRUDER v. BANK*, 3 Pet. 87. The decision in this case was to the effect that the fact that the indorser of a note took out letters of administration on the estate of the maker, who died before it became due, did not free the holder from the duty of demanding payment, and of giving notice to the indorser. *Gower v. Moore*, 25 Me. 16; *Juniata Bank v. Hale*, 16 Serg. & R. 167. In this case the maker of the note was shown to have died before it became due. Letters of administration upon the estate were taken out by the indorsers, among others, before maturity of the note. It was held that, notwithstanding these facts, notice of the maker's non-payment must be given to the indorsers. *GROTH v. GYGER*, 31 Pa. St. 271.

<sup>100</sup> *MAGRUDER v. BANK*, 3 Pet. 87; *Juniata Bank v. Hale*, 16 Serg. & R. 167; *Price v. Young*, 1 Nott & McC. 438; *Gower v. Moore*, 25 Me. 16. See Neg. Inst. L. § 136. Cf. section 142.

\* This is the language of Neg. Inst. L. § 137, which is declaratory. *BROWN v. TURNER*, 15 Ala. 832; *CAYUGA COUNTY BANK v. HUNT*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 635; *GATES v. BEECHER*, 60 N. Y. 518; *Crowley v. Barry*, 4 Gill (Md.) 194; *FOURTH NAT. BANK v. HEUSCHEN*, 52 Mo. 207.

† This is the language of Neg. Inst. L. § 138. Cf. section 142. *ARNOLD v. DRESSER*, 8 Allen (Mass.) 435; *Willis v. Green*, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 232; *BLAKE v. McMILLEN*, 83 Iowa, 150; *BENEDICT v. SCHMIEG*, 13 Wash. 476, 43 Pac. 374.

<sup>101</sup> See *supra*, p. 337 et seq.

lateral security,<sup>102</sup> or in payment of the holder's debt,<sup>103</sup> presentment for acceptance is vital. For, as has been seen,<sup>104</sup> it is the duty of the holder of such bills to present them for acceptance within a reasonable time, else the drawer and prior indorsers are discharged.<sup>105</sup> This duty binds the transferee, and he must in turn present the paper for acceptance within a reasonable time. Hence the rules already given<sup>106</sup> do not apply to such a transferee, and he is not allowed to treat the instrument as a suspension of the indebtedness, and to sue upon the original consideration, upon returning to the debtor the bill, from which the drawer and indorser are discharged by reason of his own negligence. He has made the paper his own so as to substitute the parties to it his debtors in place of his original debtor, and he has discharged the original debtor from all liability, whether the paper is in fact paid or not.<sup>107</sup> The loss must fall upon his shoulders, and not that of the debtor, for a bill rendered nugatory in many of its important particulars is treated as a discharge or payment of the original debt. This rule applies also in case of the laches of the original creditor in presenting for payment a bill or note transferred to him by his debtor, or in obtaining the payment of instruments so transferred in ways from which loss or injury ensues.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>102</sup> PEACOCK v. PURSELL, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 728; Dayton v. Trull, 23 Wend. 345.

<sup>103</sup> In the case of Smith v. Miller, 43 N. Y. 174, it was held by Allen, J., that "a creditor may so deal with negotiable securities received from his debtor for collection, and to be placed to his credit when paid, as to discharge the debtor from all liability. \* \* \* Laches which would discharge the drawer or indorser of a bill of exchange will as effectually extinguish the debt for payment of which a bill or other negotiable instrument is transferred."

<sup>104</sup> See supra, p. 337 et seq.

<sup>105</sup> Mellish v. Rawdon, 9 Bing. 416; Ramchurn v. Radakissen, 9 Moore, P. C. 46; WALLACE v. AGRY, 4 Mason, 336, Fed. Cas. No. 17,096; Strong v. King, 35 Ill. 9; GOUPY v. HARDEN, 7 Taunt. 163. In GOUPY v. HARDEN it was held by Gibbs, C. J., that there was no laches in putting a foreign bill payable after sight into circulation before acceptance, and to keep it circulating so long as the convenience of the successive holders requires.

<sup>106</sup> See supra, p. 337 et seq.

<sup>107</sup> People v. Cromwell, 102 N. Y. 477, 7 N. E. 413; Smith v. Miller, 43 N. Y. 171; Southwick v. Sax, 9 Wend. 122.

<sup>108</sup> Jones v. Savage, 6 Wend. 658; Tobey v. Barber, 5 Johns. 68; Chamber-

The principal point of importance to be noted in the case of the failure of the holder to present a bill or note for payment at the proper place or time is the difference in its effect upon the contract of the acceptor and maker, and that of the drawer and indorsers. As far as the maker and acceptor are concerned, the place and time of payment embodied in an instrument are looked upon merely as memoranda of the place where and time when payment is to be demanded, and not as part of the contract otherwise essential. The maker or acceptor is liable everywhere and at all times within the statute of limitations, and, as against him, the bringing of the action is a sufficient demand.<sup>109</sup> The right of action always subsists so long as the instrument is unpaid. The place and time of payment, however, are so far important that, if the maker or acceptor were there then, with his money to pay the instrument, it is looked upon much as a tender would be in the case of an ordinary debt. The holder may recover from him at any time the amount of the instrument,<sup>110</sup> but not interest, by

*lyn v. Delarive*, 2 Wills. 353; *Hebden v. Hartsink*, 4 Esp. 46; *Camidge v. Allenby*, 6 Barn. & C. 373; *Adams v. Darby*, 28 Mo. 162; *Gracie v. Sandford*, 9 Ark. 238. In *KEARSLAKE v. MORGAN*, 5 Term R. 513, it was held that a plea in assumpsit that the defendant (who was the payee of a promissory note) indorsed it to the plaintiff "for and on account of" the said debt was good.

<sup>109</sup> *Rhodes v. Gent*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 244; *Jackson v. Packer*, 13 Conn. 342; *Armstrong v. Caldwell*, 2 Ill. 546; *Chillicothe Branch of State Bank v. Fox*, 3 Blatchf. 431, Fed. Cas. No. 2,683; *Blair v. Bank of Tennessee*, 11 Humph. 83; *WEGERSLOFFE v. KEENE*, 1 Strange, 222; *Rice v. Hogan*, 8 Dana (Ky.) 134.

<sup>110</sup> *Bacon v. Dyer*, 12 Me. 19; *Armistead v. Armistead*, 10 Leigh, 525; *Mulherrin v. Hannum*, 2 Yerg. 81; *Hills v. Place*, 48 N. Y. 520; *Lazler v. Horan*, 55 Iowa, 75, 7 N. W. 457. Though the paper be payable on demand, action may be brought without presentment. *NORTON v. ELLAM*, 6 Law J. Exch. 121; *WHEELER v. WARNER*, 47 N. Y. 519; *HARRISBURG TRUST CO. v. SHUFELDT (C. C.)* 78 Fed. 292. In *WHEELER v. WARNER*, supra, Peckham, J., said: "Upon such a note, with or without interest, an action may be maintained against the maker without any demand, because it is due. \* \* \* To say that the suit is the demand is to repeat an unmeaning phrase as thus used, which no number of repetitions can make sensible." The rule as to necessity of demand is otherwise in the case of certificates of deposit, though the decisions are not unanimous. Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 1707, 1707a. Similar conflict exists in the case of bank notes. Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1683.

way of damages, for his failure to pay.<sup>111</sup> In other words, the non-attendance of the holder with the instrument at the time and place of payment can produce no worse consequences to him than if he had attended, and the acceptor or maker had also been present, and tendered the money, which the holder had refused to accept.<sup>112</sup> Of course, with this must be coupled the other principle governing the law of tender,—that, for the maker or acceptor to preserve his rights, the tender must be kept good. The funds must be kept at the place of payment to pay the instrument at any time; for if the holder make a special demand afterwards, and the instrument be not paid, then his rights revive, and he becomes entitled to interest or damages from the time of the demand and also his costs of suit. This general rule does not apply to the drawer<sup>113</sup> or indorser.<sup>114</sup> He is not the principal debtor, but only a surety, whose liability is dependent upon the strict performance of the contract by the holder.<sup>115</sup> The place and time of payment for him are an essential part of the contract. The indorser is entitled to be at once apprised of the default of the maker, so that he may protect himself, both from the payment of interest as damages and of costs, by taking up the bill or note himself, and further may take steps to protect himself as against prior indorsers. The holder of the bill or note is held to a most strict compliance with its terms. Presentment either the day before or the day after the instrument became due will not avail. The loss or want of one day is <sup>116</sup> a palpable want of due diligence, which discharges the indorser.

*Notice of Dishonor.*

After presentment for acceptance or payment has been made and refused, notice of dishonor must at once be given to the drawer and

<sup>111</sup> Phillips v. Franklin, Gow, 196; Murray v. East India Co., 5 Barn. & Ald. 204.

<sup>112</sup> Hills v. Place, 48 N. Y. 520; ante, p. 358.

<sup>113</sup> Munroe v. Easton, 2 Johns. Cas. 75; Burritt v. Tildmarsh, 5 Ill. App. 341.

<sup>114</sup> Magruder v. Bank, 3 Pet. 87; Ruddell v. Walker, 7 Ark. 457; Vanwickle v. Downing, 19 La. Ann. 83; Duncan v. McCullough, 4 Serg. & R. 480; Brandt v. Mickle, 28 Md. 436; Bank of Alexandria v. Young, 2 Cranch, C. C. 52, Fed. Cas. No. 858.

<sup>115</sup> Wolcott v. Van Santvoord, 17 Johns. 247; Parker v. Stroud, 98 N. Y. 379. See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 130, 144.

<sup>116</sup> JOHNSON v. HAIGHT, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 470.



indorsers; otherwise they are discharged.\* The reason of the rule that a failure to give the drawer and indorsers notice of non-acceptance discharges them is that these parties may take prompt measures of self-protection; the drawer by withdrawing or withholding the further accumulation of effects in the hands of the drawee, and the indorsers by obtaining payment from the parties respectively liable to them.<sup>117</sup> The reason for the rule that failure to give a drawer and indorsers notice of non-payment discharges them is partly that given in the last paragraph, and partly because the contract of the drawer or indorser, as construed by the law merchant, depends upon two conditions, which are conditions precedent to the right of enforcement of the bill or note against the drawer or indorser. These are presentment to the drawee, acceptor, or maker, and a refusal on his part to pay, and secondly due notice to the drawer or indorser.<sup>118</sup> If, therefore, the holder fails to give the drawer or indorser due notice of non-payment, he fails to perform a condition precedent to his right of recovery upon the bill, and cannot enforce its payment against the parties who had a right to its performance. And this discharge acquits the drawer and indorser both of his liability upon the bill or note, and of his liability upon the consideration for its transfer. For, as was shown in case of failure to present for acceptance, the holder, by his neglect, has made the bill or note his own, and loss because of this neglect will fall upon him.<sup>119</sup>

*Protest.*

A usual preliminary to giving notice of dishonor of bill or note is its protest. A protest is defined as in form a solemn declaration

\* See Neg. Inst. L. § 160.

<sup>117</sup> Edw. Neg. Inst. § 619; *Stewart v. Millard*, 7 Lans. 373.

<sup>118</sup> *MUSSON v. LAKE*, 4 How. (U. S.) 262; *ROTHSCHILD v. CURRIE*, 1 Q. B. 43.

<sup>119</sup> *Jones v. Savage*, 6 Wend. 659; *Woodcock v. Bennet*, 1 Cow. 711; *BRIDGES v. BERRY*, 3 Taunt. 130. In this case the defendant was unable to pay a bill when due, which he had accepted. He obtained time, and indorsed to the plaintiff, as a security, a bill drawn by himself to his own order, which, when due, was dishonored by the drawee, but the holder omitted to give the defendant notice. It was held that by this laches the defendant was discharged, not only as indorser of the one bill, but also as acceptor of the other. In *PEACOCK v. PURSELL*, 14 Q. B. (N. S.) 728, it was held that

written by a notary under a fair copy of the bill or note, stating that acceptance or payment has been demanded and refused; the reasons for such refusal, if any, are assigned; and that the bill or note is therefore protested.<sup>120</sup> Its popular signification includes all the steps taken to fix the liability of a drawer or indorsers,<sup>121</sup> but its accurate technical meaning is that it is the testimony of some proper person, usually a notary, that the regular legal steps to fix that liability have been taken by the holder.<sup>122</sup> Its method is for the notary to himself properly present the instrument, and demand its acceptance or payment. If these are refused, to make a minute thereof on the instrument, or in his official record; the minute consisting of his initials, the year, month, and day of dishonor and discharges. This is done on the day of the dishonor.<sup>123</sup> And on the same day, or afterwards, the notary extends the protest thus noted by embodying in a certificate the facts of the protest, and his acts in making presentment, demand, and in giving notice

where A received from B, as collateral security for a debt, a bill drawn by C upon D, and at maturity failed to present it, he, by his laches, made the bill equivalent to payment, as between A and B. Where one drew a bill of exchange on a person to whom he had shipped goods on his own account, he is entitled to notice of dishonor, although in fact the drawee had not received the goods when the bill was presented for acceptance. *RUCKER v. HILLER*, 16 East, 43; *Brown v. Cronise*, 21 Cal. 386; *Green v. Cummins* (Ky.) 6 Reporter, 524; *Jennison v. Parker*, 7 Mich. 355; *Stam v. Kerr*, 31 Miss. 199; *GALE v. WALSH*, 5 Term R. 239; *PEACOCK v. PURSELL*, 14 Q. B. (N. S.) 728; *RUCKER v. HILLER*, 16 East, 43, 3 Camp. 217.

<sup>120</sup> Byles, Bills, p. 263. See Neg. Inst. L. § 261.

<sup>121</sup> *Townsend v. Lorain Bank*, 2 Ohio St. 345; *Wolford v. Andrews*, 29 Minn. 251, 13 N. W. 167.

<sup>122</sup> *Ocoee Bank v. Hughes*, 2 Cold. (Tenn.) 52.

<sup>123</sup> In the case of *CHATERS v. BELL*, 4 Esp. 48, Lord Kenyon was of the opinion that protest might be made at a future time, if a bill were regularly presented and noted at the time of demand and refusal of payment. It was said by Grier, J., in *DENNISTOUN v. STEWART*, 21 Curt. Dec. 722, 17 How. 606, that "a protest, though necessary, need only be noted on the day on which payment was refused. It may be drawn and completed at any time before the commencement of the suit, or even before the trial, and consequently may be amended according to the truth, if any mistake has been made. The copy of the bill is connected with the bill certifying the formal demand by the public officer, as the easiest and best mode of identifying it with the original." See Neg. Inst. L. § 263. Cf. section 267.

of dishonor. To this he generally appends his official seal.<sup>124</sup> This certificate is generally accepted as evidence of the facts set forth in its terms, and its production obviates the necessity of proof of these facts by witnesses in open court. The main purpose of the protest, therefore, is to furnish to the holder legal testimony of presentment, demand, and notice of dishonor, to be used in actions against the drawer and indorsers.<sup>125</sup> The protest must be made at the place where the bill is dishonored.\* The purpose of protest is the reason for the following rules:

(1) A foreign bill must be protested when dishonored,<sup>126</sup> because, from the needs of the case, some act of a universally recognized authority is called for. By force of custom, the official act of the notary public is of recognized authority throughout the world. It is deemed to afford satisfactory evidence of dishonor to the drawer and indorsers, who from their residence abroad might experience a difficulty in making proper inquiries on the subject, and be compelled to rely on the representation of the holder. By the common law, also, in case of a foreign bill, a notary's protest is competent evidence of such fact, alike in cases of protests for non-acceptance or non-payment and for better security.<sup>127</sup>

(2) Protest by notaries public of a foreign note is unnecessary, unless it is indorsed; but, if indorsed, its protest by a notary public, according to the weight of authority, is required, because the indorsement of a note is essentially a bill drawn on the maker.<sup>128</sup>

<sup>124</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 927. The seal is essential where the evidence is for use in other jurisdictions. For detailed statement of protest, and authorities, see Byles, Bills, c. 19; Daniel, Neg. Inst. c. 28; Rand. Com. Paper, c. 34; Tied. Com. Paper, c. 17.

<sup>125</sup> Swayze v. Britton, 17 Kan. 629; Walker v. Turner, 2 Grat. 536; COMMERCIAL BANK v. VARNUM, 49 N. Y. 269; Halliday v. McDougall, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 80; DENNISTOUN v. STEWART, 17 How. (U. S.) 606; GALE v. WALSH, 5 Term R. 239.

\* The provisions of Neg. Inst. L. § 264, appear to be declaratory. Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 935; Chalm. Bills Exch. (4th Ed.) 174.

<sup>126</sup> Union Bank v. Hyde, 6 Wheat. 572; BOROUGH v. PERKINS, 1 Salk. 131; 2 Ld. Raym. 992; CARTER v. BANK, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 548. As to whether demand of payment of a foreign bill may be made by a notary's deputy, see CARTER v. BANK, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 548. See Neg. Inst. L. § 260.

<sup>127</sup> Halliday v. McDougall, 20 Wend. 80.

<sup>128</sup> Carter v. Burley, 9 N. H. 558; Ticonic Bank v. Stackpole, 41 Me. 302; Piner v. Clary, 17 B. Mon. 645.

(3) An inland bill or promissory note, whether inland or foreign, provided it be unindorsed,<sup>120</sup> not being originally within the rules of the law merchant, is not subject to the operation of this rule. Statutes† in most of the states have, however, sanctioned the practice of a notary public's presenting the paper by putting his certificate on the same footing with that of a notary public presenting a foreign bill of exchange. It is true, also, that in case of inland bills and promissory notes, it is a common practice for a notary public to be employed to make demand of payment of inland bills and promissory notes from the acceptors and makers, and also to give notice of the dishonor to the indorsers thereon. But this is a mere matter of convenience and arrangement between the holder and the notary, and is by no means a requisite imposed or recognized by law as binding upon the holder.<sup>120</sup> Even after protest, it is no necessary part of the official duty of a notary to give notice to the indorsers of the dishonor of a promissory note, although certainly it is a very convenient and useful course in the transactions of such affairs in commercial cities.<sup>121</sup> In this connection it is proper to add the additional disconnected principles: That the states of the Union, as regards each other, are foreign states, and that, when it is sought to charge non-residents, the intervention of a notary public is necessary.<sup>122</sup> And that if no notary can be conveniently found, the bill may be protested by any reputable citizen of the place where the bill is dishonored.<sup>123</sup> When protested by a private citizen, the rule that protest must be made in the presence of two witnesses is probably obsolete.<sup>124</sup>

<sup>120</sup> *Bonar v. Mitchell*, 19 Law J. Exch. 302.

† See Neg. Inst. L. § 189.

<sup>120</sup> *Bailey v. Dozler*, 6 How. 23.

<sup>121</sup> *DICKINS v. BEAL*, 10 Pet. 582; *Morgan v. Van Ingen*, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 204; *Miller v. Hackley*, 5 Johns. 384.

<sup>122</sup> *COMMERCIAL BANK v. VARNUM*, 49 N. Y. 269.

<sup>123</sup> *BURKE v. McKAY*, 2 How. 66; *Read v. Bank*, 1 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 91.

<sup>124</sup> *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 934a. This rule is enforced by Neg. Inst. L. § 262. For the provisions of the act generally, see sections 260-268, 286, 289 (in case of acceptance for honor); and section 181 (waiver of protest).

## NOTICE OF DISHONOR.

**145. NOTICE OF DISHONOR**—Is bringing, either verbally or by writing, to the knowledge of the drawer or the indorser of an instrument, the fact that a specified negotiable instrument, upon proper proceedings taken, has not been accepted, or has not been paid, and that the party notified is expected to pay it.

**146. Notice must be given as follows:**

- (a) By the holder of the instrument, or by any person upon whom a liability is fixed to any person upon whom it is sought to fix a liability.
- (b) Between parties residing in the same place, either by giving it personally, verbally or in writing, or by leaving a written notice at the residence or place of business of the party to be charged; between parties residing in different places, by depositing in the post office, postage paid, a written notice, properly addressed to the person to be charged.
- (c) Within one day after an unqualified refusal to accept the bill or pay the instrument, or by an indorser within one day after he has received notice of his own liability. This means in proper hours of a business day between co-residents, and when served on a non-resident, by or before the last post, if there be one the next day, if not, in the first practicable mail thereafter.

According to Lord Denman,<sup>185</sup> the notice of dishonor is a part and parcel of the contract of the drawer and indorser, and not a step in the remedy at law of the holder to recover the amount of the

<sup>185</sup> ROTHSCHILD v. CURRIE, 1 Q. B. 43.

bill or note. To repeat the substance of his words, the drawer and indorser contract to pay the bill or note upon two conditions: One, the dishonor by the drawee, acceptor or maker on due presentment; the other, the due notification to him of such dishonor. And taking up the latter of these conditions, we purpose in this and the succeeding sections, first, to examine the necessary elements constituting this portion of the contract of the drawer and indorser, and then to classify and point out the persons and the methods by which it is carried into effect.

*Sufficiency of Notice.*

Probably the most important test of a notice of dishonor is whether or not the words bring home to the drawer or indorser the knowledge of the fact that he is legally charged with liability for the payment of the instrument.<sup>186</sup> He is entitled to know, first, of the breach of the condition to accept or to pay the instrument on the part of the drawee, maker or acceptor, and, second, that it is sought to fix a liability for its payment upon him. The first object of notice is therefore to inform the party to whom it is sent that acceptance or payment has been refused by the drawee, acceptor or maker; and the second, that as drawer or indorser he is liable, and that payment is demanded of him. The important question, then, is to determine what is due and proper notice. These words may be either in writing or verbal. That a verbal notice is proper seems settled both in New York and elsewhere.<sup>188</sup> No precise form of words is necessary to express this purpose, the rule being merely that the form of words used must be such as to convey legal notice to the party. In this a distinction is drawn between notice of dishonor and knowledge of dishonor. Throughout the cases the statement is common "that knowledge of the dishonor of a bill is not equivalent to notice of it."<sup>189</sup>

<sup>186</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 166, 167.

<sup>188</sup> Cuyler v. Stevens, 4 Wend. 568; Woodin v. Foster, 16 Barb. 146; TINDAL v. BROWN, 1 Term R. 167; HOUSEGO v. COWNE, 6 Law J. Exch. 110; Crosse v. Smith, 1 Maule & S. 545; Merritt v. Woodbury, 14 Iowa, 299; First Nat. Bank of Iowa City v. Ryerson, 23 Iowa, 508; GILBERT v. DENNIS, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 495.

<sup>189</sup> Junlata Bank v. Hale, 16 Serg. & R. 157; Bank of Old Dominion v. McVeigh, 29 Grat. 559, 26 Grat. 852; Brown v. Ferguson, 4 Leigh, 37; Jagger v. Bank, 53 Minn. 386, 55 N. W. 545.

This means that knowledge which is equivalent to notice, and which will make a drawer or indorser responsible, must be derived from some person entitled to call for payment. It must be information that the bill has been dishonored, and that the holder is in a position to sue him. In other words, the receipt of information by an indorser that an instrument is unpaid is not sufficient to fix his liability. There must be coupled with it information derived from some competent person, that he, the indorser, is looked to for its payment.<sup>140</sup>

The law in other respects has formulated certain elements for constituting a notice, and declares notices containing them sufficient to bring home to the knowledge of the drawer and indorser the fact that he is charged with legal liability. These elements are:<sup>141</sup> (1) That the notice contain a sufficient description of the instrument. (2) That the notice expressly or impliedly notify the drawer or indorser of the presentment, demand and refusal of the drawer, acceptor or maker to accept or to pay the instrument. (3) That the notice inform the drawer and indorser that the holder looks to him for payment, though this element is not indispensable to the legality of the notice.

*Same—Identification of Instrument.*

The common form of identification is to describe the instrument by date, amount, and parties, and state where it is awaiting payment; but any identification which, as a matter of fact, would indicate unmistakably to a business man of ordinary experience what instrument is to be paid, is sufficient.<sup>142</sup> This rule does not insist upon strict technical accuracy. Its object is to enable the indorser notified to know exactly on what bill or note he has incurred liability, and the

<sup>140</sup> CAUNT v. THOMPSON, 7 C. B. 400; Miers v. Brown, 11 Mees. & W. 372.

<sup>141</sup> Artisans' Bank v. Backus, 36 N. Y. 100; Story, Prom. Notes, § 348; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 973; Tied. Com. Paper, § 344; Glicksman v. Earley, 78 Wis. 223, 47 N. W. 272, and Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 200.

<sup>142</sup> Gill v. Palmer, 29 Conn. 54; Messenger v. Southey, 1 Man. & G. 76; Housatonic Bank v. Laffin, 5 Cush. 546; Reynolds v. Appleman, 41 Md. 615; MILLS v. BANK, 11 Wheat. 431; Thompson v. Williams, 14 Cal. 162; Tobey v. Lennig, 14 Pa. St. 483; Ross v. Planters' Bank, 5 Humph. 335; Wood v. Watson, 53 Me. 300; Snow v. Perkins, 2 Mich. 238; McCune v. Belt, 38 Mo. 291. See Neg. Inst. L. § 167 (form of notice).



object of the inquiry of the court is to ascertain whether or not he has been apprised of this fact. The notice must state what the bill or note is,<sup>143</sup> and must not be calculated in any way to mislead the party to whom it may be given. It must not misdescribe the instrument, so that the defendant may perhaps be led to confound it with some other.<sup>144</sup> The description of the bill or note should be sufficiently definite to enable the indorser to know to what instrument in particular the notice applies; for an indorser may have indorsed many bills or notes of different dates, sums, and times of payment, and payable to different persons, so that he may be ignorant, unless the description in the notice is special, to which it properly applies or which it designates.<sup>145</sup> And in determining whether the description of the note or bill is sufficient, the circumstances of the case and the indorser's knowledge of these circumstances may be taken into consideration.<sup>146</sup> A notice which omits an essential feature of the indorsement or misdescribes it is an imperfect one, but is not necessarily invalid.<sup>147</sup> It is invalid only when it fails to give that information which it would have given but for its particular imperfection. And even in case the notice in itself be defective, if, from the evidence of the attendant circumstances, it is apparent that the indorser was not deceived or misled as to the identity of the note,

<sup>143</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 974. But see *HODGES v. SHULER*, 22 N. Y. 115.

<sup>144</sup> Story, Prom. Notes, § 349.

<sup>145</sup> *Cook v. Litchfield*, 9 N. Y. 279; *Home Ins. Co. v. Green*, 19 N. Y. 519.

<sup>146</sup> Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 976.

<sup>147</sup> In *HARRISON v. RUSCOE*, 15 Mees. & W. 231, it was shown that a bill of exchange was drawn by H, indorsed by him to B, and by B to C, in whose hands it was dishonored. C's attorney gave notice in due time to A, but stated therein, by mistake, that he was directed by B (from whom he had no authority) to apply for payment of the bill. It was held that the notice of dishonor was sufficient, notwithstanding this misrepresentation, the only effect of which was to give A every defense against C that he would have had if the notice had really been given by B. In an action by the first indorsee of a bill against the drawer, it was proved that the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant, stating the bill to be dishonored, and requiring payment; but the letter misdescribed the bill as drawn by J. H. (the acceptor), and accepted by the defendant. Held, that this was sufficient notice of dishonor. Parke, B., said: "This notice is quite sufficient. It is not possible, under the circumstances, that the defendant could have been misled by it." *MELLERSH v. RIPPEN*, 7 Exch. 578.

he will be charged.<sup>148</sup> It thus may become a question of fact whether or not from the contents of the notice itself and the extrinsic facts admitted into the case, knowledge of the dishonor was actually brought home to the indorser.<sup>149</sup> But this is only where there is doubt whether the indorser understood what particular instrument was dishonored. When there is no dispute as to the facts, the sufficiency of the notice is a question of law for the sole interpretation of the court.<sup>150</sup>

*Same—Statement of Presentment, etc.*

When there can be no doubt that the mind of the drawer or indorser identifies the bill or note which is unpaid, then the further question is whether the notice contained a statement of presentment, demand, non-acceptance or non-payment sufficient to comply with the rules of the law merchant. This is a question of law and of construction peculiarly the province of the court.<sup>151</sup> Some form of statement that the bill or note has been duly presented and dishonored is essential to establish the claim or right of the party giving notice, for otherwise he will not be entitled to any payment from the drawer and indorser.<sup>152</sup> Mere notice of the fact that the bill or note has not been paid affords no proof whatever that it has been presented in due season, or even that it has been presented at all. And if there be no statement of the dishonor of the bill or note, nor anything from which it can be fairly implied that due presentment has been made, the notice is fatally defective.<sup>153</sup> Whatever will show dishonor is sufficient.<sup>154</sup> No particular form of notice is necessary. The holder is only required, in such language as he may adopt, to

<sup>148</sup> *Carter v. Bradley*, 19 Me. 62; *SMITH v. WHITING*, 12 Mass. 6; *Moorman v. State Bank*, 3 Port. (Ala.) 353; *Remer v. Downer*, 23 Wend. 620; *KING v. HURLEY*, 85 Me. 525, 27 Atl. 463.

<sup>149</sup> *HODGES v. SHULER*, 22 N. Y. 114.

<sup>150</sup> *Cayuga Co. Bank v. Warden*, 6 N. Y. 19; *Dole v. Gold*, 5 Barb. 494.

<sup>151</sup> *Dole v. Gold*, 5 Barb. 490.

<sup>152</sup> *Lewis v. Gompertz*, 6 Mees. & W. 402; *Wilkinson v. Adam*, 1 Ves. & B. 466; *Boulton v. Welsh*, 3 Bing. N. C. 688. See Neg. Inst. L. § 167.

<sup>153</sup> *Page v. Gilbert*, 60 Me. 488; *GILBERT v. DENNIS*, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 495; *Phillips v. Gould*, 8 Car. & P. 355; *Graham v. Sangston*, 1 Md. 60; *Lockwood v. Crawford*, 18 Conn. 361; *Sinclair v. Lynah*, 1 Speer, 244.

<sup>154</sup> *Rowlands v. Springett*, 14 Mees. & W. 7; *Shelton v. Bralthwaite*, 7 Mees. & W. 435; *Ex parte MOLINE*, 19 Ves. 216.

inform the indorser that the drawee, acceptor, or maker has neglected to accept or pay the bill or note; that the contingency on which the drawer's or indorser's promise to pay depended has happened, and that his liability has become absolute. The express statement of the facts of presentment, demand, and non-acceptance or non-payment, in themselves, is unnecessary. These facts may be conveyed by express terms or by necessary implication.<sup>155</sup> "I should myself doubt," says Parke, B.,<sup>156</sup> "whether we could go so far as to say that it ought to appear upon the face of the notice, 'by express terms or necessary implication,' that the bill was presented or dishonored. It seems to me enough if it appear by reasonable intendment, and would be inferred by any man of business, that the bill had been presented to the acceptor, and not paid by him." And where no mercantile man, upon reading the notice, could possibly misunderstand its meaning, that is deemed within the meaning of reasonable intendment, and sufficient.

Thus the doctrine of reasonable intendment includes such terms as "dishonored," because that word includes presentment and demand,<sup>157</sup> or "protested,"<sup>158</sup> because that also shows presentment, demand, and refusal, or such other words coupled with a statement

<sup>155</sup> SOLARTE v. PALMER, 1 Bing. N. C. 194.

<sup>156</sup> HEDGER v. STEAVENSON, 2 Mees. & W. 799. In this case the following letter from the plaintiff's attorney was held to be a sufficient notice: "Sir: I am desired by Mr. H. to give you notice that a promissory note for £99. 18s., payable to your order 2 months after the date thereof, became due yesterday, and has been returned unpaid; and I have to request you will please remit the amount thereof, with 1s. 6d. noting, free of postage, by return of post. I am, &c., J. S." The holder of a bill of exchange, on the day after it became due, called at the office of J., the drawer. The latter was busy at the time, and the holder sent him the following note: "B.'s acceptance to J., £500, due 12th January, is unpaid. Payment to R. & Co. is requested before 4 o'clock." This was held to be sufficient notice, following Parke, B., in HEDGER v. STEAVENSON. PAUL v. JOEL, 3 Hurl. & N. 455, 4 Hurl. & N. 355.

<sup>157</sup> Stocken v. Collins, 9 Car. & P. 653; WOODTHORPE v. LAWES, 2 Mees. & W. 109; Edmonds v. Cates, 2 Jur. 183; Smith v. Boulton, Hurl. & W. 3.

<sup>158</sup> MILLS v. BANK, 11 Wheat. 431; Cayuga Co. Bank v. Warden, 1 N. Y. 413; Grugeon v. Smith, 6 Adol. & El. 499; Everard v. Wilson, 1 El. & Bl. 801; De Wolf v. Murray, 2 Sandf. 166.

of non-payment as "Your bill is this day returned with charges," or "with charges or protested exchange." And a very good illustration of how the doctrine of reasonable intendment enlarges the rule is in the distinction between sufficient notice of dishonor of paper made payable at a bank or other particular place, and notice of dishonor of paper made payable at large.<sup>159</sup> If made payable at a bank or other particular place, it is the business of the maker or acceptor to have funds at that place when the paper becomes due. His failure to do so amounts to a dishonor, and it is sufficient to inform the indorser of this failure. No specific statement of demand and presentment is necessary. A statement to the indorser of non-payment, if it appears that the paper was at the bank at the time of its maturity, is sufficient, because such a statement can mean nothing else than the dishonor of the paper. If, on the contrary, the paper is payable at large, a statement of presentment and demand is necessary, because a personal demand of the maker is one prerequisite of dishonor.<sup>160</sup> Such expressions as "due and unpaid,"<sup>161</sup> "that the note remains unpaid,"<sup>162</sup> "notice of non-payment,"<sup>163</sup> have been held insufficient, because the fact alone that the acceptor or maker has not paid the instrument is immaterial to the liability of the indorser. The legal fact which fixes the indorser's liability is the demand of payment of the parties and the dishonor of the bill.<sup>164</sup> It is a better practice to state that the party holding the bill looks to the person notified for payment, but this in itself is not indispensable. The reason is that this is implied in the very act of giving notice.<sup>165</sup> Notice that acceptance or payment has been demanded of the drawee, maker, or acceptor and refused by him is sufficient to charge the drawer or indorser;<sup>166</sup> and it certainly can-

<sup>159</sup> See Bigelow, *Bills & N.* p. 277.

<sup>160</sup> *Dole v. Gold*, 5 Barb. 490.

<sup>161</sup> *Gilbert v. Dennis*, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 498.

<sup>162</sup> *Pinkham v. Macy*, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 174.

<sup>163</sup> *Townsend v. Lorain Bank*, 2 Ohio St. 355.

<sup>164</sup> *Hartley v. Case*, 4 Barn. & C. 339, 10 C. L. R. 606; *Boulton v. Welsh*, 3 Bing. N. C. 688, 32 C. L. R. 283; *Strange v. Price*, 10 Adol. & El. 125, 37 C. L. R. 88; *Furze v. Sharwood*, 2 Adol. & El. (N. S.) 388, 42 C. L. R. 726.

<sup>165</sup> *Cowles v. Harts*, 3 Conn. 517; *Shrieve v. Duckham*, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 194; *Warren v. Gilman*, 17 Me. 360.

<sup>166</sup> *Fitchburg Ins. Co. v. Davis*, 121 Mass. 121; *Bank of U. S. v. Carneal*, 2 Pet. 543.

not be argued that it is necessary to state what the law itself implies,—that the drawer or indorser is to be looked to to pay the instrument if the acceptor or maker does not pay it.<sup>167</sup>

*By Whom Notice should be Given.*

In pointing out the persons and process by which knowledge is brought home to the party to be charged with liability, the law follows principles analogous to those used in formulating the elements to be used in the notice itself. The aim is to establish a process such that a business man of ordinary experience, when proceeded against, would know that he would have to pay to the holder the amount of the instrument. The first element of this process is the rule, already alluded to, that to change knowledge into legal notice the fact of dishonor must be brought home to the party to be charged by some person having an interest in enforcing the bill or note. Notice must be by a party or by some person authorized to give it. A notice by a mere stranger is not sufficient.<sup>168</sup> Properly authorized persons are an agent of the holder, who may give notice, because, in doing so, he represents and acts on behalf of his principal.<sup>169</sup> A notary,<sup>170</sup> acting in his official character, is an example of this. An attorney is also such an agent,<sup>171</sup> and so a col-

<sup>167</sup> *Furze v. Sharwood*, 2 Gale & D. 116, 2 Q. B. 416, 42 E. C. L. 726; *Miers v. Brown*, 11 Mees. & W. 372; *Nelson v. Bank*, 16 C. C. A. 425, 69 Fed. 798; *SALOMON v. LEATHER CO.* (N. J. Err. & App.) 31 Atl. 602. Notice of dishonor in these words: "I hereby give notice that a bill for £50, at 3 months after date, by A upon and accepted by B, and indorsed by you, lies at" etc., "dishonored,"—was held sufficient without further intimation that plaintiff looked to defendant for payment. *KING v. BICKLEY*, 2 Q. B. 419.

<sup>168</sup> *CHANOINE v. FOWLER*, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 173; *Sewall v. Russell*, Id. 276; *Lawrence v. Miller*, 16 N. Y. 235; *Stanton v. Blossom*, 14 Mass. 116; *STEWART v. KENNETT*, 2 Camp. 177. In this case it was said by Lord Ellenborough that "the notice must come from the person who can give the drawer or indorser his immediate remedy upon the bill; otherwise it is merely an historical fact." *Brailsford v. Williams*, 15 Md. 150.

<sup>169</sup> Neg. Inst. L. § 162. Of sections 161, 165.

<sup>170</sup> *SHED v. BRETT*, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 401; *BANK OF UTICA v. SMITH*, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 230; *Renick v. Robbins*, 28 Mo. 339; *Swayze v. Britton*, 17 Kan. 629.

<sup>171</sup> *Firth v. Thrush*, 8 Barn. & C. 387. A bill of exchange, indorsed in blank, was left by the indorsee at the office of an attorney to be presented. On presentment by the attorney the bill was dishonored. The attorney

lecting bank is an agent for transmitting notices,<sup>172</sup> or, more accurately speaking, is a principal for the purpose of transmitting notice of protest, and its notary who protests its paper is the agent.<sup>173</sup> But with these exceptions, due to the doctrine of agency that the agent is in law the same as the principal, the notice must emanate from some person who is a party to the bill. This does not mean the holder alone,<sup>174</sup> because, if the holder only could give notice, then he might secure his own rights against his immediate indorser, but the latter and every other party to the bill would be deprived of all remedy against the anterior indorsers and drawer, unless each of these parties should in succession take up the bill immediately on receiving notice of dishonor,—a highly unreasonable position.<sup>175</sup> But by a party to a bill, so far as it relates to the person who gives notice, is meant some party who might be compelled to pay it to the holder, and who, upon taking it up, would have a

wrote to the drawer on the following day, describing the bill, and stating that it had been dishonored, and subscribed his name and residence. This was held a sufficient notice of dishonor, though the attorney did not state in whose behalf he applied, nor where the bill was lying. *WOODTHORPE v. LAWES*, 2 Mees. & W. 109.

<sup>172</sup> *Bank of U. S. v. Davis*, 2 Hill. 451. "Where the instrument has been dishonored in the hands of an agent, he may either himself give notice to the parties liable thereon, or he may himself give notice to his principal. If he give notice to his principal, he must do so within the same time as if he were the holder; and the principal upon the receipt of such notice has himself the same time for giving notice as if the agent had been an independent holder." Neg. Inst. L. § 165. This is declaratory of the law in cases of agency for collection. *HOWARD v. IVES*, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 263; *Church v. Barlow*, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 547; *SCOTT v. LIFFORD*, 9 East, 347. The various branches of one bank are within the rule. *Clode v. Bayley*, 12 Mees. & W. 51; *Prince v. Bank*, 3 App. Cas. 332; *Bank of U. S. v. Goddard*, 5 Mason, 366, Fed. Cas. No. 917; *Flelding & Co. v. Corry*, 46 Wkly. Rep. 97 (under Bills of Exchange Act). See Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 992; Benj. Chalm. Bills & N. 190.

<sup>173</sup> *HOWARD v. IVES*, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 263.

<sup>174</sup> *TINDAL v. BROWN*, 1 Term R. 167; *CHAPMAN v. KEANE*, 3 Adol. & El. 193. This case held that an indorsee who has indorsed over, and is not the holder at the time of maturity and dishonor, may give notice at such time to an earlier party, and, upon afterwards taking up the bill and suing such party, may avail himself of such notice.

<sup>175</sup> *West River Bank v. Taylor*, 34 N. Y. 128.

right to reimbursement from the party to whom the notice is given.\* The liability of the party must be fixed before he is competent to give notice, although he need not know it is fixed when he sends the notices out.<sup>176</sup> And the test between the party to the bill, in the sense we have given it, and the stranger to the bill, is whether the party giving or given the notice would be liable upon the instrument.<sup>177</sup> The reason for this rule is that, unless this liability is fixed, there can be no inference that the person giving the notice looks to the party to whom it is addressed for payment; whereas, on the contrary, when the liability is fixed, and the holder gives the notice, it must mean, if it means anything, that he looks to the party notified for payment.<sup>178</sup> This rule excludes, not only the person who is in no wise a party to the instrument, but also the person who has been a party to the instrument and liable thereon, but whose liability is discharged. "The mischief would happen," says Parke, B.,<sup>179</sup> "that there might be a bill with twenty indorsements which the holder might retain twenty days after its dishonor and then recover against the drawer, on a notice then given to him by the first indorsee, which that indorsee could not do. Such a notice would not be in good time if given by the first indorsee, and would therefore be bad and not support an action by the last. The rule equally excludes the case of notice by an acceptor who never could sue himself upon the bill after taking it up."

*To Whose Benefit Notice Accrues.*

Notice sent to an indorser or drawer accrues to the benefit of all parties subsequent to the party notified.† The holder may be satisfied with giving notice to his immediate indorser, or he may give notice to the drawer and all the indorsers, and if he does it will ac-

\*This rule excludes the acceptor (HARRISON v. RUSCOE, 15 Mees. & W. 231) and the maker (Jagger v. Bank, 53 Minn. 386, 55 N. W. 545). There are, however, cases to the contrary, and as matter of authority Mr. Daniel maintains that an acceptor may give notice, whatever the merit of the doctrine. Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 990. See Neg. Inst. L. § 161.

<sup>176</sup> JENNINGS v. ROBERTS, 24 Law J. Q. B. 102.

<sup>177</sup> HARRISON v. RUSCOE, 15 Mees. & W. 231.

<sup>178</sup> East v. Smith, 4 Dowl. & L. 744.

<sup>179</sup> HARRISON v. RUSCOE, 15 Mees. & W. 231; Turner v. Leech, 4 Barn. & Ald. 451; ROWE v. TIPPER, 13 C. B. 249.

† See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 163, 164.



crue to the benefit of each indorser.<sup>180</sup> This rule is the natural outgrowth of the rule that notice need not be given by the holder of a bill, but can be given by any party to the instrument. For, as has just been said, the holder may only seek to secure his rights against his immediate indorser by regular notice to him alone. And in order, therefore, that the latter and every other party to the instrument may not be deprived of all remedy against anterior indorsers and the drawer, it is prudent in each party who receives a notice to give immediate notice to those parties against whom he may have the right to claim.<sup>181</sup> Whether there be few or many indorsers, the duty of each is the same. It is to transmit the notice from one indorser to another, in the usual order of their indorsements.<sup>182</sup> And, in turn, as notice is received by each indorser, it accrues to the benefit of all subsequent parties. Thus, for example, if the holder notifies his immediate indorser, and he, in turn, notifies his immediate indorser, and so on, through the chain of indorsers, up to the second and first indorser, the first indorser cannot object that he has received no notice from the holder. The holder can avail himself of the notice given the first indorser by the second indorser. It is sufficient if the first indorser had notice from any subsequent holder of the note of the default of the maker, and that he would be looked to for payment.<sup>183</sup>

<sup>180</sup> *Jameson v. Swinton*, 2 Taunt. 224; *Hilton v. Shepherd*, 6 East, 14, note; *STAFFORD v. YATES*, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 327; *Morgan v. Van Ingen*, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 204; *Spencer v. Ballou*, 18 N. Y. 327. Note—It is the rule to notify all indorsers, e. g. indorsers for collection; accommodation drawer or indorser; indorsers of bills or notes payable on demand; each partner, as well as the firm, by name; each of the joint indorsers; persons representative, if any; if none, then some authorized person at the family residence; the bankrupt personally; and to the assignee of the bankrupt. For cases, see *Tied. Com. Paper*, § 336, and cases cited.

<sup>181</sup> Bayley, *Bills*, p. 256; *CHAPMAN v. KEANE*, 3 Adol. & El. 193.

<sup>182</sup> *Dobree v. Eastwood*, 3 Car. & P. 250; *BANK OF UTICA v. SMITH*, 18 Johns. 230; *Mead v. Engs*, 5 Cow. 303; *West River Bank v. Taylor*, 34 N. Y. 128; *Morgan v. Woodworth*, 3 Johns. Cas. 89.

<sup>183</sup> *STAFFORD v. YATES*, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 327; *Spencer v. Ballou*, 18 N. Y. 327; *LYSAGHT v. BRYANT*, 9 C. B. 46; *Wilson v. Swabey*, 1 Starkie, 34; *Marr v. Johnson*, 9 Yerg. 1; *Triplett v. Hunt*, 3 Dana, 126; *Stanton v. Blossom*, 14 Mass. 116; *Bank of United States v. Goddard*, 5 Mason, 363, Fed. Cas. No. 917.

*To Whom Notice should be Given.*

The question to whom notice should be given is involved in the discussion of the method of giving notice, which will be taken up in the next paragraph. In general, however, it may be said that notice of dishonor may be given to the party himself or to his agent in that behalf.<sup>184</sup> If the party is dead, but his death is unknown to the party giving notice, notice sent as if the party to be notified were living is sufficient.<sup>185</sup> If his death be known, the notice must be given to a personal representative, if such there be, and if with reasonable diligence he can be found.<sup>186</sup> If there be no personal representative, notice may be sent to the last residence or last place of business of the deceased;<sup>187</sup> but if the deceased left a will, and the executor named has not qualified, or has renounced his trust, notice may be sent either to the person named or to the last residence or place of business of the deceased.<sup>188</sup> Where the parties to be notified are partners, notice to any one partner is notice to the firm, even though there has been a dissolution.<sup>189</sup> Notice to joint parties who are not partners must be given to each of them, unless one of them has authority to receive such notice for the others.<sup>190</sup>

<sup>184</sup> HOUSEGO v. COWNE, 2 Mees. & W. 348; ALLEN v. EDMUNDSON, 2 Exch. 719, 724; Viale v. Michael, 30 Law T. (N. S.) 463; Fassin v. Hubbard, 55 N. Y. 465; Lake Shore Nat. Bank v. Colliery Co., 51 Hun, 63, 3 N. Y. Supp. 771. See Neg. Inst. L. § 168.

<sup>185</sup> Maspero v. Pedesclaux, 22 La. Ann. 227; Linderman v. Guldin, 34 Pa. St. 54.

<sup>186</sup> MASSACHUSETTS BANK v. OLIVER, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 557; Oriental Bank v. Blake, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 206; Cayuga Bank v. Bennett, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 236. See Neg. Inst. L. § 169. As holding that a notice of dishonor mailed with the address, "to the estate of H. O., deceased," will not be such notice as to charge the executor, see MASSACHUSETTS BANK v. OLIVER, *supra*; Cayuga Bank v. Bennett, *supra*.

<sup>187</sup> STEWART v. EDEN, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 121; MERCHANTS' BANK v. BIRCH, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 25; Dodson v. Taylor, 56 N. J. Law, 11, 28 Atl. 316. See Neg. Inst. L. § 169.

<sup>188</sup> Goodnow v. Warren, 122 Mass. 79.

<sup>189</sup> Hubbard v. Matthews, 54 N. Y. 50; Dabney v. Stidger, 12 Miss. 749; Coster v. Thomason, 19 Ala. 717; FOURTH NAT. BANK v. HEUSCHEN, 52 Mo. 207. See Neg. Inst. L. § 170.

<sup>190</sup> WILLIS v. GREEN, 5 Hill (N. Y.) 232; State Bank v. Slaughter, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 133; People's Bank v. Keech, 26 Md. 521. See Neg. Inst. L. § 171.

If the party to be notified is a bankrupt, but no assignee has been appointed, notice to the bankrupt is sufficient;<sup>191</sup> if an assignee has been appointed, notice may probably be given either to the bankrupt or to the assignee.<sup>192</sup>

*Method of Giving Notice.*

The second element of process relates to the method of actually giving notice, which presents itself in two aspects. The first is giving notice verbally or in writing; the second is of serving the notice in writing personally or serving it by mail. While the requisites of verbal notices are not clearly stated by the courts, it seems to be agreed that, where no statute intervenes, a verbal notice is sufficient.<sup>193</sup> It also seems to be enough if, from the conversations between the parties, it can be ascertained as a fact that the party against whom the liability is sought to be enforced well understood what instrument was referred to. The courts are less strict in construing a verbal notice than in construing a written one. This is because a verbal notice communicated to the indorser, which calls forth a conversation about the instrument in question, is very different from a written notice sent to the indorser. The latter constitutes the only means which the party has to inform the drawer and indorser of the particular instrument dishonored. With a verbal notice, however, the drawer or indorser has full opportunity of informing himself fully of the character of the instrument and of the liability sought to be enforced against him.<sup>194</sup> It is almost needless to say that the verbal notice must be given to the indorser per-

<sup>191</sup> Ex parte MOLINE, 19 Ves. 216.

<sup>192</sup> Callahan v. Bank, 82 Ky. 231; AMERICAN NAT. BANK v. MANUFACTURING CO., 94 Tenn. 624, 30 S. W. 753. House v. Bank, 43 Ohio St. 346, 1 N. E. 129, contra. See Rand. Com. Paper, § 1243; Neg. Inst. L. § 172.

<sup>193</sup> Cuyler v. Stevens, 4 Wend. 566; Cayuga Co. Bank v. Warden, 1 N. Y. 413; Woodin v. Foster, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 146; GILBERT v. DENNIS, 3 Metc (Mass.) 495; TINDAL v. BROWN, 1 Term R. 167; Glasgow v. Pratte, 8 Mo. 336; Merritt v. Woodbury, 14 Iowa, 299; Boyd v. City Sav. Bank, 15 Grat. 501; Pierce v. Schaden, 55 Cal. 406. See Neg. Inst. L. § 167. As to notice by telephone, C. C. Thompson & Walkup Co. v. Appleby, 5 Kan. App. 680, 48 Pac. 933.

<sup>194</sup> Metcalfe v. Richardson, 11 C. B. 1011; Phillips v. Gould, 8 Car. & P. 355; Thompson v. Williams, 14 Cal. 162.

sonally, or to some suitable person at his residence or place of business.<sup>195</sup> Mere hearsay does not create a binding liability.<sup>196</sup>

The essentials of a written notice have been already described. Its service may be made by delivering it personally to the person to be charged,<sup>197</sup> or by leaving it at his dwelling place or place of business,<sup>198</sup> or it may be served upon him by mail. The object of the courts is to formulate a set of rules which, if followed, will render it reasonably certain that the notice of dishonor will reach the hand of the drawer and indorser, and charge him with notice or knowledge of his liability upon the instrument.<sup>199</sup> To attain this end the legislatures of many states have pointed out methods of service which, if followed, are of course legal and proper in the jurisdictions in which those legislatures are sovereign.<sup>200</sup> But, in the absence

<sup>195</sup> A person who was sent by the holder of a dishonored bill called at the house of the drawer the day after it became due, saw the drawer's wife, and told her that he had brought back the bill that had been dishonored. She said she knew nothing about it, but would tell her husband of it when he came home. The party then left, leaving no written notice. It was held that sufficient notice had been given. *HOUSEGO v. COWNE*, 2 Mees. & W. 348; *ALLEN v. EDMUNDSON*, 2 Exch. 719, per Parke, B.

<sup>196</sup> *Woodin v. Foster*, 16 Barb. 146.

<sup>197</sup> *Smedes v. Utica Bank*, 20 Johns. 372; *Louisiana State Bank v. Rowel*, 6 Mart. (N. S.) 506; *Shepard v. Hall*, 1 Conn. 329; *Hartford Bank v. Stedman*, 3 Conn. 489; *BANK OF COLUMBIA v. LAWRENCE*, 1 Pet. 578; *RANSOM v. MAOK*, 2 Hill, 590; *HOBBS v. STRAINE*, 149 Mass. 212, 21 N. E. 365, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 202.

<sup>198</sup> *BANK OF COLUMBIA v. LAWRENCE*, 1 Pet. 578; *Nevius v. Bank*, 10 Mich. 547; *Sanderson v. Reinstadler*, 31 Mo. 483; *Grinman v. Walker*, 9 Iowa, 426. As to question of due diligence in ascertaining residence, see *Bank of Utica v. Bender*, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 643. In the case of *ALLEN v. EDMUNDSON*, 2 Exch. 719, it appeared that the holder of an overdue note of exchange went during business hours to the counting house of the drawer, for the purpose of giving notice of dishonor; and, finding the counting-house door shut, he knocked at the door, and, no one answering, he came away without leaving any notice. It was held that these facts did not support an allegation of due notice, but were equivalent to a dispensation of notice, and ought to have been so pleaded.

<sup>199</sup> *Bank of U. S. v. Corcoran*, 2 Pet. 121; *Carolina Nat. Bank v. Wallace*, 13 S. C. 347; *Manchester Bank v. Fellows*, 28 N. H. 302; *Bradley v. Davis*, 26 Me. 45; *SHELBURNE FALLS NAT. BANK v. TOWNSLEY*, 107 Mass. 444.

<sup>200</sup> "It may in all cases be given by delivering it personally or through the mails." Neg. Inst. L. § 167. Cf. sections 177, 179.

of statutory regulation, the methods of service adopted by the courts are divided into two classes, according as the party giving notice and the party to whom it is given reside in the same or different places. There are various judicial interpretations of the term "residence in the same place." One, dependent upon slight authority, is that the corporate limits of the village, town, or city define the limits as to the requirements of personal notice,<sup>201</sup> meaning that persons residing within those limits are co-residents and without are non-residents as to each other. The second is that all persons are to be regarded as co-residents who receive their mails through the same post office, because the post office can only be used in the service of a notice as a means of transmission and not of deposit. This means that the drawer and indorser cannot be subjected to the uncertain chance of getting mail, but the holder must exert himself to make personal service or its equivalent upon him.<sup>202</sup> But this rule is qualified by the further one that where the drawer or indorser has no residence and no regular place of business in the city or town where the holder resides, or the instrument is payable, he may be treated as a non-resident and served by mail.<sup>203</sup> It being determined whether the party giving the notice and the party to whom it is given are residents of the same or different places, the following rules prevail:

(1) If of the same place, the service must either be personal <sup>204</sup> or

<sup>201</sup> Barret v. Evans, 28 Mo. 333.

<sup>202</sup> Ireland v. Kip, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 490, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 231; SHEL-BURNE FALLS NAT. BANK v. TOWNSLEY, 102 Mass. 177, 107 Mass. 444; Farmers' & M. Bank v. Battle, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 86; Barker v. Hall, Mart. & Y. (Tenn.) 183; Forbes v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 10 Neb. 338, 6 N. W. 393. As holding that notice of dishonor sent through the mail will not be sufficient where both parties (sender, and the one to whom the notice is sent) are residents of the same town, see SHELDON v. BENHAM, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 129. As holding that a notice of dishonor mailed to an indorser, and received the day after that on which the note became due, was sufficient, even where the postoffice was in the same town, see SHAYLOR v. MIX, 4 Allen (Mass.) 351.

<sup>203</sup> BANK OF COLUMBIA v. LAWRENCE, 1 Pet. 578; Bank of U. S. v. Norwood, 1 Har. & J. (Md.) 423; Gist v. Lybrand, 3 Ohio, 307; Jones v. Lewis, 8 Watts & S. 14; Walker v. Bank of Missouri, 8 Mo. 704.

<sup>204</sup> Bowling v. Harrison, 6 How. 248; Williams v. Bank of U. S., 2 Pet. 96; Boyd v. City Sav. Bank, 15 Grat. 501; Peirce v. Pendar, 5 Metc. (Mass.)

else be made by leaving at his place of domicile or of business.<sup>205</sup> But, as an exception to the foregoing rule, the notice may be served by mail in the following instances:

(a) If the holder can prove that the party to be charged received the notice in due time.<sup>206</sup>

(b) If the instrument is protested by a notary at a place different from that of the party's place of residence.<sup>207</sup>

(c) In large towns and cities, where letter carriers are employed to deliver letters, at the residences or places of business of parties who usually receive their letters through their hands, provided the notice be mailed early enough to reach the drawer or indorser in due time.<sup>208</sup>

(d) If there are several post offices in the same town, between which there is a regular communication by mail.<sup>209</sup>

(e) If it is the certain, clear, definite custom of a bank, in giving notice, to serve notices by mail, and this is known to the party.<sup>210</sup>

(2) If the parties reside in different places, or the drawer or indorser sought to be charged resides at a place other than that at

352; *John v. City Nat. Bank*, 62 Ala. 529; *Vance v. Collins*, 6 Cal 435; *Davis v. Gowen*, 19 Me. 447.

<sup>205</sup> *Ireland v. Kip*, 10 Johns. 491; *Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence*, 1 Pet. 578; *Sanderson v. Reinstadler*, 31 Mo. 483; *Nevius v. Bank*, 10 Mich. 547; *Grinman v. Walker*, 9 Iowa, 426. "It is well settled that, when the indorser resides at the place of the presentment and dishonor of the note, the notice must be served on him personally, or, what is deemed equivalent, must be left at his dwelling or place of business." Comstock, J., in *VAN VECHTEN v. PRYN*, 13 N. Y. 549.

<sup>206</sup> *Cabot Bank v. Warner*, 10 Allen, 524; *Peabody Ins. Co. v. Wilson*, 29 W. Va. 547, 2 S. E. 888; *Phelps v. Stocking*, 21 Neb. 443, 32 N. W. 217.

<sup>207</sup> *Hartford Bank v. Stedman*, 3 Conn. 489; *Warren v. Gilman*, 17 Me. 360; *Eagle Bank v. Hathaway*, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 212.

<sup>208</sup> *Shoemaker v. Mechanics' Bank*, 59 Pa. St. 83; *Walters v. Brown*, 15 Md. 292; *Dobree v. Eastwood*, 3 Car. & P. 250; *SMITH v. MULLETT*, 2 Camp. 208. Not unless addressed to street and number. *Benedict v. Schmieg*, 13 Wash. 476, 43 Pac. 374.

<sup>209</sup> *SHAYLOR v. MIX*, 4 Allen (Mass.) 351; *Curtis v. Bank*, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 312; *Brindley v. Barr*, 3 Har. (Del.) 419; *Gist v. Lybrand*, 3 Ohio, 307; *Bell v. Hagerstown Bank*, 7 Gill, 216.

<sup>210</sup> *Thorn v. Rice*, 15 Me. 263; *Bowling v. Harrison*, 6 How. 248; *Carolina Nat. Bank v. Wallace*, 13 S. C. 347.

which the instrument is payable,<sup>211</sup> the holder may make service by depositing the notice in the post office,<sup>212</sup> inclosed in a securely closed post-paid wrapper, and addressed to the post office at or nearest to the party's place of residence, unless he is accustomed to receive his letters at another post office, in which case it should be directed thereto.<sup>213</sup> The following are the specific rules as to the address:

(a) If the residence of such person is in a city or large town, it is probably sufficient to address to the city generally, and by his full name, unless it appears that the name is a common one in that city or town.<sup>214</sup>

<sup>211</sup> See the case of *CHOUTEAU v. WEBSTER*, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 1, in which a citizen of Boston indorsed a note payable at a New York bank, which the maker did not pay at maturity. The indorser was at the time in Washington, as a senator, and notice of non-payment was mailed in due time at New York, addressed to him at Washington. The indorser had a business agent in Boston, but the holder was ignorant of the fact. The notice was held sufficient. Depositing in any letter box in charge of the post-office department is sufficient. *Johnson v. Brown*, 154 Mass. 105, 27 N. E. 994; *Casco Nat. Bank v. Shaw*, 79 Me. 376, 10 Atl. 67; *Wood v. Callaghan*, 61 Mich. 402, 28 N. W. 162. See Neg. Inst. L. § 177.

<sup>212</sup> *BUSSARD v. LEVERING*, 6 Wheat. 102; *Munn v. Baldwin*, 6 Mass. 316; *Miller v. Hackley*, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 375; *Friend v. Wilkinson*, 9 Grat. (Va.) 31; *SAUNDERSON v. JUDGE*, 2 H. Bl. 510; *Phelps v. Stocking*, 21 Neb. 443, 32 N. W. 217; *Wooley v. Lyon*, 117 Ill. 244, 6 N. E. 885.

<sup>213</sup> *BANK OF COLUMBIA v. LAWRENCE*, 1 Pet. 582; *MERCER v. LANCASTER*, 5 Pa. St. 160. In this case it was held that a notice of dishonor was sufficient, if addressed to an indorser at the postoffice where he is in the habit of receiving his mail, although such office is not nearest to his residence. *Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Cade*, 73 Mich. 449, 41 N. E. 500; *Northwestern Coal Co. v. Bowman*, 69 Iowa, 150, 28 N. W. 496. Where there are two postoffices in the town where the indorser resides, it will be sufficient, prima facie, if notice be addressed to him at the town generally. This may, however, be rebutted by proof of the indorser's custom of receiving his letters at one office, and by proof that the holder might, by reasonable diligence, have ascertained this. *MORTON v. WESTCOTT*, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 425.

<sup>214</sup> *True v. Collins*, 8 Allen, 440; *Morse v. Chamberlin*, 144 Mass. 406, 11 N. E. 560; *Riggs v. Hatch*, 16 Fed. 640. This doctrine is disputed. *WALTER v. HAYNES*, Ryan & M. 149. In this case it was held that a letter directed, "Mr. Haynes, Bristol," containing notice of the dishonor of a bill, was proved



(b) If the party live at one place and receive his letters at another post office, notice may be sent to either.<sup>215</sup>

(c) Mailing to any address given by the drawer or indorser for that purpose will be sufficient.<sup>216</sup>

(d) If the party to be charged, unknown to the holder, changes his place of residence after drawing or indorsing the bill or note, the holder may nevertheless still address the notice to his former place of residence, provided he in good faith supposed he was addressing it to the actual place of residence of such party.<sup>217</sup>

to have been put in the postoffice. It was held that this was not sufficient proof of notice, the direction being too general to raise a presumption that the letter reached the particular individual charged. See, however, *MANN v. MOORS*, Ryan & M. 249.

<sup>215</sup> *Bank of U. S. v. Carneal*, 2 Pet. 549; *Williams v. Bank of U. S.*, Id. 96. If sojourning in another place, notice may be sent there. *CHOUTEAU v. WEBSTER*, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 1; *BANK OF COMMERCE v. CHAMBERS*, 14 Mo. App. 152. See Neg. Inst. L. § 179, subd. 3.

<sup>216</sup> *Importers' & Traders' Nat. Bank v. Shaw*, 144 Mass. 424, 11 N. E. 666; *Bank of America v. Shaw*, 142 Mass. 291, 7 N. E. 779. As where an address is added to the signature. *Burmester v. Barron*, 17 Q. B. 828; *Morris v. Husson*, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 93. It has been held that in such case notice must be sent to that address. *BARTLETT v. ROBINSON*, 39 N. Y. 187. Such is the provision of Neg. Inst. L. § 179.

<sup>217</sup> See *Munn v. Baldwin*, 6 Mass. 316; *Requa v. Collins*, 51 N. Y. 148; *Ward v. Perrin*, 54 Barb. 89. In *BERRIDGE v. FITZGERALD*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 639, a bill was shown to have been drawn on a company, and accepted by the manager. The defendant and another director indorsed. At maturity the bill was not paid, as the affairs of the company were being wound up. The plaintiff did not know the defendant's place of residence, so he sent the notice to him at the company's office. The defendant had for some time ceased to come there, since the company had become embarrassed. The notice was held to be good under the circumstances. In the case of *RAWDON v. REDFIELD*, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 178, it was shown that at the date of the note the indorser lived in Troy, but before maturity of the note he moved to New York. His name was not in the directory, however, and the notary who protested the bill in New York, being informed by the holder and acceptor, that Troy was the place of residence of the indorser, mailed him a notice to that place. This was held to be sufficient notice. In the case of *BEALE v. PARRISH*, 20 N. Y. 407, 411, it was held by Grover, J., that "inability to discover the residence of the indorser excuses the proper service only so long as such inability continues."

*Time of Giving Notice.*

The third element of process relates to the time at which notice is given. Notice of dishonor cannot be given before actual dishonor of the instrument takes place.<sup>218</sup> This is because the law merchant insists upon a legal presentment and an actual dishonor before it fixes the liability upon the indorser. Without these the notice of dishonor is a meaningless form. The fact that the bill is unpaid is immaterial. It must be dishonored before the indorser can be liable, and hence prerequisites to the issuing of the notice are the legal formalities necessary to create a dishonor.<sup>219</sup> But, the dishonor being once fixed, the holder has a reasonable time to take steps to fix the liability of the parties responsible over to him upon the bill or note. The meaning of this term "reasonable time" has become established by universal usage. He may, it is true, give notice at once,<sup>220</sup> but all that is required of him is reasonable diligence. Reasonable diligence is regulated by practical convenience and the usual course of business. Between parties living in the same place, the holder has until the expiration of the following business day to give notice. He may give it within banking hours at the bank, within business hours at the countinghouse or place of business,<sup>221</sup> and within the hours of rest at the dwelling place.<sup>222</sup> Between parties living in different places, the notice must be put into the post office in time to go by a mail of the day next succeeding the last day of grace, or the first possible or practicable mail after the day of maturity.<sup>223</sup> The rule at first required that notice

<sup>218</sup> Jackson v. Richards, 2 Caines, 343.

<sup>219</sup> Nicholson v. Gouthit, 2 H. Bl. 609; Jackson v. Richards, 2 Caines, 343.

<sup>220</sup> Ex parte MOLINE, 19 Ves. 216; Bank of Alexandria v. Swann, 9 Pet. 33; LINDENBERGER v. BEALL, 6 Wheat. 104. See Neg. Inst. L. § 173.

<sup>221</sup> ALLEN v. EDMONSON, 2 Car. & K. 547; Adams v. Wright, 14 Wis. 408; GARNETT v. WOODCOCK, 6 Maule & S. 44; PARKER v. GORDON, 7 East, 385. See Neg. Inst. L. § 174. Ante, p. — .

<sup>222</sup> In the case of JAMESON v. SWINTON, 2 Taunt. 224, the bill was shown to have been dishonored on July 10th. At 4 o'clock p. m. of the same day notice was given to the last indorser. At 8 or 9 o'clock on the night of the 11th this last indorser gave the defendant notice. It was held that the last indorser gave notice soon enough to entitle him to recover against the defendant.

<sup>223</sup> TINDAL v. BROWN, 1 Term R. 167; Darbishire v. Parker, 6 East, 3; Lenox v. Roberts, 2 Wheat. 373; STAINBACK v. BANK OF VIRGINIA,

of the default of the maker or acceptor should be put into the post office early enough to be sent by the mail of the day next succeeding the last day of grace.<sup>224</sup> But it often happened that the mail of the day succeeding the day of default went out at unreasonable hours, or before a reasonable time could be had for depositing the notice, as, for example, soon after midnight, or at a very early hour in the morning,<sup>225</sup> and in such cases was sometimes made up and closed the evening preceding. For this reason the rule universally adopted has been that the notice, in order to charge the drawer or indorser, must be deposited in the post office in time to be sent by mail of the day succeeding the day of the dishonor, provided the mail of that day be not closed at an unreasonable hour, or before early and convenient business hours.<sup>226</sup> In case of indorsers, each

11 Grat. (Va.) 260. As holding that a letter received on Sunday need not be opened till Monday, so that notice of dishonor will be held to have been received on that day, and that transmitting such notice by next day's post is sufficient diligence, see 2 Barn. & Ald. 501, note a. In *Gladwell v. Turner*, L. R. 5 Exch. 59, all the parties to the bill were shown to reside in London. On the morning after the dishonor of the bill, the plaintiff, who did not know the residence of the defendant (the drawer), applied to S. for information. The latter was not at home, and the plaintiff did not obtain his information until 5:30 p. m. of the same day. He posted his notice of dishonor after 6 p. m., and it was not received that night. It was held that, under the circumstances, the notice was not too late. See *Neg. Inst. L.* §§ 175, 176.

<sup>224</sup> *Bank of Alexandria v. Swann*, 9 Pet. 33.

<sup>225</sup> *GEILL v. JEREMY*, Moody & M. 61. In this case, it was held that a party receiving notice of dishonor of a bill of exchange need not give notice to the party above him till the next post after the day on which he himself receives the notice, although he might easily give it that day, and there is no post on the following day. *Mitchell v. Cross*, 2 R. L. 437; *West v. Brown*, 6 Ohio St. 542; *Chick v. Pillsbury*, 24 Me. 458.

<sup>226</sup> *Fullerton v. Bank of U. S.*, 1 Pet. 605-608; *Eagle Bank v. Chapin*, 3 Pick. 180; *Talbot v. Clark*, 8 Pick. 51; *Carter v. Burley*, 9 N. H. 559-570; *Farmers' Bank of Maryland v. Duvall*, 7 Gill & J. 79; *Freeman's Bank v. Perkins*, 18 Me. 292; *Mead v. Engs*, 5 Cow. 303; *Sewall v. Russell*, 3 Wend. 276; *Brown v. Ferguson*, 4 Leigh, 37; *Dodge v. Bank of Kentucky*, 2 A. K. Marsh. 610; *Hickman v. Ryan*, 5 Litt. 24; *Hartford Bank v. Stedman*, 3 Conn. 489; *BRENZER v. WIGHTMAN*, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 264. The party notifying is not bound to send the notice by mail, but, if he chooses other means of conveyance, the notice must be given within the time within which it would have been received in due course of mail. *Darbishire v.*

party to a bill or note has the same time after receipt of notice, for giving notice to other parties, that was allowed to the holder after default, and the time in regard to them is governed by the principles we have just stated.<sup>227</sup> This rule, however, has its limitations. If the holder of a bill of exchange or promissory note wishes to avail himself of a notice of dishonor given by him to a remote indorser, he must give it within the time within which he is by law required to give it to his immediate indorser. And he cannot avail himself of his laches to gain another day.<sup>228</sup> If he could, the consequence which has already been pointed out would follow, namely, that, if there were twenty indorsers, he would have twenty days within which to give notice to the first of them. The holder has his day to give notice to any party he may seek to charge, and each of the prior indorsers in turn has his day. Each has one day to give notice to all parties against whom he intends to enforce his remedy.<sup>229</sup>

Parker, 6 East, 3; *BANK OF COLUMBIA v. LAWRENCE*, 1 Pet. 578; *JARVIS v. MANUFACTURING CO.*, 23 Me. 287. See Neg. Inst. L. § 175, subd. 2.

<sup>227</sup> *SHELDON v. BENHAM*, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 129; *HOWARD v. IVES*, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 263; *LAWSON v. FARMERS' BANK*, 1 Ohio St. 206, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 203; *SHELBURNE FALLS NAT. BANK v. TOWNSLEY*, 102 Mass. 177; *SIMPSON v. TURNEY*, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 419; *SEATON v. SCOVILL*, 18 Kan. 435; *BRAY v. HADWEN*, 5 Maule & S. 68. See Neg. Inst. L. § 178. Cf. § 165.

<sup>228</sup> *Brown v. Ferguson*, 4 Leigh (Va.) 37; *TURNER v. LEECH*, 4 Barn. & Ald. 451. In this case, Abbott, C. J., said: "The plaintiff, who ought to have received notice of the dishonor of the bill of exchange from B. on the 5th September, did not, in fact, receive notice till the 8th, and therefore he was clearly discharged by the laches of the holder. Then can he, by paying the bill, place the prior indorsers in a worse situation than that in which they would otherwise have been? I think he cannot do so; and that, in paying this bill, he has paid it in his own wrong, and cannot be allowed to recover upon it against the defendant." *Kennedy v. Geddes*, 8 Port. (Ala.) 263; *Stix v. Mathews*, 63 Mo. 371; *Carter v. Burley*, 9 N. H. 558. It was decided in the case of *FITCHBURG BANK v. PERLEY*, 2 Allen, 433, that an indorser of a dishonored note will be rendered liable to a subsequent indorser, if such indorser, having received a duplicate notice from notary of holder, for the prior indorser, mailed it, with the proper address, on the day of its receipt, although it did not reach its destination as soon as if it had been sent by the holder or notary.

<sup>229</sup> In an action by the fourth against the first indorsee of a note, all the parties to which resided in London, it was shown that the plaintiff received

The holder may avail himself of a notice duly given by any other party to a bill, but this notice must be given in due time by the party to the bill, by which is meant due time if he himself were serving.<sup>220</sup>

notice of dishonor from his indorsee on the 20th, and gave notice to his immediate indorser by a letter mailed on the evening of the 21st, but so late that it was not delivered until next morning. This was held to be such laches as to discharge all prior indorsers, though, in the course of the 22d, notice was given to second indorsee and to defendant. *SMITH v. MULLETT*, 2 Camp. 208. In the case of *HOWARD v. IVES*, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 263, it was held that "the next day" is to be construed as meaning the next business day, so that, in case of protest on Saturday, notice will be in time if mailed on the following Monday. The indorsee of a bill of exchange left it with his bankers, who presented it for payment on the 4th, when it was dishonored, and on the 5th they returned it to the indorsee, who gave notice of the dishonor to the drawer, on the 6th, by post. Such notice was held to be reasonable. *SCOTT v. LUFFORD*, 9 East, 347.

<sup>220</sup> *ROWE v. TIPPER*, 13 C. B. 249; *Dobree v. Eastwood*, 8 Car. & P. 250.

**EXCUSES FOR FAILURE TO PRESENT OR GIVE NOTICE.**

147. Presentment and notice of dishonor are dispensed with in the case of a drawer or indorser whose duty it is, as between himself and the prior parties to the instrument, to pay it at maturity.<sup>231</sup>

147a. Presentment is dispensed with when, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, it cannot be made; and notice of dishonor is dispensed with when, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, it cannot be given, or does not reach the parties to be charged.

147b. Presentment and notice of dishonor may be dispensed with by waiver, express or implied.

The foregoing are common instances among the many in which presentment and notice of dishonor are dispensed with. They rest upon somewhat different reasons, which it is our purpose to explain.

Where the drawer, through his own fault, has no reason to expect the bill will be paid, it is unjust to cast upon the holder the duty of presentment and notice.<sup>232</sup> These are steps taken to fix the drawer's liability, and need only be taken when the bill was given in good faith, and after proper provision for its acceptance

<sup>231</sup> 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 813.

<sup>232</sup> TERRY v. PARKER, 6 Adol. & E. 502. In this case it was held that if the drawer of a bill of exchange have no effects in the hands of the drawee at the time of drawing the bill, and of its maturity, and have no ground to expect that it will be paid, it is not necessary to present the bill at maturity; and if it be presented two days after, and payment be refused, the drawer is liable. Mobley v. Clark, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 390; Kinsley v. Robinson, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 327; CAUNT v. THOMPSON, 7 C. B. 400. "The law requires notice to be given for this reason, because it is presumed that the bill is drawn on account of the drawee's having effects of the drawer in his hands; and, if the latter has notice that the bill is not accepted or not paid, he may withdraw them immediately. But, if he has no effects in the other's hands, then he cannot be injured for want of notice." Buller, J., in BICKERDIKE v. BOLLMAN, 1 Term R. 405. For a holding to the same effect, by the same judge, see Corney v. Da Costa, 1 Esp. 302. See, also, DENNIS v. MORRICE, 3 Esp. 158; Sands v. Clarke, 8 C. B. 751.

or payment had been made on the drawer's part. He has made a contract with the holder, one element of which was that the drawee would honor his bill when presented. And, if it can be shown that there could have been no reasonable expectation of this, the drawer can suffer no loss or injury from the failure of the holder to make a presentment to the drawee which would be fruitless if made. Notice of dishonor as to him would be an empty form, which the law will not require at the hands of the holder. But these reasons do not apply to excuse presentment and notice as to the indorsers, unless the indorsers have indorsed for the accommodation of the drawer, with knowledge of the fact that the drawer has no right to expect acceptance or payment.<sup>233</sup> For if the indorsers know nothing of the relation between the drawer and drawee, they may require presentment and notice, although the drawer cannot.<sup>234</sup> A drawer or indorser who is the accommodating party may insist upon presentment and notice;<sup>235</sup> but not if he is the accommodated party, inasmuch as he then can have no recourse against the acceptor or maker.<sup>236</sup>

Presentment and notice are not dispensed with where the drawee, though he has no funds of the drawer in his hands, has promised to accept the bill for the drawer's accommodation,<sup>237</sup> nor because the

<sup>233</sup> French v. Bank of Columbia, 4 Cranch, 141; LEACH v. HEWITT, 4 Taunt. 731.

<sup>234</sup> Carter v. Flower, 16 Mees. & W. 743; Brown v. Maffey, 15 East, 216; Bogy v. Kell, 1 Mo. 743; Warder v. Tucker, 7 Mass. 449; Rea v. Dorrance, 18 Me. 137. In the case of TURNER v. SAMSON, 2 Q. B. Div. 23, Mellish, L. J., said: "It appears beyond all doubt that the bill was an accommodation bill, and that the drawer and the other defendants, as indorsers, all signed the bill for the accommodation of S. The question is, in substance, whether the defendant (the appellant) was entitled to notice. He was plainly not the person who was to take up the bill, and he had a right to suppose that another person would see that it was taken up. It appears to me that the defendant was in the same position as if the acceptor had been the person who was ultimately liable to pay."

<sup>235</sup> Cory v. Scott, 3 Barn. & Ald. 619; TURNER v. SAMSON, 2 Q. B. Div. 23; Miser v. Trovinger, 7 Ohio St. 281.

<sup>236</sup> Ex parte Heath, 2 Ves. & B. 240; Miser v. Trovinger, 7 Ohio St. 281; Rhett v. Poe, 2 How. 457; AMERICAN NAT. BANK v. MANUFACTURING CO., 94 Tenn. 624, 30 S. W. 753. See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 140, 186, subd. 3.

<sup>237</sup> Walwyn v. St. Quintin, 1 Bos. & P. 652; Adams v. Darby, 28 Mo. 162; Oliver v. Bank of Tennessee, 11 Humph. 74.



drawer has consigned property to the drawee which he draws against,<sup>238</sup> nor because there is a running account between him and the drawer,<sup>239</sup> nor in any case where he has reason to expect his draft would be honored.<sup>240</sup> The test to be applied is whether the drawer had a right to expect or require that the drawee would honor his bill.<sup>241</sup> If the courts can construe such a legal right or just expectation on his part, failure to present the bill, and give him notice of its dishonor, discharges him.

<sup>238</sup> *DICKINS v. BEAL*, 10 Pet. 572; *Grosvenor v. Stone*, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 79.

<sup>239</sup> In the case of *HAMMOND v. DUFRENE*, 3 Camp. 145, Lord Ellenborough said: "I conceive the whole period must be looked to from the drawing of the bill till it becomes due, and that notice is requisite if the drawer has effects in the hands of the drawee at any time during that interval." In *THACKRAY v. BLACKETT*, Id. 164, it was shown that after acceptance and indorsement, and before maturity, certain bills drawn on P. & S. were destroyed by mistake while in the hands of the acceptor. This fact was made known to the defendant (the drawer), and he was requested to give other bills. He refused, and afterwards P. & S. failed. No notice was given the defendant of dishonor, though the bills were presented on maturity. Lord Ellenborough held that "it is well settled that insolvency or bankruptcy of the acceptor does not dispense with due notice of the dishonor of the bill being given to the drawer. Then does it make any difference that the bills were destroyed before they came due? I think not; for they might still have been paid with or without an indemnity, and the defendant, not hearing that they were dishonored, might have been prevented from pressing his remedy against the acceptors. \* \* \* If there was an open account between the parties, and the acceptors were indebted in any sum to the drawer before the bills became due, I cannot say that he must necessarily have been aware beforehand that either of them would be dishonored." See, also, *DONNELLY v. HOWIE*, Hayes & J. 436.

<sup>240</sup> *THACKRAY v. BLACKETT*, 3 Camp. 164; *LEGGE v. THORPE*, 12 East, 171. Thus, in the case of *BLACKHAN v. DOREN*, 2 Camp. 503, it was held that if the drawer of a bill of exchange, when presented for acceptance, has effects in the hands of the drawees, though he is indebted to them for a much larger amount, and they, without his knowledge, have appropriated these effects to the satisfaction of the debt, he is entitled to notice of dishonor for nonacceptance, as he might expect under these circumstances that the bill would be accepted and paid. See, also, *Carew v. Duckworth*, L. R. 4 Exch. 313; *Hopkirk v. Page*, 2 Brock. 34, Fed. Cas. No. 6,697; *CATHELL v. GOODWIN*, 1 Har. & G. (Md.) 468; *ROBINSON v. AMES*, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 146.

<sup>241</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 139, 185, subd. 4.

Thus when the drawer or indorser is fully secured, and has promised to see to the payment of the paper,<sup>242</sup> there is no reason for the enforcement of the rule requiring presentment and notice in his behalf. As we have already said, one of the principal objects of notice is to enable the indorser to obtain indemnity from the principal, and this has already in such case been attained. But the mere precaution by an indorser of taking security from his principal does not operate as a dispensation of a regular demand and notice. It has been held that an assignment to the drawer or indorser of all the property of the acceptor or maker as security against liability is sufficient to dispense with presentment and notice.<sup>243</sup> But upon principle, and by weight of authority, even this is not enough unless there be an understanding, express or implied, between the parties, that the drawer or indorser is to be exclusively liable to provide for the payment; and in all cases the proper test is whether the drawer or indorser is bound to take up the paper.<sup>244</sup>

Presentment and notice are also dispensed with when the drawer and drawee are one and the same person,<sup>245</sup> and consequently when a bill is drawn by a partner on the firm in the firm business,<sup>246</sup> and when the drawee is a fictitious person.<sup>247</sup>

### *Reasonable Diligence.*

Presentment may be dispensed with when, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, it cannot be made; and notice of dishonor is dispensed with when, under the same circumstances, it cannot be

<sup>242</sup> *Corney v. Da Costa*, 1 Esp. 302; *Bond v. Farnham*, 5 Mass. 170; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. §§ 1128-1143; *Tied. Com. Paper*, § 362.

<sup>243</sup> *Duvall v. Bank*, 9 Gill & J. (Md.) 31; *Spencer v. Harvey*, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 489; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. §§ 1130-1132.

<sup>244</sup> *MOSES v. ELA*, 43 N. H. 557; *Creamer v. Perry*, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 332; *Haskell v. Boardman*, 8 Allen (Mass.) 38; *WILSON v. SENIER*, 14 Wis. 380; *Ray v. Smith*, 17 Wall. 416; *HULL v. MYERS*, 90 Ga. 674, 16 S. E. 653.

<sup>245</sup> As to notice. *Bailey v. Bank*, 11 Fla. 266; *Raymond v. Mann*, 45 Tex. 301. As to presentment. *Bailey v. Bank*, supra; *Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan*, 40 Ind. 361. But as to presentment this is doubtful. 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 462, note 1; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 1088a. See Neg. Inst. L. § 185, subd. 1.

<sup>246</sup> *PORTHOUSE v. PARKER*, 1 Camp. 82; *GOWAN v. JACKSON*, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 176; *Rhett v. Poe*, 2 How. 457; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. § 1086.

<sup>247</sup> *Smith v. Bellamy*, 2 Starkie, 223; *Chalm. Bills Exch.* (4th Ed.) 150. See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 142, 185. Cf. section 186, subd. 1; section 245, subd. 1.

given, or does not reach the parties sought to be charged.<sup>248</sup> It is impossible to define accurately what constitutes reasonable diligence, or to do more than enumerate some of the instances in which presentment and notice may be dispensed with under this general rule.

War,<sup>249</sup> disease,<sup>250</sup> the suspension of commercial intercourse by superior force, such as the public and positive prohibition of commerce, occupation of a country by public enemies,<sup>251</sup> and the like, exonerate the holder from presentment and notice. The interest of the public forbids such acts, and therefore the individual cannot be held responsible if he fail to perform them. Thus, the public policy forbids communication with districts infected by such plagues as the cholera or yellow fever, because public safety requires their quarantine. Hence, even if the matter be not regulated by express statute, as it is in some states, the doctrines of the common law forbid all business intercourse with the inhabitants of such districts. But the other rule of the common law, that inability to perform the terms or conditions of a contract by reason of inevitable accident or casualty constitutes no excuse for non-performance, does not apply to the presentment of negotiable instruments and notice of their dishonor, because questions of presentment and notice depend upon due diligence. The holder, if he has used due diligence in presenting the bill or note, and in notifying parties of its dishonor, has done all the law requires of him.<sup>252</sup> Diligence on his part is measured

<sup>248</sup> See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 142, 183, 245.

<sup>249</sup> *Scholefield v. Elchelberger*, 7 Pet. 586; *U. S. v. Grossmayer*, 9 Wall. 75; *Berry v. Southern Bank*, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 379; *JAMES v. WADE*, 21 La. Ann. 548 (this case holds that the holder of commercial paper must use all other means possible to give notice to the party to be charged when by reason of circumstances the mail cannot be used).

<sup>250</sup> *Billgerry v. Branch*, 19 Grat. (Va.) 393; *MORGAN v. BANK OF LOUISVILLE*, 4 Bush (Ky.) 82; *Norris v. Despard*, 38 Md. 491; *TUNNO v. LEAGUE*, 2 Johns. Cas. (Ky.) 1. As holding that the illness of one's wife will not excuse delay in giving notice of dishonor, see *TURNER v. LEACH*, Chit. Bills & N. (10th Ed.) 332, note 13.

<sup>251</sup> *Polk v. Spinks*, 5 Cold. 431; *Tardy v. Boyd*, 26 Grat. 632.

<sup>252</sup> Due diligence thus excuses delay as well as entire failure to present or give notice. *Windham Bank v. Norton*, 22 Conn. 213; *PATIENCE v. TOWNLEY*, 2 J. P. Smith (Eng.) 223; *PIER v. HEINRICHSHOFFEN*, 67 Mo. 163. See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 141, 184. Cf. section 244.

by the general convenience of the commercial world, and the practicability of accomplishing the end required by ordinary skill, caution, and effort.<sup>253</sup> And it only requires that demand and notice must be made and given within a reasonable time after the impediment is removed. This rule also does not apply to indorsers, unless the objection applies to them. For example, where a maker or acceptor is in a beleaguered town, and so inaccessible, it is merely the presentment to him which is excused. The indorser's liability should be at once fixed by sending him notice; and, if the indorser can be notified, notice to him is not excused, for the law merchant insists on compliance with its formalities as far as they can be observed.<sup>254</sup>

In cases of absence, death, or inability to discover the residence of the maker or acceptor, the question is one of diligence.<sup>255</sup> When the maker of a note or acceptor of a bill has absconded, that will ordinarily excuse a demand, and notice of the fact is sufficient to hold all the indorsers.<sup>256</sup> Where the maker or acceptor is a seaman on a voyage, having no domicile, the indorser is liable without a demand being made;<sup>257</sup> and in every case where the maker or acceptor has no known place of residence, or place at which the note can be presented, the holder will in like manner be excused from making any demand whatever.<sup>258</sup> The commonest instance of this last general statement is where the maker or acceptor removes from the state, and continues to reside abroad until its maturity.

<sup>253</sup> *Windham Bank v. Norton*, 22 Conn. 213; *PATIENCE v. TOWNLEY*, 2 J. P. Smith (Eng.) 223; *Farmers' Bank v. Gunnell*, 26 Grat. (Va.) 131; *SCHOFIELD v. BAYARD*, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 488.

<sup>254</sup> *Foster v. Julien*, 24 N. Y. 28; *Spies v. Gilmore*, 1 N. Y. 321; *McGRUDER v. BANK OF WASHINGTON*, 9 Wheat. 598. In this case, it was held that a removal to another state by the maker excuses actual demand. *Juniata Bank v. Hale*, 16 Serg. & R. 157; *Gibbs v. Cannon*, 9 Serg. & R. 201.

<sup>255</sup> If payable at a particular place, which no longer exists, presentment is excused. *Erwin v. Adams*, 2 La. 318; *Waring v. Betts*, 90 Va. 46, 17 S. E. 739. As to what is reasonable diligence in making inquiry, *Lambert v. Ghiselin*, 9 How. 552; *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. §§ 1115-1123.

<sup>256</sup> *PUTNAM v. SULLIVAN*, 4 Mass. 45; *Lehman v. Jones*, 1 Watts & S. 126; *Taylor v. Snyder*, 8 Denio, 145.

<sup>257</sup> *Barrett v. Wills*, 4 Leigh, 114; *Moore v. Coffield*, 12 N. C. 247.

<sup>258</sup> *ERWIN v. ADAMS*, 2 La. 318; *ADAMS v. LELAND*, 30 N. Y. 309.

It is deemed in such cases a better business rule that the holder shall not be bound to seek out the maker or acceptor or his place of residence in the state to which he has removed for the purpose of presenting the instrument and demanding payment.<sup>259</sup> It is probably also the law that he is not bound to present it at the last known place of residence or business of the maker or acceptor, though the cases are not explicit on this point. The most that is said is that a presentment will be sufficient if made at the last known place of residence or of business;<sup>260</sup> but it probably would not be enjoined upon the holder that it be done, because such a formality would be of no practical value. In case of death of the maker or acceptor, the general principle which we have stated above governs the case. If the instrument is made payable at a bank or other particular place, it must be still presented there. If its presentment be impossible, because of the death of the maker or acceptor, and no one can be found to whom to make presentment, its presentment will be excused. If a personal representative has been appointed, presentment and demand must be made to him.<sup>261</sup> And if there is no personal representative, and at the time of his death the maker or acceptor had a known place of residence, presentment should be made at his former residence.<sup>262</sup> In this case, as in all others, the death of the acceptor or maker never dispenses with notice to the drawers and indorsers of the fact of non-acceptance or of non-payment.<sup>263</sup>

<sup>259</sup> *ANDERSON v. DRAKE*, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 114.

<sup>260</sup> *ADAMS v. LELAND*, 30 N. Y. 309; *Foster v. Julien*, 24 N. Y. 28; *McGRUDER v. BANK OF WASHINGTON*, 9 Wheat. 598; *DENNIE v. WALKER*, 7 N. H. 199; *Wheeler v. Field*, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 290; *Herrick v. Baldwin*, 17 Minn. 209 (Gil. 183); *Gist v. Lybrand*, 3 Ohio. 308; *Central Bank v. Allen*, 16 Me. 41.

<sup>261</sup> *Magruder v. Union Bank of Georgetown*, 8 Curt. Dec. 299, 3 Pet. 87; *TOBY v. MAURIAN*, 7 La. 493; *Harp v. Kenner*, 19 La. Ann. 63; *Gower v. Moore*, 25 Me. 16; *Shoenberger v. Lancaster Sav. Inst.*, 28 Pa. St. 459. Ante, p. 383.

<sup>262</sup> *BANK OF WASHINGTON v. REYNOLDS*, 2 Cranch, C. C. 289, Fed. Cas. No. 954.

<sup>263</sup> *Oriental Bank v. Blake*, 22 Pick. 208.

*Waiver.*

The third class of cases mentioned in the principal text is what is known as "waiver." It may be of two kinds: (1) Expressed in words; or (2) implied from acts.<sup>264</sup> When presentment of a bill or note at maturity or notice of its dishonor has been dispensed with by prior agreement, it would be a fraud upon the holder to permit him to suffer by acting upon the assurance of the party to whom he looks as security upon the paper. And it is fair that this should be enforced against the indorser, for the conditions of presentment and demand are for his benefit alone.<sup>265</sup> The commonest forms of express waiver are the words "presentation and protest waived," or "notices and protest of non-acceptance waived," or words similar in form and import, written or printed on the face of the bill, or over some or all the indorsements, or else on a separate piece of paper.<sup>266</sup> Where it is written on the face of the bill or note, it applies to all the parties.<sup>267</sup> Where it is written over some or all the indorsements, it applies only to those indorsements over which it is written.<sup>268</sup> Where it is written on a separate piece of paper, the in-

<sup>264</sup> Fuller v. McDonald, 8 Greenl. (Me.) 213; PORTHOUSE v. PARKER, 1 Camp. 82. See Neg. Inst. L. § 142, subd. 3; Id. §§ 180-182.

<sup>265</sup> While a parol waiver is ordinarily sufficient (PHIPSON v. KNELLER, 4 Camp. 285; Lane v. Stewart, 20 Me. 98; Smith v. Lownsdale, 6 Or. 78), many cases hold that an undertaking, at the time of drawing or indorsing, to dispense with presentment and notice, is not a waiver of performance of conditions precedent, but a term of the contract, and that, if the undertaking be by parol, it is inoperative (unless in the case of blank indorsements), on the ground that it attempts to vary the terms of a written contract. FREE v. HAWKINS, Holt, N. P. 550; Barry v. Morse, 3 N. H. 132; Farwell v. Trust Co., 45 Minn. 495, 48 N. W. 326; Goldman v. Davis, 23 Cal. 256; 2 Ames, Cas. Bills & N. 814; Boyd v. Cleveland, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 525; Fullerton v. Rundlett, 27 Me. 31; Annville Nat. Bank v. Kettering, 106 Pa. St. 531; Schmied v. Frank, 86 Ind. 255; Cummings v. Kent, 44 Ohio St. 96, 4 N. E. 710; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1093.

<sup>266</sup> Spencer v. Harvey, 17 Wend. 489.

<sup>267</sup> Bryant v. Merchants' Bank, 8 Bush, 43; Farmers' Bank of Kentucky v. Ewing, 78 Ky. 266; Lowry v. Steele, 27 Ind. 170; Bryant v. Lord, 19 Minn. 397 (Gil. 342).

<sup>268</sup> Woodman v. Thurston, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 157; CENTRAL BANK v. DAVIS, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 373. Parshley v. Heath, 69 Me. 90, contra.

strument is to be construed according to its terms. In extent, the waiver is construed to apply only to the acts which it specifies. Sometimes notice alone is waived;<sup>269</sup> sometimes presentment; sometimes protest, in which last case the term "protest" is deemed to include all the formal facts which constitute dishonor.<sup>270</sup> Any act, course of conduct, or language of the drawer or indorser calculated to induce the holder not to make demand or protest or give notice, or to put him off his guard, or any agreement by the parties to that effect, will dispense with the necessity of taking these steps as against any party so dealing with the holder.<sup>271</sup> The reason for this is that the conditions of demand and notice are for the benefit and protection of the drawer and indorser; and when his acts are such that the court cannot protect him without sanctioning a fraud or wrong, or when the drawer and indorser himself waives these proceedings, and consents to be bound without them, he is bound. A party to a contract may renounce the benefit of any stipulation in it designed for his own protection.<sup>272</sup>

### *Conflict of Laws.*

Where a bill or note is drawn or indorsed in one place, and is payable by the acceptor or maker in another, the formalities in respect to diligence are in general governed by the law of the place of

<sup>269</sup> Backus v. Shipherd, 11 Wend. 629; Berkshire Bank v. Jones, 6 Mass. 524; Burnham v. Webster, 17 Me. 50.

<sup>270</sup> Coddington v. Davis, 1 N. Y. 186; Porter v. Kimball, 53 Barb. 467; SHAW v. McNEILL, 95 N. C. 535; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1095a.

<sup>271</sup> Story, Bills, § 317; Andrews v. Boyd, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 434; Norton v. Lewis, 2 Conn. 478; Taunton Bank v. Richardson, 5 Pick. 436; Leonard v. Gary, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 504; Boyd v. Cleveland, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 525; PHIPSON v. KNELLER, 4 Camp. 285, 1 Starkie, 116. In this case Lord Ellenborough said: "No legal proposition can be more clear than that where a party says: 'My residence is immaterial. I will inquire whether the bill is paid,'—he thereby takes upon himself the onus of making inquiry, and dispenses with notice." Whitfield v. Savage, 2 Bos. & P. 277; Mead v. Small, 2 Greenl. 207; Hoover v. McCormick, 84 Wis. 215, 54 N. W. 505, Johns. Cas. Bills & N. 134.

<sup>272</sup> Sheldon v. Horton, 43 N. Y. 93; Pugh v. McCormick, 14 Wall. 361; Reynolds v. Douglass, 12 Pet. 497; CADY v. BRADSHAW, 116 N. Y. 188, 22 N. E. 371; Ross v. Hurd, 71 N. Y. 14.



payment. So far as presentment<sup>273</sup> and protest<sup>274</sup> are concerned, there is no conflict of authority. In England<sup>275</sup> the same rule applies to the formalities of notice, and upon principle and upon the ground of convenience it seems that notice should stand upon the same footing as other formalities of diligence. In the United States the authorities are divided. In the leading case of *AYMAR v. SHELDON*<sup>276</sup> it was held that notice must conform to the law of the place where the contract of the drawer or indorser is to be performed. There are, however, American authorities which maintain the English view.<sup>277</sup>

<sup>273</sup> *ROTHSCHILD v. CURRIE*, 1 Q. B. 43; *Todd v. Neal's Adm'r*, 49 Ala. 266; *Pierce v. Indseth*, 106 U. S. 546, 1 Sup. Ct. 418; *Ellis v. Bank*, 8 How. (Miss.) 294; *Snow v. Perkins*, 2 Mich. 238; *McCLANE v. FITCH*, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 600.

<sup>274</sup> *TOWNSLEY v. SUMRALL*, 2 Pet. 170; *Ellis v. Bank*, 8 How. (Miss.) 294; *Chatham Bank v. Allison*, 15 Iowa, 357; *CARTER v. BANK*, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 547; *Simpson v. White*, 40 N. H. 540.

<sup>275</sup> *ROTHSCHILD v. CURRIE*, 1 Q. B. 43; *HIRSCHFELD v. SMITH*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 340; *Horne v. Rouquette*, 3 Q. B. Div. 514; *ROUQUETTE v. OVERMANN*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 525. The English Bills of Exchange Act, § 72, subd. 3, so provides.

<sup>276</sup> 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 439; *LEE v. SELLECK*, 33 N. Y. 615; *Snow v. Perkins*, 2 Mich. 238; *Story, Bills*, § 285; *Story, Notes*, § 177.

<sup>277</sup> *TODD v. NEAL'S ADM'R*, 49 Ala. 266; *Wooley v. Lyon*, 117 Ill. 244, 6 N. E. 885; *Daniel, Neg. Inst.* §§ 911, 912.

## CHAPTER X.

## CHECKS.

- 148-150. In General.
- 151. Checks as Negotiable Instruments.
- 152-154. Presentment and Notice of Dishonor—Effect of Delay.
- 155. Rights of Holder against Bank.
- 156-159. Certification and Acceptance of Checks.
- 160. Failure of Bank to Honor Check.

## IN GENERAL.

148. A check is a draft or order on a bank or banker, purporting to be drawn on a deposit of funds, for the payment, at all events, of a certain sum of money to a certain person therein named, or to him or his order, or to bearer, and payable instantly on demand.<sup>1</sup>

149. A check resembles an inland bill of exchange payable on demand, except that it is always drawn on a banker; and many, but not all, of the rules governing a bill, are applicable to it.

150. In some, but not all, states, an instrument, in the form of a check, drawn in one state on a banker in another state, is held to be a foreign bill of exchange, and not a check.

The following is the ordinary form of a check:

Chicago, Ill., Aug. 1st, 1895.

First National Bank of Chicago, Ill.

Pay to Adam Smith or order [*or to Adam Smith simply, or to Adam Smith or bearer, or simply to bearer*]

Five hundred and <sup>50</sup>/<sub>100</sub>.....Dollars  
\$500 <sup>50</sup>/<sub>100</sub> John Jones.

<sup>1</sup> Van Schaack, Bank Checks, 1, citing BLAIR v. WILSON, 28 Grat. (Va.) 170; Story, Prom. Notes (7th Ed.) § 487; 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. (3d Ed.) § 1566.

John Jones is the drawer; the First National Bank of Chicago, Ill., is the drawee; Adam Smith is the payee; and the payee, while he holds the check, or any person who holds it by transfer from him, is called the "holder."

A check is in form similar to an inland bill of exchange, the only difference being that it is drawn on a bank or banker. The Negotiable Instruments Law defines a check as a "bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand." \* As we shall presently see, more at length, however, a check is not a bill of exchange, though it is similar in form, and though many of the incidents of a bill attach to it. In view of its resemblance to a bill in form, the rules governing the form of bills, their alteration, the capacity of the parties thereto, etc., apply to it, and it is unnecessary to do much more than refer to what has been said in this regard in speaking of bills. A few points, however, may well be noticed shortly.

A check, in order to render the bank liable to the drawer for failure to pay it, and to protect the bank in paying it, should it turn out to be invalid for any reason as between the drawer and payee, should be dated. The fact that a check is not dated would naturally be held sufficient to put the bank on inquiry.<sup>2</sup> It is even said that an undated check is never payable.<sup>3</sup> It need not be dated on the day of its issuance, but may be dated on a prior or subsequent day. In the former case it is called an "antedated" check; in the latter, a "postdated" check. A postdated check is payable on demand or at any time after its date.† To be a check, the order must be drawn on a bank or banker. If drawn on any other person, it is a bill of exchange, and not a check. It need not appear on the face of

\* Section 321. This is, however, qualified by sections 321-325. A similar definition is given by the English Bills of Exchange Act, § 73, though some of its other provisions are different.

<sup>2</sup> Under the English Bills of Exchange Act, it seems that a check, like a bill of exchange, need not be dated; that, when undated, it is payable on demand, "because no time of payment is expressed." Smith, Bills, C. & N. 127. See Neg. Inst. L. §§ 25, 32. If there is a blank left for the date, the holder has implied authority to insert the true date; but if he inserts an untrue date, without the drawer's consent, he alters the check, and an alteration of the date renders the check void. See Van Schaack, Bank Checks 2, 3; Crawford v. West Side Bank, 100 N. Y. 50, 2 N. E. 881.

<sup>3</sup> Van Schaack, Bank Checks, 2, citing Morse, Banks (2d Ed.) 253.

† See Neg. Inst. L. § 31.

it that the drawee is a banker, but it is safer that this should appear, for it has been said that otherwise a bona fide holder without knowledge that it is drawn on a banker may treat it as a bill of exchange. Like a bill, a check must contain an order; the order must be for the payment unconditionally and at all events; and it must be for the payment of a certain sum of money. Though the contrary has been held in some jurisdictions,<sup>4</sup> yet by the great weight of authority it is essential that a check shall be payable instantly on demand; so that if an instrument, though otherwise in the form of a check, and drawn on a bank, orders payment on a day subsequent to its date, it is not a check, but a bill of exchange, and subject, therefore, to all the rules governing bills of exchange,—the rule, for instance, allowing days of grace.<sup>5</sup> A check must order payment to a person named in it, or to a person or his order, or to a person or bearer, or simply to bearer without naming any particular payee. Failure to designate a payee, or to designate him with sufficient certainty, will render the check void.<sup>6</sup> A check payable to a person named is transferable by his indorsement in the same manner as if payable to his order. A check payable to a fictitious person, or order, or to a name or figure not standing for any person, as "Bills Payable," "Rent," "1658," etc., or order, is in law regarded as payable to bearer, and is transferable by delivery.<sup>7</sup> A check must, of course, be signed by the drawer, but the place of the signature is immaterial, provided it appears to have been intended as a signature; and it may be in pencil, or printed, or stamped, or it may be

<sup>4</sup> In re Brown, 2 Story, 502, Fed. Cas. No. 1,985; CHAMPION v. GORDON, 70 Pa. St. 474.

<sup>5</sup> BOWEN v. NEWELL, 8 N. Y. 190; BULL v. BANK, 123 U. S. 105, 8 Sup. Ct. 62; MORRISON v. BAILEY, 5 Ohio St. 13; WOODRUFF v. BANK, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 673; HARKER v. ANDERSON, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 372; Minturn v. Fisher, 4 Cal. 36; BROWN v. LUSK, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 209; Georgia Nat. Bank v. Henderson, 46 Ga. 487; Bradley v. Delaplaine, 5 Har. (Del.) 305; HARRISON v. BANK, 41 Minn. 488, 43 N. W. 336. In re Brown, 2 Story, 502, Fed. Cas. No. 1,985; CHAMPION v. GORDON, 70 Pa. St. 475; Westminster Bank v. Wheaton, 4 R. I. 30; Way v. Towle, 155 Mass. 374, 29 N. E. 506, contra. See Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§ 1573-1575.

<sup>6</sup> Van Schaack, Bank Checks, 6; Daniel, Neg. Inst. (3d Ed.) § 1570.

<sup>7</sup> VERE v. LEWIS, 3 Term R. 183; WILLETS v. BANK, 2 Duer (N. Y.) 121.

the drawer's mark.<sup>9</sup> The points of difference between a check and a bill of exchange will be presently shown.

*Memorandum Checks.*

It is necessary to notice shortly a class of checks of a peculiar character, known as "memorandum checks." In form and appearance a memorandum check does not differ from ordinary checks, except that on the face of them is written the word "memorandum," or "mem.," or "memo." Such a check "is given by the maker to the payee rather as a memorandum of indebtedness than as a payment. Between those parties it is considered as a duebill, or an L. O. U. It can be sued upon as a promissory note, without presentment to the bank, whereas the holder of a regular check must first demand its payment at bank, and be refused, before he can maintain an action against the drawer."<sup>10</sup> The fact that the word "memorandum," or "mem.," or "memo.," is written on a check, makes it a memorandum check. The bank, however, is not bound to pay any attention to these words, or to recognize any contract as implied between the maker and payee which gives the check any peculiar character. If such a check is presented for payment, and the drawer has sufficient funds to meet it, the bank must honor it like any ordinary check. If the agreement between the maker and payee is that it shall not be presented for payment, any remedy of the drawer for the breach of such agreement is solely against the payee.<sup>10</sup>

A memorandum check presents all the features of other negotiable instruments when transferred or indorsed to a bona fide holder for value.<sup>11</sup> "A memorandum check is a contract by which the maker engages to pay the bona fide holder absolutely, and not upon a condition to pay if the bank upon which it be drawn should not pay upon presentation at maturity, and if due notice of the presentation and nonpayment should be given."<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Van Schaack, Bank Checks, 7, 8. And see *BROWN v. BANK*, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 443; *SHANK v. BUTSCH*, 28 Ind. 19; *Com. v. Ray*, 3 Gray (Mass.) 441, 447; *PENNINGTON v. BAEHR*, 48 Cal. 565.

<sup>10</sup> Van Schaack, Bank Checks, 184.

<sup>10</sup> Morse, Banks, 313.

<sup>11</sup> Van Schaack, Bank Checks, 185.

<sup>12</sup> *Franklin Bank v. Freeman*, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 535. See, also, as to this

*Drafts on a Bank in Another State.*

It would seem that a draft in the form of a check drawn in one state on a bank in another state should not be regarded as a check, but as a foreign bill of exchange, and therefore subject to the rules governing those instruments;<sup>13</sup> but the question has not been expressly decided, and there are intimations to the contrary.<sup>14</sup>

**CHECKS AS NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.**

**151. A check is not a bill of exchange, but it is in the nature of a bill of exchange payable on demand, and is governed by most of the rules applicable to such an instrument. It is subject to the same rules as regards transfer, indorsement, and negotiability.**

A check is defined in Negotiable Instruments Law as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand," and it is also thus defined by some text writers and judges.<sup>15</sup> But, though it is true that it is in the form and nature of an inland bill of exchange payable on demand, and though it is governed by most of the rules applicable to such an instrument, it is not a bill of exchange, but a distinct commercial instrument.<sup>16</sup> It differs from a bill of ex-

class of checks, *CUSHING v. GORE*, 15 Mass. 69; *DYKERS v. BANK*, 11 Paige (N. Y.) 612.

<sup>13</sup> *DICKINS v. BEAL*, 10 Pet. 572, 579; *Bank of U. S. v. Daniel*, 12 Pet. 32, 52. See *BULL v. BANK*, 123 U. S. 105, 8 Sup. Ct. 62.

<sup>14</sup> See *Roberts v. Corbin*, 26 Iowa, 315; *LITTLE v. BANK*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 425.

<sup>15</sup> *WHISTLER v. FORSTER*, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 248; *Chalm. Bills Exch.* 245; *McLean v. Clydesdale Banking Co.*, 9 App. Cas. 95. Ante, p. 405.

<sup>16</sup> *BLAIR v. WILSON*, 28 Grat. (Va.) 170; *Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank*, 10 Wall. 647; *Lynn v. Bell*, 10 Ir. C. L. 490; *KEENE v. BEARD*, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 380; *HOPKINSON v. FORSTER*, L. R. 19 Eq. 76; *Mullick v. Radakissen*, 9 Moore, P. O. 69. "In a sense, undoubtedly, a check is a species of bill of exchange, and in a sense, also, it is a distinct commercial instrument; but according to the understanding of merchants, and according to our statutes, these instruments were checks, and not bills of exchange. 'A check is an order to pay the holder a sum of money at the bank, on presentment of the check and demand of the money. No previous notice is necessary; no acceptance is required or expected; it has no days of grace. It

change, as we shall see, in that, in the case of a bill of exchange, the drawer is discharged by default of the payee or holder in making due presentment to the drawee, and in giving notice in case of dishonor, while, in the case of a check, the drawer is not discharged by delay in presentment, or in giving notice of dishonor, unless the delay was unreasonable under the circumstances, and, further than this, unless the drawer was prejudiced thereby, as by failure of the banker before presentment.<sup>18</sup> A check is not due until payment is demanded, and the statute of limitations runs only from that time.<sup>19</sup> It further differs from a bill of exchange in that it is always drawn upon a bank or banker;<sup>20</sup> and that it is payable immediately upon presentment, without the allowance of any days of grace;<sup>21</sup> and that it is never, as a matter of right, presentable for acceptance, but only for payment,<sup>22</sup> though, if the holder requests and the banker chooses, the latter may accept it.\* A foreign bill of exchange must be protested to hold the drawer or an indorser; but a check, unless drawn out of the state, in which case perhaps it would be regarded, not as a check, but as a foreign bill of exchange, need not be protested.

A check, however, is, as stated above, in the nature of an inland bill of exchange payable on demand, and is precisely like a bill of exchange in its incidents, except as above stated. Like a bill of exchange, it is a negotiable instrument, if negotiable in form, and it is subject to the same rules as regards its transfer. It may be transferred by indorsement, for instance, and the indorsement will impose upon the indorser the ordinary liabilities which flow from the

is payable on presentment, and not before.' *Bullard v. Randall*, 1 Gray, 605, 606." *MINOT v. RUSS*, 156 Mass. 458, 31 N. E. 489.

<sup>18</sup> Per Byles, J., in *KEENE v. BEARD*, supra. Post, p. 412; *Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank*, supra; *Lester v. Given*, 8 Bush (Ky.) 360; *In re Brown*, 2 Story, 502, Fed. Cas. No. 1,985.

<sup>19</sup> *Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank*, supra.

<sup>20</sup> *MORSE v. BANK*, Holmes, 209, Fed. Cas. No. 9,857; *Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank*, supra; *In re Brown*, supra.

<sup>21</sup> *MORSE v. BANK*, supra; *Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank*, supra; *In re Brown*, supra; *BOWEN v. NEWELL*, 8 N. Y. 190; *WOODRUFF v. BANK*, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 673.

<sup>22</sup> *MORSE v. BANK*, supra; *In re Brown*, supra.

\* *First Nat. Bank v. Whitman*, 94 U. S. 343, per Hunt, J.



indorsement of a bill of exchange or negotiable promissory note.<sup>23</sup> And it makes no difference that the check was payable to bearer, for, like a bill or note payable to bearer, though it is transferable by mere delivery, it may also be transferred by indorsement of the payee, or of any subsequent holder. In such a case the indorser incurs the same liabilities and obligations as the indorser of a check, bill, or note payable to order.<sup>24</sup>

A check, whether uncertified or certified, as will be presently explained, by the bank upon which it is drawn, passes to a bona fide purchaser or transferee for value free from all equities existing between the drawer and the payee or first holder of which the transferee had no notice, whether the check is payable to bearer and transferred by delivery merely or by indorsement and delivery, or is payable to order and is transferred by indorsement and delivery.<sup>25</sup> In the latter case indorsement is necessary to protect the holder.<sup>26</sup> The principles governing the transfer of checks are in this respect the same as those which govern the transfer of negotiable bills and notes. A check not being due until payment is demanded, it cannot, as a rule, until then be treated as overdue, and it may at any time be transferred to a bona fide holder; but it is held in most jurisdictions where the question has arisen that, if the check is "stale" when transferred, it is to be regarded in respect to its transfer like an overdue bill or note, so that the transferee will not be protected against equities.<sup>27</sup>

In *KEENE v. BEARD*,<sup>28</sup> where it was held that a check can pass by indorsement, and the indorser is liable as on an ordinary negotiable instrument, the holder of a check payable to the payee or

<sup>23</sup> This was held in *KEENE v. BEARD*, *supra*. The name written on the back of the check must be intended as an indorsement. There must be an *animo indorsandi*. *KEENE v. BEARD*, *supra*.

<sup>24</sup> *KEENE v. BEARD*, *supra*; Story, Prom. Notes, § 132.

<sup>25</sup> *WILLETS v. BANK*, 2 Duer (N. Y.) 121; *Whistler v. Forster*, 14 O. B. (N. S.) 248.

<sup>26</sup> *Whistler v. Forster*, *supra*. In this case it was held that while the bona fide indorsee, for value and without notice, of a check payable to order, is protected against equities between the drawer and the bank, a person to whom a check payable to order is transferred unindorsed is not so protected, as the transfer is a mere equitable assignment.

<sup>27</sup> This will be shown presently. Post, p. 417.

<sup>28</sup> 8 C. B. (N. S.) 372.

bearer, and indorsed and delivered by the payee to a third person, and by the latter to the present holder, sued the payee on his indorsement, and it was held that he was entitled to recover.<sup>29</sup> "The point urged" by counsel for the defendant, it was said by Erle, C. J., "was that a check is not to be classed with bills of exchange so far as to be capable of creating a liability in an indorser to the person who may be the holder or bearer of the instrument. I think he has failed to establish that proposition. A check is strongly analogous to a bill of exchange in many respects. It is drawn upon a banker; and, though in practice the banker does not accept the draft, he might, for aught I know, do so. A check has also some of the incidents of a bill of exchange, if not all; as, in respect of its passing by delivery,<sup>30</sup> and also in respect of a bona fide holder taking it for value having a better title than the person from whom he received it. Having these incidents of a bill of exchange, has it the further incident of being capable of passing by indorsement? that is, where the indorsement is made, not by merely placing the name of the party on the back of the instrument, but doing so with the intention of passing the title to it, and of incurring all the usual liabilities of an indorser of a negotiable instrument? It is admitted here that the defendant's name was placed upon the check *animo indorsandi*, and therefore our judgment for the plaintiff is in accordance with the real intention of the parties. The indorser intended to give the indorsee the security of his name and liability on the instrument. I also think our decision is in accordance with the law, when we hold that a check is a negotiable instrument, and capable of indorsement."

To be negotiable, a check must be in the form of a negotiable instrument. The rules governing bills of exchange in this respect apply equally to checks. Thus, if a check is payable, not absolutely, but on a contingency, it is not negotiable.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> The defendant in this case demurred on the ground that by indorsing the check he did not render himself liable to an action on the check at the suit of a third party, or bearer, upon the dishonor thereof.

<sup>30</sup> The court is here speaking of checks payable to bearer, or to A, or bearer, and not of checks payable to a person, or order.

<sup>31</sup> See *LITTLE v. BANK*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 425.

**PRESENTMENT AND NOTICE OF DISHONOR—EFFECT OF DELAY.**

152. The drawer of a check is not discharged from his obligation by unreasonable delay in presentment of the check for payment, or in giving him notice of dishonor, in case of presentment and dishonor, unless he has been actually prejudiced thereby; but if he has suffered a loss thereby, as by failure of the bank, he is discharged to the extent of his loss.

153. In determining what is a reasonable time, regard must be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade and of bankers, and the facts of the particular case. A check is to be deemed to have been presented within a reasonable time when presented according to the following rules:

- (a) If the person who receives it and the banker are in the same place, it must, in the absence of special circumstances, be presented during business hours of the next secular day after it is received.
- (b) If the person who receives it and the banker are in different places, it must, in the absence of special circumstances, be forwarded for presentment on the next secular day after it is received, and the agent to whom it is sent must present it during business hours of the next secular day after it is received by him.

154. STATUS OF "STALE" CHECK—If the delay in presenting a check is so unreasonable as to make the check "stale" (a year and a half, for instance, or perhaps five months, or even less), the bank will be put upon inquiry as to equities of the drawer, and will pay at its peril; and the check will perhaps be treated like an overdue bill, and cease to be negotiable.

As has been seen, delay in presenting a bill of exchange either for acceptance, or for payment after acceptance, will operate to discharge the drawer from his obligation. Checks, however, in this respect, stand on a very different footing. A check is not presentable at all for acceptance, but is presentable for payment only, though the bank, as we shall see, may accept it if it chooses and the holder so desires. And there is no fixed rule as to the time within which a check must be presented for payment. It is payable on demand, and demand may be made at any time within the period of the statute of limitations. Certain consequences may result, however, from delay in presenting a check, so that, while delay may not under ordinary circumstances affect the rights of the holder, it is always unsafe.\*

In no case will delay in presentment discharge the drawer from his obligation either on the check or on the original consideration, unless it can be shown that he was prejudiced thereby.\*\* When a man gives a check, he should see that he does not withdraw the

\* Indorsers stand on a different footing from the drawer; and, as in the case of bills of exchange, unless presentment be made, and notice given, within a reasonable time, they are discharged. *MERCHANTS' BANK v. SPICER*, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 445; *MURRAY v. JUDAH*, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 490; Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1587. See *Kirkpatrick v. Puryear*, 93 Tenn. 409, 24 S. W. 1130.

\*\* *SERLE v. NORTON*, 2 Moody & R. 401, and *ROBINSON v. HAWKS-FORD*, 9 Q. B. 52, among many other cases, sustain this proposition. In *Serle v. Norton*, a check dated March 19th was not presented until April 6th, when payment was refused. The holder sued the drawer, and the latter pleaded delay on presentment. No excuse for the delay was shown, but it did not appear that the bank had failed, or that the defendant was otherwise prejudiced. The plaintiff had a verdict. In *ROBINSON v. HAWKS-FORD*, a check drawn on June 13th was not presented for payment until June 28th, when payment was refused by direction of the drawer given on the 21st. The payee sued the drawer, who pleaded delay in presentment. It was held that the delay was immaterial, since no inconvenience resulted, and that the defendant was not discharged from his liability on the check, so as to leave the plaintiff to sue on the consideration for it. There are many cases to the same effect. See *BULL v. BANK*, 123 U. S. 105, 8 Sup. Ct. 62; *LITTLE v. BANK*, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 425, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 359; *Hoyt v. Seeley*, 18 Conn. 353; *Pack v. Thomas*, 13 Smedes & M. 11; *Purcell v. Allemong*, 22 Grat. (Va.) 739; *Howes v. Austin*, 35 Ill. 396; *Heartt v. Rhodes*, 66 Ill. 351; *Stevens v. Park*, 73 Ill. 387; *Henshaw v. Root*, 60 Ind. 220; *STEWART v. SMITH*, 17 Ohio St. 82; *Kinyon v. Stanton*, 44 Wis. 479.

money that is there to meet it. Allowing the money to remain there cannot prejudice him.

If the delay is unreasonable, and the drawer is prejudiced thereby, he will be discharged from his obligation, both on the check and on the original consideration, to the extent of his loss, but only to that extent.<sup>33</sup> Thus, if the holder of a check fails to present it within a reasonable time, and the bank becomes insolvent, so that the drawer loses the whole amount of the check which he had on deposit to meet it, the loss will fall on the holder, and the drawer will be entirely discharged. It would be unreasonable to permit the holder to allow the money to remain in the bank indefinitely at the risk of the drawer, who has no means of protecting himself. If the bank should pay the drawer 50 cents on the dollar, so that he would only lose half the amount of the check, he would only be discharged as to the other half. If he had no money at all in the bank, though the bank might have honored his check, he would not be discharged at all. In all cases there must be both unreasonable delay and prejudice. "When a loss has occurred by the check not being presented, it is necessary to inquire if there was any unreasonable delay. \* \* \* Under ordinary circumstances, the only rule is, that, if things have continued the same, and no damage has arisen from delay of presentment, the drawer continues liable."<sup>34</sup> It is in this sense only that the drawer is entitled to have his check presented within a reasonable time.

In no case will the drawer be discharged unless the delay was unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular case. If the bank on which a check is drawn should fail after issue of the check, and before presentment, there being no unreasonable delay in presenting it, the loss would fall on the drawer, and he would continue liable on the check, or on the original consideration. Though the question as to what is a reasonable time for presentation of a check must depend upon the circumstances, it may be laid down as a general rule, that under ordinary circumstances, and where the payee or holder is in the same place where the bank is located, the check must be presented during banking hours of the next secular day

<sup>33</sup> See the cases above cited. And see *Alexander v. Burchfield*, 7 Man. & G. 1061; Neg. Inst. L. § 322.

<sup>34</sup> Per Lord Denman, C. J., in *ROBINSON v. HAWKSFORD*, *supra*.

after the day on which it is received by him; any longer delay will be unreasonable, and at his peril.<sup>35</sup> If the bank is located at a distant place, the check must be mailed to that place for collection not later than during business hours of the next secular day after its receipt; and the person to whom it is sent must present it not later than during business hours of the next secular day after its receipt by him.<sup>36</sup> These rules apply under ordinary circumstances only. There may be circumstances under which a greater delay would not be regarded as unreasonable.<sup>37</sup>

In like manner, and for the same reason, contrary to the rule governing bills of exchange, the drawer of a check is not discharged by failure of the holder to give him notice of the dishonor of the check by the bank, unless he has been prejudiced thereby.<sup>38</sup> Notice should be given, however, within a reasonable time (ordinarily, not later than the next secular day after the bank refuses payment), so as to enable the drawer to take steps to protect himself. If such notice is not given, and the drawer is prejudiced, he will be discharged

<sup>35</sup> *Alexander v. Burchfield*, 7 Man. & G. 1061, 11 Law J. C. P. 253; *SMITH v. MILLER*, 43 N. Y. 171; *BICKFORD v. BANK*, 42 Ill. 238; *Farwell v. Curtis*, 7 Biss. 165, Fed. Cas. No. 4,690; *Hamilton v. Lumber Co.*, 95 Mich. 436, 54 N. W. 903; *GRANGE v. REIGH*, 93 Wis. 552, 67 N. W. 1130. If the day following the day the check is delivered is Sunday or a legal holiday, presentation on the next day is in time. *O'Brien v. Smith*, 1 Black, 99.

<sup>36</sup> *Hare v. Henty*, 30 Law J. C. P. 302; *Prideaux v. Criddle*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 455; *Heywood v. Pickering*, L. R. 9 Q. B. 428; *SMITH v. JANES*, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 192; *Northwestern Coal Co. v. Bowman*, 69 Iowa, 150, 28 N. W. 496. This rule does not apply where the payee deposits the check for collection in a bank in the same place where he resides and the drawee bank is located. In such a case the check must be presented on the next secular day after it was received by the payee. *SMITH v. MILLER*, 43 N. Y. 171; *Farwell v. Curtis*, 7 Biss. 165, Fed. Cas. No. 4,690. If time is lost by depositing in a bank which forwards in a roundabout way, this is unreasonable delay. *Moule v. Brown*, 4 Blng. N. C. 266; *Harvey v. Bank*, 119 Pa. St. 212, 13 Atl. 202; *First Nat. Bank v. Bank*, 80 Md. 475, 31 Atl. 302; *GREGG v. BEANE*, 69 Vt. 22, 37 Atl. 248; *GIFFORD v. HARDELL*, 88 Wis. 538, 60 N. W. 1064; *First Nat. Bank v. Miller*, 37 Neb. 500, 55 N. W. 1064; 43 Neb. 791, 62 N. W. 195. Cf. *HOLMES v. ROE*, 62 Mich. 199, 28 N. W. 864.

<sup>37</sup> See *Freiberg v. Cody*, 55 Mich. 108, 20 N. W. 813; *Cox v. Boone*, 8 W. Va. 500; *Firth v. Brooks*, 4 Law T. (N. S.) 467.

<sup>38</sup> *BULL v. BANK*, 123 U. S. 105, 8 Sup. Ct. 62; *Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank*, 10 Wall. 607; *Heartt v. Rhodes*, 66 Ill. 351; *Lester v. Given*, 8 Bush (Ky.) 360; *STEWART v. SMITH*, 17 Ohio St. 85.

*pro tanto*. The notice of dishonor need not be in any particular form. It may be oral as well as written. All that is required is that the fact of dishonor shall be made known to the drawer.<sup>39</sup>

It is not necessary, in the absence of a statute, that a check shall be protested on refusal of the drawee to pay it, in order to hold the drawer thereon; but it is safer to adopt this course, for the notary's certificate will be *prima facie* proof of presentment and dishonor.<sup>40</sup> Protest, however, is not necessary. Parol evidence of presentment and refusal is sufficient.<sup>41</sup>

The circumstances which will excuse the holder of a check for failure to present it in accordance with the rules above stated are, with few exceptions, the same as those which will excuse the failure to present a bill of exchange. The valid excuses, which "are mostly based upon the old adage of the civil law, '*Impossibilium nulla obligatio est*,'" are thus stated by Mr. Van Schaack:<sup>42</sup> (1) Where the drawer had not sufficient funds in the bank when it was reasonable to suppose the check would be presented; (2) where he withdrew his funds before presentment; (3) removal of the drawee bank; (4) inevitable accident or overwhelming calamity; (5) the presence of political circumstances amounting to a virtual interruption and obstruction of the ordinary negotiations of trade; (6) the breaking out of war between the country of the maker and that of the holder; (7) occupation of the country where the parties lived, or where the check was payable, by a public enemy, and suspension of commercial intercourse; (8) sudden illness or death of the holder or his agent; (9) general prevalence of a malignant disease, such as yellow fever or cholera, to such an extent as to stop all trade in the place; (10) impossibility of reaching the bank, by reason of snow, freshets, or overwhelming accidents; (11) when it was known

<sup>39</sup> *Williams v. Bank of U. S.*, 2 Pet. 96; *MILLS v. BANK*, 11 Wheat. 431; *Bank of Alexandria v. Swann*, 9 Pet. 33; *Bowling v. Harrison*, 6 How. 248. Immaterial mistakes will not render the notice ineffectual. *MILLS v. BANK*, *supra*; *DENNISTOUN v. STEWART*, 17 How. 606.

<sup>40</sup> *TOWNSLEY v. SUMRALL*, 2 Pet. 170.

<sup>41</sup> *Buckner v. Finley*, 2 Pet. 589; *BURKE v. McKAY*, 2 How. 66; *Mechanics' & Traders' Ins. Co. v. Coons*, 36 La. Ann. 271; *Bowling v. Harrison*, 6 How. 248; *Williams v. Bank of U. S.*, 2 Pet. 96; *Moses v. Franklin Bank*, 34 Md. 574; *Norris v. Despard*, 38 Md. 491; *HARKER v. ANDERSON*, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 372; *Young v. Bryan*, 6 Wheat. 146; *Union Bank v. Hyde*, *Id.* 572.

<sup>42</sup> Van Schaack, *Bank Checks*, 53, 54. And see *BLAIR v. WILSON*, 28



that the check could not be paid by the bank, as because of its bankruptcy and suspension, or a public and notorious injunction issued against it.<sup>43</sup> Notice of the existence of these circumstances should be given the drawer, if unknown to him, as soon as possible and practicable, or the excuse will not avail.<sup>44</sup>

*Status of a "Stale" Check.*

While, as we have just seen, the drawer of a check is not discharged by unreasonable delay of the holder in presenting it for payment, unless prejudice can be shown to have resulted, it is always unsafe to delay presentation, not only because loss may thus discharge the drawer or indorser, but for the further reason that a "stale" check is rightly looked upon with suspicion, for checks are not supposed to remain long in circulation. The fact, therefore, that a check is stale when presented for payment has been held sufficient to put the bank upon inquiry, so that, if it pays such a check without inquiry, it will be held to have done so at its peril in case the check is for any reason invalid as against the maker.<sup>45</sup> It has also been held that the staleness of a check is sufficient to put a purchaser of it upon inquiry as to equities that may exist between the drawer and the payee.<sup>46</sup> No certain rule has been laid down for determining when a check is to be regarded as stale, nor can any rule be gathered from the decided cases. It seems that a check is not stale if it is only a few days, or even a month, old;<sup>47</sup> but a check has been held stale when it was a year and a half old,<sup>48</sup> and even where it was five months old.<sup>49</sup>

Grat. (Va.) 165, 172; *Bell v. Alexander*, 21 Grat. 1, 6; *Fletcher v. Pierson*, 69 Ind. 281; *Lovett v. Cornwell*, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 369; *Rhett v. Poe*, 2 How. 457.

<sup>43</sup> Van Schaack, *Bank Checks*, 53-55; *Lovett v. Cornwell*, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 369; ante, p. 394, where excuses for nonpresentment of bills of exchange are shown.

<sup>44</sup> See *Purcell v. Allemong*, 22 Grat. (Va.) 739.

<sup>45</sup> *Daniel*, Neg. Inst. (3d Ed.) § 1632; *Lancaster Bank v. Woodward*, 18 Pa. St. 357.

<sup>46</sup> *FIRST NAT. BANK v. NEEDHAM*, 29 Iowa, 249; *Skillman v. Titus*, 32 N. J. Law, 96.

<sup>47</sup> *Lester v. Given*, 8 Bush (Ky.) 357; *AMES v. MERIAM*, 98 Mass. 294; *First Nat. Bank v. Harris*, 108 Mass. 514; *London & C. Bank v. Groome*, 8 Q. B. Div. 288; *Estes v. Shoe Co.*, 59 Minn. 504, 61 N. W. 674.

<sup>48</sup> *Lancaster Bank v. Woodward*, 18 Pa. St. 357.

<sup>49</sup> *FIRST NAT. BANK v. NEEDHAM*, 29 Iowa, 249. Contra, *BULL v. BANK*, 123 U. S. 105, 8 Sup. Ct. 62; *Serrell v. Railway*, 9 C. B. 811 (2 months).

**RIGHTS OF HOLDER AGAINST BANK.**

155. By the weight of authority, though there are decisions to the contrary, which are controlling in the particular jurisdictions, the holder of a check has no right of action against the bank on which it is drawn for refusal to pay it, unless the bank has assumed an obligation to him by certifying or accepting it; his only remedy in such a case being against the drawer, and against the indorsers, if there are any.

It would seem that there is no privity of contract between the payee or holder of a check and the bank upon which it is drawn, and, therefore, that the payee or holder cannot maintain an action at law against the bank on its refusal to honor the check, unless the bank has expressly, or by its conduct, assumed an obligation to him; but there is upon this question a direct conflict in the authorities. Some of the courts have held that the check is an equitable assignment of the amount in the hands of the banker to the payee or holder, and that there is an implied contract between the bank and the holder, so as to render the bank liable to the latter on its refusal to pay the check.<sup>50</sup> By the weight of authority, however, and, it would seem, on principle, there is no assignment, nor privity of contract, and the bank is not liable to the holder of an uncertified and unaccepted check, either at law or in equity. His remedy is against the drawer, and to the drawer only is the bank liable if its refusal to pay was a breach of its contract. In an English case it was held that the holder of an uncertified check could not maintain an action at law against the bank under a statute allowing the assignee of a chose in action to sue thereon in

<sup>50</sup> *Fogarties v. State Bank*, 12 Rich. Law (S. C.) 518; *Roberts v. Corbin*, 26 Iowa, 315; *Munn v. Burch*, 25 Ill. 35; *Fourth Nat. Bank of Chicago v. City Nat. Bank of Grand Rapids*, 68 Ill. 398; *Union Nat. Bank v. Oceana Co. Bank*, 80 Ill. 212; *National Bank of America v. Indiana Banking Co.*, 114 Ill. 483, 2 N. E. 401; *Lester v. Given*, 8 Bush (Ky.) 357; *Weinstock v. Bellwood*, 12 Bush (Ky.) 139; *McGrade v. German Sav. Inst.*, 4 Mo. App. 330; *Zeller v. German Sav. Inst.*, Id. 401; *Senter v. Continental Bank*, 7 Mo. App. 532.

his own name at law. "The bank," it was said, "has made a contract with the drawer that they will honor his checks to the amount of his account. They break that contract. How can that give a right of action to a third person? The check is but an order to pay, and not an absolute assignment of anything."<sup>51</sup> In *Hopkinson v. Forster*<sup>52</sup> it was held that the bank is not liable to the holder in equity. "A check is clearly not an assignment of money in the hands of a banker; it is a bill of exchange payable at a banker's. The banker is bound by his contract with his customer to honor the check, when he has sufficient assets in his hands. If he does not fulfill his contract, he is liable to an action by the drawer, in which heavy damages may be recovered if the drawer's credit has been injured. I do not understand the expressions attributed to Mr. Justice Byles in the case of *Keene v. Beard*, but I am quite sure that learned judge never meant to lay down that a banker who dishonors a check is liable to a suit in equity by the holder."<sup>54</sup>

#### CERTIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE OF CHECKS.

**156.** By certifying a check to be good, the bank assumes an unconditional obligation to the holder presenting it, and to every subsequent holder, to pay it on demand; and

<sup>51</sup> *Schroeder v. Central Bank*, 34 Law T. (N. S.) 735, per Brett, J. And see *Gibson v. Cooke*, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 15; *Bullard v. Randall*, 1 Gray (Mass.) 605; *Dana v. Boston Third Nat. Bank*, 13 Allen (Mass.) 448; *National Bank v. Millard*, 10 Wall. 152; *First Nat. Bank v. Whitman*, 94 U. S. 343; *Chapman v. White*, 6 N. Y. 412; *Aetna Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bank*, 46 N. Y. 82; *Tyler v. Gould*, 48 N. Y. 682; *ATTORNEY GENERAL v. CONTINENTAL LIFE INS. CO.*, 71 N. Y. 325; *SECOND NAT. BANK v. WILLIAMS*, 13 Mich. 282; *Creveling v. Bloomsbury Nat. Bank*, 46 N. J. Law, 255; *Loyd v. McCaffrey*, 46 Pa. St. 410; *First Nat. Bank v. Gish*, 72 Pa. St. 13; *Moses v. Franklin Bank*, 34 Md. 574; *National Commercial Bank v. Miller*, 77 Ala. 168; *St. John v. Homans*, 8 Mo. 383; *Case v. Henderson*, 23 La. Ann. 49; *Colorado Nat. Bank v. Boettcher*, 5 Colo. 185; *Northern Trust Co. v. Rogers*, 60 Minn. 208, 62 N. W. 273. Such is the provision of Neg. Inst. L. § 325. But, if the parties so agree, the transaction will have the effect of an equitable assignment. *Fourth St. Nat. Bank v. Yardley*, 165 U. S. 634, 17 Sup. Ct. 439.

<sup>52</sup> L. R. 19 Eq. 74.

<sup>54</sup> *Hopkinson v. Forster*, L. R. 19 Eq. 74.

this obligation may be enforced by the holder against the bank. And a delay in presentment will not discharge the obligation.

157. The certification of a check at the instance of the holder discharges the drawer and indorsers from liability, but the drawer is not discharged where he himself has it certified, and puts it in circulation. The drawer will also be discharged if the holder takes the parol acceptance of the bank instead of payment.

158. Where the drawer of a check has no funds in a bank and the bank verbally promises the holder to honor the check, this, it has been held (though there are decisions apparently to the contrary), is a mere parol promise to answer for the debt of another, within the statute of frauds, and cannot be enforced. But such a promise where the bank has funds of the drawer, whether express or implied, is clearly binding as a promise to pay its own debt.

159. Where a bank pays a check to a holder under an unauthorized indorsement, and charges the amount to the account of the drawer, it is liable for the amount of the check to the true holder on demand. The action, it would seem, should be brought, not on the check, but on the promise implied in law from its receipt of the money from the drawer for the true holder's use.

#### *Certified Checks—Liability of Bank.*

A certified check is a check which the bank on which it is drawn has certified to be good, for the purpose of assuring the holders of it that it will be paid when presented. No particular form of words is necessary. All that is required is that it shall clearly appear that a certification is intended. A bank, by certifying a check as good, estops itself, as against a bona fide holder, to deny that it was valid as a draft upon the funds of the drawer, and would not, for instance, be allowed to say that it was made payable to no

one, and therefore void, for it would be held payable to bearer;<sup>55</sup> nor would it be allowed to dispute the genuineness of the drawer's signature, as against a bona fide holder,<sup>56</sup> or the sufficiency of funds in its hands to pay it.<sup>57</sup> In reason it would seem that the certification of a check is, as regards a bona fide holder, an absolute promise that the check will be paid on demand.\* It has been held in New York, however, that the certification only estops the bank from denying that the signature is genuine, and that there are sufficient funds, leaving it free to dispute the genuineness of the body of the check as to the amount or as to the payee.<sup>58</sup> If the officer or employé of a bank, whose regular duty it is to certify the checks drawn upon it, certifies a check in excess of his authority, the certification will nevertheless bind the bank as against a bona fide holder of the check. This, however, is a question of the law of agency.<sup>59</sup>

The effect of the certification of a check by the bank upon which it is drawn is not merely a declaration of the fact that the maker has sufficient funds to his credit to pay it; but it is more. It creates a new and binding obligation on the part of the bank. It is an appropriation of the funds of the drawer, to the amount of the check, to its payment, and an unconditional promise by the bank to make the payment on demand. This promise the bank impliedly makes to every subsequent holder of the check, and it may be enforced by him in an action against the bank.<sup>60</sup> In this

<sup>55</sup> WILLETS v. BANK, 2 Duer (N. Y.) 121.

<sup>56</sup> Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, 16 N. Y. 125; Commercial & Farmers' Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 30 Md. 11.

<sup>57</sup> ESPY v. BANK, 18 Wall. 621.

\* LOUISIANA NAT. BANK v. CITIZENS' BANK, 1 Ames, Cases, 601, 28 La. Ann. 189.

<sup>58</sup> MARINE NAT. BANK v. NATIONAL CITY BANK, 59 N. Y. 67.

<sup>59</sup> Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, 14 N. Y. 623, 16 N. Y. 125; Meads v. Merchants' Bank, 25 N. Y. 143; Cooke v. State Nat. Bank, 52 N. Y. 106; MERCHANTS' BANK v. STATE BANK, 10 Wall. 604. It is otherwise if the officer or employé has no authority to certify checks. Pope v. Bank of Albion, 57 N. Y. 126; Mussey v. Eagle Bank, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 306.

<sup>60</sup> This was held in WILLETS v. BANK, 2 Duer (N. Y.) 121, and many other cases may be cited to the same effect. See National Commercial Bank v. Miller, 77 Ala. 168; Florence Mln. Co. v. Brown, 124 U. S. 385, 8 Sup. Ct. 531; Laclede Bank v. Schuler, 120 U. S. 511, 7 Sup. Ct. 644; MERCHANTS' NAT. BANK v. STATE NAT. BANK, 10 Wall. 604; Farmers' & M. Bank v. Butchers'

respect, as we have seen, an uncertified check is on a different footing.

Delay in presenting a certified check does not discharge the bank from its obligation. "The obligation of the bank is simple and unconditional to pay upon demand; and in all such cases the demand may be made whenever it suits the convenience of the party entitled to the stipulated payment. When the business of a bank is properly conducted, it is not possible that it can sustain any loss or prejudice from this interpretation of its contract,—the contract which it makes in certifying a check; and it is only where delay may be prejudicial that the want of due diligence may be legally imputed; and operate as a bar to a claim otherwise valid.

• • • There is in reality, in good sense, no distinction, in the nature of the liability created, between a certified check and a note of the bank payable on demand. Each is intended to circulate as money, each is an absolute promise to pay a specific sum upon demand, and laches in making the demand is no more imputable in the one case than in the other. The only difference between them is that the promise which in the note is expressed in the check is implied."<sup>61</sup>

*Discharge of Drawer and Indorsers by Certification or Acceptance of Check.*

The certification of a check at the instance of the holder operates as a discharge of the drawer from his liability, the holder's only remedy thereafter being against the bank; and in like manner it will operate as a discharge of prior indorsers, who, as to the holder, occupy the same position as the drawer. It is otherwise, however, if the drawer himself has a check certified and puts it in circulation. In such a case he remains also liable, unless there is some agreement to the contrary. That certification at the instance of the holder discharges the drawer was held in *FIRST NAT. BANK v. LEACH*.<sup>62</sup> The theory of the law, it was there explained, is that,

& D. Bank, 14 N. Y. 623, 16 N. Y. 125; *Girard Bank v. Bank of Penn Tp.*, 39 Pa. St. 92; *Meads v. Merchants' Bank*, 25 N. Y. 143; *Andrews v. German Nat. Bank*, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 211; *Mussey v. Eagle Bank*, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 306. See *Neg. Inst. L.* § 323.

<sup>61</sup> *WILLETS v. BANK*, 2 Duer (N. Y.) 121. And see the cases above cited.

<sup>62</sup> 52 N. Y. 350. To the same effect, see *Metropolitan Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Jones*, 137 Ill. 634, 27 N. E. 533; *CONTINENTAL NAT. BANK v. M.*

where a check is certified to be good by the bank upon which it is drawn, the amount thereof is then charged to the account of the drawer. Every well-regulated bank adopts this practice to protect itself, and the reason therefor is so strong that the law presumes it is adopted by the banks. It follows that after a check is certified the drawer of the check cannot draw out the funds in the bank necessary to meet the certified check. The money is no longer his. If he apprehended danger from the suspected failure of the bank, he could not draw out that money, because it has already been appropriated by means of the check thus certified. As to him, it is precisely as if the bank had paid the money on the check, instead of certifying it. This, it is true, applies also to the acceptance of a time bill of exchange before it is due. When the drawee accepts, it is an appropriation of the funds pro tanto for the service and use of the payee or holder of the bill, so that the money ceases henceforth to be the money of the drawer, and becomes that of the payee or holder in the hands of the acceptor. Yet the acceptance of a time bill of exchange before due does not discharge the drawer. Its only effect is to make the acceptor the primary party to pay it. The parties to a certified check, however, due when certified, occupy a different position. There the money is due and payable when the check is certified, and the holder of the check, instead of taking it when he may, leaves it with the bank, and instead takes the bank's certificate that it is good, and its promise to pay it on demand. The law will not permit a check, when due, to be thus presented, and the money to be left with the bank for the accommodation of the holder, thus changing the position and increasing the risk of the drawer, without discharging him. If the holder, therefore, chooses to have the check certified instead of paid, he discharges the drawer, and his only remedy is against the bank.<sup>68</sup>

CORNHAUSER & CO., 37 Ill. App. 475; BORN v. BANK, 123 Ind. 78, 24 N. E. 173; Essex Co. Nat. Bank v. Bank of Montreal, 7 Bliss 193, Fed. Cas. No. 4,532; First Nat. Bank of Washington v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343, 345; National Commercial Bank v. Miller, 77 Ala. 168. See Neg. Inst. L. § 324.

<sup>68</sup> FIRST NAT. BANK OF JERSEY CITY v. LEACH, 52 N. Y. 350; Freund v. Importers' & T. Nat. Bank, 76 N. Y. 352; MINOT v. RUSS, 156 Mass. 458, 31 N. E. 489; Rounds v. Smith, 42 Ill. 245; BROWN v. LECKIE, 43 Ill. 497; Andrews v. Bank, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 211; LARSEN v. BREENE, 12 Colo. 480, 21 Pac. 498; Mutual Nat. Bank v. Rotge, 28 La. Ann. 933. Nor is an in-



The rule does not apply where the drawer himself causes the check to be certified, and then puts it in circulation. In such a case the reason for the rule does not apply, and he also remains liable.<sup>64</sup>

The same is true where the holder of a check takes the parol acceptance of the bank instead of payment. If the payee or holder of a check presents the check, and the bank offers to pay it, he cannot, instead of taking the money, leave it with the bank, without doing so at his own risk. If the bank fails, the drawer is discharged, and it makes no difference that the check was presented on the same day it was received, and the bank suspended soon afterwards, and refused payment, when the check was again presented on the same day. He might, it is true, have waited until the next day to present the check, without being chargeable with laches, but having presented it earlier, and having refused to receive payment when offered, he cannot hold the drawer.<sup>65</sup>

*Verbal Acceptance or Promise by Bank to Pay Check.*

A bank may render itself liable to the holder of a check otherwise than by a certification of it. It may under some circumstances render itself liable by a verbal acceptance, and a promise, express or implied from acceptance, to pay it; and under some circumstances an acceptance and promise may be implied from its conduct. If the drawer of a check has no funds in the bank, and the bank verbally promises the holder to honor the check, it would seem clear that this is a mere parol promise to answer for the debt of the drawer,

drawer discharged where he himself procures a check to be certified, and then transfers it. *Mutual Nat. Bank v. Rotge*, supra.

<sup>64</sup> *FIRST NAT. BANK OF JERSEY CITY v. LEACH*, supra; *MINOT v. RUSS*, supra. "When a check payable to another person than the drawer is presented by the drawer to the bank for certification, the bank knows that it has not been negotiated, and that it is not presented for payment, but that the drawer wishes the obligation of the bank to pay it to the holder when it is negotiated, in addition to his own obligation. But, when the payee or holder of a check presents it for certification, the bank knows that this is done for the convenience or security of the holder. The holder could demand payment if he chose, and it is only because, instead of payment, the holder desires certification, that the bank certifies the check instead of paying it. In one case the bank certifies the check for the use or convenience of the drawer, and in the other for the use or convenience of the holder." *MINOT v. RUSS*, supra.

<sup>65</sup> *Simpson v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.*, 44 Cal. 139.

and, under the section of the statute of frauds requiring a promise to answer for the debt of another to be in writing, not enforceable against the bank. In *MORSE v. MASSACHUSETTS NAT. BANK*,<sup>66</sup> a bank in which the drawer of checks upon it had no funds had verbally promised the holder to pay the checks, if deposited in some other bank, and presented through the clearing house. It was held that this was a mere parol promise to pay another's debt, within the statute of frauds, and that the holder, therefore, acquired no right against the bank. And it was held that the reasons for holding good a parol accommodation acceptance of a bill of exchange do not apply to the case of a bank check. There are cases, however, apparently sustaining the proposition that parol acceptances of checks by the bank may be enforced without regard to whether the bank has funds of the drawer.

If the bank has funds of the drawer, and verbally accepts the check, and promises the holder, expressly or impliedly, by such acceptance, to pay it, the leaving of the funds with the bank instead of withdrawing them is a sufficient consideration to support the promise; and the promise, being to pay the promisor's (the bank's) own debt (that is, the debt it owes to the drawer), is not within the statute of frauds. The holder can therefore maintain an action against the bank on such a promise.<sup>67</sup>

A bank is entitled to a reasonable time in which to ascertain whether the drawer's signature is genuine, and whether he has sufficient funds to meet the check, and its retention of the check for such a time cannot be construed as an acceptance of the check and promise to pay it.<sup>68</sup> But if it retains a check for an unreasonable time, it runs the risk of being held to have impliedly accepted the check so as to become liable to the holder to pay it.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>66</sup> 1 Holmes, 209, Fed. Cas. No. 9,857.

<sup>67</sup> See the cases hereafter cited. *ESPY v. BANK*, 18 Wall. 621; *MASON v. DOUSAY*, 35 Ill. 424; *BANK OF RUTLAND v. WOODRUFF*, 34 Vt. 89.

<sup>68</sup> *Boyd v. Emmerson*, 2 Adol. & E. 184; *Overman v. Hoboken City Bank*, 31 N. J. Law, 563.

<sup>69</sup> *First Nat. Bank v. McMichael*, 106 Pa. St. 460. In New York it has been held that a bank is bound to know the state of its depositor's account immediately upon presentation of his check. *Oddie v. National City Bank*, 45 N. Y. 786.

*Payment on Unauthorized Indorsement.*

Where a bank pays a check to a holder under an unauthorized indorsement, and charges the check to the account of the drawer, it has been held, though there is a decision to the contrary,<sup>70</sup> that it is liable for the amount of the check to the true holder on demand.

The action, however, it is submitted, should properly be brought, not on the check, but for money had and received,—that is, on the promise implied in law from the receipt by the bank of the amount of the check from the drawer for the use of the true holder. In *BANK OF THE REPUBLIC v. MILLARD*,<sup>71</sup> where the court held that the true holder of a check paid to another under a forged indorsement cannot sue the bank for refusing payment to him, in the absence of proof that it was accepted by the bank or charged against the drawer, it was said: "It may be, if it could be shown that the bank had charged the check on its books against the drawer, and settled with him on that basis, that the plaintiff could recover on the count for money had and received, on the ground that the rule *ex æquo et bono* would be applicable, as the bank, having assented to the order, and communicated its assent to the drawer, would be considered as holding the money thus appropriated for the plaintiff's use, and therefore under an implied promise to him to pay it on demand." In *SEVENTH NAT. BANK v. COOK*,<sup>72</sup> the supreme court of Pennsylvania, purporting to apply the principle above stated, held that the payment of a check to the holder under an unauthorized indorsement, the check being charged to the account of the maker, amounts to an acceptance, and binds the bank to pay the true holder on presentment. It was said in this case that "it is, in fact, an acceptance, and binds the bank as a certified check does. It is tantamount to an acceptance of a draft." It does not seem right to base this decision on the ground that the check is accepted or certified by the bank, though the court seems to have done so, losing sight, it seems, of the principle stated in *BANK OF THE REPUBLIC v. MILLARD*, upon which it relied. There was in fact no certification of the check, nor any acceptance of it by the bank on presentment

<sup>70</sup> *First Nat. Bank v. Whitman*, 94 U. S. 343.

<sup>71</sup> 10 Wall. 152.

<sup>72</sup> 73 Pa. St. 483. See, also, *DODGE v. BANK*, 20 Ohio St. 234, 30 Ohio St. 1; *Vanbibber v. Louisiana Bank*, 14 La. Ann. 481.

which could be construed as a promise in fact to the true holder to pay the check. The action should not be on the theory that the bank has certified the check, but should be on the theory that, having retained the money in settling with the drawer of the check, it holds the same for the use of the true holder of the check, the action being on the promise created by law for money had and received.

#### FAILURE OF BANK TO HONOR CHECK.

**160. A bank having funds of a depositor is bound to honor his checks to the amount of those funds, and, for a failure to do so, is liable for damages. The bank, however, must have had a reasonable time since the deposit in which to make proper entries on its books so as to show the amount to the depositor's credit.**

When a bank receives funds on deposit it impliedly contracts with the depositor that it will pay checks drawn by him to the amount of the deposit, and a failure to honor his check when there are sufficient funds to his credit is not only a breach of contract, but a tort as well, entitling the depositor to recover any damage he may have sustained, and to recover nominal damages, at least, if no actual damage has been sustained.<sup>73</sup> Of course, the check must be drawn properly, so as to raise a duty on the part of the bank to pay it.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>73</sup> It was so held in *MARZETTI v. WILLIAMS*, 1 Barn. & Adol. 415. And see *Rolin v. Steward*, 14 Cl. B. 505; *Whitaker v. Bank of England*, 1 Crompt., M. & R. 744; *Patterson v. Marine Nat. Bank*, 130 Pa. St. 419, 18 Atl. 632; *Gray v. Johnston*, L. R. 3 H. L. 1; *National Mahaiwe Bank v. Peck*, 127 Mass. 298. The rule also applies to notes and acceptances of a depositor made payable at the bank. *Whitaker v. Bank of England*, 1 Crompt., M. & R. 744; *ROBARTS v. TUCKER*, 16 Q. B. 560. It is not necessary to allege and prove special damages, at least if the form of action be tort, but the plaintiff may recover general compensatory damages. *Schaffner v. Ehrman*, 139 Ill. 109, 28 N. E. 917; *Bank of Commerce v. Goos*, 39 Neb. 437, 58 N. W. 84; *Patterson v. Bank*, 130 Pa. St. 419, 18 Atl. 632; *ATLANTA NAT. BANK v. DAVIS*, 96 Ga. 334, 23 S. E. 190; *Svensen v. Bank*, 64 Minn. 40, 65 N. W. 1086.

<sup>74</sup> A bank is not bound to honor a check drawn on one of its branches by a depositor in another branch. *Woodland v. Fear*, 7 El. & Bl. 519; *Gray v. Johnston*, L. R. 3 H. L. 1.

To render a bank liable for failure to honor a check, the depositor must have had a right to draw the money. A bank may refuse to honor a check if there are not sufficient funds to the credit of the depositor, after offsetting a balance of account due from him to the bank.<sup>75</sup> And there must be a sufficient balance to pay the check in full, for the bank cannot be required to make a part payment. The duty and authority of a bank to pay a check drawn on it by a depositor are determined by countermand of payment,<sup>76</sup> or by notice of the drawer's death.<sup>77</sup>

It is only reasonable that, after a deposit is made, the bank should be allowed a reasonable time in which to enter the credit on its books, so that the clerk whose duty it is to pay checks may know the amount to the drawer's credit. If a deposit were made with one clerk, and a check immediately presented to another, before he could have time to know of the deposit, the bank would not be liable for failure to honor the check. But if a reasonable time has elapsed between the deposit and presentation of the check the bank will be liable, notwithstanding the fact that the credit was not entered, for it must keep proper books, and conduct its business in a proper manner.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>75</sup> *Garnett v. McKewan*, L. R. 8 Exch. 10; *Schuler v. Israel Bank*, 120 U. S. 506, 7 Sup. Ct. 648. This applies where the balance against the depositor is at another branch of the bank. *Garnett v. McKewan*, *supra*.

<sup>76</sup> See *COHEN v. HALE*, 3 Q. B. Div. 371; *McLean v. Clydesdale Banking Co.*, 9 App. Cas. 95.

<sup>77</sup> *Rogerson v. Ladbroke*, 1 Bing. 93. Such is the provision of the English Bills of Exchange Act (section 75). It is said that the Negotiable Instruments Law in its original draft contained the following: "The death of the drawer does not operate as a revocation of the authority of the bank to pay a check if the check is presented for payment within ten days from the date thereof;" but that this was struck out of the final draft. The proposed provision was taken from Pub. St. Mass. Supp. 1888, c. 210. See Huffcut, *Neg. Inst.* 80. Mr. Daniel maintains that the idea that death operates as a revocation is a total misconception of the law. Daniel, *Neg. Inst.* § 1618b.

<sup>78</sup> This was in effect held in *MARZETTI v. WILLIAMS*, *supra*. In that case a depositor on the 17th of the month, when he had £69 to his credit in a bank, drew a check of that date for £87. At 11 o'clock on the 19th a deposit of £40 was made. At 3 o'clock on the 19th the check was presented and payment refused. The judge held that a bank who received a sum of money belonging to his customer became his debtor the moment he received

it, and was bound to pay a check drawn by such customer after the lapse of a such a reasonable time as would afford an opportunity to the different persons in his establishment of knowing the fact of the receipt of such money, and directed the jury to find against the banker if they were of opinion that such a reasonable time had intervened between the receipt of the money at 11 o'clock and the presentment of the check at 3. The court said that it could not be expected if a sum of money was paid to a clerk in a large banking office, and immediately afterwards a check presented to another clerk in a different part of the office, that the latter should be immediately acquainted with the fact of the deposit, but a reasonable time should be allowed for that purpose, and he told the jury that they should consider whether the banker ought or ought not, between 11 and 3 o'clock, to have had in some book an entry of deposit which would have informed all the clerks of the state of the account. The jury found against the bank, and the verdict was sustained. See, also, *Whitaker v. Bank of England*, *supra*.

•





# APPENDIX.

---

## THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.

---

Following the example of Great Britain, which in 1882 enacted the Bills of Exchange Act,<sup>1</sup> many of the states of the Union have enacted the so-called Negotiable Instruments Law. The English act was based upon the Digest of Judge Chalmers, and is for the most part a codification of the law relating to bills, notes, and checks. The history of the American act is as follows: In 1895 in many of the states were passed acts providing for the appointment of "Commissioners for the Promotion of Uniformity of Legislation in the United States"; and at a conference of commissioners from nineteen states, held in that year, was adopted a resolution requesting the committee on commercial laws to procure a draft of a bill relating to commercial paper, based on the English statute, and on such other sources of information as the committee might deem proper to consult. The committee appointed a sub-committee, which employed Mr. John J. Crawford, of New York City, to make a draft. Upon the completion of the draft by Mr. Crawford, it was revised by the sub-committee, and was then submitted to a conference of the commissioners, which included representatives of fourteen states; and, with certain amendments, was adopted by the commissioners. The final draft, with slight changes in some states, has already become law in fifteen states and in the District of Columbia. The law is in the main declaratory in its effect, but makes a few changes, and necessarily changes the law in some jurisdictions on points concerning which a conflict of laws has existed.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61. See Introduction to Chalm. Dig. Bills Exch. (3d Ed.). The act is found in the Digest, and also in Rand. Com. Paper, p. 2737, and in Huffcut, Neg. Inst. p. 87.

<sup>2</sup> See preface to Crawford's Annotated Negotiable Instruments Law; Huffcut, Neg. Inst. pp. 117-127. Few cases involving the construction of the Negotiable Instruments Law have as yet arisen. On this point consult Chalm. Dig. Bills Exch., Preface, supra; *BANK OF ENGLAND v. VAGLIANO*, [1891] App. Cas. 107, 144, per Lord Herschell; *LEWIS v. CLAY*, 42 Sol. J. 151, per Lord Russell. Both cases are found in Prof. Huffcut's valuable book, which should be consulted by the student of the American law. See, also, *Brewster v. Shrader*, 57 N. Y. Supp. 606, 26 Misc. Rep. 480.

# THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.

(AS ADOPTED IN NEW YORK.)

---

[This act has been adopted, with the changes indicated in the notes, in Colorado, Laws 1897, c. 64; Connecticut, Laws 1897, c. 74; District of Columbia, Laws 1899 (U. S.) c. 47; Florida, Laws 1897, c. 4524; Maryland, Laws 1898, c. 119; Massachusetts, Laws 1898, c. 533; New York, Laws 1897, c. 612, as amended by Laws 1898, c. 336; North Carolina, Laws 1899, c. 733; North Dakota, Laws 1899, c. 113; Oregon, Laws 1899, p. 18; Rhode Island, Laws 1899, c. 674; Tennessee, Laws 1899, c. 94; Utah, Laws 1899, c. 83; Virginia, Laws 1898, c. 866; Washington, Laws 1899, c. 149; and Wisconsin, Laws 1899, c. 356. The text of the law as printed here is that of the New York act, such modifications and additions as have been made by other states being indicated in the notes following the sections.]

[The section numbers in parentheses, except under article 1, are those of Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Massachusetts, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. The section numbers in parentheses under article 1 are those of Colorado, Massachusetts, North Carolina, North Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. The section numbers in the other states are indicated in the footnotes.]

## THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.

- Article I. General Provisions. (§§ 1-7.)**
  - II. Form and Interpretation of Negotiable Instruments. (§§ 20-42.)**
  - III. Consideration. (§§ 50-55.)**
  - IV. Negotiation. (§§ 60-80.)**
  - V. Rights of Holder. (§§ 90-98.)**
  - VI. Liabilities of Parties. (§§ 110-119.)**
  - VII. Presentment for Payment. (§§ 130-148.)**
  - VIII. Notice of Dishonor. (§§ 160-189.)**
  - IX. Discharge of Negotiable Instruments. (§§ 200-206.)**
  - X. Bills of Exchange—Form and Interpretation. (§§ 210-215.)**
  - XI. Acceptance. (§§ 220-230.)**
  - XII. Presentment for Acceptance. (§§ 240-248.)**
  - XIII. Protest. (§§ 260-268.)**
  - XIV. Acceptance for Honor. (§§ 280-289.)**
  - XV. Payment for Honor. (§§ 300-306.)**
  - XVI. Bills in a Set. (§§ 310-315.)**
  - XVII. Promissory Notes and Checks. (§§ 320-325.)**
  - XVIII. Notes Given for a Patent Right and for a Speculative Consideration. (§§ 330-332.)**
  - XIX. Laws Repealed, When to Take Effect. (§§ 340, 341.)** [These sections vary in the different states which have enacted this statute, and are therefore not printed here.]

**ARTICLE I.<sup>1</sup>****GENERAL PROVISIONS.**

- Section 1.** Short Title.  
**2.** Definitions and Meaning of Terms.  
**3.** Persons Primarily Liable on Instrument.  
**4.** Reasonable Time, What Constitutes.  
**5.** Time, How Computed; When Last Day Falls on Holiday.  
**6.** Application of Chapter.  
**7.** Rule of Law Merchant; When Governs.

Section 1 (190). *Short Title.*

This act shall be known as the Negotiable Instruments Law.

Sec. 2 (191). *Definitions and Meaning of Terms.*

In this act, unless the context otherwise requires:

"Acceptance" means an acceptance completed by delivery or notification.

"Action" includes counter-claim and set-off.

"Bank" includes any person or association of persons carrying on the business of banking, whether incorporated or not.

"Bearer" means the person in possession of a bill or note which is payable to bearer.

"Bill" means bill of exchange, and "note" means negotiable promissory note.

"Delivery" means transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one person to another.

"Holder" means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.

"Indorsement" means an indorsement completed by delivery.

"Instrument" means negotiable instrument.

"Issue" means the first delivery of the instrument, complete in form, to a person who takes it as a holder.

"Person" includes a body of persons, whether incorporated or not.

"Value" means valuable consideration.

"Written" includes printed, and "writing" includes print.

<sup>1</sup> §§ 190-196, Colo., Mass., N. C., N. D., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 13-19, Md.; §§ 190-192, Or.; §§ 1-7, R. I.; § 1675, Wis.; no section numbers Conn., D. C., Fla., and Tenn.

**Sec. 3 (192). *Person Primarily Liable on Instrument.***

The person "primarily" liable on an instrument is the person who by the terms of the instrument is absolutely required to pay the same. All other parties are "secondarily" liable.

**Sec. 4 (193). *Reasonable Time, What Constitutes.***

In determining what is a "reasonable time" or an "unreasonable time" regard is to be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade or business (if any) with respect to such instruments, and the facts of the particular case.

**Sec. 5 (194). *Time, How Computed; When Last Day Falls on Holiday.***

Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act herein required or permitted to be done falls on Sunday or on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding secular or business day.

**Sec. 6 (195). *Application of Chapter.***

The provisions of this act do not apply to negotiable instruments made and delivered prior to the passage hereof.

**Sec. 7 (196). *Law Merchant; When Governs.***

In any case not provided for in this act the rules of the law merchant shall govern.

**ARTICLE II.<sup>1</sup>****FORM AND INTERPRETATION.**

- Section 20. Form of Negotiable Instrument.**
- 21. Certainty as to Sum; What Constitutes.
  - 22. When Promise is Unconditional.
  - 23. Determinable Future Time; What Constitutes.
  - 24. Additional Provisions not Affecting Negotiability.
  - 25. Omissions; Seal; Particular Money.
  - 26. When Payable on Demand.
  - 27. When Payable to Order.
  - 28. When Payable to Bearer.
  - 29. Terms, When Sufficient.
  - 30. Date, Presumption as to.
  - 31. Ante-Dated and Post-Dated.
  - 32. When Date May be Inserted.
  - 33. Blanks, When May be Filled.
  - 34. Incomplete Instrument not Delivered.
  - 35. Delivery; When Effectual; When Presumed.
  - 36. Construction where Instrument is Ambiguous.
  - 37. Liability of Persons Signing in Trade or Assumed Name.
  - 38. Signature by Agent; Authority; How Shown.
  - 39. Liability of Person Signing as Agent, etc.
  - 40. Signature by Procuration; Effect of.
  - 41. Effect of Indorsement by Infant or Corporation.
  - 42. Forged Signature; Effect of.

**Sec. 20 (1). *Form of Negotiable Instrument.***

An instrument to be negotiable must conform to the following requirements:

- 1. It must be in writing (a) and signed by the maker or drawer;
- 2. Must contain an unconditional promise or order (b) to pay a sum certain (c) in money;
- 3. Must be payable on demand (d), or at a fixed or determinable future time (e);
- 4. Must be payable to order (f) or to bearer (g); and
- 5. Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty. (h)

(a) See § 2 (191) "written."

(c) See § 21 (2).

(b) See § 22 (3).

(d) See § 26 (7).

(e) See § 23 (4).

---

<sup>1</sup> §§ 1-23, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 20-42, Md.; §§ 1675-1 to 1675-23, Wis.

(f) See § 27 (8). The North Carolina act (§ 1) reads: "Must be payable to the order of a specified person or to bearer."

(g) See § 28 (9).

(h) See § 210 (126). The Wisconsin act (§ 1675-1) adds: "But no order drawn upon or accepted by the treasurer of any county, town, city, village or school district, whether drawn by any officer thereof or any other person, and no obligation nor instrument made by any such corporation or any officer thereof, unless expressly authorized by law to be made negotiable, shall be, or shall be deemed to be, negotiable according to the custom of merchants, in whatever form they may be drawn or made. Warehouse receipts, bills of lading and railroad receipts upon the face of which the words 'Not negotiable' shall not be plainly written, printed or stamped, shall be negotiable as provided in section 1676 of the Wisconsin Statutes of 1878, and in sections 4194 and 4425 of these statutes, as the same have been construed by the supreme court."

### Sec. 21 (2). *Certainty as to Sum; What Constitutes.*

The sum payable is a sum certain within the meaning of this act, although it is to be paid:

1. With interest; or
2. By stated installments; or
3. By stated installments, with a provision that upon default in payment of any installment or of interest (a), the whole shall become due; or.
4. With exchange, whether at a fixed rate or at the current rate; or
5. With costs of collection or an attorney's fee, in case payment shall not be made at maturity. (b)

(a) The North Carolina act (§ 2) omits: "Or of interest."

(b) See section 197 of the North Carolina act. Section 24, note (a), post.

### Sec. 22 (3). *When Promise is Unconditional.*

An unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional within the meaning of this act, though coupled with:

1. An indication of a particular fund out of which reimbursement is to be made, or a particular account is to be debited with the amount; or
2. A statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument.

But an order or promises to pay out of a particular fund is not unconditional.

**Sec. 23 (4). *Determinable Future Time; What Constitutes.***

An instrument is payable at a determinable future time, within the meaning of this act, which is expressed to be payable:

1. At a fixed period after date or sight; or
2. On or before a fixed or determinable future time specified therein; or
3. On or at a fixed period after the occurrence of a specified event, which is certain to happen, though the time of happening be uncertain.

An instrument payable upon a contingency is not negotiable, and the happening of the event does not cure the defect. (a)

(a) The Wisconsin act (§ 1675-4) substitutes, for the last paragraph, the following: "4. At a fixed period after date or sight, though payable before then on a contingency. An instrument payable upon a contingency is not negotiable, and the happening of the event does not cure the defect, except as herein provided."

**Sec. 24 (5). *Additional Provisions not Affecting Negotiability.***

An instrument which contains an order or promise to do any act in addition to the payment of money is not negotiable. But the negotiable character of an instrument otherwise negotiable is not affected by a provision which:

1. Authorizes the sale of collateral securities in case the instrument be not paid at maturity; or
2. Authorizes a confession of judgment if the instrument be not paid at maturity (a); or
3. Waives the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of the obligor (b); or
4. Gives the holder an election to require something to be done in lieu of payment of money.

But nothing in this section shall validate any provision or stipulation otherwise illegal. (c)

(a) The North Carolina act (§ 197) contains the following: "That nothing in this act shall authorize the enforcement of an authorization to confess judgment or a waiver of homestead or personal property exemptions or a provision to pay counsel fees for collection incorporated in any instrument mentioned in this act; but the mention of such provision in such instrument shall not affect the other terms of such instruments or the negotiability thereof."

(b) See note (a), *supra*.

(c) The Wisconsin act (§ 1675-5) adds: "or authorize the waiver of exemptions from execution."



**Sec. 25 (6). *Omissions; Seal; Particular Money.***

The validity and negotiable character of an instrument are not affected by the fact that:

1. It is not dated (a); or
2. Does not specify the value given, or that any value has been given therefor; or
3. Does not specify the place where it is drawn or the place where it is payable; or
4. Bears a seal; or
5. Designates a particular kind of current money in which payment is to be made.

But nothing in this section shall alter or repeal any statute requiring in certain cases the nature of the consideration to be stated in the instrument. (b)

(a) See § 82 (13).

(b) See §§ 330, 331.

**Sec. 26 (7). *When Payable on Demand.***

An instrument is payable on demand:

1. Where it is expressed to be payable on demand, or at sight, or on presentation; or
2. In which no time for payment is expressed.

Where an instrument is issued, accepted or indorsed when overdue, it is, as regards the person so issuing, accepting or indorsing it, payable on demand.

**Sec. 27 (8). *When Payable to Order.***

The instrument is payable to order where it is drawn payable to the order of a specified person or to him or his order. It may be drawn payable to the order of:

1. A payee who is not maker, drawer or drawee; or
2. The drawer (a) or maker; or
3. The drawee; or
4. Two or more payees jointly; or
5. One or some of several payees; or
6. The holder of an office for the time being.

Where the instrument is payable to order the payee must be named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty.

(a) "Drawee" by mistake in original New York act.

**Sec. 28 (9). *When Payable to Bearer.***

The instrument is payable to bearer:

1. When it is expressed to be so payable; or
2. When it is payable to a person named therein or bearer; or
3. When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or nonexisting person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable; or
4. When the name of the payee does not purport to be the name of any person; or
5. When the only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank. (a)

(a) See § 64 (34).

**Sec. 29 (10). *Terms, When Sufficient.***

The instrument need not follow the language of this act, but any terms are sufficient which clearly indicate an intention to conform to the requirements hereof. (a)

(a) The Wisconsin act (§ 1675-10) adds: "Memoranda upon the face or back of the instrument, whether signed or not, material to the contract, if made at the time of delivery, are part of the instrument, and parol evidence is admissible to show the circumstances under which they were made."

**Sec. 30 (11). *Date, Presumption, as to.***

Where the instrument or an acceptance or any indorsement thereon is dated, such date is deemed prima facie to be the true date of the making, drawing, acceptance or indorsement, as the case may be.

**Sec. 31 (12). *Ante-Dated and Post-Dated.***

The instrument is not invalid for the reason only that it is ante-dated or post-dated, provided this is not done for an illegal or fraudulent purpose. The person to whom an instrument so dated is delivered acquires the title thereto as of the date of delivery.

**Sec. 32 (13). *When Date May be Inserted.***

Where an instrument expressed to be payable at a fixed period after date is issued undated, or where the acceptance of an instrument payable at a fixed period after sight is undated, any holder may insert therein the true date of issue or acceptance, and the instrument shall be payable accordingly. The insertion of a wrong date does not void the instrument in the hands of a subsequent holder in due course; but as to him, the date so inserted is to be regarded as the true date. (a)

(a) See § 33 (14).

**Sec. 33 (14). *Blanks, When May be Filled.***

Where the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it (a) by filling up the blanks therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority (b) to fill it up as such for any amount. In order, however, that any such instrument, when completed, may be enforced against any person who became a party thereto prior to its completion, it must be filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time. But if any such instrument, after completion, is negotiated to a holder in due course, it is valid and effectual for all purposes in his hands, and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time. (c)

(a) The Wisconsin act (§ 1675-14) reads, "complete it prior to negotiation by filling," etc.

(b) The Wisconsin act reads, "operates as an authority," etc.

(c) See §§ 205 (124), 206 (125).

**Sec. 34 (15). *Incomplete Instrument not Delivered.***

Where an incomplete instrument has not been delivered it will not, if completed and negotiated, without authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as against any person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery.

**Sec. 35 (16). *Delivery; When Effectual; When Presumed.***

Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties, and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing, accepting (a) or indorsing, as the case may be; and in such case the delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the property in the instrument. But where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. (b) And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid

and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved. ,

(a) The North Carolina act (§ 16) omits "accepting."

(b) See § 34 (15).

**Sec. 36 (17).** *Construction where Instrument is Ambiguous.*

Where the language of the instrument is ambiguous, or there are omissions therein, the following rules of construction apply:

1. Where the sum payable is expressed in words and also in figures and there is a discrepancy between the two, the sum denoted by the words is the sum payable; but if the words are ambiguous or uncertain, references may be had to the figures to fix the amount;

2. Where the instrument provides for the payment of interest, without specifying the date from which interest is to run, the interest runs from the date of the instrument, and if the instrument is undated, from the issue thereof;

3. Where the instrument is not dated, it will be considered to be dated as of the time it was issued;

4. Where there is a conflict between the written and printed provisions of the instrument, the written provisions prevail;

5. Where the instrument is so ambiguous that there is doubt whether it is a bill or note, the holder may treat it as either at his election;

6. Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the same intended to sign, he is to be deemed an indorser; (a)

7. Where an instrument containing the words "I promise to pay" is signed by two or more persons, they are deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon.

(a) See § 114 (64).

[NOTE. The Wisconsin act (§ 1675-17) adds: "8. Where several writings are executed at or about the same time, as parts of the same transaction, intended to accomplish the same object, they may be construed as one and the same instrument as to all parties having notice thereof."]

**Sec. 37 (18).** *Liability of Person Signing in Trade or Assumed Name.*

No person is liable on the instrument whose signature does not appear thereon, except as herein otherwise expressly provided. (a)

But one who signs in a trade or assumed name will be liable to the same extent as if he had signed in his own name.

(a) See § 72 (42).

**Sec. 38 (19). *Signature by Agent; Authority; How Shown.***

The signature of any party may be made by a duly authorized agent. No particular form of appointment is necessary for this purpose; and the authority of the agent may be established as in other cases of agency,

**Sec. 39 (20). *Liability of Person Signing as Agent, etc.***

Where the instrument contains or a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, or in a representative capacity (a), he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized; but the mere addition of words describing him as an agent, or as filling a representative character, without disclosing his principal, does not exempt him from personal liability.

(a) The Virginia act (§ 20) inserts after "capacity," "without disclosing his principal."

**Sec. 40 (21). *Signature by Procuration; Effect of.***

A signature by "procuration" operates as notice that the agent has but a limited authority to sign, and the principal is bound only in case the agent in so signing acted within the actual limits of his authority,

**Sec. 41 (22). *Effect of Indorsement by Infant or Corporation.***

The indorsement or assignment of the instrument by a corporation or by an infant passes the property therein, notwithstanding that from want of capacity the corporation or infant may incur no liability thereon.

**Sec. 42 (23). *Forged Signature; Effect of.***

Where a signature is forged or made without authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority.

ARTICLE III.<sup>1</sup>

## CONSIDERATION OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

- Section** 50. Presumption of Consideration.  
 51. What Constitutes Consideration.  
 52. What Constitutes Holder for Value.  
 53. When Lien on Instrument Constitutes Holder for Value.  
 54. Effect of Want of Consideration.  
 55. Liability of Accommodation Indorser.

Sec. 50 (24). *Presumption of Consideration.*

Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value.

Sec. 51 (25). *Consideration; What Constitutes.*

Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt (a) constitutes value; and is deemed such whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time.

(a) The Wisconsin act (§ 1675-51) inserts after "debt," "discharged, extinguished or extended," and adds at the end of the section: "But the indorsement or delivery of negotiable paper as collateral security for a pre-existing debt, without other consideration, and not in pursuance of an agreement at the time of delivery, by the maker, does not constitute value."

Sec. 52 (26). *What Constitutes Holder for Value.*

Where value has at any time been given for the instrument, the holder is deemed a holder for value in respect to all parties who became such prior to that time.

Sec. 53 (27). *When Lien on Instrument Constitutes Holder for Value.*

Where the holder has a lien on the instrument, arising either from contract or by implication of law, he is deemed a holder for value to the extent of his lien.

Sec. 54 (28). *Effect of Want of Consideration.*

Absence or failure of consideration is matter of defense as against any person not a holder in due course (a); and partial failure of con-

<sup>1</sup> §§ 24-29, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 43-48, Md.; §§ 32-37, R. I.; §§ 1675-50 to 1675-55, Wis.

sideration is a defense pro tanto whether the failure is an ascertained and liquidated amount or otherwise.

(a) See § 91 (52).

**Sec. 55 (29). *Liability of Accommodation Party.***

An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party.



**ARTICLE IV.<sup>4</sup>****NEGOTIATION.**

- Section** 60. What Constitutes Negotiation.  
 61. Indorsement; How Made.  
 62. Indorsement Must be of Entire Instrument.  
 63. Kinds of Indorsement.  
 64. Special Indorsement; Indorsement in Blank.  
 65. Blank Indorsement; How Changed to Special Indorsement.  
 66. When Indorsement Restrictive.  
 67. Effect of Restrictive Indorsement; Rights of Indorsee.  
 68. Qualified Indorsement.  
 69. Conditional Indorsement.  
 70. Indorsement of Instrument Payable to Bearer.  
 71. Indorsement when Payable to Two or More Persons.  
 72. Effect of Instrument Drawn or Indorsed to a Person as Cashier.  
 73. Indorsement where Name is Misspelled, et cetera.  
 74. Indorsement in Representative Capacity.  
 75. Time of Indorsement; Presumption.  
 76. Place of Indorsement; Presumption.  
 77. Continuation of Negotiable Character.  
 78. Striking Out Indorsement.  
 79. Transfer without Indorsement; Effect of.  
 80. When Prior Party may Negotiate Instrument.

**Sec. 60 (30). *What Constitutes Negotiation.***

An instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such manner as to constitute the transferee the holder (a) thereof. If payable to bearer (b) it is negotiated by delivery; if payable to order (c) it is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery.

(a) See § 2 (191) "holder."

(b) See § 28 (9).

(c) See § 27 (8).

**Sec. 61 (31). *Indorsement; How Made.***

The indorsement must be written on the instrument itself or upon a paper attached thereto. The signature of the indorser, without additional words, is a sufficient indorsement.

<sup>4</sup> §§ 30-50, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 49-69, Md.; §§ 38-58 R. I.; §§ 1676 to 1676-20, Wis.

**Sec. 62 (32). *Indorsement Must be of Entire Instrument.***

The indorsement must be an indorsement of the entire instrument. An indorsement which purports to transfer to the indorsee a part only of the amount payable, or which purports to transfer the instrument to two or more indorseees severally, does not operate as a negotiation of the instrument. But where the instrument has been paid in part, it may be indorsed as to the residue.

**Sec. 63 (33). *Kinds of Indorsement.***

An indorsement may be either special or in blank; and it may also be either restrictive or qualified or conditional.

**Sec. 64 (34). *Special Indorsement; Indorsement in Blank.***

A special indorsement specifies the person to whom, or to whose order the instrument is to be payable; and the indorsement of such indorsee is necessary to the further negotiation of the instrument. (a) An indorsement in blank specifies no indorsee, and an instrument so indorsed is payable to bearer, and may be negotiated by delivery. (b)

(a) See §§ 27 (8), 70 (40).

(b) See § 28 (9).

**Sec. 65 (35). *Blank Indorsement; How Changed to Special Indorsement.***

The holder may convert a blank indorsement into a special indorsement by writing over the signature of the indorser in blank any contract consistent with the character of the indorsement.

**Sec. 66 (36). *When Indorsement Restrictive.***

An indorsement is restrictive, which either:

1. Prohibits the further negotiation of the instrument; or
2. Constitutes the indorsee the agent of the indorser; or
3. Vests the title in the indorsee in trust for or to the use of some other person,

But the mere absence of words implying power to negotiate does not make an indorsement restrictive.

**Sec. 67 (37). *Effect of Restrictive Indorsement; Rights of Indorsee.***

A restrictive indorsement confers upon the indorsee the right:

1. To receive payment of the instrument;
2. To bring any action thereon that the indorser could bring;
3. To transfer his rights as such indorsee, where the form of the indorsement authorizes him to do so.

But all subsequent indorseees acquire only the title of the first indorsee under the restrictive indorsement.

**Sec. 68 (38). *Qualified Indorsement.***

A qualified indorsement constitutes the indorser a mere assignor of the title to the instrument. It may be made by adding to the indorser's signature the words "without recourse" or any words of similar import. Such an indorsement does not impair the negotiable character of the instrument. (a)

(a) See § 115 (65).

**Sec. 69 (39). *Conditional Indorsement.***

Where an indorsement is conditional, a party required to pay the instrument may disregard the condition, and make payment to the indorsee or his transferee, whether the condition has been fulfilled or not. But any person to whom an instrument so indorsed is negotiated, will hold the same, or the proceeds thereof, subject to the rights of the person indorsing conditionally.

**Sec. 70 (40). *Indorsement of Instrument Payable to Bearer.***

Where an instrument, payable to bearer, is indorsed specially, it may nevertheless be further negotiated by delivery; but the person indorsing specially is liable as indorser to only such holders as make title through his indorsement. (a)

(a) See §§ 116 (66), 117 (67).

**Sec. 71 (41). *Indorsement where Payable to Two or More Persons.***

Where an instrument is payable to the order of two or more payees or (a) indorseees who are not partners, all must indorse, unless the one indorsing has authority to indorse for the others.

(a) The Wisconsin act (§ 1676-11) inserts before "indorseees," "joint."

**Sec. 72 (42). *Effect of Instrument Drawn or Indorsed to a Person as Cashier.***

Where an instrument is drawn or indorsed to a person as "cashier" or other fiscal officer of a bank or corporation, it is deemed prima facie to be payable to the bank or corporation of which he is such officer; and may be negotiated by either the indorsement of the bank or corporation, or the indorsement of the officer. (a)

(a) See § 37 (18).

**Sec. 73 (43). *Indorsement where Name is Misspelled, et cetera.***

Where the name of a payee or indorsee is wrongly designated or misspelled, he may indorse the instrument as therein described, adding, if he think fit, his proper signature.

**Sec. 74 (44). *Indorsement in Representative Capacity.***

Where any person is under obligation to indorse in a representative capacity, he may indorse in such terms as to negative personal liability. (a)

(a) See §§ 39 (20), 68 (38).

**Sec. 75 (45). *Time of Indorsement; Presumption.***

Except where an indorsement bears date after the maturity of the instrument, every negotiation is deemed prima facie to have been effected before the instrument was overdue. (a)

(a) See § 91 (52).

**Sec. 76 (46). *Place of Indorsement; Presumption.***

Except where the contrary appears every indorsement is presumed prima facie to have been made at the place where the instrument is dated.

**Sec. 77 (47). *Continuation of Negotiable Character.***

An instrument negotiable in its origin continues to be negotiable until it has been restrictively indorsed (a) or discharged by payment or otherwise. (b) .

(a) See §§ 66 (36), 67 (37).

(b) See § 200 (119) et seq.

**Sec. 78 (48). *Striking Out Indorsement.***

The holder may at any time strike out any indorsement which is not necessary to his title. The indorser whose indorsement is struck out, and all indorsers subsequent to him, are thereby relieved from liability on the instrument.

**Sec. 79 (49). *Transfer without Indorsement; Effect of.***

Where the holder of an instrument payable to his order transfers it for value without indorsing it, the transfer vests in the transferee such title as the transferer had therein, and the transferee acquires, in addition, the right to have the indorsement of the transferer. (a) But for the purpose of determining whether the transferee is a hold-

in due course, the negotiation takes effect as of the time when the indorsement is actually made. (b)

(a) The Colorado act (§ 49) inserts after "transferer," "if omitted by mistake, accident or fraud."

(b) The Wisconsin act (§ 1676-19) adds: "When the indorsement was omitted by mistake, or there was an agreement to endorse made at the time of the transfer, the indorsement, when made, relates back to the time of transfer."

**Sec. 80 (50). *When Prior Party may Negotiate Instrument.***

Where an instrument is negotiated back to a prior party, such party may, subject to the provisions of this act (a), reissue and further negotiate the same. But he is not entitled to enforce payment thereof against any intervening party to whom he was personally liable.

(a) See §§ 200 (119)-202 (121).

NEG.BILLS.—29

ARTICLE V.<sup>a</sup>

## RIGHTS OF HOLDER.

- Section 90. Right of Holder to Sue; Payment.**  
 91. What Constitutes a Holder in Due Course.  
 92. When Person not Deemed Holder in Due Course.  
 93. Notice before Full Amount Paid.  
 94. When Title Defective.  
 95. What Constitutes Notice of Defect.  
 96. Rights of Holder in Due Course.  
 97. When Subject to Original Defenses.  
 98. Who Deemed Holder in Due Course.

**Sec. 90 (51). *Right of Holder to Sue; Payment.***

The holder of a negotiable instrument may sue thereon in his own name (a); and payment to him in due course discharges the instrument. (b)

(a) See § 67 (37), subd. 2.

(b) See §§ 148 (88), 200 (119).

**Sec. 91 (52). *What Constitutes a Holder in Due Course.***

A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:

1. That it is complete and regular upon its face; (a)
2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;
3. That he took it in good faith and for value; (b)
4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it. (c)

(a) See §§ 32 (13), 33 (14).

(b) See § 51 (25).

(c) See § 95 (56).

[Note. The Wisconsin act (§ 1676-22) adds a fifth subdivision: "5. That he took it in the usual course of business."]

---

<sup>a</sup> §§ 51-59, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 70-78, Md.; §§ 59-67, R. I.; §§ 1676-21 to 1676-29, Wis.

**Sec. 92 (53). *When Person not Deemed Holder in Due Course.***

Where an instrument payable on demand (a) is negotiated an unreasonable length of time after its issue, the holder is not deemed a holder in due course.

(a) See § 26 (7).

**Sec. 93 (54). *Notice before Full Amount Paid.***

Where the transferee receives notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same before he has paid the full amount agreed to be paid thereof, he will be deemed a holder in due course only to the extent of the amount theretofore paid by him.

**Sec. 94 (55). *When Title Defective.***

The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective within the meaning of this act when he obtained the instrument, or any signature thereto, by fraud, duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of faith, or under such circumstances as amount to a fraud. (a)

(a) The Wisconsin act (§ 1676-25) adds the following: "And the title of such person is absolutely void when such instrument or signature was so procured from a person who did not know the nature of the instrument and could not have obtained such knowledge by the use of ordinary care."

**Sec. 95 (56). *What Constitutes Notice of Defect.***

To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith.

**Sec. 96 (57). *Rights of Holder in Due Course.***

A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties and free from defenses available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon. (a)

(a) The Wisconsin act (§ 1676-27) adds the following: "Except as provided in sections 1944 and 1945 of these statutes, relating to insurance premiums, and also in cases where the title of the person negotiating such instrument is void under the provision of section 1676-25 of this act."



**Sec. 97 (58). *When Subject to Original Defenses.***

In the hands of any holder other than a holder in due course, a negotiable instrument is subject to the same defenses as if it were nonnegotiable. But a holder who derives his title through a holder in due course, and who is not himself a party to any fraud (a) or illegality affecting the instrument, has all the rights of such former holder in respect of all parties prior to the latter. (b)

(a) The Wisconsin act (§ 1676-28) inserts after "fraud," "duress."

(b) The Wisconsin act substitutes for "the latter," "such holder."

**Sec. 98 (59). *Who Deemed Holder in Due Course.***

Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course; but when it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims acquired the title as a holder in due course. But the last-mentioned rule does not apply in favor of a party who became bound on the instrument prior to the acquisition of such defective title.

## ARTICLE VI.\*

## LIABILITIES OF PARTIES.

- Section 110. Liability of Maker.**  
**111. Liability of Drawer.**  
**112. Liability of Acceptor.**  
**113. When Person Deemed Indorser.**  
**114. Liability of Irregular Indorser.**  
**115. Warranty; Where Negotiation by Delivery, et cetera.**  
**116. Liability of General Indorsers.**  
**117. Liability of Indorser where Paper Negotiable by Delivery.**  
**118. Order in which Indorsers are Liable.**  
**119. Liability of Agent or Broker.**

**Sec. 110 (60). *Liability of Maker.***

The maker of a negotiable instrument by making it engages that he will pay it according to its tenor; and admits the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse.

**Sec. 111 (61). *Liability of Drawer.***

The drawer by drawing the instrument admits the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse; and engages that on due presentment the instrument will be accepted and (a) paid, or both, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent (b) indorser who may be compelled to pay it. But the drawer may insert in the instrument an express stipulation negating or limiting his own liability to the holder.

(a) Other acts read "accepted or paid."

(b) The Colorado act (§ 61) omits "subsequent."

**Sec. 112 (62). *Liability of Acceptor.***

The acceptor by accepting (a) the instrument engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance (b); and admits:

\* §§ 60-69, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 79-88, Md.; §§ 68-77, R. I.; §§ 1677 to 1677-9, Wis.

1. The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the instrument; and

2. The existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse.

(a) See §§ 220 (132)–230 (142).

(b) See § 130 (70).

**Sec. 113 (63). *When Person Deemed Indorser.***

A person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer, or acceptor is deemed to be an indorser, unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity. (a)

(a) See § 38 (17), subd. 6.

**Sec. 114 (64). *Liability of Irregular Indorser.***

Where a person, not otherwise a party to an instrument, places thereon his signature in blank before delivery, he is liable as indorser in accordance with the following rules:

1. If the instrument is payable to the order of a third person, he is liable to the payee and to all subsequent parties.

2. If the instrument is payable to the order of the maker or drawer, or is payable to bearer, he is liable to all parties subsequent to the maker or drawer.

3. If he signs for the accommodation of the payee, he is liable to all parties subsequent to the payee.

**Sec. 115 (65). *Warranty; Where Negotiation by Delivery, et cetera.***

Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a qualified indorsement, warrants:

1. That the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be;

2. That he has a good title to it;

3. That all prior parties had capacity to contract;

4. That he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity of the instrument or render it valueless.

But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the warranty extends in favor of no holder other than the immediate transferee. The provisions of subdivision three of this section do not apply to persons negotiating public or corporate securities, other than bills and notes.

**Sec. 116 (66). *Liability of General Indorser.***

Every indorser who indorses without qualifications, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course:

1. The matter and things mentioned in subdivisions one, two, and three of the next preceding section; and
2. That the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting.

And, in addition, he engages that on due presentment it shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it.

**Sec. 117 (67). *Liability of Indorser where Paper Negotiable by Delivery.***

Where a person places his indorsement on an instrument negotiable by delivery he incurs all the liabilities of an indorser.

**Sec. 118 (68). *Order in Which Indorsers are Liable.***

As respects one another, indorsers are liable prima facie in the order in which they indorse; but evidence is admissible to show that as between or among themselves they have agreed otherwise. Joint payees or joint indorseees who indorse are deemed to indorse jointly and severally.

**Sec. 119 (69). *Liability of Agent or Broker.***

Where a broker or other agent negotiates an instrument without indorsement, he incurs all the liabilities prescribed by section 115 (a) of this act, unless he discloses the name of his principal, and the fact that he is acting only as agent.

(a) "Section 65" in original New York act by mistake.

**ARTICLE VII.<sup>1</sup>****PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT.**

- Section 130.** Effect of Want of Demand on Principal Debtor.
181. Presentment where Instrument is not Payable on Demand.
182. What Constitutes a Sufficient Presentment.
183. Place of Presentment.
184. Instrument Must be Exhibited.
185. Presentment where Instrument Payable at Bank.
186. Presentment where Principal Debtor is Dead.
187. Presentment to Persons Liable as Partners.
188. Presentment to Joint Debtors.
189. When Presentment not Required to Charge the Drawer.
140. When Presentment not Required to Charge the Indorser.
141. When Delay in Making Presentment is Excused.
142. When Presentment May be Dispensed With.
143. When Instrument Dishonored by Non-Payment.
144. Liability of Persons Secondarily Liable, When Instrument Dishonored.
145. Time of Maturity.
146. Time; How Computed.
147. Rule where Instrument Payable at Bank.
148. What Constitutes Payment in Due Course.

**Sec. 130 (70). *Effect of Want of Demand on Principal Debtor.***

Presentment for payment is not necessary in order to charge the person primarily liable on the instrument (a); but if the instrument is, by its terms, payable at a special place, and he is able and willing to pay it there at maturity, and has funds there available for that purpose (b), such ability and willingness are equivalent to a tender of payment upon his part. But except as herein otherwise provided, presentment for payment is necessary in order to charge the drawer and indorsers. (c)

(a) The Wisconsin act (§ 1678) omits that part of the first sentence following the words "primarily liable on the instrument."

(b) The words "and has funds there available for that purpose" were added to the New York act by amendment. They are not found in the other states.

(c) See §§ 111 (61), 116 (66).

---

<sup>1</sup> §§ 70-88, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 89-107, Md.; §§ 78-96, R. I.; §§ 1678 to 1678-18, Wis.

**Sec. 131 (71).** *Presentment where Instrument is not Payable on Demand—[Where Payable on Demand.]*

Where the instrument is not payable on demand, presentment must be made on the day it falls due. (a) Where it is payable on demand, presentment must be made within a reasonable time (b) after its issue, except that in the case of a bill of exchange, presentment for payment will be sufficient if made within a reasonable time after the last negotiation thereof. (c)

(a) See § 145 (85).

(b) See § 4 (193).

(c) See §§ 241 (144), 322 (186).

**Sec. 132 (72).** *What Constitutes Sufficient Presentment.*

Presentment for payment, to be sufficient, must be made:

1. By the holder, or by some person authorized to receive payment on his behalf;
2. At a reasonable hour on a business day;
3. At a proper place as herein defined; (a)
4. To the person primarily liable on the instrument, or if he is absent or inaccessible, to any person found at the place where the presentment is made.

(a) See § 133 (73).

**Sec. 133 (73).** *Place of Presentment.*

Presentment for payment is made at the proper place:

1. Where a place of payment is specified in the instrument and it is there presented;
2. Where no place of payment is specified, but the address of the person to make payment is given in the instrument and it is there presented;
3. Where no place of payment is specified and no address is given and the instrument is presented at the usual place of business or residence of the person to make payment;
4. In any other case if presented to the person to make payment wherever he can be found, or if presented at his last known place of business or residence.

**Sec. 134 (74).** *Instrument Must be Exhibited.*

The instrument must be exhibited to the person from whom payment is demanded, and when it is paid must be delivered up to the party paying it.

**Sec. 135 (75). *Presentment where Instrument Payable at Bank.***

Where the instrument is payable at a bank, presentment for payment must be made during banking hours, unless the person to make payment has no funds there to meet it at any time during the day, in which case presentment at any hour before the bank is closed on that day is sufficient.

**Sec. 136 (76). *Presentment where Principal Debtor is Dead.***

Where the person primarily liable on the instrument is dead, and no place of payment is specified, presentment for payment must be made to his personal representative, if such there be, and if with the exercise of reasonable diligence he can be found.

**Sec. 137 (77). *Presentment to Persons Liable as Partners.***

Where the persons primary liable on the instrument are liable as partners, and no place of payment is specified, presentment for payment may be made to any one of them, even though there has been a dissolution of the firm.

**Sec. 138 (78). *Presentment to Joint Debtors.***

Where there are several persons not partners, primarily liable on the instrument, and no place of payment is specified, presentment must be made to them all.

**Sec. 139 (79). *When Presentment not Required to Charge the Drawer.***

Presentment for payment is not required in order to charge the drawer where he has no right to expect or require that the drawee or acceptor will pay the instrument. (a)

(a) See § 185 (114), subd. 4.

**Sec. 140 (80). *When Presentment not Required to Charge the Indorser.***

Presentment for payment is not required in order to charge an indorser where the instrument was made or accepted for his accommodation, and he has no reason to expect that the instrument will be paid if presented. (a)

(a) See § 186 (115), subd. 3.

**Sec. 141 (81). *When Delay in Making Presentment is Excused.***

Delay in making presentment for payment is excused when the delay is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the holder



and not imputable to his default, misconduct or negligence. When the cause of delay ceases to operate, presentment must be made with reasonable diligence.

**Sec. 142 (82). *When Presentment May be Dispensed with.***

Presentment for payment is dispensed with:

1. Where after the exercise of reasonable diligence presentment as required by this act can not be made;

2. Where the drawee is a fictitious person; (a)

3. By waiver of presentment express or implied. (b)

(a) See § 185 (114), subd. 2.

(b) See §§ 180 (109)–182 (111).

**Sec. 143 (83). *When Instrument Dishonored by Non-Payment.***

The instrument is dishonored by non-payment when:

1. It is duly presented for payment and payment is refused or can not be obtained; or

2. Presentment is excused and the instrument is overdue and unpaid.

**Sec. 144 (84). *Liability of Person Secondarily Liable, When Instrument Dishonored.***

Subject to the provisions of this act, when the instrument is dishonored by non-payment, an immediate right of recourse to all parties secondarily liable thereon, accrues to the holder.

**Sec. 145 (85). *Time of Maturity.***

Every negotiable instrument is payable at the time fixed therein without grace. When the day of maturity falls upon Sunday, or a holiday, the instrument is payable on the next succeeding business day. (a) Instruments falling due or becoming payable (b) on Saturday are to be presented for payment on the next succeeding business day, except that instruments payable on demand may, at the option of the holder, be presented for payment before twelve o'clock noon on Saturday when that entire day is not a holiday.

(a) The Wisconsin act (§ 1678–15) omits the sentence beginning "Instruments falling due," etc.

In the Colorado act (§ 85) this sentence is omitted, and the following substituted: "Instruments falling due on any day, in any place where any part of such day is a holiday are to be presented for payment on the next succeeding business day, except that instruments payable on demand may, at the option

of the holder, be presented for payment during reasonable hours of the part of such day which is not a holiday."

The North Carolina act (§ 197) provides: "The laws now in force in this state with regard to days of grace shall remain in force and shall not be construed to be repealed by this act."

In Massachusetts this section has been modified (Laws 1899, c. 130) as follows: "On all drafts and bills of exchange made payable within this Commonwealth at sight, three days of grace shall be allowed, unless there is an express stipulation therefor to the contrary."

(b) The words "on becoming payable" were added to the New York act by amendment. They do not appear in the other states.

**Sec. 146 (86). *Time; How Computed.***

Where the instrument is payable at a fixed period after date, after sight, or after the happening of a specified event, the time of payment is determined by excluding the day from which the time is to begin to run, and by including the date of payment.

**Sec. 147 (87). *Rule where Instrument Payable at Bank.***

Where the instrument is made payable at a bank it is equivalent to an order to the bank to pay the same for the account of the principal debtor thereon.

**Sec. 148 (88). *What Constitutes Payment in Due Course.***

Payment is made in due course when it is made at or after the maturity of the instrument to the holder (a) thereof in good faith and without notice that his title is defective. (b)

(a) See § 2 (191) "holder."

(b) See §§ 94 (55), 95 (56), 200 (119).

**ARTICLE VIII.<sup>5</sup>****NOTICE OF DISHONOR.**

- Section 160.** To Whom Notice of Dishonor Must be Given.  
**161.** By Whom Given.  
**162.** Notice Given by Agent.  
**163.** Effect of Notice Given on Behalf of Holder.  
**164.** Effect where Notice is Given by Party Entitled Thereeto.  
**165.** When Agent may Give Notice.  
**166.** When Notice Sufficient.  
**167.** Form of Notice.  
**168.** To Whom Notice May be Given.  
**169.** Notice where Party is Dead.  
**170.** Notice to Partners.  
**171.** Notice to Persons Jointly Liable.  
**172.** Notice to Bankrupt.  
**173.** Time within Which Notice Must be Given.  
**174.** Where Parties Reside in Same Place.  
**175.** Where Parties Reside in Different Places.  
**176.** When Sender Deemed to have Given Due Notice.  
**177.** Deposit in Post-Office, What Constitutes.  
**178.** Notice to Subsequent Parties, Time of.  
**179.** Where Notice Must be Sent.  
**180.** Waiver of Notice.  
**181.** Whom Affected by Waiver.  
**182.** Waiver of Protest.  
**183.** When Notice Dispensed with.  
**184.** Delay in Giving Notice; How Excused.  
**185.** When Notice Need not be Given to Drawer.  
**186.** When Notice Need not be Given to Indorser.  
**187.** Notice of Non-Payment where Acceptance Refused.  
**188.** Effect of Omission to Give Notice of Non-Acceptance.  
**189.** When Protest Need not be Made; When Must be Made.

**Sec. 160 (89).** *To Whom Notice of Dishonor Must be Given.*

Except as herein otherwise provided (a), when a negotiable instrument has been dishonored by non-acceptance (b) or non-payment (c), notice of dishonor must be given to the drawer and to each in-

<sup>5</sup> §§ 89-118, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 108-137, Md.; §§ 97-126, R. I.; §§ 1678-19 to 1678-48, Wis.

dorser, and any drawer or indorser to whom such notice is not given is discharged.

(a) See §§ 180 (109)–187 (116).

(b) See §§ 246 (149)–248 (151).

(c) See §§ 143 (83), 144 (84).

**Sec. 161 (90). *By Whom Given.***

The notice may be given by or on behalf of the holder, or by or on behalf of any party to the instrument who might be compelled to pay it to the holder, and who, upon taking it up, would have a right to reimbursement from the party to whom the notice is given.

**Sec. 162 (91). *Notice Given by Agent.***

Notice of dishonor may be given by an agent either in his own name or in the name of any party entitled to give notice, whether that party be his principal or not.

**Sec. 163 (92). *Effect of Notice Given on Behalf of Holder.***

Where notice is given by or on behalf of the holder, it enures for the benefit of all subsequent holders and all prior parties who have a right of recourse against the party to whom it is given.

**Sec. 164 (93). *Effect where Notice is Given by Party Entitled Thereto.***

Where notice is given by or on behalf of a party entitled to give notice, it enures for the benefit of the holder and all parties subsequent to the party to whom notice is given.

**Sec. 165 (94). *When Agent may Give Notice.***

Where the instrument has been dishonored in the hands of an agent, he may either himself give notice to the parties liable thereon, or he may give notice to his principal. If he give notice to his principal, he must do so within the same time as if he were the holder, and the principal upon the receipt of such notice has himself the same time for giving notice as if the agent had been an independent holder.

**Sec. 166 (95). *When Notice Sufficient.***

A written notice need not be signed and an insufficient written notice may be supplemented and validated by verbal communication. A misdescription of the instrument does not vitiate the notice unless the party to whom the notice is given is in fact misled thereby.

**Sec. 167 (96). *Form of Notice.***

The notice may be in writing or merely oral, and may be given in any terms which sufficiently identify the instrument, and indicate that it has been dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment. It may in all cases be given by delivering it personally or through the mails. (a)

(a) See §§ 177 (106), 179 (108).

**Sec. 168 (97). *To Whom Notice May be Given.***

Notice of dishonor may be given either to the party himself or to his agent in that behalf.

**Sec. 169 (98). *Notice where Party is Dead.***

When any party is dead, and his death is known to the party giving notice, the notice must be given to a personal representative, if there be one, and if with reasonable diligence, he can be found. If there be no personal representative, notice may be sent to the last residence or last place of business of the deceased.

**Sec. 170 (99). *Notice to Partners.***

Where the parties to be notified are partners, notice to any one partner is notice to the firm even though there has been a dissolution.

**Sec. 171 (100). *Notice to Persons Jointly Liable.***

Notice to joint parties who are not partners must be given to each of them, unless one of them has authority to receive such notice for the others.

**Sec. 172 (101). *Notice to Bankrupt.***

Where a party has been adjudged a bankrupt or an insolvent, or has made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, notice may be given either to the party himself or to his trustee or assignee.

**Sec. 173 (102). *Time within Which Notice Must be Given.***

Notice may be given as soon as the instrument is dishonored; and unless delay is excused as hereinafter provided, must be given within the times fixed by this act.

**Sec. 174 (103). *Where Parties Reside in Same Place.***

Where the person giving and the person to receive notice reside in the same place, notice must be given within the following times:

1. If given at the place of business of the person to receive notice it must be given before the close of business hours on the day following;

2. If given at his residence, it must be given before the usual hours of rest on the day following;

3. If sent by mail, it must be deposited in the post-office in time to reach him in usual course on the day following.

**Sec. 175 (104). *Where Parties Reside in Different Places.***

Where the person giving and the person to receive notice reside in different places, the notice must be given within the following times:

1. If sent by mail, it must be deposited in the post-office in time to go by mail the day following the day of dishonor, or if there be no mail at a convenient hour on that day, by the next mail thereafter.

2. If given otherwise than through the post-office, then within the time that notice would have been received in due course of mail, if it had been deposited in the post-office within the time specified in the last subdivision.

**Sec. 176 (105). *When Sender Deemed to have Given Due Notice.***

Where notice of dishonor is duly addressed and deposited in the post-office, the sender is deemed to have given due notice, notwithstanding any miscarriage in the mails.

**Sec. 177 (106). *Deposit in Post-Office; What Constitutes.***

Notice is deemed to have been deposited in the post-office when deposited in any branch post-office or in any letter box under the control of the post-office department.

**Sec. 178 (107). *Notice to Subsequent Party; Time of.***

Where a party receives notice of dishonor, he has, after the receipt of such notice, the same time for giving notice to antecedent parties that the holder has after the dishonor.

**Sec. 179 (108). *Where Notice Must be Sent.***

Where a party has added an address to his signature, notice of dishonor must be sent to that address; but if he has not given such address, then the notice must be sent as follows:

1. Either to the post-office nearest to his place of residence, or to the post-office where he is accustomed to receive his letters; or,

2. If he live in one place, and have his place of business in another, notice may be sent to either place; or,

3. If he is sojourning in another place, notice may be sent to the place where he is so sojourning.

But where the notice is actually received by the party within the time specified in this act, it will be sufficient though not sent in accordance with the requirements of this section.

**Sec. 180 (109). *Waiver of Notice.***

Notice of dishonor may be waived, either before the time of giving notice has arrived or after the omission to give due notice, and the waiver may be express or implied.

**Sec. 181 (110). *Whom Affected by Waiver.***

Where the waiver is embodied in the instrument itself, it is binding upon all parties; but where it is written above the signature of an indorser, it binds him only.

**Sec. 182 (111). *Waiver of Protest.***

A waiver of protest, whether in the case of a foreign bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument, is deemed to be a waiver not only of a formal protest, but also of presentment and notice of dishonor.

**Sec. 183 (112). *When Notice is Dispensed with.***

Notice of dishonor is dispensed with when, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, it can not be given to or does not reach the parties sought to be charged.

**Sec. 184 (113). *Delay in Giving Notice; How Excused.***

Delay in giving notice of dishonor is excused when the delay is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the holder and not imputable to his default, misconduct or negligence. When the cause of delay ceases to operate, notice must be given with reasonable diligence.

**Sec. 185 (114). *When Notice Need not be Given to Drawer.***

Notice of dishonor is not required to be given to the drawer in either of the following cases:



1. Where the drawer and drawee are the same person;
2. Where the drawee is a fictitious person or a person not having capacity to contract;
3. Where the drawer is the person to whom the instrument is presented for payment;
4. Where the drawer has no right to expect or require that the drawee or acceptor will honor the instrument;
5. Where the drawer has countermanded payment.

**Sec. 186 (115).** *When Notice Need not be Given to Indorser.*

Notice of dishonor is not required to be given to an indorser in either of the following cases:

1. Where the drawee is a fictitious person or a person not having capacity to contract, and the indorser was aware of the fact at the time he indorsed the instrument;
2. Where the indorser is the person to whom the instrument is presented for payment;
3. Where the instrument was made or accepted for his accommodation.

**Sec. 187 (116).** *Notice of Non-Payment where Acceptance Refused.*

Where due notice of dishonor by non-acceptance has been given, notice of a subsequent dishonor by non-payment is not necessary, unless in the meantime the instrument has been accepted.

**Sec. 188 (117).** *Effect of Omission to Give Notice of Non-Acceptance.*

An omission to give notice of dishonor by non-acceptance does not prejudice the rights of a holder in due course subsequent to the omission. (a)

(a) The Wisconsin act (§ 1678-47) adds: "But this shall not be construed to revive any liability discharged by such omission."

**Sec. 189 (118).** *When Protest Need not be Made; When Must be Made.*

Where any negotiable instrument has been dishonored it may be protested for non-acceptance or non-payment, as the case may be; but protest is not required, except in the case of foreign bills of exchange. (a)

(a) See §§ 280 (152)-288 (160).

**ARTICLE IX.\*****DISCHARGE OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.****Section 200. Instrument; How Discharged.**

- 201. When Persons Secondarily Liable on, Discharged.
- 202. Right of Party who Discharges Instrument.
- 203. Renunciation by Holder.
- 204. Cancellation; Unintentional; Burden of Proof.
- 205. Alteration of Instrument; Effect of.
- 206. What Constitutes a Material Alteration.

**Sec. 200 (119). *Instrument; How Discharged.***

A negotiable instrument is discharged:

- 1. By payment in due course by or on behalf of the principal debtor; (a)
- 2. By payment in due course by the party accommodated, where the instrument is made or accepted for accommodation; (b)
- 3. By the intentional cancellation thereof by the holder; (c)
- 4. By any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money;
- 5. When the principal debtor becomes the holder of the instrument at or after maturity in his own right. (d)

(a) See § 148 (88).

(b) See § 55 (29).

(c) See § 204 (123).

(d) See § 80 (50).

**Sec. 201 (120). *When Person Secondarily Liable on, Discharged.***

A person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged:

- 1. By any act which discharges the instrument;
- 2. By the intentional cancellation of his signature by the holder; (a)
- 3. By the discharge of a prior party;
- 4. By a valid tender of payment made by a prior party; (b)
- 5. By a release of the principal debtor, unless the holder's right of recourse against the party secondarily liable is expressly reserved;

\* §§ 119-125, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 138-144, Md.; §§ 127-133, R. I.; §§ 1679 to 1679-6, Wis.

6. By any agreement binding upon the holder to extend the time of payment or to postpone the holder's right to enforce the instrument, unless the right of recourse against such party is expressly reserved. (c)

(a) See § 78 (48).

(b) The Wisconsin act (§ 1679-1) adds a subdivision (4a) as follows: "By giving up or applying to other purposes collateral security applicable to the debt, or, there being in the holder's hands or within his control the means of complete or partial satisfaction, the same are applied to other purposes."

(c) The Wisconsin act substitutes for subdivision 6 the following: "By an agreement binding upon the holder to extend the time of payment, or to postpone the holder's right to enforce the instrument unless made with the assent, prior or subsequent, of the party secondarily liable, unless the right of recourse against such party is expressly reserved, or unless he is fully indemnified."

The acts of Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Massachusetts, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Washington insert after "right to enforce the instrument" the words "unless made with the assent of the party secondarily liable, or."

**Sec. 202 (121). *Right of Party who Discharges Instrument.***

Where the instrument is paid by a party secondarily liable thereon, it is not discharged; but the party so paying it is remitted to his former rights as regards all prior parties, and he may strike out his own and all subsequent indorsements, and again negotiate the instrument, except:

1. Where it is payable to the order of a third person, and has been paid by the drawer; and,

2. Where it was made or accepted for accommodation, and has been paid by the party accommodated.

**Sec. 203 (122). *Renunciation by Holder.***

The holder may expressly renounce his rights against any party to the instrument, before, at or after its maturity. An absolute and unconditional renunciation of his rights against the principal debtor made at or after the maturity of the instrument, discharges the instrument. But a renunciation does not affect the rights of a holder in due course without notice. A renunciation must be in writing, unless the instrument is delivered up to the person primarily liable thereon.

**Sec. 204 (123). *Cancellation; Unintentional; Burden of Proof.***

A cancellation made unintentionally, or under a mistake, or without the authority of the holder, is inoperative; but where an instrument or any signature thereon appears to have been canceled the burden of proof lies on the party who alleges that the cancellation was made unintentionally, or under a mistake or without authority.

**Sec. 205 (124). *Alteration of Instrument; Effect of.***

Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except as against a party who has himself made, authorized or assented (a) to the alteration and subsequent indorsers. But when an instrument has been materially altered and is in the hands of a holder in due course, not a party to the alteration, he may enforce payment thereof according to its original tenor. .

(a) The Wisconsin act (§ 1679-5) inserts after "assented," "orally or in writing."

**Sec. 206 (125). *What Constitutes a Material Alteration.***

Any alteration which changes:

1. The date; (a)
2. The sum payable, either for principal or interest;
3. The time or place of payment;
4. The number or the relations of the parties;
5. The medium or currency in which payment is to be made;

Or which adds a place of payment where no place of payment is specified, or any other change or addition which alters the effect of the instrument in any respect, is a material alteration. (b)

(a) See § 32 (13).

(b) See § 33 (14).

## ARTICLE X.<sup>10</sup>

### BILLS OF EXCHANGE—FORM AND INTERPRETATION.

**Section 210. Bill of Exchange Defined.**

- 211. Bill not an Assignment of Funds in Hands of Drawee.
- 212. Bill Addressed to More than One Drawee.
- 213. Inland and Foreign Bills of Exchange.
- 214. When Bill May be Treated as Promissory Note.
- 215. Drawee in Case of Need.

**Sec. 210.(126). *Bill of Exchange Defined.***

A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing addressed by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum certain in money to order or to bearer.

**Sec. 211 (127). *Bill not an Assignment of Funds in Hands of Drawee.***

A bill of itself does not operate as an assignment of the funds in the hands of the drawee available for the payment thereof and the drawee is not liable on the bill unless and until he accepts the same.

**Sec. 212 (128). *Bill Addressed to More than One Drawee.***

A bill may be addressed to two or more drawees jointly, whether they are partners or not; but not to two or more drawees in the alternative or in succession. (a)

(a) The Wisconsin act (§ 1680b) omits "or in succession."

**Sec. 213 (129). *Inland and Foreign Bills of Exchange.***

An inland bill of exchange is a bill which is, or on its face purports to be, both drawn and payable within this state. Any other bill is a foreign bill. Unless the contrary appears on the face of the bill, the holder may treat it as an inland bill.

**Sec. 214 (130). *When Bill May be Treated as Promissory Note.***

Where in a bill drawer and drawee are the same person, or where the drawee is a fictitious person, or a person (a) not having capacity

<sup>10</sup> §§ 126-131, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 145-150, Md.; §§ 134-139, R. I.; §§ 1680-1680e, Wis.

to contract, the holder may treat the instrument, at his option, either as a bill of exchange or a promissory note.

(a) The Wisconsin act (§ 1680d) omits "or a person."

**Sec. 215 (131). *Referee in Case of Need.***

The drawer of a bill and any indorser may insert thereon the name of person to whom the holder may resort in case of need, that is to say, in case the bill is dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment. Such person is called the referee in case of need. It is in the option of the holder to resort to the referee in case of need or not as he may see fit.

**ARTICLE XI.<sup>11</sup>****ACCEPTANCE OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE**

- Section 220.** Acceptance, How Made, et cetera.  
 221. Holder Entitled to Acceptance on Face of Bill.  
 222. Acceptance by Separate Instrument.  
 223. Promise to Accept; When Equivalent to Acceptance.  
 224. Time Allowed Drawee to Accept.  
 225. Liability of Drawee Retaining or Destroying Bill.  
 226. Acceptance of Incomplete Bill.  
 227. Kinds of Acceptance.  
 228. What Constitutes a General Acceptance.  
 229. Qualified Acceptance.  
 230. Rights of Parties as to Qualified Acceptance.

**Sec. 220 (132).** *Acceptance; How Made, et cetera.*

The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of the drawer. The acceptance must be in writing and signed by the drawee. It must not express that the drawee will perform his promise by any other means than the payment of money.

**Sec. 221 (133).** *Holder Entitled to Acceptance on Face of Bill.*

The holder of a bill presenting the same for acceptance may require that the acceptance be written on the bill, and if such request is refused, may treat the bill as dishonored.

**Sec. 222 (134).** *Acceptance by Separate Instrument.*

Where an acceptance is written on a paper other than the bill itself, it does not bind the acceptor except in favor of a person to whom it is shown and who, on the faith thereof, receives the bill for value.

**Sec. 223 (135).** *Promise to Accept; When Equivalent to Acceptance.*

An unconditional promise in writing to accept a bill before it is drawn is deemed an actual acceptance in favor of every person who, upon the faith thereof, receives the bill for value.

<sup>11</sup> §§ 132-142, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 151-161, Md.; §§ 140-150, R. I.; §§ 1680f-1680p, Wis.



**Sec. 224 (133). *Time Allowed Drawee to Accept.***

The drawee is allowed twenty-four hours after presentment in which to decide whether or not he will accept the bill; but the acceptance is given dates as of the day of presentation.

**Sec. 225 (137). *Liability of Drawee Retaining or Destroying Bill.***

Where a drawee to whom a bill is delivered for acceptance destroys the same, or refuses within twenty-four hours after such delivery, or within such other period as the holder may allow, to return the bill accepted or non-accepted to the holder, he will be deemed to have accepted the same. (a)

(a) The Wisconsin act (§ 1680k) adds: "Mere retention of the bill is not acceptance."

**Sec. 226 (138). *Acceptance of Incomplete Bill.***

A bill may be accepted before it has been signed by the drawer, or while otherwise incomplete (a), or when it is overdue, or after it has been dishonored by a previous refusal to accept, or by non-payment. But when a bill payable after sight is dishonored by non-acceptance and the drawee subsequently accepts it, the holder, in the absence of any different agreement, is entitled to have the bill accepted as of the date of the first presentment.

(a) See § 33 (14).

**Sec. 227 (139). *Kinds of Acceptances.***

An acceptance is either general or qualified. A general acceptance assents without qualification to the order of the drawer. A qualified acceptance in express terms varies the effect of the bill as drawn.

**Sec. 228 (140). *What Constitutes a General Acceptance.***

An acceptance to pay at a particular place is a general acceptance unless it expressly states that the bill is to be paid there only and not elsewhere.

**Sec. 229 (141). *Qualified Acceptance.***

An acceptance is qualified, which is:

1. Conditional, that is to say, which makes payment by the acceptor dependent on the fulfilment of a condition therein stated;
2. Partial, that is to say, an acceptance to pay part only of the amount for which the bill is drawn;

3. Local, that is to say, an acceptance to pay only at a particular place; (a)

4. Qualified as to time;

5. The acceptance of some one or more of the drawees, but not of all.,

(a) See § 228 (140).

**Sec. 230 (142). *Rights of Parties as to Qualified Acceptance.***

The holder may refuse to take a qualified acceptance, and if he does not obtain an unqualified acceptance, he may treat the bill as dishonored by non-acceptance. Where a qualified acceptance is taken, the drawer and indorsers are discharged from liability on the bill, unless they have expressly or impliedly authorized the holder to take a qualified acceptance, or subsequently assent thereto. When the drawer or an indorser receives notice of a qualified acceptance, he must within a reasonable time express his dissent to the holder, or he will be deemed to have assented thereto.

ARTICLE XII.<sup>12</sup>

## PRESENTMENT OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE FOR ACCEPTANCE.

**Section 240. When Presentment for Acceptance Must be Made.**

241. When Failure to Present Releases Drawer and Indorser.

242. Presentment; How Made.

243. On what Days Presentment May be Made.

244. Presentment; Where Time is Insufficient.

245. When Presentment is Excused.

246. When Dishonored by Non-Acceptance.

247. Duty of Holder where Bill not Accepted.

248. Rights of Holder where Bill not Accepted.

**Sec. 240 (143). *When Presentment for Acceptance Must be Made.***

Presentment for acceptance must be made:

1. Where the bill is payable after sight, or in any other case where presentment for acceptance is necessary in order to fix the maturity of the instrument; or,

2. Where the bill expressly stipulates that it shall be presented for acceptance; or,,

3. Where the bill is drawn payable elsewhere than at the residence or place of business of the drawee. (a)

In no other case is presentment for acceptance necessary, in order to render any party to the bill liable.

(a) See § 244 (147).

**Sec. 241 (144). *When Failure to Present Releases Drawer and Indorser.***

Except as herein otherwise provided, the holder of a bill which is required by the next preceding section to be presented for acceptance must either present it for acceptance or negotiate it within a reasonable time. (a) If he fails to do so, the drawer and all indorsers are discharged.

(a) See § 4 (193).

**Sec. 242 (145). *Presentment; How Made.***

Presentment for acceptance must be made by or on behalf of the holder at a reasonable hour on a business day, and before the bill

<sup>12</sup> §§ 143-151, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 162-170, Md.; §§ 151-159, R. I.; §§ 1681 to 1681-8, Wis.

is overdue, to the drawee (a) or some person authorized to accept or refuse acceptance on his behalf; and

1. Where a bill is addressed to two or more drawees who are not partners, presentment must be made to them all, unless one has authority to accept or refuse acceptance for all, in which case presentment may be made to him only; (b)

2. Where the drawee is dead, presentment may be made to his personal representative; (c)

3. Where the drawee has been adjudged a bankrupt or an insolvent, or has made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, presentment may be made to him or to his trustees or assignee.

(a) "Drawer" appeared in the original New York act, a mistake which has been followed in some other states.

(b) See § 229 (141), subd. 5.

(c) See § 245 (148), subd. 1.

**Sec. 243 (146). *On What Days Presentment May be Made.***

A bill may be presented for acceptance on any day on which negotiable instruments may be presented for payment under the provisions of sections 132 and 145 of this act. (a) When Saturday is not otherwise a holiday, presentment for acceptance may be made before twelve o'clock noon on that day. (b)

(a) The sections were referred to as §§ 72, 85, by mistake in the original New York act.

(b) The Colorado act (§ 146) substitutes for the last sentence the following: "When any day is in part a holiday, presentment for acceptance may be made during reasonable hours of the part of such day which is not a holiday."

The Wisconsin act (§ 1681-3) omits the last sentence.

**Sec. 244 (147). *Presentment; Where Time is Insufficient.***

Where the holder of a bill drawn payable elsewhere than at the place of business or the residence of the drawee has not time with the exercise of reasonable diligence to present the bill for acceptance before presenting it for payment on the day that it falls due, the delay caused by presenting the bill for acceptance before presenting it for payment is excused and does not discharge the drawers and indorsers. (a)

(a) See § 240 (143).

**Sec. 245 (148). *Where Presentment is Excused.***

Presentment for acceptance is excused and a bill may be treated as dishonored by non-acceptance in either of the following cases:

1. Where the drawee is dead (a), or has absconded, or is a fictitious person or a person not having capacity to contract by bill;
2. Where after the exercise of reasonable diligence, presentment cannot be made;
3. Where although presentment has been irregular, acceptance has been refused on some other ground.

(a) See § 242 (145), subd. 2.

**Sec. 246 (149). *When Dishonored by Non-Acceptance.***

A bill is dishonored by non-acceptance:

1. When it is duly presented for acceptance, and such an acceptance as is prescribed by this act is refused or cannot be obtained; or,
2. When presentment for acceptance is excused (a) and the bill is not accepted.

(a) In North Carolina act (§ 149) "executed" (sic).

**Sec. 247 (150). *Duty of Holder where Bill not Accepted.***

Where a bill is duly presented for acceptance and is not accepted within the prescribed time, the person presenting it must treat the bill as dishonored by non-acceptance or he loses the right of recourse against the drawer and indorsers. (a)

(a) See § 188 (117).

**Sec. 248 (151). *Rights of Holder where Bill not Accepted.***

When a bill is dishonored by non-acceptance, an immediate right of recourse against the drawers and indorsers accrues to the holder, and no presentment for payment is necessary.

**ARTICLE XIII.<sup>12</sup>****PROTEST OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE****Section 260. In what Cases Protest Necessary.**

- 261. Protest; How Made.
- 262. Protest; By Whom Made.
- 263. Protest; When to be Made.
- 264. Protest; Where Made.
- 265. Protest Both for Non-Acceptance and Non-Payment.
- 266. Protest before Maturity where Acceptor Insolvent.
- 267. When Protest Dispensed with.
- 268. Protest; Where Bill is Lost, et cetera.

**Sec. 260 (152). *In what Cases Protest Necessary.***

Where a foreign bill (a) appearing on its face to be such is dishonored by non-acceptance, it must be duly protested for non-acceptance, and where such a bill which has not previously been dishonored by non-acceptance is dishonored by non-payment, it must be duly protested for non-payment. If it is not so protested, the drawer and indorsers are discharged. Where a bill does not appear on its face to be a foreign bill, protest thereof in case of dishonor is unnecessary.

(a) See § 213 (129).

**Sec. 261 (153). *Protest; How Made.***

The protest must be annexed to the bill, or must contain a copy thereof, and must be under the hand and seal of the notary making it, and must specify:

1. The time and place of presentment;
2. The fact that presentment was made and the manner thereof;
3. The cause or reason for protesting the bill;
4. The demand made and the answer given, if any, or the fact that the drawee or acceptor could not be found.

**Sec. 262 (154). *Protest; By Whom Made.***

Protest may be made by:

1. A notary public; or,
2. By any respectable resident of the place where the bill is dishonored, in the presence of two or more credible witnesses.

<sup>12</sup> §§ 152-160, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 171-179, Md.; §§ 160-168, R. I.; §§ 1681-9 to 1681-17, Wis.

**Sec. 263 (155). *Protest; When to be Made.***

When a bill is protested, such protest must be made on the day of its dishonor, unless delay is excused as herein provided. (a) When a bill has been duly noted, the protest may be subsequently extended as of the date of the noting.

(a) See § 267 (159).

**Sec. 264 (156). *Protest; Where Made.***

A bill must be protested at the place where it is dishonored, except that when a bill drawn payable at the place of business or residence of some person other than the drawee, has been dishonored by non-acceptance, it must be protested for non-payment at the place where it is expressed to be payable, and no further presentment for payment to, or demand on, the drawee is necessary.

**Sec. 265 (157). *Protest Both for Non-Acceptance and Non-Payment.***

A bill which has been protested for non-acceptance may be subsequently protested for non-payment.

**Sec. 266 (158). *Protest before Maturity where Acceptor Insolvent.***

Where the acceptor has been adjudged a bankrupt or an insolvent or has made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, before the bill matures, the holder may cause the bill to be protested for better security against the drawer and indorsers.

**Sec. 267 (159). *When Protest Dispensed with.***

Protest is dispensed with by any circumstances which would dispense with notice of dishonor. (a) Delay in noting or protesting is excused when delay is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the holder and not imputable to his default, misconduct, or negligence. When the cause of delay ceases to operate, the bill must be noted or protested with reasonable diligence.

(a) See §§ 180 (109) -186 (115), 188 (117).

**Sec. 268 (160). *Protest where Bill is Lost, et cetera.***

Where a bill is lost or destroyed or is wrongly detained from the person entitled to hold it, protest may be made on a copy or written particulars thereof.



**ARTICLE XIV.<sup>14</sup>****ACCEPTANCE OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE FOR HONOR.**

**Section 280.** When Bill May be Accepted for Honor.

281. Acceptance for Honor; How Made.

282. When Deemed to be an Acceptance for Honor of the Drawer.

283. Liability of Acceptor for Honor.

284. Agreement of Acceptor for Honor.

285. Maturity of Bill Payable after Sight; Accepted for Honor.

286. Protest of Bill Accepted for Honor, et cetera.

287. Presentment for Payment to Acceptor for Honor; How Made.

288. When Delay in Making Presentment is Excused.

289. Dishonor of Bill by Acceptor for Honor.

**Sec. 280 (161).** *When Bill May be Accepted for Honor.*

Where a bill of exchange has been protested for dishonor by non-acceptance or protested for better security and is not overdue, any person not being a party already liable thereon may, with the consent of the holder, intervene and accept the bill supra protest for the honor of any party liable thereon or for the honor of the person for whose account the bill is drawn.

The acceptance for honor may be for part only of the sum for which the bill is drawn; and where there has been an acceptance for honor for one party, there may be a further acceptance by a different person for the honor of another party.

**Sec. 281 (162).** *Acceptance for Honor; How Made.*

An acceptance for honor supra protest must be in writing and indicate that it is an acceptance for honor, and must be signed by the acceptor for honor.

**Sec. 282 (163).** *When Deemed to be an Acceptance for Honor of the Drawer.*

Where an acceptance for honor does not expressly state for whose honor it is made, it is deemed to be an acceptance for the honor of the drawer.

**Sec. 283 (164).** *Liability of Acceptor for Honor.*

The acceptor for honor is liable to the holder and to all parties to the bill subsequent to the party for whose honor he has accepted.

<sup>14</sup> §§ 161-170, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 180-189, Md.; §§ 169-178, R. I.; §§ 1681-18 to 1681-27, Wis.

**Sec. 284 (165). *Agreement of Acceptor for Honor.***

The acceptor for honor by such acceptance engages that he will on due presentment pay the bill according to the terms of his acceptance, provided it shall not have been paid by the drawee, and provided also, that it shall have been duly presented for payment and protested for non-payment and notice of dishonor given to him.

**Sec. 285 (166). *Maturity of Bill Payable after Sight; Accepted for Honor.***

Where a bill payable after sight is accepted for honor, its maturity is calculated from the date of the noting for non-acceptance and not from the date of the acceptance for honor.

**Sec. 286 (167). *Protest of Bill Accepted for Honor, et cetera.***

Where a dishonored bill has been accepted for honor supra protest or contains a reference in case of need, it must be protested for non-payment before it is presented for payment to the acceptor for honor or referee in case of need.

**Sec. 287 (168). *Presentment for Payment to Acceptor for Honor; How Made.***

Presentment for payment to the acceptor for honor must be made as follows:

1. If it is to be presented in the place where the protest for non-payment was made, it must be presented not later than the day following its maturity;

2. If it is to be presented in some other place than the place where it was protested, then it must be forwarded within the time specified in section 175. (a)

(a) In original New York act "section 104" by mistake.

**Sec. 288 (169). *When Delay in Making Presentment is Excused.***

The provisions of section one hundred and forty-one (a) apply where there is delay in making presentment to the acceptor for honor or referee in case of need.

(a) In original New York act "section 81" by mistake.

**Sec. 289 (170). *Dishonor of Bill by Acceptor for Honor.***

When the bill is dishonored by the acceptor for honor it must be protested for non-payment by him.

**ARTICLE XV.<sup>15</sup>****PAYMENT OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE FOR HONOR.****Section 300. Who may Make Payment for Honor.****301. Payment for Honor; How Made.****302. Declaration before Payment for Honor.****303. Preference of Parties Offering to Pay for Honor.****304. Effect on Subsequent Parties where Bill is Paid for Honor.****305. Where Holder Refuses to Receive Payment Supra Protest.****306. Rights of Payer for Honor.****Sec. 300 (171). *Who may Make Payment for Honor.***

Where a bill has been protested for non-payment, any person may intervene and pay it supra protest for the honor of any person liable thereon or for the honor of the person for whose account it was drawn.

**Sec. 301 (172). *Payment for Honor; How Made.***

The payment for honor supra protest in order to operate as such and not as a mere voluntary payment must be attested by a notarial act of honor which may be appended to the protest or form an extension to it.

**Sec. 302 (173). *Declaration before Payment for Honor.***

The notarial act of honor must be founded on a declaration made by the payer for honor or by his agent in that behalf declaring his intention to pay the bill for honor and for whose honor he pays.

**Sec. 303 (174). *Preference of Parties Offering to Pay for Honor.***

Where two or more persons offer to pay a bill for the honor of different parties, the person whose payment will discharge most parties to the bill is to be given the preference.

**Sec. 304 (175). *Effect on Subsequent Parties where Bill is Paid for Honor.***

Where a bill has been paid for honor all parties subsequent to the party for whose honor it is paid are discharged, but the payer for honor is subrogated for, and succeeds to, both the rights and duties of the holder as regards the party for whose honor he pays and all parties liable to the latter.

<sup>15</sup> §§ 171-177, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 190-196, Md.; §§ 179-185, R. I.; §§ 1681-28 to 1681-34, Wis.

**Sec. 305 (176).** *Where Holder Refuses to Receive Payment Supra Protest.*

Where the holder of a bill refuses to receive payment supra protest, he loses his right of recourse against any party who would have been discharged by such payment.

**Sec. 306 (177).** *Rights of Payer for Honor.*

The payer for honor on paying to the holder the amount of the bill and the notarial expenses incidental to its dishonor, is entitled to receive both the bill itself and the protest.

**ARTICLE XVI.<sup>18</sup>****BILLS IN A SET.****Section 310. Bills in Sets Constitute One Bill.****311. Rights of Holders where Different Parts are Negotiated.****312. Liability of Holder who Indorses Two or More Parts of a Set to Different Persons.****313. Acceptance of Bills Drawn in Sets.****314. Payment by Acceptor of Bills Drawn in Sets.****315. Effect of Discharging One of a Set.****Sec. 310 (178). *Bills in Sets Constitute One Bill.***

Where a bill is drawn in a set, each part of the set being numbered and containing a reference to the other parts, the whole of the parts constitute one bill.

**Sec. 311 (179). *Rights of Holders where Different Parts are Negotiated.***

Where two or more parts of a set are negotiated to different holders in due course, the holder whose title first accrues is as between such holders the true owner of the bill. But nothing in this section affects the rights of a person who in due course accepts or pays the part first presented to him.

**Sec. 312 (180). *Liability of Holder who Indorses Two or More Parts of a Set to Different Persons.***

Where the holder of a set indorses two or more parts to different persons he is liable on every such part, and every indorser subsequent to him is liable on the part he has himself indorsed, as if such parts were separate bills.

**Sec. 313 (181). *Acceptance of Bills Drawn in Sets.***

The acceptance may be written on any part and it must be written on one part only. If the drawee accepts more than one part, and such accepted parts are negotiated to different holders in due course, he is liable on every such part as if it were a separate bill.

**Sec. 314 (182). *Payment by Acceptor of Bills Drawn in Sets.***

When the acceptor of a bill drawn in a set pays it without requiring the part bearing his acceptance to be delivered up to him,

<sup>18</sup> §§ 178-183, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 197-202, Md.; §§ 186-191, R. I.; §§ 1681-35 to 1681-40, Wis.

and that part at maturity is outstanding in the hands of a holder in due course, he is liable to the holder thereon.

**Sec. 315 (183). *Effect of Discharging One of a Set.***

Except as herein otherwise provided, where any one part of a bill drawn in a set is discharged by payment or otherwise the whole bill is discharged.

[Note. The Wisconsin act here inserts an article, not found in the other acts, entitled "Damages on Bills," as follows:

§ 1682. Whenever any bill of exchange drawn or indorsed within this state and payable without the limits of the United States shall be duly protested for non-acceptance or non-payment the party liable for the contents of such bill shall, on due notice and demand thereof, pay the same at the current rate of exchange at the time of the demand and damages at the rate of five per cent. upon the contents thereof, together with interest on the said contents, to be computed from the date of the protest; and said amount of contents, damages and interest shall be in full of all damages, charges and expenses.

§ 1683. If any bill of exchange drawn upon any person or corporation out of this state, but within some state or territory of the United States, for the payment of money shall be duly presented for acceptance or payment and protested for non-acceptance or non-payment the drawer or indorser thereof, due notice being given of such non-acceptance or non-payment, shall pay said bill with legal interest according to its tenor and five per cent. damages, together with costs and charges of protest.]

ARTICLE XVII.<sup>17</sup>

## PROMISSORY NOTES AND CHECKS.

**Section 320. Promissory Note Defined.**

821. Check Defined.

822. Within what Time a Check Must be Presented.

823. Certification of Check; Effect of.

824. Effect where Holder of Check Procures it to be Certified.

825. When Check Operates as an Assignment.

**Sec. 320 (184). *Promissory Note Defined.***

A negotiable promissory note within the meaning of this act is an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another signed by the maker engaging to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to order or to bearer. Where a note is drawn to the maker's own order, it is not complete until indorsed by him.

**Sec. 321 (185). *Check Defined.***

A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank (a) payable on demand. Except as herein otherwise provided, the provisions of this act applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a check.

(a) See § 2 (191) "bank."

**Sec. 322 (186). *Within what Time a Check Must be Presented.***

A check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time (a) after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.

(a) See § 4 (193).

**Sec. 323 (187). *Certification of Check; Effect of.***

Where a check is certified by the bank on which it is drawn the certification is equivalent to an acceptance.

**Sec. 324 (188). *Effect where the Holder of Check Procures it to be Certified.***

Where the holder of a check procures it to be accepted or certified the drawer and all indorsers are discharged from liability thereon.

<sup>17</sup> §§ 184-189, Colo., Conn., D. C., Fla., Mass., N. C., N. D., Or., Tenn., Utah, Va., and Wash.; §§ 203-208, Md.; §§ 192-197, R. I.; §§ 1684 to 1684-5, Wis.



**Sec. 325 (189). *When Check Operates as an Assignment.***

**A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder, unless and until it accepts or certifies the check.**

**ARTICLE XVIII.<sup>18</sup>****NOTES GIVEN FOR A PATENT RIGHT AND FOR A SPECULATIVE CONSIDERATION.**

**Section 330. Negotiable Instruments Given for Patent Rights.**

**331. Negotiable Instruments Given for a Speculative Consideration.**

**332. How Negotiable Bonds are Made Non-Negotiable.**

**Sec. 330. *Negotiable Instruments Given for Patent Rights.***

A promissory note or other negotiable instrument, the consideration of which consists wholly or partly of the right to make, use or sell any invention claimed or represented by the vendor at the time of sale to be patented, must contain the words "given for a patent right" prominently and legibly written or printed on the face of such note or instrument above the signature thereto; and such note or instrument in the hands of any purchaser or holder is subject to the same defenses as in the hands of the original holder; but this section does not apply to a negotiable instrument given solely for the purchase price or the use of a patented article.

**Sec. 331. *Negotiable Instruments for a Speculative Consideration.***

If the consideration of a promissory note or other negotiable instrument consists in whole or in part of the purchase price of any farm product, at a price greater by at least four times than the fair market value of the same product at the time, in the locality, or of the membership and rights in an association, company or combination to produce or sell any farm product at a fictitious rate, or of a contract or bond to purchase or sell any farm product at a price greater by four times than the market value of the same product at the time in the locality, the words, "given for a speculative consideration," or other words clearly showing the nature of the consideration, must be prominently and legibly written or printed on the face of such note or instrument above the signature thereof; and such note or instrument, in the hands of any purchaser or holder, is subject to the same defenses as in the hands of the original owner or holder.

<sup>18</sup> This article appears only in New York.

**Sec. 332. *How Negotiable Bonds are Made Non-Negotiable.***

The owner or holder of any corporate or municipal bond or obligation (except such as are designated to circulate as money, payable to bearer), heretofore or hereafter issued in and payable in this state, but not registered in pursuance of any state law, may make such bond or obligation, or the interest coupon accompanying the same, non-negotiable, by subscribing his name to a statement indorsed thereon, that such bond, obligation or coupon is his property; and thereon the principal sum therein mentioned is payable only to such owner or holder, or his legal representatives or assigns, unless such bond, obligation or coupon be transferred by indorsement in blank, or payable to bearer, or to order, with the addition of the assignor's place of residence.



# TABLE OF CASES CITED.

[THE FIGURES REFER TO PAGES.]

## A

Abbott v. Hendricks, 193.  
     v. Winchester, 304.  
 Abel v. Alexander, 307.  
 Adams v. Blethen, 109, 119.  
     v. Cordis, 173.  
     v. Darby, 366, 395.  
     v. Jones, 137.  
     v. King, 59, 60.  
     v. Leland, 358, 399, 400.  
     v. Robertson, 184.  
     v. Wright, 390.  
 Adanson Co., In re, 66.  
 Aetna Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bank,  
     419.  
 Agawam Bank v. Strever, 182.  
 Agnew v. Bank of Gettysburg, 361.  
 Agra & Masterman's Bank v. Leighton,  
     281.  
 Akers v. Demond, 184-186.  
 Alabama Coal Min. Co. v. Brainard,  
     81.  
 Alderson v. Langdale, 248, 250.  
 Aldrich v. Jackson, 174.  
 Aldridge v. Branch Bank, 287.  
 Alexander v. Burchfield, 414, 415.  
     v. Strong, 338.  
     v. Thomas, 32, 35.  
 Alger v. Scott, 39.  
     v. Thacher, 291.  
 Allan v. Mawson, 58.  
 Allen v. Brown, 12.  
     v. Coffin, 113.  
     v. Deming, 286.  
     v. Edmonson, 390.  
     v. Edmundson, 383, 385.  
     v. Rescous, 288.  
     v. Suydam, 80, 341, 346.  
 Allport v. Meek, 331.  
 Almich v. Downey, 72, 73.  
 Almy v. Winslow, 16, 81.

NEG.BILLS

Alves v. Hodgson, 185.  
 American Bank v. Jenness, 347.  
 American Exch. Bank v. Blanchard,  
     16.  
 American Exch. Nat. Bank v. New  
     York B. & P. Co., 314.  
 American Nat. Bank v. Mfg. Co., 384,  
     395.  
 American Trust & Savings Bank v.  
     Gluck, 183.  
 Ames v. Meriam, 207, 417.  
 Anchor v. Bank of England, 128, 321.  
 Ancona v. Marks, 213.  
 Anderson v. Drake, 73, 354, 400.  
     v. Hick, 93.  
     v. Pearce, 30, 66.  
 Anderton v. Beck, 349.  
     v. Shoup, 66.  
 Andrew v. Blachly, 75.  
 Andrews v. Boyd, 402.  
     v. Chadbourne, 328, 330.  
     v. Franklin, 35.  
     v. German Nat. Bank, 422, 423.  
     v. Marrett, 308.  
     v. Pond, 186.  
 Angle v. Insurance Co., 246.  
 Aniba v. Yeomans, 158.  
 Annville Nat. Bank v. Kettering, 401.  
 Anonymous, 3, 194, 297, 353.  
 Anthony v. Harrison, 275, 282, 328.  
 Appleby v. Biddolph, 34.  
 Archibald v. Argall, 20.  
 Armistead v. Armistead, 366.  
 Armour v. McMichael, 312.  
 Armstrong, In re, 90, 97.  
     v. Bank, 62.  
     v. Caldwell, 366.  
     v. Gibson, 243.  
     v. Harshman, 139.  
 Arnold v. Bryant, 142.  
     v. Clifford, 288.  
     v. Dresser, 340, 364.

(491)

[The figures refer to pages.]

- Arnold v. Rock River V. U. R. Co.**, 49.  
     v. Sprague, 7, 66, 74, 92.  
**Arnot v. Pittston & E. Coal Co.**, 291.  
**Artcher v. Whalen**, 69.  
**Artisans' Bank v. Backus**, 374.  
**Ashurst v. Royal Bank of Australia**, 207.  
**Atkins v. Johnson**, 288.  
**Atkinson v. Hawdon**, 255.  
     v. Manks, 7, 75.  
**Atlanta Mining & Rolling Mill Co. v. Gwyer**, 239.  
**Atlanta Nat. Bank v. Davis**, 427.  
**Atlanta Sav. Bank v. Spencer**, 243.  
**Atlantic Nat. Bank of New York v. Franklin**, 316.  
**Atlas Bank v. Doyle**, 182, 316.  
**Attenborough v. Mackenzie**, 79, 296.  
**Attorney General v. Continental Life Ins. Co.**, 419.  
**Aubert v. Maze**, 282.  
**Auerbach v. Pritchett**, 45.  
**Aull Sav. Bank v. City of Lexington**, 224.  
**Aurey v. Fearnslides**, 52.  
**Auriol v. Thomas**, 160.  
**Austin v. Imus**, 189.  
     v. Munro, 64.  
**Averett v. Booker**, 7, 38, 75.  
**Averill v. Wood**, 81.  
**Avery v. Stewart**, 76, 77, 350.  
**Awde v. Dixon**, 259.  
**Ayer v. Tilden**, 244.  
**Aymar v. Beers**, 341, 346, 347.  
     v. Sheldon, 129, 344, 403.  
**Ayres v. Campbell**, 13.
- B**
- Bachellor v. Priest**, 299, 341, 361.  
**Backhouse v. Harrison**, 320.  
**Backus v. Shipherd**, 402.  
**Bacon v. Burnham**, 140.  
     v. Dyer, 366.  
     v. Fitch, 60.  
     v. Harris, 180.  
**Badgley v. Votrain**, 136.  
**Baer v. Leppert**, 362.  
**Bailey v. Armstrong**, 112.  
     v. Bank, 397.  
     v. Bidwell, 284, 334.  
     v. Dozier, 371.  
     v. Heald, 189.  
**Bainbridge v. Firmstone**, 273.
- Baird v. Underwood**, 83.  
**Baker v. Dening**, 55.  
**Baldwin v. Bank**, 133.  
     v. Killian, 283.  
     v. Van Deusen, 168.  
**Balfour v. Sea Fire Life Assur. Co.**, 272.  
**Ball v. Allen**, 58.  
     v. Powers, 287.  
**Baillard v. Greenbush**, 295.  
     v. Insurance Co., 248.  
**Ballingalls v. Gloster**, 157, 161, 342.  
**Bank v. Godfrey**, 223.  
     v. Orvis, 353.  
**Banker v. Banker**, 229.  
**Bank of Albion v. Smith**, 115.  
**Bank of Alexandria v. Mandeville**, 239.  
     v. Swann, 76, 390, 391, 416.  
     v. Young, 367.  
**Bank of America v. Shaw**, 389.  
**Bank of British North America v. Merchants' Nat. Bank**, 257.  
**Bank of Burlington v. Raymond**, 341.  
**Bank of Chenango v. Hyde**, 181, 182, 315.  
**Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence**, 385-388, 392.  
**Bank of Commerce v. Bogy**, 8.  
     v. Chambers, 389.  
     v. Goos, 427.  
     v. Union Bank, 55, 146, 148, 151, 251.  
**Bank of Cumberland v. Mayberry**, 286, 287.  
**Bank of England v. Newman**, 21, 206, 363.  
     v. Vagliano, 63, 431.  
**Bank of Ft. Edward v. Washington County Bank**, 210.  
**Bank of Genesee v. Bank**, 67, 224, 225.  
**Bank of Ireland v. Archer**, 96, 100, 101.  
     v. Beresford, 179.  
**Bank of Jamaica v. Jefferson**, 134.  
**Bank of Kentucky v. Wister**, 206.  
**Bank of Limestone v. Penick**, 252.  
**Bank of Marietta v. Pindall**, 106.  
**Bank of Metropolis v. Breut**, 355.  
     v. New England Bank, 312.  
**Bank of Michigan v. Ely**, 99.  
     v. Niles, 224.  
**Bank of Missouri v. Wright**, 48.  
**Bank of New York v. Muskingum Branch Bank of Ohio**, 225.

[The figures refer to pages.]

- Bank of New York v. Vanderhorst**, 315.  
**Bank of Old Dominion v. McVeigh**, 373.  
**Bank of Orleans v. Merrill**, 31.  
     v. Whittemore, 72, 358.  
**Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal**, 259, 321.  
**Bank of Republic v. Millard**, 426.  
**Bank of Rochester v. Gray**, 161.  
**Bank of Rutland v. Buck**, 181, 315.  
     v. Woodruff, 425.  
**Bank of Salina v. Babcock**, 310, 314.  
**Bank of Sandusky v. Scoville**, 310.  
**Bank of Syracuse v. Hollister**, 351, 356.  
**Bank of United States v. Bank of Georgia**, 148.  
     v. Carneal, 378, 389.  
     v. Corcoran, 385.  
     v. Daniel, 20, 24, 408.  
     v. Davis, 380.  
     v. Goddard, 380, 382.  
     v. Norwood, 386.  
     v. Smith, 172, 359.  
     v. United States, 171, 297, 299.  
     v. Waggener, 237.  
**Bank of Utica v. Bender**, 385.  
     v. Philips, 351.  
     v. Smith, 351, 361, 379, 382.  
**Bank of Washington v. Reynolds**, 400.  
     v. Triplett, 341, 350, 353.  
**Barbor v. Boehm**, 279.  
**Barbour v. Fullerton**, 347.  
**Barclay v. Bailey**, 352.  
     v. Minchin, 24.  
**Bardsley v. Delp**, 315.  
**Baring v. Clark**, 155.  
**Barker v. Bradley**, 71.  
     v. Casidy, 176.  
     v. Hall, 386.  
     v. Mechanics' Fire Ins. Co., 225.  
     v. Parker, 77.  
     v. Sterne, 259.  
**Barlow v. Bishop**, 221.  
     v. Myers, 133.  
**Barnes v. Vaughan**, 354, 357, 363.  
**Barnet v. Smith**, 91.  
**Barnett v. Juday**, 56.  
     v. Offerman, 180.  
**Barney v. Earle**, 312.  
     v. Newcomb, 80.  
     v. Worthington, 99.  
**Barough v. White**, 172.  
**Barret v. Evans**, 386.  
**Barrett v. Allen**, 77, 350.  
**Barrett v. May**, 110.  
     v. Wills, 357, 399.  
**Barrick v. Austin**, 6.  
**Barriere v. Nairac**, 16.  
**Barry v. Equitable Assur. Soc.**, 269.  
     v. Morse, 115, 401.  
**Bartlett v. Robinson**, 389.  
     v. Smith, 245.  
     v. Tucker, 66.  
**Bartrum v. Caddy**, 295, 296.  
**Bass v. Clive**, 148.  
**Bassenhorst v. Wilby**, 41, 207.  
**Bassett v. Avery**, 327.  
**Batavian Bank v. McDonald**, 306.  
**Bateman v. Joseph**, 354.  
**Bathe v. Taylor**, 250.  
**Batsford v. Every**, 286.  
**Battle v. Weems**, 180, 212.  
**Baxendale v. Bennett**, 260, 303.  
**Bay v. Coddington**, 313.  
**Bayard v. Shunk**, 279.  
**Bayerque v. City of San Francisco**, 37.  
**Bayley v. Taber**, 68, 235.  
**Beach v. Bank**, 183.  
     v. Wise, 206.  
     v. Zimmerman, 307.  
**Beal v. City of Somerville**, 125.  
**Beale v. Parrish**, 389.  
**Beals v. See**, 227, 231.  
**Bearce v. Barstow**, 237.  
**Beard v. Root**, 308.  
**Beardesley v. Baldwin**, 34.  
**Beatty's Estate v. Western College**, 36.  
**Beck v. Robley**, 298.  
     v. Thompson, 350.  
**Becker's Investment Agency v. Rea**, 243.  
**Beckwith, In re**, 231.  
**Bedell v. Carll**, 206.  
**Beecher v. Buckingham**, 10.  
**Beeching v. Gower**, 356.  
**Begbie v. Levi**, 285.  
**Behrens v. McKenzie**, 228, 231.  
**Belcher v. Smith**, 109.  
**Belden v. Hann**, 113.  
     v. Lamb, 241, 244.  
**Belford v. Bangs**, 129.  
**Bell v. Alexander**, 417.  
     v. Bean, 316.  
     v. Dagg, 168, 174.  
     v. Hagerstown Bank, 337.  
     v. Ingestre, 70.  
     v. Mahin, 247.  
     v. Packard, 188.  
**Bellamy v. Majoribanks**, 79.

[The figures refer to pages.]

- Bellasis v. Hester, 76, 103.  
 Belmont Branch of State Bank v. Hoge, 320.  
 Benedict v. Cowden, 123, 253.  
     v. Miner, 250.  
     v. Schmieg, 364, 387.  
 Benjamin v. Tillman, 74.  
 Bennett v. Farnell, 62.  
     v. Smith, 243.  
 Bennington v. Dinsmore, 59.  
 Bennison v. Jewison, 245.  
 Bentinck v. Dorrien, 88.  
 Benton v. Martin, 70, 71, 123.  
 Berkley v. Cannon, 233.  
 Berkshire Bank v. Jones, 402.  
 Berridge v. Fitzgerald, 389.  
 Berry v. Robinson, 209.  
     v. Southern Bank, 398.  
 Besancon v. Shirley, 43.  
 Bickerdike v. Bollman, 394.  
 Bickford v. First Nat. Bank, 415.  
 Bicknell v. Waterman, 21, 169.  
 Bierce v. Stocking, 194.  
 Bigelow v. Colton, 139, 206.  
     v. Stilphen, 255.  
 Bilderback v. Burlingame, 75.  
 Billgerry v. Branch, 398.  
 Billing v. Devaux, 98.  
 Billings v. Collins, 199.  
 Bird v. Daggett, 183, 225.  
 Birdsall v. Russell, 13, 321.  
 Bishop v. Curtis, 198.  
     v. Hayward, 135.  
     v. Rowe, 21.  
 Bissell v. Lewis, 100, 184.  
 Bitzer v. Wagar, 205.  
 Black v. Caffé, 144.  
     v. Ridgway, 194, 281.  
     v. Ward, 46.  
 Blackburn, Ex parte, 20.  
 Blackhan v. Doren, 396.  
 Blackstone Bank v. Hill, 307.  
 Blade v. Noland, 255, 302.  
 Blair v. Bank of Tennessee, 356, 366.  
     v. Wilson, 404, 408, 416.  
 Blake v. McMillen, 364.  
 Blakemore v. Wood, 329.  
 Blakeslee v. Hewett, 141.  
 Blanchard v. Stevens, 312.  
 Blanckenhagen v. Blundell, 60.  
 Blandin v. Wade, 339.  
 Blatchford v. Melliken, 113.  
 Blenn v. Lyford, 183, 296.  
 Blesard v. Hirst, 158.  
 Blethen v. Lovering, 164.  
 Bliss v. Matteson, 288.  
 Block v. Bell, 30, 57, 58.  
 Blodgett v. Durgin, 187.  
 Blont v. Proctor, 293.  
 Bloss v. Bloomer, 288.  
 Blossom v. Griffin, 71.  
 Boalt v. Brown, 251.  
 Boardman v. Spooner, 55.  
 Bock v. Lauman, 241.  
 Bodley v. Higgins, 69.  
 Boehm v. Garclas, 82.  
 Bogy v. Keil, 395.  
 Bolton v. Dugdale, 52.  
 Bonar v. Mitchell, 371.  
 Bond v. Farnham, 397.  
     v. Fitzpatrick, 207.  
 Bonner v. Nelson, 267.  
 Bookstaver v. Jayne, 71, 123.  
 Booth v. Powers, 248, 255.  
     v. Robinson, 223, 224.  
 Borden v. Clerk, 121.  
 Born v. First Nat. Bank, 423.  
 Borough v. Perkins, 370.  
 Bossange v. Ross, 241.  
 Bottum v. Scott, 275, 328.  
 Boulton v. Welsh, 376, 378.  
 Bowen v. Bryne, 245.  
     v. Newell, 187, 350, 406, 409.  
     v. Stoddard, 173.  
 Bower v. Hastings, 180, 212.  
 Bowling v. Harrison, 386, 387, 416.  
 Bowman v. McChesney, 40.  
 Bowyer v. Bampton, 164, 194, 195, 234, 235.  
 Boyce v. Edwards, 100.  
     v. Smith, 230.  
 Boyd v. City Sav. Bank, 384, 386.  
     v. Cleveland, 401, 402.  
     v. Corbitt, 125, 215.  
     v. Emmerson, 425.  
 Boynton v. Page, 285.  
     v. Pierce, 113, 142.  
 Bradlaugh v. De Rin, 188.  
 Bradley v. Davis, 385.  
     v. Delaplaine, 406.  
 Brady v. Chandler, 30.  
 Bragg v. Danielson, 302.  
 Braham v. Bubb, 34.  
 Brailsford v. Williams, 379.  
 Braithwaite v. Gardiner, 149.  
 Braman v. Hess, 175.  
 Brandt v. Mickle, 367.  
 Bray v. Hadwen, 392.  
 Brayley v. Kelly, 55.  
 Breck v. Cole, 288, 329.



[The figures refer to pages.]

- Breckinridge v. Ralls, 43.  
 Brennehan v. Furniss, 114.  
 Brenzer v. Wightman, 391.  
 Brewer v. Boynton, 135.  
 Brewster v. Dana, 113.  
     v. McCardell, 72.  
     v. Shrader, 317, 431.  
 Breyfogle v. Beckley, 172.  
 Bridgeford v. Mfg. Co., 339.  
 Bridgeport Bank v. Welch, 312.  
 Bridges v. Berry, 368.  
     v. Winters, 247.  
 Brigg v. Hilton, 280.  
 Briggs v. Boyd, 182.  
     v. Dorr, 202.  
     v. Latham, 109, 183.  
     v. Merrill, 324.  
     v. Partridge, 67.  
 Brigham v. Fayerweather, 227.  
     v. Marean, 213.  
 Bright v. Purrier, 342.  
 Brill v. Tuttle, 8, 38, 39.  
 Brimhall v. Van Campen, 287.  
 Brind v. Hampshire, 137.  
 Brindley v. Barr, 387.  
 Bringham v. Lighley, 281.  
 Bristol v. Warner, 7, 274.  
 Bristow v. Sequeville, 185.  
 Britton v. Dierker, 249.  
     v. Hall, 211.  
 Bromage v. Lloyd, 69, 187.  
 Bromwich v. Lloyd, 4.  
 Brook v. Hook, 256.  
     v. Teague, 112.  
 Brooklyn C. & N. R. Co. v. National Bank, 311.  
 Brookman v. Millbank, 333.  
 Brooks v. Elkins, 30.  
     v. Hargreaves, 35, 51.  
     v. Higby, 356.  
     v. Mitchell, 209, 345, 346.  
 Brower v. Fisher, 230.  
 Brown, In re, 406, 409.  
     v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, 55, 108, 407.  
     v. Callaway, 316.  
     v. Cronise, 369.  
     v. Curtiss, 110.  
     v. Davies, 207.  
     v. Donnell, 226.  
     v. Ferguson, 373, 391, 392.  
     v. Harraden, 350.  
     v. Jodrell, 227.  
     v. Jones, 84, 251, 359.  
     v. Jordhal, 25.  
 Brown v. Leavitt, 310, 315.  
     v. Leckle, 423.  
     v. Lusk, 406.  
     v. Maffey, 395.  
     v. Mott, 175, 179, 211.  
     v. Reed, 254.  
     v. St. Charles, 71.  
     v. Taber, 181.  
     v. Turner, 362, 364.  
 Browne v. Joddrell, 231.  
 Browning v. Kinnear, 354.  
 Bruce v. Wright, 123.  
 Brush v. Scribner, 312, 315.  
 Bruyn v. Russell, 275.  
 Bryant v. Eastman, 201.  
     v. Faries, 130.  
     v. Lord, 401.  
     v. Merchants' Bank, 401.  
     v. Pember, 281.  
 Buchanan v. Hubbard, 219.  
 Buckley v. Briggs, 224.  
     v. Hann, 137.  
     v. Jackson, 322.  
 Buckner v. Finley, 416.  
 Bull v. Bank, 45, 406, 408, 413, 415, 417.  
     v. Rice, 237.  
     v. Sims, 145.  
 Bullard v. Randall, 79, 409, 419.  
 Buller v. Crips, 3, 197.  
 Bullock v. Taylor, 52.  
 Burbridge v. Manners, 296.  
 Burchell v. Slocock, 6.  
 Burchfield v. Moore, 246, 250, 253.  
 Burgess v. Merrill, 218.  
     v. Northern Bank, 256.  
     v. Pollock, 230.  
 Burke v. Allen, 231.  
     v. Dulaney, 71.  
     v. McKay, 24, 371, 416.  
 Burmester v. Barron, 389.  
 Burnap v. Cook, 114, 118.  
 Burnes v. Scott, 193.  
 Burnham v. Webster, 402.  
 Burns v. Rowland, 315.  
 Burr v. Smith, 300.  
 Burrill v. Smith, 165.  
 Burritt v. Tidmarsh, 367.  
 Burrough v. Moss, 208.  
 Burrows v. Klunk, 246, 254.  
 Burson v. Huntington, 68, 268.  
 Burtnett v. Gwynne, 12.  
 Burton v. Stewart, 280.  
 Bussard v. Levering, 77, 350, 383.  
 Butler v. Paine, 44.

[The figures refer to pages.]

Buxton v. Jones, 161, 355.  
B. & W. Beeman v. Duck, 331.

## C

Cabbott v. Radford, 245.  
Cabot Bank v. Morton, 170.  
v. Warner, 387.  
Cady v. Bradshaw, 402.  
v. Shepard, 141.  
Caister v. Eccles, 10.  
Calder v. Billington, 203.  
Callahan v. Bank, 384.  
Callanan v. Edwards, 197.  
Callott v. Haigh, 307.  
Callow v. Lawrence, 298.  
Camden v. McKoy, 113, 141.  
Camden Bank v. Hall, 247.  
Came v. Brigham, 224.  
Camidge v. Allenby, 279, 368.  
Cammer v. Harrison, 344.  
Campbell v. French, 76, 344.  
v. Pettengill, 85.  
v. Sloan, 240.  
v. Welster, 43.  
v. Wilcox, 245.  
Campbell Printing Press & Mfg. Co.  
v. Jones, 172.  
Canadian Bank of Commerce v.  
Coumbe, 150.  
Canajoharie Nat. Bank v. Diefendorf,  
320, 334.  
Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, 148,  
257, 331.  
Cannan v. Bryce, 293.  
Canon v. Grigsby, 247.  
Cape Ann Nat. Bank v. Burns, 254.  
Capp v. Lancaster, 344.  
Capron v. Capron, 36.  
Cardwell v. Hicks, 316.  
v. Martin, 242.  
Carew v. Duckworth, 396.  
Carll v. Brown, 347.  
Carlon v. Kenealy, 41, 42.  
Carlos v. Fancourt, 37.  
Carnegie v. Morrison, 97.  
Carnwright v. Gray, 6, 74, 274, 275.  
Carolina Nat. Bank v. Wallace, 385,  
387.  
Carpenter v. Greenop, 207.  
v. Snelling, 245.  
Carrick v. Vickery, 202.  
Carrier v. Cameron, 334.  
Carroll v. Weld, 142.

Carrollton Bank v. Tayleur, 99.  
Carruthers v. West, 176, 180.  
Carter v. Bank, 370, 403.  
v. Beckwith, 229.  
v. Bradley, 376.  
v. Burley, 370, 391, 392.  
v. Downish, 3.  
v. Flower, 395.  
v. Moulton, 71.  
v. Smith, 359.  
Cartwright v. Williams, 187.  
Carver v. Hayes, 74.  
Carvick v. Vickery, 133.  
Cary v. Bancroft, 13.  
v. White, 308.  
Casborne v. Dutton, 29.  
Casco Nat. Bank v. Clark, 67.  
v. Shaw, 388.  
Case v. Burt, 103.  
v. Hall, 20.  
v. Henderson, 419.  
v. Mechanics' Banking Ass'n, 332.  
Cash v. Kennion, 48.  
Cashman v. Harrison, 157.  
Cassel v. Dows, 97.  
Castrique v. Buttigieg, 157.  
Cathell v. Goodwin, 396.  
Catlin v. Gunter, 68.  
Caulkins v. Fry, 234.  
v. Whisler, 260.  
Caunt v. Thompson, 374, 394.  
Cayuga Bank v. Bennett, 383.  
v. Warden, 129, 376, 377, 384.  
Cayuga Co. Bank v. Hunt, 351, 384.  
Cazet v. Field, 235, 285, 287.  
C. C. Thompson & Walkup Co. v.  
Appleby, 384.  
Cecil v. Hicks, 172.  
Central Bank v. Allen, 358, 400.  
v. Davis, 113, 401.  
v. Hammett, 320, 324.  
Central Nat. Bank v. Railroad Co., 25.  
Central Trust Co. v. Bank, 109, 133,  
203.  
Chadwick v. Allen, 59.  
Chaffe v. Ludeling, 245.  
Chaffee v. Jones, 56.  
Challiss v. McCrum, 120, 168.  
Chalmers v. Lanton, 210, 328.  
Chamberlyn v. Delarive, 365.  
Chambers v. Union Bank, 117.  
Champion v. Gordon, 406.  
Chandler v. Temple, 70.  
Chanoine v. Fowler, 379.  
Chapin v. Dobson, 71.

[The figures refer to pages.]

- Chapman v. Black, 243.  
     v. Cottrell, 69.  
     v. Keane, 380, 382.  
     v. Kellogg, 304.  
     v. Rose, 265.  
     v. White, 79, 419.  
 Chappel v. Brockway, 290.  
 Chappellear v. Martin, 297.  
 Chappell v. Bissell, 70, 136.  
     v. Spencer, 253.  
 Charles v. Marsden, 150, 179, 180, 211.  
 Chartiers & Robinson Turnpike Co.  
     v. McNamara, 245.  
 Chase v. Hathorn, 164.  
 Chaters v. Bell, 369.  
 Chatham Bank v. Allison, 403.  
 Cheek v. Roper, 357, 363.  
 Cheever v. Railroad Co., 322.  
 Chemical Electric Light & Power Co.  
     v. Howard, 793.  
 Chemung Canal Bank v. Bradner,  
     183.  
 Chenault v. Bush, 279.  
 Chester v. Dorr, 179, 180, 212.  
 Chicago Railway Equipment Co. v.  
     Bank, 42.  
 Chick v. Pillsbury, 391.  
 Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank,  
     356.  
 Childs v. Monins, 65.  
 Chillicothe Branch of State Bank v.  
     Fox, 67, 366.  
 Chipman v. Foster, 67.  
     v. Tucker, 68, 71.  
 Cholmeley v. Darley, 123, 253.  
 Chouteau v. Webster, 388, 389.  
 Chrysler v. Renols, 43, 314, 315.  
 Church v. Barlow, 177, 380.  
     v. Clapp, 209.  
     v. Howard, 252.  
 Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Brown, 44.  
     v. Cade, 388.  
     v. Piolet, 32, 35.  
     v. Richmond, 246, 251.  
 Citizens' Nat. Bank of Davenport v.  
     Importers' & Traders' Bank, 257.  
 City Bank v. Barnard, 285.  
     v. Cutter, 77.  
 City of Aurora v. West, 235.  
 City of Lexington v. Butler, 206.  
 City of Muscatine v. Sterneman, 245.  
 Clafin v. Boorum, 182, 243.  
     v. Lenheim, 321.  
 Clanin v. Machine Co., 71.  
 Clark v. Blackstock, 252.  
     Clark v. Callison, 203.  
         v. King, 11, 45.  
         v. Manufacturing Co., 25.  
         v. Mundal, 20, 21.  
         v. Pease, 194, 270, 334.  
         v. Phillips, 214.  
         v. Sisson, 182.  
         v. Tanner, 265.  
         v. Whitaker, 203.  
 Clarke v. Dunham, 228.  
     v. Johnson, 268.  
     v. Patrick, 115.  
     v. Percival, 38, 52.  
     v. School Dist., 224.  
 Clason v. Balley, 56.  
     v. Morris, 305, 306.  
 Clayton v. Gosling, 74.  
 Clerk v. Martin, 4.  
 Cleveland & M. R. Co. v. Himrod Fur-  
     nace Co., 223.  
 Clift v. Rodger, 332.  
 Cline v. Guthrie, 68.  
 Clinton Nat. Bank v. Graves, 287.  
 Clode v. Bayley, 380.  
 Clofin v. Boorum, 239.  
 Clough v. Davis, 287.  
 Clute v. Small, 255.  
 Clutton v. Attenborough, 63.  
 Cobb v. Doyle, 312.  
 Cock v. Fellows, 133, 201.  
 Cockle v. Flack, 239.  
 Coddington v. Davis, 402.  
 Coffin v. Loring, 75.  
 Coggill v. American Exch. Bank, 164,  
     256, 331.  
 Cohea v. Hunt, 351.  
 Cohen v. Hale, 428.  
 Colburn v. Averill, 142.  
 Cole v. Bank, 132.  
     v. Cushing, 114.  
     v. Sackett, 20.  
     v. Saulpaugh, 181, 182.  
 Colehan v. Cooke, 35.  
 Coleman v. Biedman, 213.  
     v. Sayer, 348.  
 Collamer v. Langdon, 21.  
 Collier v. Nevill, 175.  
 Collins v. Butler, 354.  
     v. Denning, 344.  
     v. Gilbert, 12, 333.  
     v. Lincoln, 43.  
     v. Locke, 291.  
     v. Martin, 330.  
 Collott v. Haigh, 158.  
 Colms v. Bank, 350.

[The figures refer to pages.]

- Colorado Nat. Bank v. Boettcher, 94, 419.  
 Colson v. Arnot, 117, 255.  
 Colt v. Barnard, 208.  
 Commercial Bank v. Armstrong, 125.  
     v. Hamer, 351.  
     v. Varnum, 24, 370, 371.  
 Commercial Bank of Buffalo v. Warren, 247.  
 Commercial & Farmers' Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 421.  
 Commissioners of Iredell Co. v. Wasson, 115.  
 Commissioners of Marion Co. v. Clark, 327.  
 Commonwealth v. Butterick, 61, 108.  
     v. Ray, 407.  
 Comstock v. Hannah, 321.  
     v. Hler, 313.  
 Condit v. Baldwin, 237.  
 Condon v. Pearce, 164.  
 Conklin v. Gandall, 332.  
     v. Vail, 312.  
 Connelly v. McKean, 103.  
 Connor v. Martin, 221.  
 Conover v. Earl, 132.  
 Conrad v. Kinzie, 286.  
 Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, 308.  
 Continental Nat. Bank v. M. Cornhauser & Co., 422.  
     v. Townsend, 315.  
 Cook v. Darling, 350.  
     v. Lister, 183, 296.  
     v. Litchfield, 375.  
     v. Moffat, 188.  
     v. Norwood, 195.  
     v. Satterlee, 48.  
     v. Wright, 272.  
 Cooke v. State Nat. Bank, 421.  
     v. United States, 268.  
 Coolidge v. Payson, 96.  
     v. Ruggles, 11, 35.  
 Cooper v. Dedrick, 132.  
     v. Earl of Waldegrave, 189.  
     v. Meyer, 148, 331.  
 Corbett v. Clark, 40.  
     v. State, 35.  
 Corcoran v. Powers, 241.  
     v. White, 80.  
 Cordier v. Thompson, 70.  
 Corney v. Da Costa, 394, 397.  
 Corning v. Pond, 243.  
 Cory v. Scott, 395.  
 Costello v. Crowell, 51.  
 Coster v. Thomason, 383.  
 Cota v. Buck, 36.  
 Cotes v. Davis, 202.  
 Couch v. Meeker, 71.  
     v. Waring, 305.  
 Coulter v. Richmond, 141.  
 Coward v. Hughes, 273.  
 Cowie v. Halsall, 250.  
     v. Stirling, 60.  
 Cowing v. Altman, 68, 72.  
 Cowles v. Harts, 378.  
     v. McVickar, 175.  
 Cox v. Bank, 80, 357, 359.  
     v. Boone, 415.  
     v. Coleman, 93.  
     v. Hodge, 296.  
     v. Reinhardt, 76.  
     v. Troy, 89.  
 Coy v. Stiner, 55.  
 Coye v. Palmer, 244.  
 Craft v. Fleming, 120.  
 Cram v. Hendricks, 172, 175, 239, 243, 244.  
 Crandall v. Schroepfel, 339.  
     v. Vickery, 325.  
 Crane v. Price, 243.  
 Cranson v. Goss, 287.  
 Crawford v. Bank, 189, 249, 405.  
 Craythorne v. Swinburne, 306.  
 Creamer v. Perry, 397.  
 Creveling v. Bloomsbury Nat. Bank, 419.  
 Crider v. Shelby, 35.  
 Crim v. Starkweather, 345.  
 Crippen v. Culver, 228.  
 Crist v. Crist, 198.  
 Crocker v. Getchell, 115.  
 Cromwell v. Arrott, 345.  
     v. County of Sac, 172, 317.  
     v. Hewitt, 8, 14, 142.  
 Cronise v. Kellogg, 179.  
 Crook v. Jadis, 320, 351.  
 Crosby v. Grant, 321.  
     v. Roub, 196.  
 Crosman v. Feller, 71.  
 Crosse v. Smith, 373.  
 Crossley v. Ham, 207.  
 Crossmore v. Page, 41.  
 Crouch v. Credit Foncier of England, 16, 197.  
 Crowley v. Barry, 364.  
 Cruchley v. Clarence, 60, 258.  
 Cruchly v. Mann, 258.  
 Cruger v. Armstrong, 329.  
 Culver v. Bigelow, 239.

[The figures refer to pages.]

Culver v. Robinson, 46.  
Cumber v. Wane, 21.  
Cummings v. Boyd, 194.  
    v. Kent, 401.  
    v. Thompson, 334.  
    v. Williams, 238.  
Cundy v. Marriott, 355.  
Currie v. Misa, 270, 312.  
Currier v. Lockwood, 29, 31.  
Curtis v. Leavitt, 224.  
    v. Sprague, 114.  
    v. State Bank, 387.  
Cushing v. Gore, 408.  
Cushman v. Haynes, 52.  
Cussen v. Brandt, 300.  
Cutler v. Welch, 293.  
Cuyler v. Stevens, 129, 373, 384.

**D**

Dabney v. Stidger, 383.  
Dacosta v. Davis, 184.  
Daggett v. Daggett, 16.  
    v. Whiting, 181.  
Dale v. Gear, 113.  
Dalrymple v. Hillenbrand, 165, 331.  
Dana v. Boston Third Nat. Bank, 419.  
    v. Sawyer, 352.  
Dane v. Kirkwall, 231.  
Daniels v. Wilson, 317.  
Dann v. Norris, 137.  
Darbishire v. Parker, 390, 391.  
Darnell v. Williams, 281.  
Darrow v. Walker, 273.  
Darwin v. Rippey, 252.  
David v. Bank, 265.  
Davidson v. Cooper, 247.  
Davis v. Brown, 120.  
    v. Clarke, 58, 87.  
    v. French, 65.  
    v. Garr, 61.  
    v. Gowen, 387.  
    v. Graham, 307.  
    v. Jones, 72.  
    v. McCready, 282.  
    v. Miller, 211.  
    v. Morgan, 115.  
    v. Randall, 177.  
Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Best, 268.  
Davren v. White, 230.  
Dawkes v. Lord De Lorane, 37, 38.  
Dawson v. Goodyear, 180.  
    v. McCarty, 245.  
Day v. Lyon, 113.

Day v. Pool, 280.  
    v. Saunders, 314.  
    v. Thompson, 115.  
Dayton v. Moore, 238.  
    v. Trull, 365.  
Dean v. Carruth, 6, 70, 74.  
    v. Hall, 112.  
Deberry v. Darnell, 47.  
De Forest v. Frary, 35.  
    v. Strong, 239.  
De La Chaumette v. Bank, 186, 205.  
Delano v. Bartlett, 275.  
Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Gilbert, 65.  
Demond v. Burnham, 72.  
De Mott v. Starkey, 325.  
Den v. Clark, 229.  
    v. Wright, 247.  
Dennett v. Goodwin, 50.  
Dennie v. Walker, 357, 400.  
Dennis v. Morrice, 394.  
Denniston v. Bacon, 181.  
Dennistoun v. Stewart, 369, 370, 416.  
Depau v. Humphreys, 185.  
De Pauw v. Bank of Salem, 107.  
Des Arts v. Leggett, 339.  
Desha v. Stewart, 79.  
De Silva v. Fuller, 297.  
Desilver's Estate, In re, 227.  
Detrick v. McGlone, 281.  
Deuters v. Townsend, 207.  
De Wald's Estate, 34.  
Dewey v. Reed, 251.  
De Witt v. Walton, 67.  
De Wolf v. Johnson, 241.  
    v. Murray, 161, 377.  
Dexter v. Hall, 227.  
Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 291.  
Dick v. Leverich, 257.  
Dickins v. Beal, 24, 371, 396, 408.  
Dickinson v. Hall, 280.  
Dill v. White, 56.  
Dinsmore v. Duncan, 258.  
District of Columbia v. Cornell, 303.  
Dix v. Van Wyck, 240.  
Dixon v. Dixon, 312, 315.  
    v. Nuttall, 41, 344.  
D. M. Osborne & Co. v. Hubbard, 25.  
Dobree v. Eastwood, 382, 387, 393.  
Dod v. Edwards, 302.  
Dodge v. Bank, 391, 426.  
    v. Emerson, 52.  
Dodson v. Taylor, 383.  
Dole v. Gold, 376, 378.  
Donnelly v. Howie, 396.

[The figures refer to pages.]

Doolittle v. Ferry, 115.  
 Doremus v. Bond, 281.  
 Dorman v. Dibdin, 172.  
 Dorsey v. Wolff, 51.  
 Doubleday v. Kress, 134, 297, 299, 361.  
 Dougal v. Cowles, 20.  
 Dougherty v. Deeney, 300.  
 Douglass v. Matting, 265, 268.  
     v. Wilkeson, 59, 131, 132.  
 Downes v. Church, 25.  
 Downey v. Hicks, 20.  
 Downing v. Backenstoos, 1.  
 Downs v. Collins, 65.  
 Dows v. Kidder, 326.  
 Drake v. Rogers, 72, 287.  
 Draper v. Clemens, 339, 357, 363.  
 Dresser v. Missouri & I. Ry. Const. Co., 111, 326.  
 Drum v. Drum, 247.  
 Drummond v. Drummond, 58.  
 Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Insurance & Trust Co., 237.  
 Dubois v. Mason, 110, 139.  
 Dubose v. Wheddon, 220.  
 Dubuys v. Farmer, 76.  
 Dudley v. Wells, 245.  
 Dudman v. Earl, 118.  
 Duel v. Spence, 182.  
 Dufaur v. Oxenden, 90.  
 Dull v. Bricker, 81, 100.  
 Dumont v. Williamson, 120, 168.  
 Dunavan v. Flynn, 89, 94.  
 Duncan v. Berlin, 79.  
     v. Gilbert, 182, 316.  
     v. Institution, 76, 237.  
     v. McCullough, 357, 367.  
     v. Morrison, 195.  
     v. Scott, 270, 332, 333.  
 Dunham v. Clogg, 258.  
     v. Dey, 237.  
 Dunlop v. Gregory, 275, 291.  
 Dunn v. Weston, 181, 182, 211.  
 Dunnent v. Tuttle, 281.  
 Dunning v. Heller, 106.  
 Dunscomb v. Bunker, 184.  
 Duran v. Ayer, 172.  
 Durant v. Banta, 172.  
 Durgin v. Bartol, 17.  
     v. Ireland, 12.  
 Durham v. Manrow, 136.  
 Durkin v. Cranston, 25.  
 Dutchess Co. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hachfield, 323.  
 Duvall v. Bank, 397.

Dwight v. Pease, 183.  
 Dykers v. Leather Manufacturers' Bank, 408.

## E

Eadie v. Slimmon, 269.  
 Eads v. City of Carondelet, 80.  
 Eagle Bank v. Chapin, 391.  
     v. Hathaway, 387.  
 Eaglechilde's Case, 2.  
 Eales v. Dicker, 329.  
 Eames v. Crosier, 202, 209.  
 Earl v. Peck, 70, 277.  
 Earle v. Reed, 220.  
 East v. Smith, 381.  
 Easter v. Minard, 235.  
 Easterly v. Barber, 135.  
 Eastman v. Plumer, 297, 300.  
     v. Shaw, 68, 71.  
 Easton v. Pratchett, 193, 278.  
 East River Bank v. Butterworth, 21.  
 Eastwood v. Kenyon, 273.  
 Eaton v. Alger, 215, 238.  
     v. Aspinwall, 226.  
 Eberhart v. Page, 141.  
 Eckert v. Pickel, 248.  
 Eckhert v. Ellis, 212.  
 Ecton v. Halan, 12.  
 Edgar v. Boles, 45.  
     v. Chute, 3.  
 Edge v. Bumford, 203.  
 Edgerly v. Shaw, 219.  
 Edgerton v. Edgerton, 7.  
 Edie v. East India Co., 117, 125, 127, 129, 201.  
 Edis v. Bury, 58.  
 Edmonds v. Cates, 377.  
 Edmunds v. Groves, 194.  
 Edney v. Willis, 208.  
 Edson v. Fuller, 100.  
 Edwards v. Davenport, 227.  
     v. Dick, 164.  
 Ehrichs v. De Mill, 8, 38, 39.  
 Elford v. Teed, 351.  
 Elgin City Banking Co. v. Zelch, 109.  
 Ellason v. Henshaw, 80.  
 Elliot v. Ince, 227, 231.  
     v. Miller, 100.  
     v. Wood, 240.  
 Ellis v. Bank, 403.  
     v. Brown, 134.  
     v. Mason, 30.  
 Ellison v. Collingridge, 28, 30.  
     v. Jackson Water Co., 81.

[The figures refer to pages.]

Ellsworth v. Brewer, 114, 329.  
 Elsam v. Denny, 295.  
 Elting v. Brincherhoff, 341.  
 Ely v. Clute, 56.  
     v. James, 21.  
 Emery v. Bartlett, 275.  
 Emly v. Lye, 206.  
 Emmett v. Tottenham, 213.  
 English v. Darley, 306.  
 Epler v. Funk, 322.  
 Ernst v. Crosby, 293.  
     v. Steckman, 36.  
 Erwin v. Adams, 358, 399.  
     v. Downs, 165.  
     v. Lynn, 113.  
 Espy v. Bank of Cincinnati, 117, 421,  
     425.  
 Essex Co. Nat. Bank v. Bank of Mon-  
     treal, 423.  
 Estabrook v. Smith, 202.  
 Estes v. Shoe Co., 417.  
 Etheridge v. Gallagher, 193, 210.  
     v. Ladd, 339.  
 Evans v. Anderson, 184.  
     v. Cramlington, 126.  
     v. Foreman, 248.  
     v. Gee, 106, 113, 342.  
     v. Kymer, 181, 314.  
     v. Williamson, 280.  
 Everard v. Wilson, 377.  
 Everson v. Carpenter, 219.  
 Evertson v. Bank, 13, 16.  
 Exchange Bank v. Hubbard, 184.  
     v. Rice, 98.  
 Exchange Nat. Bank v. Bank of Lit-  
     tle Rock, 246, 254.  
 Exeter Bank v. Gordon, 342.

**F**

Falkney v. Reynous, 294.  
 Fairchild v. Railroad Co., 50, 59, 145.  
 Fairland v. Percy, 65.  
 Fairley v. Roch, 154.  
 Fales v. Russell, 339.  
 Fall River Nat. Bank v. Walton, 339.  
 Fanning v. Consequa, 186.  
 Fant v. Miller, 185.  
 Farmers' Bank v. Duvall, 357, 391.  
     v. Gunnell, 399.  
     v. Noxon, 181.  
 Farmers' Bank of Kentucky v. Ewing,  
     401.

Farmers' & Citizens' Bank v. Noxon,  
     264, 326, 334.  
 Farmers' & M. Bank v. Battle, 386.  
     v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank,  
         225, 421.  
 Farmers' & Merchants' Ins. Co. v.  
     Needles, 226.  
     v. Joslyn, 240.  
 Farnam v. Brooks, 230.  
 Farnsworth v. Allen, 352.  
 Farnum v. Brooks, 230.  
     v. Fowle, 77.  
 Farr v. Ricker, 115.  
 Farrington v. Frankford Bank, 314.  
 Farwell v. Curtis, 415.  
     v. Trust Co., 401.  
 Fassin v. Hubbard, 109, 121, 383.  
 Faulder v. Silk, 229.  
 Favor v. Philbrick, 293.  
 Fawsett v. National Life Ins. Co., 16.  
 Fay v. Guynon, 10.  
     v. Smith, 251.  
 Fearing v. Clark, 71, 267.  
 Federick v. Winans, 137.  
 Fenn v. Harrison, 108, 206.  
 Fenton v. Robinson, 265.  
 Fentum v. Pocock, 307.  
 Ferguson v. Davis, 85.  
 Fernandez v. Lewis, 347.  
 Ferner v. Williams, 359.  
 Fernon v. Farmer, 16.  
 Ferris v. Bond, 56, 59.  
     v. Brush, 269.  
 Fetters v. Muncie Nat. Bank, 180.  
 Field v. Nickerson, 345, 347.  
 Fielden v. Lahens, 322.  
 Fielding & Co. v. Corry, 380.  
 Findlay v. Hall, 172.  
 Firman v. Blood, 142.  
 First Nat. Bank v. Bank, 415.  
     v. Fricke, 248.  
     v. Gish, 419.  
     v. Grant, 180.  
     v. Green, 264, 333, 334.  
     v. Grindstaff, 235.  
     v. Hall, 67, 133.  
     v. Harris, 417.  
     v. Larsen, 51.  
     v. Leach, 422-424.  
     v. McMichael, 425.  
     v. Mfg. Co., 259.  
     v. Miller, 415.  
     v. Needham, 417.  
     v. Payne, 139.

[The figures refer to pages.]

**First Nat. Bank v. Price**, 41, 344.  
     v. Ryerson, 373.  
     v. Skeen, 36.  
     v. Slaughter, 51.  
     v. Slette, 43, 53.  
     v. Sollenberger, 12.  
     v. Whitman, 409, 419, 423, 426.  
**First State Sav. Bank v. Webster**, 258.  
**Firth v. Brooks**, 415.  
     v. Thrush, 379.  
**Fish v. First Nat. Bank of Detroit**,  
     164.  
     v. French, 207.  
**Fisher v. Beckwith**, 339.  
     v. Fisher, 312.  
     v. Leland, 210, 318.  
     v. Leslie, 29, 31.  
     v. Pomfret, 59.  
     v. Samuda, 280.  
     v. Sharpe, 280.  
**Fitch v. McDowell**, 178.  
**Fitchburg Bank v. Greenwood**, 120.  
     v. Perley, 392.  
**Fitchburg Ins. Co. v. Davis**, 378.  
**Fitzhugh v. Wilcox**, 228.  
**Fletcher v. Chase**, 280.  
     v. Pierson, 417.  
     v. Thompson, 48.  
**Fleury v. Tufts**, 33.  
**Flint v. Flint**, 132.  
     v. Rogers, 351.  
**Florence Min. Co. v. Brown**, 421.  
**Florida Cent. R. Co. v. Schutte**, 317.  
**Fobes v. Cantfield**, 239.  
**Foden v. Sharp**, 80, 356.  
**Fogarties v. State Bank**, 418.  
**Folger v. Chase**, 108, 133.  
**Follett v. Moore**, 48.  
**Folsom v. Bartlett**, 209.  
**Foote v. Emerson**, 237.  
**Forbes v. Omaha Nat. Bank**, 386.  
**Ford v. Angelrodt**, 83.  
**Forman v. Wright**, 282.  
**Forward v. Thompson**, 81.  
**Foster v. Dawber**, 302.  
     v. Julien, 399, 400.  
     v. Mackinnon, 265, 266.  
     v. Shattuck, 62.  
**Fourth Nat. Bank v. City Nat. Bank  
     of Grand Rapids**, 418.  
     v. Heuschen, 364, 383.  
**Fourth St. Nat. Bank v. Yardley**, 419.  
**Fowler v. Brantly**, 322.  
     v. Bush, 21.  
     v. Strickland, 178.

**Fraker v. Little**, 257.  
**Fralick v. Norton**, 51.  
**Francia v. Joseph**, 312.  
**Frank v. Lanier**, 168, 257.  
     v. Lillienfeld, 258.  
**Franklin v. March**, 30, 74, 275.  
     v. Twogood, 8.  
**Franklin Bank v. Freeman**, 407.  
     v. Raymond, 361.  
**Frazer v. D'Invilliers**, 120.  
**Frazier v. Massey**, 220.  
     v. Trow's Printing & Bookbind-  
         ing Co., 72.  
**Freakley v. Fox**, 303.  
**Free v. Hawkins**, 401.  
**Freeman v. Boynton**, 339, 354, 361.  
     v. Ellison, 68.  
     v. Perry, 133.  
**Freeman's Bank v. Perkins**, 391.  
     v. Rollins, 308.  
     v. Ruckman, 137, 186.  
**Freese v. Brownell**, 186, 188.  
**Freiberg v. Cody**, 415.  
**French v. Bank of Columbia**, 395.  
     v. Grindle, 244.  
     v. Jarvis, 213.  
     v. Turner, 108.  
**Freund v. Bank**, 89, 134, 202, 423.  
**Friedlander v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.**, 18.  
**Friend v. Wilkinson**, 388.  
**Frost v. Inhabitants of Belmont**, 289.  
**Fry v. Fry**, 269.  
     v. Hill, 346, 347.  
     v. Reusseau, 43.  
**Fugure v. Mutual Soc. of St. Joseph**,  
     81.  
**Fuller v. Dame**, 289.  
     v. McDonald, 401.  
**Fullerton v. Bank of U. S.**, 339, 391.  
     v. Hill, 109.  
     v. Rundlett, 401.  
     v. Sturges, 258.  
**Funk v. Babbitt**, 58.  
**Furman v. Haskin**, 345.  
**Furze v. Sharwood**, 378, 379.  
**Fydell v. Clark**, 206.

## G

**Gage v. Kendall**, 214.  
**Galbraith v. Fullerton**, 307.  
**Gale v. Kemper**, 355.  
     v. Miller, 68.  
     v. Walsh, 158, 369, 370.



[The figures refer to pages.]

- Gallagher v. Roberts, 20.  
v. White, 133.
- Gallery v. Prindle, 37.
- Gamble v. Grimes, 281.
- Gammon v. Schmoll, 85.
- Gantt v. Mackenzie, 160.
- Garden v. Maynard, 296.
- Gardner v. Gardner, 269.  
v. Maxey, 290.  
v. Maynard, 295, 298.  
v. Walsh, 252.  
v. Watson, 307.
- Garland, Ex parte, 64.
- Garner v. Flite, 71.
- Garnett v. McKewan, 428.  
v. Woodcock, 351, 390.
- Garrard v. Haddan, 268.
- Garvin v. Wiswell, 12.
- Gascoyne v. Smith, 345, 346.
- Gates v. Beecher, 357, 364.
- Gay v. Rainey, 188.  
v. Rooke, 29.
- Gayoso Sav. Inst. v. Fellows, 196.
- Gazzam v. Armstrong, 155, 301.
- Geary v. Physic, 55, 108.
- Geib v. Reynolds, 20.
- Geill v. Jeremy, 391.
- General South American Co., In re, 173.
- Genesee Bank v. Patchin Bank, 225.
- George v. Surrey, 55.
- Georgia Nat. Bank v. Henderson, 406.
- German v. Ritchie, 173.
- Germania Bank v. Distler, 72, 329.
- Gettysburg Nat. Bank v. Chisolm, 246.
- Gibb v. Mather, 359.
- Gibbs v. Cannon, 399.  
v. Fremont, 189.  
v. Linabury, 266.
- Gibson v. Cooke, 419.  
v. Minet, 16, 33, 59.  
v. Smith, 82.  
v. Tobey, 21.
- Giffert v. West, 168.
- Gifford v. Hardell, 415.
- Gilbert v. Dennis, 373, 376, 378, 384.
- Gill v. Cubit, 320.  
v. Palmer, 374.
- Gillespie v. Hannahan, 358.
- Gillett v. Averill, 355.
- Gillham v. Bank, 113.
- Gillilan v. Myers, 51.
- Gilmore v. Hirst, 52.
- Gilson v. Stevens Mfg. Co., 195.
- Girard Bank v. Bank of Penn Tp., 422.
- Gist v. Lybrand, 386, 387, 400.
- Gladwell v. Turner, 391.
- Glasgow v. Pratte, 384.
- Glenn v. Farmers' Bank, 235.
- Glicksman v. Earley, 374.
- Glidden v. Chamberlin, 165.
- Gloucester Bank v. Worcester, 307.
- Goddard v. Merchants' Bank, 148, 150, 257, 331.
- Godfrey v. Craycraft, 172.
- Goggerly v. Cuthbert, 314.
- Goldman v. Davis, 401.
- Gompertz v. Bartlett, 174.
- Good v. Martin, 142.
- Goodall v. Dolly, 341.
- Goodell v. Harrington, 232.
- Gooding v. Morgan, 21.  
v. Underwood, 85.
- Goodloe v. Taylor, 36.
- Goodman v. Eastman, 251.  
v. Harvey, 320.  
v. Simonds, 320, 321.
- Goodnow v. Warren, 383.
- Goodrich v. Gordon, 97.  
v. Reynolds, 224.
- Goodsell v. Myers, 219.
- Goodwin v. Conklin, 314.  
v. Goodwin, 51.  
v. Roberts, 2, 15, 17.
- Goodyear v. Watson, 305, 306.
- Gordon v. Anderson, 59.  
v. Price, 20.  
v. Wansey, 295.
- Gore v. Gibson, 232, 233.
- Gorham v. Keyes, 289.
- Gorman v. Ketchum, 108.
- Goshen Nat. Bank v. Bingham, 106, 203.
- Goshen & M. Turnpike Road v. Hur-  
tin, 42.
- Gould v. Armstrong, 285.  
v. Mortimer, 112.  
v. Segee, 268.
- Goupy v. Harden, 365.
- Gowan v. Jackson, 397.
- Gower v. Moore, 364, 400.
- Gracie v. Sandford, 366.
- Graff v. Logue, 71.
- Grafton Bank v. Cox, 358.
- Graham v. Maguire, 165.  
v. Sangston, 376.
- Grandin v. Le Roy, 182.

[The figures refer to pages.]

**Grange v. Reigh**, 415.  
**Grant v. Da Costa**, 74.  
     v. **Ellicott**, 150, 179, 211.  
     v. **Healey**, 47, 173.  
     v. **Hunt**, 98.  
     v. **Shaw**, 81.  
     v. **Vaughan**, 3, 60, 111, 197, 205, 206.  
     v. **Wood**, 35.  
**Graves v. American Exch. Bank**, 117, 255, 257.  
     v. **Johnson**, 293.  
**Gray v. Bank of Kentucky**, 181, 333.  
     v. **Bowden**, 29, 59.  
     v. **Hook**, 289.  
     v. **Johnston**, 427.  
     v. **Milner**, 58, 87.  
     v. **Wood**, 72, 214.  
     v. **Worden**, 43.  
**Greathead v. Walton**, 287.  
**Greele v. Parker**, 96.  
**Green v. Cummins**, 369.  
     v. **Goings**, 330.  
     v. **Holway**, 245.  
     v. **Skeel**, 66, 67.  
     v. **Wilkie**, 265.  
**Greenawalt v. McDowell**, 308.  
**Greenfield Bank v. Crafts**, 247.  
     v. **Stowell**, 246, 254, 258.  
**Greening v. Patten**, 300.  
**Greenough v. Smead**, 113.  
**Greenwell v. Haydon**, 210.  
**Gregg v. Beane**, 415.  
**Greusel v. Hubbard**, 135.  
**Greve v. Schweitzer**, 297.  
**Grey v. Cooper**, 195, 220.  
**Gridley v. Bane**, 264.  
     v. **Capen**, 110.  
**Griener v. Ulerey**, 226.  
**Grierson v. Mason**, 71.  
**Griffin v. Goff**, 76.  
     v. **Ranney**, 245.  
     v. **Weatherby**, 37.  
**Griffith v. Reed**, 178.  
     v. **Wells**, 235.  
**Griggs v. Howe**, 258.  
**Grimes v. Hillenbrand**, 235, 285.  
     v. **Piersol**, 213.  
**Grimshaw v. Bender**, 24.  
**Grinman v. Walker**, 385, 387.  
**Grinnell v. Baxter**, 16.  
**Grist v. Backhouse**, 66.  
**Griswold v. Davis**, 70.  
**Grocers' Bank v. Penfield**, 182, 264, 315.

**Grosvenor v. Stone**, 396.  
**Groth v. Gyger**, 364.  
**Grover v. Grover**, 278.  
**Groves v. Sentell**, 56.  
**Grugeon v. Smith**, 377.  
**Grutacap v. Woullnise**, 53.  
**Guernsey v. Burns**, 213.  
     v. **Rexford**, 239.  
**Gulick v. Ward**, 289.  
**Gumz v. Giegling**, 142.  
**Gunnis v. Welgey**, 305.  
**Gushee v. Eddy**, 45.  
**Gwinnell v. Herbert**, 129, 143.

## H

**Haine's Adm'rs v. Tarrant**, 220.  
**Hale v. Rice**, 302.  
**Haley v. Congdon**, 208.  
**Halifax v. Lyle**, 149.  
**Halifax Union v. Wheelwright**, 254.  
**Hall v. Auburn Turnpike Co.**, 226.  
     v. **Cordell**, 184.  
     v. **Earnest**, 241.  
     v. **Farmer**, 2.  
     v. **Fuller**, 251.  
     v. **Haggart**, 238.  
     v. **Newcomb**, 141.  
     v. **Steel**, 94.  
     v. **Toby**, 40, 109.  
     v. **Wilson**, 241, 268.  
**Halliday v. McDougall**, 24, 370.  
**Halloran v. Whitcomb**, 10.  
**Halstead v. Skelton**, 359.  
**Haly v. Lane**, 165.  
**Hamer v. Sidway**, 277.  
**Hamilton v. Le Grange**, 239.  
     v. **Lumber Co.**, 415.  
     v. **Newcastle & D. R. R.**, 224.  
     v. **Spottiswoode**, 28.  
**Hammett v. Barnard**, 281.  
**Hammond v. Dufrene**, 396.  
**Hanauer v. Doane**, 293.  
**Hance v. Miller**, 113.  
**Hankey v. Trotman**, 348.  
**Hannahs v. Sheldon**, 231.  
**Hannum v. Richardson**, 120, 164, 168, 287.  
**Hansard v. Robinson**, 338, 339.  
**Hansberger v. Gelger**, 307.  
**Harbert v. Dumont**, 307.  
**Harbord v. Cooper**, 133.  
**Hardy v. Merriweather**, 224.  
     v. **Waters**, 134.

[The figures refer to pages.]

- Hare v. Henty**, 415.  
**Harger v. Wilson**, 317.  
     **v. Worrall**, 150, 182, 333, 334.  
**Harker v. Anderson**, 329, 406, 416.  
**Harmer v. Steele**, 296.  
**Harp v. Kenner**, 400.  
**Harrell v. Broxton**, 209.  
**Harrington v. Lee**, 280.  
**Harris v. Berger**, 268.  
     **v. Brisco**, 289.  
     **v. Clark**, 278.  
     **v. Packer**, 355.  
**Harrisburg Trust Co. v. Shufeldt**, 366.  
**Harrison v. Bank**, 406.  
     **v. McClelland**, 65.  
     **v. Ruscoe**, 375, 381.  
**Harrod v. Myers**, 219.  
**Harrop v. Fisher**, 118, 134.  
**Hart v. Smith**, 75, 344.  
**Hartford Bank v. Barry**, 76, 362.  
     **v. Stedman**, 362, 385, 387, 391.  
**Hartley v. Case**, 378.  
     **v. Wilkinson**, 34, 123, 253.  
**Hartwell v. McBeth**, 214.  
**Harvey v. Archibold**, 185.  
     **v. Bank**, 415.  
     **v. Cane**, 57, 81.  
     **v. Martin**, 94, 95.  
     **v. Smith**, 253.  
     **v. Towers**, 284, 334.  
**Harwood v. Jones**, 13.  
**Hasbrook v. Palmer**, 43.  
**Hascall v. Life Ass'n**, 87.  
     **v. Whitmore**, 180, 327.  
**Hasey v. White Pigeon Beet-Sugar Co.**, 16.  
**Haskell v. Boardman**, 397.  
     **v. Mitchell**, 203.  
     **v. Whitmore**, 210.  
**Haskett v. Flint**, 81.  
**Hastings v. Dollarhide**, 220.  
     **v. Thompson**, 53.  
**Hatch v. Searles**, 259.  
     **v. Traves**, 74.  
**Hately v. Pike**, 139.  
**Hawkins v. Bone**, 232.  
     **v. Cardy**, 131.  
     **v. Watkins**, 43.  
**Hawley v. Sloo**, 189.  
**Haxtun v. Bishop**, 213.  
**Hayden v. Weldon**, 132.  
**Hayes v. Caulfield**, 264.  
**Hayling v. Mullhall**, 298.  
**Haynes v. Rudd**, 289.  
**Hays v. Hathorn**, 214, 215.  
     **v. Kingston**, 209.  
**Hayword v. Stearns**, 210.  
**Heard v. Dubuque Co. Bank**, 50.  
**Heartt v. Rhodes**, 413, 415.  
**Heath, Ex parte**, 395.  
     **v. Blake**, 248.  
     **v. Van Cott**, 139.  
**Hebden v. Hartsink**, 366.  
**Hedger v. Steavenson**, 377.  
**Hedges v. Sealy**, 134, 201, 203.  
**Heenan v. Nash**, 86.  
**Hegeler v. Comstock**, 53.  
**Hegeman v. Moon**, 29.  
**Heidelback, Ex parte**, 189.  
**Heiser v. Hatch**, 257.  
**Heman v. Francisco**, 59.  
**Henderson v. Henderson**, 302.  
     **v. Palmer**, 289.  
**Hendricks v. Franklin**, 189.  
     **v. Judah**, 330.  
     **v. Thornton**, 60.  
**Henry v. Conley**, 20.  
     **v. Jones**, 76.  
     **v. Lee**, 351.  
**Henry Christian Building & Loan Ass'n v. Walton**, 256.  
**Henshaw v. Root**, 413.  
**Herdic v. Roessler**, 184.  
**Hereth v. Meyer**, 49.  
**Herrick v. Baldwin**, 400.  
     **v. Bennett**, 41.  
     **v. Carman**, 140.  
     **v. Whitney**, 168.  
     **v. Woolverton**, 345.  
**Herring v. Woodhull**, 108.  
**Heuertematte v. Morris**, 149, 150, 283.  
**Heylyn v. Adamson**, 158, 342.  
**Heywood v. Pickering**, 415.  
**Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe**, 162.  
**Hickerson v. Raiguel**, 314.  
**Hickman v. Ryan**, 391.  
**Hicks v. Marshall**, 232.  
**Hidden v. Bishop**, 181.  
**Higgins v. Bullock**, 137.  
**Highmore v. Primrose**, 74.  
**Hill v. Anderson**, 219.  
     **v. Bostick**, 308.  
     **v. Cooley**, 250.  
     **v. Lewis**, 4, 16, 106.  
     **v. Northrup**, 235, 285.  
     **v. Wilson**, 273.  
**Hills v. Place**, 359, 366, 367.  
**Hillsdale College v. Thomas**, 68.  
**Hilton v. Houghton**, 287.

[The figures refer to pages.]

- Hilton v. Shepherd, 382.  
     v. Smith, 182.  
 Hinckley v. Railroad Co., 210, 339.  
 Hine v. Allely, 161, 354.  
 Hirsch v. Tralner, 231.  
 Hirschfeld v. Smith, 403.  
 Hirshfield v. Ft. Worth Nat. Bank, 77.  
 Hitchcock v. Buchanan, 67.  
     v. Galveston, 224.  
 Hoare v. Cazenove, 153, 156.  
 Hobbs v. Straine, 385.  
 Hobson v. Stevenson, 11.  
 Hodge v. Fillis, 353.  
 Hodges v. Adams, 117.  
     v. Holland, 214.  
     v. Hunt, 219.  
     v. Nash, 177.  
     v. Shuler, 49, 375, 376.  
     v. Steward, 176, 197, 202.  
 Hodgkins v. Moulton, 194.  
 Hoffman v. Bank, 145, 147, 148, 283.  
     v. Foster, 180, 212.  
 Hogan v. Moore, 270.  
 Hogarth v. Latham, 183.  
 Hoge v. Lansing, 326.  
 Hogue v. Williamson, 46.  
 Holbrook v. Payne, 94.  
     v. Vibbard, 129.  
 Holcomb v. Wyckoff, 317.  
 Holden v. Rattan Co., 333.  
     v. Trust Co., 172.  
 Holdsworth v. Hunter, 25.  
 Holeman v. Hobson, 241.  
 Holliday v. Atkinson, 193, 278.  
 Hollingsworth v. Moulton, 215.  
 Holloway v. Quinn, 135.  
 Holman v. Creagmiles, 281.  
     v. Johnson, 294.  
 Holmes v. Bank, 242.  
     v. Jaques, 61.  
     v. Kerrison, 344.  
     v. Kidd, 209.  
     v. Roe, 415.  
     v. Trumper, 252.  
 Holt v. Ross, 117, 151, 152.  
 Holton v. McCormick, 115.  
 Holtz v. Boppe, 357.  
 Home Ins. Co. v. Green, 375.  
 Homes v. Smyth, 312.  
 Hook v. Pratt, 125, 126, 136.  
 Hooper v. Williams, 61.  
 Hoover v. McCormick, 402.  
 Hopkins v. Detwiler, 20.  
 Hopkinson v. Forster, 408, 419.  
 Hopkirk v. Page, 396.  
 Hopper, In re, 229.  
 Hopps v. Savage, 57, 88.  
 Horn v. Newton City Bank, 246.  
 Horne v. Rouquette, 403.  
 Horton v. Coggs, 3.  
 Hortsman v. Henshaw, 149, 151, 256.  
 Hosstatter v. Wilson, 50.  
 Hough v. Loring, 94.  
 Housatonic Bank v. Laffin, 374.  
 House v. Adams, 341.  
     v. Bank, 384.  
 Housego v. Cowne, 373, 383, 385.  
 Houston v. Bruner, 142.  
 Hovey v. Chase, 230.  
     v. Hobson, 227, 228.  
     v. Sebring, 213.  
 Howard v. Ames, 207.  
     v. Duncan, 256.  
     v. Ives, 380, 392, 393.  
     v. Simpkins, 219.  
 Howard Banking Co. v. Welchman, 326.  
 Howell v. Medler, 13.  
 Howe Mach. Co. v. Hadden, 298.  
 Howes v. Austin, 329, 413.  
 Hoxie v. Kennedy, 215.  
 Hoyt v. Lynch, 28.  
     v. Seeley, 413.  
 Hubbard v. Bank, 184.  
     v. Matthews, 383.  
     v. Moseley, 51.  
     v. Rankin, 265.  
 Hubbell v. Flint, 293.  
 Huff v. Wagner, 316, 317.  
 Hughes v. Jones, 229.  
     v. Kiddell, 131.  
     v. Nelson, 203.  
 Huguenin v. Baseley, 269.  
 Hull v. Myers, 183, 397.  
 Humphreys v. Gullow, 247.  
 Hunt v. Adams, 110.  
     v. Gray, 247, 248, 255.  
     v. Massey, 219.  
     v. Standart, 187.  
 Hunter v. Jeffery, 62.  
     v. Wood, 172.  
 Huntington v. Ballou, 247.  
     v. Bank, 259.  
 Husband v. Epling, 35.  
 Huse v. Hamblin, 44.  
 Hussey v. Winslow, 30.  
 Huston v. Young, 265.  
 Hutchins v. Hebbard, 71.  
     v. McCann, 172.  
 Hyde v. Goodnow, 184, 186.

[The figures refer to pages.]

Hyde v. Paige, 66.  
Hyne v. Dewdney, 29.

I

Isley v. Jones, 80, 174.  
Imperial Land Co., In re, 25.  
Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone, 228.  
Importers' & Traders' Nat. Bank v. Littell, 175.  
v. Shaw, 389.  
Ingalls v. Lee, 106, 164, 172, 244.  
Ingersoll v. Long, 187.  
Ingham v. Primrose, 303.  
v. Vaden, 314.  
Ingrain v. Forster, 103.  
Iowa College v. Hill, 324.  
Ireland v. Kip, 386, 387.  
Irish v. Cutter, 132.  
Iron City Nat. Bank v. McCord, 82.  
Irvine v. Lowry, 43.  
Irving Nat. Bank v. Alley, 63.  
Iselin v. Rowlands, 215.  
Isnard v. Jones, 253.  
Israel v. Gale, 179.  
Ives v. Bank, 258.  
Ivory v. Michael, 252.

J

Jackson v. First Nat. Bank, 182.  
v. Haskell, 114.  
v. Henry, 240.  
v. Hudson, 86.  
v. Johnson, 247.  
v. King, 230.  
v. Myers, 25.  
v. Packer, 366.  
v. Pigott, 83.  
v. Richards, 390.  
v. Travis, 242.  
v. Warwick, 178.  
Jacobs v. Hart, 249.  
Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. Trust Co., 183.  
Jacquim v. Warren, 80.  
Jaffray v. Brown, 141.  
Jagger v. Bank, 373, 381.  
James v. Chalmers, 206, 329, 381.  
v. Wade, 398.  
Jameson v. Swinton, 382, 390.  
Janson v. Thomas, 345.  
Jarvis v. Mfg. Co., 392.

Jarvis v. Wilkins, 34, 38.  
v. Wilson, 80, 149.  
Jefferies v. Austin, 192, 281.  
Jeffries v. Lamb, 282.  
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 219.  
v. Tongue, 213.  
Jenners v. Howard, 232.  
Jenney v. Herle, 37.  
Jennings v. Roberts, 381.  
Jennison v. Parker, 369.  
v. Stafford, 74.  
Jenys v. Fawler, 194.  
Jerome v. Bigelow, 288.  
v. Whitney, 45.  
Jeune v. Ward, 94.  
Jewett v. Cook, 12.  
John v. City Nat. Bank, 387.  
Johnson v. Bank of Fulton, 173.  
v. Brown, 388.  
v. Collings, 92, 96, 100, 101.  
v. Frisbie, 53.  
v. Haight, 352, 367.  
v. Heagan, 253.  
v. Mangum, 202.  
v. Medlicott, 233.  
v. Mitchell, 114, 118.  
v. Stone, 231.  
v. Titus, 280.  
v. Way, 111, 318, 321.  
Johnston Harvester Co. v. Clark, 51, 52.  
Jones v. Bank, 97.  
v. Berryhill, 179.  
v. Broadhurst, 298.  
v. Carter, 11.  
v. Deyer, 278.  
v. Fales, 43.  
v. Fort, 314.  
v. Gordon, 334.  
v. Lees, 291.  
v. Lewis, 386.  
v. Radatz, 51.  
v. Savage, 365, 368.  
v. Shaw, 71.  
v. Shawhan, 20.  
v. Simpson, 52.  
Jordan v. Tate, 36.  
v. Wheeler, 343.  
Joseph v. Bigelow, 329.  
Joslyn v. Eastman, 305.  
Josselyn v. Ames, 114.  
v. Lacier, 7, 38, 75.  
Judah v. Harris, 44.  
Judd v. Seaver, 172.  
Judson v. Corcoran, 11.

[The figures refer to pages.]

Judson v. Gookwin, 16, 110.  
 Juilliard v. Chaffee, 71.  
 Juniata Bank v. Hale, 364, 373, 399.  
 Jury v. Barker, 38.  
 Justh v. National Bank of Commonwealth, 264.

## K

Kamm v. Holland, 141.  
 Kasson v. Smith, 181.  
 Kearney v. King, 24.  
 Kearslake v. Morgan, 366.  
 Keene v. Beard, 408-410, 419.  
     v. Weeks, 248.  
 Keith v. Jones, 44.  
 Kelley v. Hemmingway, 34.  
 Kellogg v. Curtis, 334.  
     v. Fancher, 315.  
     v. Schaaake, 210.  
 Kelly v. Burroughs, 135, 177.  
     v. Solari, 166.  
 Kendall v. Robertson, 235.  
 Kennedy v. Crandell, 255.  
     v. Geddes, 100, 392.  
     v. Goodman, 192.  
 Kent v. Walton, 239.  
 Kenworthy v. Sawyer, 165.  
 Ketchum v. Barber, 237, 239.  
 Keteltas v. Myers, 70, 136.  
 Key v. Flint, 181.  
 Keyes v. Fenstermaker, 345.  
 Kidder v. Horribin, 329.  
 Kieffer v. Ehler, 318.  
 Kilgore v. Dempsey, 185.  
 Kilpatrick v. Heaton, 109.  
 Kimball v. Huntington, 1, 6, 29, 74.  
 King v. Bickley, 379.  
     v. Box, 61.  
     v. Crowell, 339, 352.  
     v. Ellor, 28.  
     v. Fleming, 287.  
     v. Hurley, 376.  
 Kingsbury v. Wall, 51.  
 Kings Co. El. R. Co., In re, 226.  
 King's Estate, In re, 194.  
 Kingsland v. Koeppe, 107, 142.  
 Kingston v. Long, 34.  
 Kingston Bank v. Eltinge, 257.  
 Kinne v. Ford, 69.  
     v. Johnson, 269.  
 Kinsley v. Robinson, 394.  
 Kinyon v. Stanton, 413.  
     v. Wohlford, 268.

Kinzie v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, 68.  
 Kirk v. Dodge Co. M. Ins. Co., 50.  
 Kirkman v. Bank of America, 69.  
 Kirkpatrick v. Puryear, 413.  
 Kiskadden v. Allen, 36.  
 Kitchel v. Schenck, 178, 238.  
 Kitchen v. Loudonback, 317.  
     v. Place, 268.  
 Kleeman v. Frisbie, 197.  
 Klein v. Keyes, 193.  
 Kling v. Kehoe, 115.  
 Knight v. Hunt, 178.  
     v. Jones, 61.  
 Knights v. Putnam, 240, 242, 243.  
 Knisely v. Sampson, 72.  
 Knox v. Clifford, 287.  
 Knoxville Nat. Bank v. Clark, 254.  
 Koch v. Howell, 94.  
 Kohler v. Montgomery, 352.  
 Kohn v. Egg Co., 143.  
 Konig v. Bayard, 102.  
 Kreiss v. Seligman, 294.  
 Kuhl v. Press Co., 235.  
 Kulenkamp v. Groff, 194.  
 Kuntz v. Temple, 77, 350.  
 Kyle v. Thompson, 136.  
 Kyne v. Erskine, 300.

## L

Labouchere v. Tupper, 65.  
 Laclede Bank v. Schuler, 421.  
 La Coste v. De Armas, 213.  
 La Due v. Bank, 345.  
 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 136.  
 Laffin v. Sherman, 213.  
 Laing v. Stone, 172.  
 Laird v. State, 44.  
 Lake Shore Nat. Bank v. Colliery Co., 383.  
 Lambert, Ex parte, 154, 301.  
     v. Ghiselin, 399.  
 L'Amoureux v. Crosby, 229, 230.  
 Lancaster v. Baltzell, 255.  
 Lancaster Bank v. Woodward, 417.  
 Lancaster Co. Bank v. Moore, 229.  
 Lancaster Nat. Bank v. Taylor, 203.  
 Lancey v. Clark, 178, 300.  
 Lane v. Krekle, 62.  
     v. Smith, 197.  
     v. Stewart, 401.  
 Langenberger v. Kroeger, 362.

[The figures refer to pages.]

- Langston v. Corney, 93.  
 Langton v. Lazarus, 249.  
 Lank v. Morrison, 142.  
 Larkin v. Hardenbrook, 302.  
 La Rose v. Logansport Nat. Bank, 110.  
 Larsen v. Breene, 423.  
 Latham v. Smith, 245.  
 La Touche v. La Touche, 272.  
 Law v. Parnell, 213.  
 Lawrence v. American Nat. Bank, 257.  
     v. Bassett, 188.  
     v. Clark, 314.  
     v. Dougherty, 45.  
     v. Miller, 379.  
     v. Willis, 230.  
 Lawson v. Farmers' Bank, 166, 392.  
     v. Lovejoy, 219.  
     v. Weston, 321.  
 Laxton v. Peat, 306.  
 Lay v. Wissman, 317, 326.  
 Lazarus v. Cowle, 183, 296.  
 Lazier v. Horan, 359, 366.  
 Leach v. Hewitt, 395.  
 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lonsont, 291.  
 Leavitt v. Putnam, 117, 127, 129, 201,  
     207, 209.  
     v. Simes, 352.  
 Lebel v. Tucker, 188.  
 Lecaen v. Kirkman, 142.  
 Ledwich v. McKim, 260.  
 Lee v. Balcom, 30.  
     v. Green, 20.  
     v. Murdoch, 250.  
     v. Selleck, 403.  
     v. Starbird, 251.  
     v. Swift, 6.  
     v. Wilcocks, 47, 173.  
 Leeds v. Lancashire, 123, 253.  
 Leftley v. Mills, 361.  
 Legge v. Thorpe, 396.  
 Leggett v. Cooper, 280.  
     v. Jones, 53.  
 Legro v. Staples, 52.  
 Lehman v. Jones, 357, 399.  
 Leiber v. Goodrich, 43.  
 Leland v. Farnham, 330.  
 Le Neve v. Le Neve, 217, 313.  
 Lenheim v. Fay, 112.  
 Lennig v. Ralston, 24, 188, 189, 333.  
 Lennon v. Grauer, 165.  
 Lenox v. Leverett, 153.  
     v. Roberts, 76, 390.  
 Leonard v. Gary, 402.  
     v. Mason, 49.  
 Leonard v. Olson, 346.  
     v. Vredenburg, 110.  
 Leslie v. Hastings, 88, 90.  
     v. Lorillard, 291.  
 Lester v. Given, 409, 415, 417, 418.  
 Lett v. Morris, 8.  
 Levy v. Gadsby, 243.  
 Lewis v. Berry, 39.  
     v. Clay, 266, 431.  
     v. Cosgrave, 280.  
     v. Davisson, 20.  
     v. Gompertz, 376.  
     v. Hathman, 134.  
     v. Hodgdon, 214.  
     v. Kramer, 250.  
     v. Lady Parker, 330.  
     v. Payn, 247.  
     v. Pead, 230.  
 Libby v. Mikelborg, 41.  
 Lightbody v. Bank, 279.  
 Lincoln v. Buckmaster, 231.  
     v. Stevens, 178.  
 Lindell v. Rokes, 278.  
 Lindenberger v. Beall, 390.  
 Linderman v. Guldin, 383.  
 Lindley v. Hofman, 265.  
 Lindsay v. Price, 113.  
 Lindsey v. McClelland, 345.  
 Lindus v. Bradwell, 81.  
 Lisle v. Rogers, 250.  
 Lithgow v. Lyon, 172.  
 Littauer v. Goldman, 168, 169.  
 Littell v. Hord, 175.  
 Little v. O'Brien, 213.  
     v. Phenix Bank, 408, 411, 413.  
     v. Slackford, 27.  
 Littlefield v. Bank, 197.  
 Livingston v. Hastie, 175.  
 Lloyd v. Sigourney, 125, 126, 322.  
 Lobdell v. Baker, 168.  
 Lockwood v. Crawford, 376.  
 Lodge v. Phelps, 197.  
     v. Spooner, 173.  
 Logan v. Attix, 20.  
 Lomax v. Picot, 120.  
 London & C. Bank v. Groome, 417.  
 London & S. Bank v. Wentworth, 81.  
 Long v. Moore, 250.  
 Loomis v. Pulver, 345.  
     v. Ruck, 269.  
 Lord v. Bank, 182.  
 Loring v. Chase, 245.  
 Losee v. Dunkin, 209, 347.  
 Louisiana State Bank v. Rowel, 385.

[The figures refer to pages.]

Louisville Banking Co. v. Gray, 50.  
 Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 7.  
 Lovejoy v. Whipple, 287.  
 Lovell v. Evertson, 213.  
     v. Hill, 38.  
 Lovett v. Cornwell, 417.  
 Lowe v. Bliss, 53.  
     v. Waller, 195, 242, 243.  
 Lowery v. Steward, 8.  
 Lowes v. Mazzaredo, 243.  
 Lowry v. Steele, 401.  
 Lowy v. Andreas, 16.  
 Loyd v. McCaffrey, 419.  
 Lubbering v. Kohlbrecher, 247.  
 Lucas v. James, 55.  
     v. Ladew, 342.  
     v. Pitney, 224.  
 Luce v. Shoff, 76.  
 Luckey v. Pepper, 344.  
 Luff v. Pope, 27.  
 Lugrue v. Woodruff, 98.  
 Lumley v. Palmer, 92.  
 Lunt v. Adams, 351.  
 Luxe v. Pompe, 171.  
 Lynn v. Bell, 408.  
 Lyon v. Marshall, 60.  
     v. Mitchell, 289.  
 Lyon, Potter & Co. v. Bank, 142, 203, 204.  
 Lyons v. Divelbis, 109.  
 Lysaght v. Bryant, 382.

## M

Macarthur v. Fullarton, 35.  
 McCaffrey v. Dustin, 207.  
 McCall v. Taylor, 56.  
 McCamant v. Miners' Trust Co. Bank, 128.  
 McCaskill v. Connecticut Sav. Bank, 27.  
 McClain v. Davis, 231.  
     v. Weldemeyer, 196.  
 McClane v. Fitch, 403.  
 McCrillis v. How, 218.  
 McCulloch v. Hoffman, 193.  
 McCune v. Belt, 374.  
 McDool v. Yeomans, 132.  
 McDonald v. Hodge, 45.  
     v. Muscatine Nat. Bank, 268.  
 McDowell v. Cook, 301.  
 McEvers v. Mason, 96.  
 McGehee v. Posey, 45.

McGinn v. Holmes, 20.  
 McGinnis v. Com., 229.  
 McGrade v. German Sav. Inst., 418.  
 McGrath v. Clark, 251, 254.  
 McGruder v. Bank of Washington, 358, 399, 400.  
 McGuire v. Bidwell, 20.  
 McIntire v. Preston, 224.  
 Macintosh v. Haydon, 250.  
     v. Lytle, 59.  
 McKay's Estate v. Bank, 185.  
 McKenzie v. British Linen Co., 256.  
 Mackey v. Peterson, 265.  
 McKinnell v. Robinson, 293.  
 Mackintosh v. Elliot Nat. Bank, 147.  
 McKleroy v. Southern Bank of Kentucky, 147.  
 McKnight v. Knisely, 312, 315.  
     v. Wheeler, 164.  
 McKyring v. Bull, 330.  
 McLaren v. Hall, 20.  
 McLaughlin, In re, 228.  
     v. McGovern, 165.  
 McLean v. Clydesdale Banking Co., 408, 428.  
 Macleed v. Snee, 39, 40.  
 McLemore v. Powell, 307.  
 McLeod v. Hunter, 41.  
 McMinn v. Richmonds, 218.  
 McMullen v. Rafferty, 8, 14.  
 McMurchy v. Robinson, 76.  
 McNamee v. McNamee, 286.  
 McNeillage v. Holloway, 221.  
 Macomb v. Wilkinson, 194.  
 Macomber v. Dunham, 172.  
 McSharran v. Neeley, 72.  
 McWilliam v. Webb, 10.  
 Madison Square Bank v. Pierce, 298.  
 Magee v. Badger, 320, 321.  
 Magruder v. Union Bank, 355, 364, 367, 400.  
 Maine Trust & Banking Co. v. Butler, 109.  
 Maitland v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 316.  
 Mammon v. Hartman, 141.  
 Manchester Bank v. Fellows, 385.  
 Mandeville v. Newton, 124, 168.  
     v. Riddle, 3.  
     v. Welch, 8, 79.  
 Mangles v. Dixon, 197.  
 Mann v. Moors, 389.  
 Manners, Ex parte, 245.  
 Manning v. Kohn, 173.  
     v. McClure, 312.  
 Manrow v. Durham, 110.



[The figures refer to pages.]

Manwaring v. Harrison, 348.  
 Marine Nat. Bank v. National City Bank, 251, 257, 421.  
 Marion & M. R. R. v. Hodge, 145.  
 Market & Fulton Nat. Bank v. Sargent, 258.  
 Markey v. Corey, 109.  
 Marr v. Johnson, 382.  
 Marsh v. Marshall, 210.  
 Marshall v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 289.  
     v. Clary, 85.  
     v. Marshall, 209.  
     v. Rockwood, 70, 136.  
 Marston v. Allen, 136, 137.  
 Martendale v. Follett, 252, 255.  
 Martin v. Chaunty, 48.  
     v. Franklin, 173.  
     v. Mayo, 219.  
     v. Winslow, 345.  
 Marvin v. McCullum, 68.  
 Marvine v. Hymers, 224.  
 Marzetti v. Williams, 427, 428.  
 Mason v. Dousay, 92, 98, 184, 425.  
     v. Franklin, 161, 342, 353.  
     v. Lord, 241.  
     v. Mason, 176.  
     v. Morgan, 202.  
     v. Noonan, 330.  
 Maspero v. Pedesclaux, 383.  
 Massachusetts Bank v. Oliver, 383.  
 Massey v. Paola Bldg. & Sav. Ass'n, 226.  
 Master v. Miller, 246, 249.  
 Masters v. Ibberson, 327.  
 Materne v. Horwitz, 288.  
 Mathews v. Aikin, 306.  
 Matteson v. Ellsworth, 248, 255.  
     v. Moulton, 95.  
 Matthews v. Bloxsome, 130.  
     v. Haydon, 363.  
     v. Houghton, 45.  
 Matthiessen v. McMahon, 228.  
 Mattison v. Marks, 31, 36.  
 Maule v. Crawford, 6, 16.  
 Mauran v. Lamb, 206, 214, 299.  
 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 397.  
 Maxwell v. Vansant, 113.  
 May v. Campbell, 242.  
     v. Chapman, 319, 327.  
     v. Coffin, 130.  
     v. Hewitt, 67.  
     v. Kelly, 87.  
     v. Miller, 56.

Mayberry v. Morris, 315.  
 Mayer v. Heidelbach, 314.  
 Meacher v. Fort, 164, 256.  
 Mead v. Engs, 382, 391.  
     v. Keeler, 224.  
     v. Small, 402.  
     v. Young, 117, 255.  
 Meadow v. Bird, 312.  
 Meads v. Merchants' Bank, 421, 422.  
 Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 75, 354.  
     v. Straiton, 16, 59, 62, 330.  
 Mechanics' Banking Ass'n v. New York & S. W. L. Co., 225.  
 Mechanics' & F. Bank v. Wixson, 315.  
 Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Barnett, 316.  
 Mechanics' & Traders' Ins. Co. v. Coons, 416.  
 Mechanics' & Traders' Nat. Bank v. Crow, 333.  
 Meeker v. Shanks, 68.  
 Megginson v. Harper, 60.  
 Mehlberg v. Tisher, 275.  
 Mellersh v. Rippen, 375.  
 Mellish v. Rawdon, 343, 365.  
     v. Simeon, 160, 173.  
 Meltzer v. Doll, 272.  
 Mendez v. Carreroon, 299.  
 Mercantile Bank v. Cox, 100.  
 Mercer v. Lancaster, 388.  
 Mercer Co. v. Hacket, 206.  
 Merchants' Bank v. Birch, 383.  
     v. Elderkin, 356.  
     v. Spicer, 55, 362, 413.  
     v. State Bank, 421.  
 Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Clair, 215.  
 Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Eagle Nat. Bank, 147.  
     v. State Nat. Bank, 408, 409, 415, 421.  
 Merchants' & Mechanics' Bank v. Hewett, 11.  
 Meridian Nat. Bank v. Gallaudet, 168.  
 Merrick v. Boury, 20.  
 Merritt v. Benton, 173.  
     v. Cole, 299.  
     v. Earle, 286.  
     v. Todd, 346.  
     v. Woodbury, 373, 384.  
 Mersman v. Verges, 246.  
 Mertens v. Winnington, 154, 301.  
 Messenger v. Southey, 374.

[The figures refer to pages.]

- Metcalf v. Richardson**, 384.  
**Metropolitan Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Jones**, 422.  
**Meyer v. Hibsher**, 177, 178, 356-358.  
     v. Huncke, 255.  
     v. Huneke, 248.  
     v. Richards, 164, 169.  
**Meyers v. Phillips**, 33.  
**Michigan Bank v. Eldred**, 258.  
**Michigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred**, 1.  
**Michigan Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth**, 68.  
**Miers v. Brown**, 374, 379.  
**Miles v. Lingeran**, 219.  
**Milford v. Mayer**, 342.  
**Miller v. Austen**, 31.  
     v. Biddle, 6, 42.  
     v. Crayton, 322.  
     v. Excelsior Stone Co., 51.  
     v. Finley, 234, 321.  
     v. Gilleland, 250.  
     v. Hackley, 161, 371, 388.  
     v. Hull, 243.  
     v. Larned, 195.  
     v. Nelhaus, 92.  
     v. Poage, 36.  
     v. Race, 111, 206.  
     v. Talcott, 211, 326.  
     v. Thomson, 145.  
     v. Tiffany, 185.  
     v. Wood, 282.  
     v. Zelmer, 243.  
**Millis v. Barber**, 182, 194.  
**Mills v. Bank of United States**, 374, 377, 416.  
     v. Mills, 289.  
**Milne v. Graham**, 197.  
**Milton's Case**, 3.  
**Miner v. Paris Exch. Bank**, 239.  
**Minet v. Gibson**, 62, 330.  
**Mining Co. v. Anglo-Californian Bank**, 224.  
**Minor v. Bewick**, 134.  
**Minot v. Russ**, 409, 423, 424.  
**Minturn v. Fisher**, 406.  
**Miser v. Trovinger**, 183, 395.  
**Mishler v. Reed**, 296.  
**Mitchel v. De Grand**, 341, 352.  
**Mitchell v. Baring**, 357.  
     v. Cross, 391.  
     v. Culver, 72, 258, 259, 268.  
     v. Fuller, 114, 118.  
     v. Reynolds, 290.  
     v. Rome R. Co., 226.  
**Mix v. National Bank of Bloomington**, 815.  
**Mobile Bank v. Brown**, 44.  
**Mobley v. Clark**, 394.  
     v. Ryan, 330.  
**Mohawk Bank v. Corey**, 180, 182.  
**Molese v. Knapp**, 57.  
**Moline, Ex parte**, 376, 384, 390.  
**Molton v. Camroux**, 227, 231.  
**Money v. Ricketts**, 209.  
**Monroe v. Hoff**, 20.  
**Montague v. Perkins**, 259.  
**Montellus v. Charles**, 343.  
**Montgomery v. Crossthwait**, 253.  
     v. Elliott, 359.  
     v. Tutt, 359.  
**Montross v. Clark**, 178, 179.  
**Monument Nat. Bank v. Globe Works**, 225.  
**Moody v. Threkeld**, 60.  
**Moore v. Clopton**, 184.  
     v. Coffield, 399.  
     v. Cross, 136, 141, 178.  
     v. Hershey, 227, 229.  
     v. McClure, 66.  
     v. Maple, 213.  
     v. Moore, 324.  
     v. Ryder, 314.  
     v. Walitt, 357.  
     v. Warren, 348.  
**Moorman v. State Bank**, 376.  
**Moran v. Commissioners of Miami Co.**, 206.  
**Mordecai v. Dawkins**, 293.  
**More v. Manning**, 117, 127, 201.  
**Morehead v. Parkersburg Nat. Bank**, 250.  
**Morford v. Davis**, 164.  
**Morgan v. Bank of Louisville**, 398.  
     v. Fallenstein, 281.  
     v. Reintzel, 298.  
     v. Reinzel, 339.  
     v. United States, 209, 345.  
     v. Van Ingen, 371, 382.  
     v. Woodworth, 382.  
**Morley v. Culverwell**, 297, 302.  
**Mornyer v. Cooper**, 327.  
**Morris v. Husson**, 389.  
     v. Lee, 30.  
     v. Poillon, 189, 196.  
**Morrison v. Bailey**, 27, 406.  
**Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co.**, 290.  
**Morrow v. Brown**, 281.  
**Morse v. Chamberlin**, 388.  
     v. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 409, 425.

[The figures refer to pages.]

Morse Twist Drill & Mach. Co. v. Morse, 291.  
 Morton v. Naylor, 8, 37.  
     v. Steward, 218.  
     v. Thurber, 238.  
     v. Westcott, 388.  
 Moses v. Bank, 61, 110, 416, 419.  
     v. Ela, 397.  
     v. Trice, 339.  
 Mosher v. Carpenter, 164.  
 Moss v. Averell, 224.  
     v. Harpeth Academy, 224.  
     v. Oakley, 224.  
 Mott v. Havana Nat. Bank, 49.  
     v. Hicks, 66, 120, 224.  
 Moule v. Brown, 415.  
 Mt. Mansfield Hotel Co. v. Bailey, 130.  
 Moxon v. Pulling, 106.  
 Muilman v. D'Eguino, 341, 343, 347, 348.  
 Muir v. Crawford, 308.  
 Mulherrin v. Hannum, 366.  
 Muller v. Pondir, 203.  
 Mullick v. Radakissen, 341, 346, 408.  
 Munger v. Shannon, 7, 37.  
 Munn v. Baldwin, 388, 389.  
     v. Burch, 418.  
     v. Commission Co., 172, 175, 224, 244.  
 Munroe v. Easton, 367.  
 Murdock v. Mills, 97.  
 Murphy v. Collins, 285.  
     v. Keyes, 194.  
     v. Lippe, 280.  
 Murray v. Beckwith, 195.  
     v. East India Co., 367.  
     v. Judah, 168, 413.  
     v. Lardner, 321, 323.  
 Muse v. Dantzler, 25.  
 Musselman v. Oakes, 60.  
 Mussey v. Eagle Bank, 421, 422.  
 Musson v. Lake, 129, 338, 368.  
 Mustard v. Wohlford's Heirs, 219.  
 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 231.  
 Mutual Nat. Bank v. Rotge, 423, 424.

**N**

Nagle v. Homer, 85.  
     v. Lyman, 99.  
 Nailor v. Bowle, 339.  
 Nance v. Lary, 260.  
 Nash v. Brown, 182.  
     v. Towne, 66.

NEG.BILLS.—33

Nason v. Barff, 94.  
 Nassau Bank v. Jones, 224.  
 National Bank v. Green, 172, 244.  
     v. Kirby, 334, 335.  
     v. Law, 322.  
     v. Millard, 419.  
     v. Texas, 208.  
     v. Young, 183.  
 National Bank of America v. Indiana Banking Co., 418.  
 National Bank of Commerce v. Atkinson, 225.  
     v. Galland, 110.  
 National Bank of Commonwealth v. Law, 110.  
 National Bank of North America v. Bangs, 147.  
 National Bank of Oxford v. Kirk, 290.  
 National City Bank of Brooklyn v. Westcott, 125.  
 National Commercial Bank v. Miller, 125, 419, 421, 423.  
 National Exch. Bank v. Veneman, 265.  
 National Mahaiwe Bank v. Peck, 427.  
 National Newark Banking Co. v. Second Nat. Bank, 345.  
 National Park Bank v. Ninth Nat. Bank, 148.  
 National State Bank v. Rising, 247.  
 Nay v. Lamb, 210.  
 Nazro v. Fuller, 250.  
 Neeley v. McSparran, 233.  
 Neff v. Horner, 251.  
 Nelson v. Bank, 99, 100, 379.  
     v. Edwards, 215.  
     v. Fottterall, 352, 363.  
 Nevada Bank v. Luce, 99.  
 Nevius v. Bank, 385, 387.  
 Newark Banking Co. v. National Bank of Erie, 343.  
 Newberry v. Trowbridge, 158.  
 Newcomb v. Raynor, 305.  
 Newell v. Doty, 182.  
 Newman v. Aultman, Miller & Co., 312.  
     v. Goza, 173.  
     v. Ravenscroft, 133.  
     v. Williams, 244.  
 New Orleans Canal & Banking Co. v. Montgomery, 330.  
 Newton v. Kennerly, 172.  
 New York Firemen Ins. Co. v. Sturges, 239.  
 Niagara Dist. Bank v. Fairman & W. Mach. Tool Mfg. Co., 84, 356, 359.  
 Nicholls v. Diamond, 81, 87.

[The figures refer to pages.]

Nichols v. Blackmore, 341, 347.  
     v. Fearson, 243, 244.  
     v. Goldsmith, 355.  
     v. Johnson, 247.  
 Nicholson v. Gouthit, 390.  
     v. Sedgwick, 197, 202.  
 Nickerson v. Ruger, 264.  
 Nightingale v. Withington, 220.  
 Noble v. Walker, 172, 244.  
 Nobles v. Bates, 290.  
 Noel v. Murray, 20.  
 Noll v. Smith, 254.  
 Norris v. Despard, 398, 416.  
     v. Langley, 285, 287.  
     v. Solomon, 28.  
 Northam v. Latouche, 233, 284.  
 Northampton Nat. Bank v. Kidder,  
     809, 326, 334.  
 North Atchison Bank v. Garrettson,  
     97.  
 Northern Trust Co. v. Rogers, 419.  
 Northwestern Coal Co. v. Bowman,  
     388, 415.  
 Northwestern Iron Co. v. Meade, 80.  
 Norton v. Dreyfuss, 280.  
     v. Ellam, 344, 366.  
     v. Lewis, 402.  
     v. Walte, 315.  
 Norwich Bank v. Hyde, 329.  
 Nourse v. Prime, 237.  
 Noxon v. Smith, 61.  
 Noyes v. Gilman, 196.

## O

Oakey v. Wilcox, 250.  
 Oakley v. Boorman, 107.  
 Oates v. Bank, 15, 240.  
 Oatman v. Taylor, 50.  
 O'Brien v. Smith, 415.  
 Ocean Bank v. Dill, 123.  
     v. Fant, 339.  
 Ocean Nat. Bank v. Carll, 264.  
     v. Williams, 362.  
 Ocoee Bank v. Hughes, 369.  
 O'Conner v. Hurley, 21.  
 Oddie v. National City Bank, 425.  
 Odell v. Buck, 230.  
 Ogden v. Saunders, 164, 350.  
 Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Kasson, 240.  
 Okie v. Spencer, 306.  
 Olcott v. Tloga R. Co., 225.  
 Oliver v. Bank of Tennessee, 395.  
 Olsen v. Ensign, 275, 328.

Olvey v. Jackson, 21.  
 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Walker, 133.  
 Onondaga County Bank v. Bates, 176.  
 Oppenheimer v. Farmers' & M. Bank,  
     317.  
 Ord v. Portal, 213.  
 Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor, 291.  
 Oridge v. Sherborne, 75, 350.  
 Oriental Bank v. Blake, 383, 400.  
 Ormes v. Beadel, 270.  
 Ormsbee v. Howe, 264.  
 Orr v. Lacy, 213.  
     v. Maginnis, 341.  
 Orrick v. Colston, 106.  
 Ort v. Fowler, 62, 265.  
 Ory v. Winter, 186.  
 Osborn v. Hawley, 51.  
     v. Pearsons, 59.  
 Osgood's Adm'rs v. Artt, 107, 108, 134,  
     203.  
 Osmond v. Fitzroy, 230.  
 Otisfield v. Mayberry, 338.  
 Oulds v. Harrison, 208.  
 Outhwalte v. Luntley, 249.  
 Outhwite v. Porter, 312.  
 Overend, In re, 301.  
 Overman v. Bank, 94, 98, 425.  
 Overton v. Tyler, 51.  
 Owen v. Barnum, 50.  
     v. Homan, 308.  
     v. Lavine, 85.  
     v. Van Uster, 87.  
 Owings v. Arnot, 249.

## P

Pack v. Thomas, 413.  
 Pagan v. Wylie, 253.  
 Page v. Cook, 41.  
     v. Gilbert, 376.  
     v. Heineberg, 224.  
     v. Morrell, 258, 268.  
 Paine v. Noelke, 6.  
 Palm v. Watt, 255.  
 Palmer v. Courtney, 168.  
     v. Field, 178.  
     v. Poor, 268.  
     v. Pratt, 35.  
     v. Stephens, 55.  
 Pannell v. M'Mechen, 306.  
 Pardee v. Lindley, 136.  
 Parish v. Stone, 282.  
 Park Bank v. Watson, 314, 316.  
 Parker v. City of Syracuse, 39.

[The figures refer to pages.]

- Parker v. Conner**, 320.  
     v. Gordon, 351, 390.  
     v. Greele, 97.  
     v. Kellogg, 357.  
     v. Plymell, 53.  
     v. Reddick, 345.  
     v. Stroud, 346, 359, 367.  
     v. Totten, 214.
- Parkin v. Moon**, 330.
- Parr v. Ellason**, 242, 243.
- Parshley v. Heath**, 401.
- Parsons v. Jackson**, 52.
- Partridge v. Badger**, 224.  
     v. Davis, 110.
- Pasmore v. North**, 72.
- Passumpsic Bank v. Goss**, 267.
- Patience v. Townley**, 348, 398, 396.
- Paton v. Coit**, 284, 334.
- Patterson v. Bank**, 427.  
     v. Todd, 209.
- Pattillo v. Alexander**, 110.
- Pattinson v. Luckley**, 247.
- Patton v. Shanklin**, 259.
- Paul v. Joel**, 377.
- Payne v. Cutler**, 314.
- Peabody Ins. Co. v. Wilson**, 359, 387.
- Peacock v. Pursell**, 365, 368, 369.  
     v. Rhodes, 111, 329.
- Pearce v. Wilkins**, 177.
- Pearson v. Bank of Metropolis**, 356.  
     v. Garrett, 35.  
     v. Pearson, 278.  
     v. Stoddard, 76.
- Pease v. Dwight**, 134.  
     v. Hirst, 133.  
     v. Pease, 66.  
     v. Warren, 299.
- Peaslee v. Robbins**, 113.
- Peck v. Cochran**, 90.  
     v. Mayo, 189, 342.
- Peets v. Bratt**, 70, 136.
- Peirce v. Pendar**, 386.
- Pellecat v. Angell**, 294.
- Penn v. Flack**, 329.
- Pennington v. Baehr**, 407.
- Penny v. Innes**, 128.
- Pentz v. Winterbottom**, 118, 119.
- People v. Cromwell**, 365.  
     v. D'Argencour, 255.  
     v. Fromme, 245.  
     v. Gates, 245.  
     v. McDermott, 74.  
     v. Tax Com'rs, 230.
- People's Bank v. Keech**, 383.  
     v. Legrand, 307.
- Perkins v. Franklin Bank**, 75.  
     v. White, 326.
- Perley v. Perley**, 7, 275.
- Perrine v. Canal Co.**, 223.  
     v. Hotchkiss, 237.
- Perry v. Smith**, 46.
- Peterson v. Hubbard**, 81.  
     v. Johnson, 281.
- Petit v. Benson**, 82.
- Peto v. Reynolds**, 31, 57.
- Pettee v. Prout**, 12.
- Phelan v. Moss**, 254, 321.
- Phelps v. Church**, 110, 132.  
     v. People, 255.  
     v. Sargent, 133.  
     v. Stocking, 387, 388.  
     v. Town, 44.  
     v. Vischer, 140.
- Philadelphia Bank v. Newkirk**, 52, 53.
- Phillips v. Ford**, 55.  
     v. Franklin, 367.  
     v. Gould, 376, 384.  
     v. Poindexter, 363.  
     v. — Thurn, 156.
- Philpott v. Bryant**, 341, 356.
- Phipps v. Harding**, 142.
- Phipson v. Kneller**, 401, 402.
- Phoenix Bank v. Hussey**, 24.
- Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Church**, 313, 314.
- Pickett v. Merchants' Nat. Bank**, 240.
- Pier v. Heinrichshoffen**, 398.
- Pierce v. Crafts**, 329.  
     v. Indseth, 403.  
     v. Kittredge, 92.  
     v. Schaden, 384.  
     v. Struthers, 161.
- Piersol v. Grimes**, 247.
- Pierson v. Hutchinson**, 338.
- Pigot's Case**, 247, 252.
- Pike v. Irwin**, 100.  
     v. Street, 120.
- Pilkingtion v. Scott**, 273.
- Pillans v. Van Mierop**, 96.
- Pinard v. Klockmann**, 25.
- Pindar v. Barlow**, 285, 287.
- Pine v. Smith**, 209.
- Piner v. Clary**, 370.
- Pinkham v. Macy**, 378.
- Pinnes v. Ely**, 119.
- Pinney v. Gleason**, 45.
- Pitman v. Breckenridge**, 38.
- Pixley v. Boynton**, 293.
- Planters' Bank v. Sharp**, 225.
- Planters' Bank of Tennessee v. Evans**, 131.

[The figures refer to pages.]

Plato v. Reynolds, 341.  
 Platt v. Bank, 44.  
     v. Beebe, 316.  
 Plummer v. Lyman, 100.  
 Pocklington v. Silvester, 349.  
 Polk v. Spinks, 398.  
 Pomeroy v. Tanner, 178.  
 Poorman v. Mills, 347.  
 Pope v. Bank of Albion, 421.  
     v. Linn, 287.  
 Poppett v. Stockdale, 288.  
 Porter v. Cushman, 299.  
     v. Kimball, 402.  
     v. Pittsburg Bessemer Steel Co.,  
     327.  
 Porthouse v. Parker, 397, 401.  
 Post v. Railway Co., 33.  
 Potter v. Pearson, 4.  
     v. Tallman, 185.  
     v. Tubb, 284.  
 Potts v. Mayer, 314, 325.  
     v. Whitehead, 80.  
 Powell v. Jones, 92.  
     v. Waters, 181, 182, 243, 308.  
 Power v. Finnie, 125.  
 Powers v. French, 193.  
 Prentiss v. Graves, 123.  
     v. Savage, 186.  
 Prescott Bank v. Caverly, 348.  
 President, etc., of Turnpike Road v.  
     Hurtin, 1, 6.  
 Preston v. Whitney, 50.  
 Prevot v. Abbott, 133.  
 Price v. Campbell, 237.  
     v. Easton, 81.  
     v. Neal, 55, 147, 330.  
     v. Price, 20, 147.  
     v. Young, 364.  
 Priddy v. Henbrey, 176.  
 Prideaux v. Criddle, 415.  
 Prince v. Bank, 380.  
 Printing & Numerical Registering Co.  
     v. Sampson, 291.  
 Pritchard v. Hirt, 215.  
 Prouty v. Roberts, 195.  
     v. Wilson, 307.  
 Prutsman v. Baker, 71.  
 Pruyn v. Milwaukee, 172.  
 Puffer v. Smith, 265.  
 Puget de Bras v. Forbes, 192.  
 Pugh v. McCormick, 402.  
 Pulliam v. Withers, 252.  
 Pumpelly v. Phelps, 67.  
 Purcell v. Allemong, 418, 417.

Putnam v. Crymes, 59.  
     v. Sullivan, 265, 357, 399.

## Q

Quackenbush v. Leonard, 240.  
 Quinby v. Merritt, 45.  
 Quinn v. Fuller, 177.  
     v. Hard, 180.  
 Quirk v. Thomas, 293.

## R

Rabberman v. Muehlhausen, 8.  
 Raborg v. Peyton, 86.  
 Ramchurn v. Radakissen, 365.  
 Ramuz v. Crowe, 339.  
 Rand v. Hubbard, 198.  
 Ranger v. Cary, 345, 347.  
 Rankin v. Weguelin, 278.  
 Rann v. Hughes, 4.  
 Ransom v. Mack, 385.  
 Rapelye v. Anderson, 175, 241.  
 Raplee v. Morgan, 172.  
 Ratcliff v. Planters' Bank, 353, 357.  
 Raubitschek v. Bank, 7.  
 Rawdon v. Redfield, 389.  
 Ray v. Smith, 397.  
 Raymond v. Mann, 397.  
     v. Sellick, 278.  
 Rea v. Dorrance, 395.  
 Read v. Bank of Kentucky, 371.  
     v. Cutts, 110.  
     v. McNulty, 53.  
     v. Marsh, 98.  
     v. Wilkinson, 85.  
 Reamer v. Bell, 334.  
 Redlich v. Doll, 267, 268.  
 Redman v. Adams, 39, 40.  
 Reed v. Batchelder, 219.  
     v. Prentiss, 281.  
     v. Roark, 55.  
     v. Wilson, 77, 350.  
 Rees v. Overbaugh, 247.  
 Reg. v. Harper, 56.  
 Reid v. Furnival, 132.  
     v. Morrison, 358.  
 Reinicker v. Smith, 234.  
 Remer v. Downer, 376.  
 Remsen v. Graves, 165, 166.  
 Renick v. Robbins, 379.  
 Renwick v. Williams, 208.

[The figures refer to pages.]

- Requa v. Collins, 389.  
 Rex v. Bigg, 108.  
     v. Hunter, 58.  
     v. Lambton, 69.  
     v. Randall, 59.  
     v. Thom, 65.  
     v. Treble, 250.  
     v. Wilcox, 43.  
 Rey v. Simpson, 141.  
 Reynolds v. Appleman, 374.  
     v. Dechaums, 234.  
     v. Douglass, 402.  
     v. Peto, 92.  
 Rhea v. Allison, 314.  
 Rhett v. Poe, 395, 397, 417.  
 Rhine v. Robinson, 70.  
 Rhodes v. Gent, 366.  
     v. Lindley, 45.  
 Rice v. Grange, 310.  
     v. Hogan, 366.  
     v. Peet, 231.  
     v. Stearns, 120, 121.  
 Rich v. Starbuck, 59, 113, 258.  
 Richards v. Barlow, 6.  
     v. Betzer, 281.  
     v. Daily, 208.  
     v. Darst, 136.  
     v. Frankum, 109.  
     v. Griggs, 11.  
     v. Warring, 8.  
 Richardson v. Carpenter, 38.  
     v. Lincoln, 120.  
     v. Martyr, 34.  
     v. Massachusetts Charitable Me-  
         chanic Ass'n, 223.  
     v. Rickman, 20.  
 Richmond v. Diefendorf, 324.  
 Rickford v. Ridge, 348.  
 Rickle v. Dow, 112.  
 Riddle v. Mandeville, 176.  
 Ridley v. Taylor, 322.  
 Riggin v. Collier, 24.  
 Riggs v. American Tract Soc., 231.  
     v. Hatch, 388.  
     v. Lindsay, 80.  
 Riker v. Mfg. Co., 41, 42.  
 Riley v. Shawacker, 327.  
 Ripley v. Grant, 229.  
     v. Greenleaf, 76.  
 Risley v. Smith, 39.  
 Rivanna Nav. Co. v. Dawsons, 224.  
 Riverside Iron-Works v. Hall, 20.  
 Roark v. Turner, 172, 244.  
 Robarts v. Tucker, 427.  
 Robbins v. Bacon, 8.  
 Roberts v. Corbin, 408, 418.  
     v. Jackson, 70.  
     v. Snow, 42.  
 Robertson v. Allen, 165.  
     v. Burdekin, 186, 188.  
     v. Kensington, 122, 123, 322.  
 Robinson v. Ames, 341, 343, 396.  
     v. Bartlett, 142.  
     v. Brown, 16, 201.  
     v. Crandall, 214.  
     v. Hawksford, 413, 414.  
     v. Lyman, 208.  
     v. Perry, 208.  
     v. Reynolds, 283.  
     v. Smith, 244.  
     v. Wilkinson, 16.  
     v. Yarrow, 331.  
 Rock v. Nichols, 281.  
 Rock County Nat. Bank v. Hollister,  
     125, 215.  
 Rock Island Nat. Bank v. Nelson, 334.  
 Rockville Nat. Bank v. Holt, 305, 307.  
 Rockwell v. Charles, 235.  
     v. Elkhorn Bank, 224.  
 Roehner v. Knickerbocker Life Ins.  
     Co., 76.  
 Roff v. Miller, 88.  
 Rogers v. Blackwell, 228.  
     v. Morton, 194.  
     v. Walker, 229.  
 Rogerson v. Ladbroke, 428.  
 Rollin v. Steward, 427.  
 Roll v. Raguet, 289.  
 Rosa v. Brotherson, 314.  
 Rose v. Sims, 272.  
 Rosenwald v. Goldstein, 317.  
 Ross v. Bedell, 332.  
     v. Espy, 114.  
     v. Hurd, 402.  
     v. Milne, 81.  
     v. Planters' Bank, 374.  
 Rossman v. Townsend, 81.  
 Rothschild v. Currie, 130, 368, 372, 403.  
 Rounds v. Smith, 423.  
 Rouquette v. Overmann, 187, 403.  
 Rousillon v. Rousillon, 291.  
 Row v. Dawson, 8.  
 Rowe v. Tipper, 381, 393.  
     v. Young, 359.  
 Rowlands v. Springett, 376.  
 Rowley v. Ball, 339.  
 Rubey v. Culbertson, 12.  
 Rucker v. Hiller, 369.  
 Ruckman v. Bryan, 293.  
 Ruddell v. Walker, 367.

[The figures refer to pages.]

Ruff v. Webb, 27, 28.  
 Ruiz v. Renauld, 97.  
 Rumball v. Ball, 344.  
 Russel v. Langstaffe, 112, 258, 259.  
 Russell v. Ball, 121.  
     v. Phillips, 80.  
     v. Powell, 28.  
     v. Whipple, 17, 30, 70, 136.  
     v. Wiggin, 96.

## S

Safford v. Wyckoff, 224.  
 Sager v. Tupper, 55.  
 St. John v. Homans, 419.  
 St. Louis, I. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Camden Bank, 30.  
 St. Louis Nat. Stockyards v. O'Reilly, 92.  
 St. Stephen Branch Ry. Co. v. Black, 46.  
 Salomon v. Hopkins, 56.  
     v. Leather Co., 379.  
 Salter v. Burt, 77, 350.  
 Saltmarsh v. Tuthill, 285.  
 Salt Springs Bank v. Burton, 351, 352.  
     v. Syracuse Savings Inst., 156.  
 Saltus v. Everett, 267.  
 Sammons v. Halloway, 245.  
 Sanders v. Bacon, 122.  
     v. Blain, 201.  
 Sanderson v. Bowes, 344, 359.  
     v. Reinstadler, 385, 387.  
 Sands v. Clarke, 358, 394.  
     v. Lyon, 350.  
 Sanford v. Norton, 363.  
 Sargent v. Appleton, 305.  
     v. Southgate, 208.  
 Saunderson v. Jackson, 56.  
     v. Judge, 355, 388.  
 Savage v. Aldren, 123.  
     v. King, 203.  
 Sawyer v. Chambers, 123, 280.  
     v. McLouth, 273.  
     v. Patterson, 113.  
     v. Warner, 329.  
 Say v. Barwick, 234.  
 Sayles v. Smith, 285.  
 Scalfe v. Byrd, 70.  
 Scanland v. Porter, 142.  
 Schaffner v. Ehrman, 427.  
 Schepp v. Carpenter, 181, 315.  
 Schermerhorn v. Talman, 47.  
 Schmied v. Frank, 401.  
 Schmittler v. Simon, 39.  
 Schmitz v. Mining Co., 30.  
 Schnell v. Mill Co., 115.  
 Schofield v. Bayard, 153, 156, 399.  
 Scholesfield v. Eichelberger, 398.  
 Scholey v. Ramsbottom, 303.  
 Scholfield v. Earl of Loundesborough, 254.  
 Schoonmaker v. Roosa, 278.  
 Schroeder v. Central Bank, 419.  
     v. Turner, 142.  
 Schuler v. Israel Bank, 428.  
 Schultz v. Howard, 142.  
 Schwalm v. McIntyre, 252.  
 Schwenk v. Yost, 108.  
 Scofield v. Day, 173, 189.  
 Scotland Co. v. Hill, 327.  
 Scott v. Bevan, 48.  
     v. Lifford, 380.  
     v. Lloyd, 237.  
     v. Lufford, 393.  
     v. Pilkington, 100.  
     v. Schreeve, 13.  
 Scudder v. Bank, 92, 100, 184.  
 Seabury v. Hungerford, 113.  
 Seaman v. Whitney, 81.  
 Searcy v. Vance, 44.  
 Sears v. Lantz, 109.  
 Seaton v. Scovill, 392.  
 Seaver v. Lincoln, 362.  
     v. Phelps, 227, 228.  
 Second Nat. Bank v. Basiner, 53.  
     v. Williams, 419.  
 Security Bank v. Fuel Co., 125.  
 Sedgwick v. Stanton, 289.  
 Seebold v. Tatlie, 250.  
 Seeley v. Engell, 282.  
 Seibel v. Vaughan, 254.  
 Selby v. Eden, 359.  
     v. McCullough, 20.  
     v. Selby, 55.  
 Seligman v. Ten Eyck's Estate, 13.  
 Selser v. Brock, 164.  
 Semmes v. Wilson, 172.  
 Seneca Co. Bank v. Neass, 182.  
 Sentance v. Poole, 227, 228.  
 Senter v. Continental Bank, 418.  
 Sergeson v. Sealey, 229.  
 Serle v. Norton, 413.  
 Serrell v. Railway, 417.  
 Seventh Nat. Bank v. Cook, 426.  
 Sewall v. Russell, 379, 391.  
 Seybel v. National Currency Bank, 320.  
 Seyfert v. Edison, 180.



[The figures refer to pages.]

- Seymour v. Cowing, 71.  
     v. Insurance Co., 172.  
     v. Mickey, 113.  
 Shackelford v. Hooker, 82, 84.  
 Shade v. Creviston, 197.  
 Shadwell v. Shadwell, 277.  
 Shank v. Butsch, 55, 407.  
 Sharp v. Bailey, 183.  
 Sharpe v. Drew, 303.  
 Shaver v. Ehle, 168.  
 Shaw v. Camp, 35, 278.  
     v. Clark, 327.  
     v. Knox, 177.  
     v. McNeill, 402.  
     v. Railroad Co., 27.  
     v. Smith, 60.  
 Shaylor v. Mix, 386, 387.  
 Shed v. Brett, 362, 379.  
 Sheehy v. Mandeville, 20.  
 Shelburne Falls Nat. Bank v. Towns-  
     ley, 385, 386, 392.  
 Shelby v. Judd, 109.  
 Sheldon v. Benham, 386, 392  
     v. Horton, 402.  
 Shelton v. Braithwaite, 376.  
 Shenton v. James, 34, 40.  
 Shepard v. Hall, 385.  
 Shepherd v. Chamberlain, 351.  
 Sheridan v. Mayor, etc., 12.  
 Sherman v. Sherman, 302.  
 Shinn v. Fredericks, 8.  
 Shipley v. Carroll, 268.  
 Shipman v. Bank, 62.  
 Shisler v. Vandike, 256.  
 Shoemaker v. Mechanics' Bank, 387.  
 Shoenberger v. Lancaster Sav. Inst.,  
     400.  
 Shotwell v. Webb, 13.  
 Shoulters v. Allen, 228.  
 Shrieve v. Duckham, 378.  
 Shriner v. Keller, 20.  
 Shultz v. Depuy, 332.  
     v. Payne, 258.  
 Shuttleworth v. Stephens, 58.  
 Shutts v. Fingar, 305, 346.  
 Sice v. Cunningham, 345, 347.  
 Siebeneck v. Anchor Sav. Bank, 306.  
 Siebold v. Davis, 80.  
 Siegel v. Bank, 49.  
 Siffkin v. Walker, 66.  
 Sigourney v. Lloyd, 125.  
 Simpson v. Davis, 7, 275.  
     v. Hall, 210.  
     v. Moulden, 43.  
     v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 424.  
 Simpson v. Stackhouse, 253.  
     v. Turney, 392.  
     v. White, 403.  
 Sims v. Smith, 219.  
 Sinclair v. Baggaley, 287.  
     v. Lynah, 376.  
 Skelton v. Dustin, 352.  
 Skillman v. Titus, 417.  
 Slacum v. Pomery, 189.  
 Slade v. Mutrie, 302.  
 Sloan v. McCarty, 33, 35.  
 Slocumb v. Holmes, 20.  
 Sloman v. Cox, 248.  
 Small v. Smith, 181.  
 Smallwood v. Vernon, 131.  
 Smedes v. Utica Bank, 385.  
 Smentek v. Coonhauser, 33.  
 Smille v. Stevens, 32.  
 Smith v. Abbott, 83, 85.  
     v. Allen, 30, 31.  
     v. Bank, 363.  
     v. Bellamy, 397.  
     v. Boheme, 32, 45.  
     v. Boulton, 377.  
     v. Braine, 334.  
     v. Brittain, 10.  
     v. Caro, 41.  
     v. Chester, 148, 195, 255, 331.  
     v. Clarke, 114, 118, 205.  
     v. Crane, 52, 53.  
     v. De Witts, 199, 202.  
     v. Eureka Flour Mills, 224.  
     v. Ewer, 11.  
     v. Hawkins, 307.  
     v. Hiscock, 211, 282.  
     v. Janes, 415.  
     v. Johnson, 226.  
     v. Kendall, 6, 53, 54, 76.  
     v. Knox, 179.  
     v. Livingston, 264, 334.  
     v. Livingstone, 195.  
     v. Lownsdale, 401.  
     v. Mace, 248.  
     v. Marsack, 149.  
     v. Miller, 365, 415.  
     v. Moberly, 267.  
     v. Mullett, 387, 393.  
     v. Nightingale, 52.  
     v. Philbrick, 72.  
     v. Roach, 342.  
     v. Sac Co., 333.  
     v. Sawyer, 154.  
     v. Shaw, 47.  
     v. Shepard, 297.  
     v. Sheppard, 255.

[The figures refer to pages.]

- Smith v. Smith, 272.  
     v. Whiting, 133, 202, 376.  
     v. Wilcox, 286.  
     v. Williamson, 233.  
 Smithers v. Junker, 36.  
 Snalith v. Mingay, 188, 259.  
 Snirts v. Overjohn, 265.  
 Snow v. Perkins, 374, 403.  
 Snyder v. Studebaker, 226.  
 Soares v. Glyn, 124.  
 Sohn v. Morton, 308.  
 Solarte v. Palmer, 377.  
 Solomons v. Bank of England, 211.  
 Sommerville v. Williams, 75.  
 Souhegan Nat. Bank v. Boardman, 67.  
 Southall v. Rigg, 273.  
 Southard v. Porter, 203.  
     v. Wilson, 213.  
 Southern Masonic Relief Tier Ass'n v. Laudenbach, 230.  
 Southwick v. First Nat. Bank of Memphis, 264.  
     v. Sax, 365.  
 Sparrow v. Chisman, 178.  
 Spaulding v. Andrews, 93, 98.  
     v. Putnam, 110.  
 Spear v. Crawford, 224.  
     v. Pratt, 90, 91.  
 Speck v. Pullman Car Co., 209.  
 Spencer v. Allerton, 134.  
     v. Ballou, 181, 315, 382.  
     v. Carstarphen, 136.  
     v. Halpern, 109.  
     v. Harvey, 397, 401.  
     v. Tilden, 237.  
 Sperry v. Horr, 51, 245.  
 Spies v. Gilmore, 399.  
 Spinning v. Sullivan, 197.  
 Spitler v. James, 321.  
 Spooner v. Holmes, 13, 321.  
 Sprague v. Duel, 230.  
     v. Sprague, 275.  
 Sproat v. Matthews, 40, 90, 92.  
 Spurgeon v. Smitha, 305.  
 Spurgin v. McPheeters, 28, 40.  
 Stackpole v. Arnold, 66.  
 Stacy v. Kemp, 282.  
 Stafford v. Yates, 382.  
 Stainback v. Bank, 363, 390.  
 Stalker v. McDonald, 313.  
 Stam v. Kerr, 369.  
 Stanton v. Allen, 290.  
     v. Blossom, 379, 382.  
 Staples v. Franklin Bank, 351.  
 Stapleton v. Banking Co., 51.  
 State v. Cilley, 252.  
     v. Corpening, 43.  
     v. Hill, 245.  
     v. Rice, 223.  
 State Bank v. Hurd, 356.  
     v. McCoy, 233.  
     v. Slaughter, 383.  
 State Capital Bank v. Thompson, 287.  
 State Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 13.  
 Steele v. McKinlay, 87, 143.  
 Stein v. Yglesias, 180, 211.  
 Steman v. Harrison, 97.  
 Stephens v. Graham, 249, 251.  
     v. Monongahela Nat. Bank, 178.  
 Stephenson v. King, 278.  
 Sterling v. Marietta & S. Trading Co., 308.  
 Sterry v. Robinson, 342.  
 Stevens v. Bruce, 347.  
     v. Oaks, 306.  
     v. Park, 413.  
 Stevenson v. Hyland, 312.  
     v. O'Neal, 120.  
 Stewart v. Anderson, 71.  
     v. Eden, 73, 305, 383.  
     v. Hidden, 296, 302.  
     v. Insall, 281.  
     v. Kennett, 379.  
     v. Lansing, 264.  
     v. Lispenard, 230.  
     v. Millard, 368.  
     v. Petree, 239.  
     v. Smith, 413, 415.  
 Stinson v. Lee, 66.  
 Stix v. Mathews, 392.  
 Stocken v. Collins, 377.  
 Stocks v. Dobson, 12.  
 Stockwell v. Bramble, 92, 98, 104.  
 Stoddard v. Burton, 297.  
     v. Kimball, 181.  
 Stoessiger v. South E. Ry. Co., 56.  
 Stone v. Clough, 338.  
     v. Frost, 12.  
     v. Peake, 280.  
     v. Rawlinson, 198, 201.  
 Storer v. Logan, 85.  
 Storm v. Stirling, 59.  
 Story v. Lamb, 8.  
 Strange v. Price, 378.  
 Stratton v. Hill, 176.  
 Strawbridge v. Robinson, 24.  
 Streit v. Sanborn, 287.  
 Strong v. King, 351, 365.  
 Struthers v. Kendall, 312.  
 Stults v. Silva, 33, 36.

[The figures refer to pages.]

Sturdy v. Henderson, 344.  
 Sturges v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 81, 92, 100.  
 Sturtevant v. Ford, 180, 211.  
 Sudler v. Collins, 250.  
 Suffell v. Bank of England, 252.  
 Suffolk Sav. Bank v. City of Boston, 327.  
 Sullivan v. Langley, 264, 334, 335.  
     v. Rudisill, 248.  
 Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. Tribune Ass'n, 286.  
 Supervisors v. Schenck, 225.  
 Suse v. Pomp, 171, 342.  
 Susquehanna Bridge & Bank Co. v. Evans, 114.  
 Susquehanna Valley Bank v. Loomis, 175.  
 Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 354, 357, 361.  
 Sutton v. Toomer, 252, 344.  
 Suydam v. Westfall, 178, 237, 295.  
 Svendsen v. Bank, 427.  
 Swasey v. Vanderheyden, 218.  
 Swayze v. Britton, 370, 379.  
 Sweet v. Chapman, 241, 310.  
 Sweetser v. French, 114.  
 Swem v. Newell, 296.  
 Swetland v. Creigh, 44.  
 Swett v. Hooper, 172.  
 Swift v. Tyson, 311.  
 Swope v. Leffingwell, 300.  
     v. Ross, 79, 83, 295, 296.  
 Sylvester v. Crapo, 347.

**T**

Taft v. Sergeant, 219.  
 Talbot v. Bank of Rochester, 257.  
     v. Clark, 391.  
 Talbott v. Suit, 25.  
 Tappan v. Ely, 122.  
 Tardeveau v. Smith's Ex'rs, 237.  
 Tardy v. Boyd, 398.  
 Tassell v. Lewis, 349.  
 Tasse v. Church, 49.  
 Tatam v. Haslar, 335.  
 Tatum v. Kelley, 293.  
 Taunton Bank v. Richardson, 402.  
 Taylor v. Atchison, 235.  
     v. Croker, 149.  
     v. Dobbins, 56.  
     v. Drake, 100.  
     v. French, 141.  
     v. Shelton, 66.

Taylor v. Snyder, 72, 357, 358, 399.  
     v. Steele, 29, 31.  
 Telford v. Patton, 44.  
 Temple v. Baker, 110.  
     v. Pullen, 259.  
 Tenney v. Prince, 113.  
     v. Sanborn, 329.  
 Terry v. Parker, 394.  
 Tevis v. Young, 56.  
 Texas L. & T. Co. v. Carroll, 66.  
 Thacher v. Dinsmore, 194.  
     v. Pray, 312.  
     v. Stevens, 139.  
 Thackray v. Blackett, 396.  
 Thatcher v. West River Nat. Bank, 177, 178, 179.  
 Thayer v. Elliott, 184.  
 Thielman v. Gueble, 346.  
 Third Nat. Bank v. Clark, 215.  
     v. Spring, 47.  
 Thomas v. Railroad Co., 223.  
     v. Roosa, 45.  
     v. Shoemaker, 76.  
     v. Thomas, 193.  
 Thompson v. Clubley, 178.  
     v. Cumming, 342.  
     v. Ketcham, 356.  
     v. Shepherd, 177.  
     v. Sloan, 43, 46, 47.  
     v. Waters, 224.  
     v. Whitmarsh, 65.  
     v. Williams, 374, 384.  
 Thomson v. Lee Co., 206.  
 Thorn v. Bell, 256.  
     v. Rice, 387.  
 Thornburg v. Emmons, 344.  
 Thornton v. Dick, 88.  
 Thorp v. Craig, 186.  
 Thorpe v. Booth, 344.  
     v. Peck, 351.  
 Thurman v. Van Brunt, 74.  
 Thurston v. Cornell, 238.  
     v. M'Kown, 347.  
 Tibbets v. Gerrish, 10.  
 Ticonic Bank v. Stackpole, 370.  
 Tidmarsh v. Grover, 250.  
 Tiernan v. Jackson, 79.  
     v. Woodruff, 306.  
 Tillman v. Wheeler, 140.  
 Timms v. Shannon, 13.  
 Tindal v. Brown, 373, 380, 384, 390.  
 Tinker v. McCauley, 110, 132.  
 Titcomb v. Thomas, 134.  
     v. Vantyle, 230.  
 Tittle v. Thomas, 59.

[The figures refer to pages.]

Tobey v. Barber, 365.  
     v. Lennig, 374.  
 Toby v. Maurian, 400.  
 Todd v. Neal's Adm'r, 403.  
 Tombeckbee Bank v. Dumell, 363.  
 Tool Co. v. Norris, 289.  
 Towne v. Rice, 49, 235.  
 Town of Solon v. Williamsburgh Sav. Bank, 268.  
 Town of Thompson v. Perrine, 206.  
 Townsend v. Derby, 6, 74.  
     v. Lorain Bank, 369, 378.  
 Townsley v. Sumrall, 100, 101, 403, 416.  
 Trabue v. Short, 187.  
 Tracy v. Alvord, 278.  
     v. Talmage, 294.  
 Traders' Bank v. Bradner, 315.  
 Trammell v. Hudmon, 173.  
 Trask v. Martin, 75.  
 Trent Tile Co. v. Ft. Dearborn Nat. Bank of Chicago, 79.  
 Treuttel v. Barandon, 126, 321.  
 Trickey v. Larne, 278.  
 Trieber v. Commercial Bank, 287.  
 Triggs v. Newnham, 351.  
 Trimbey v. Vignier, 188.  
 Triplett v. Hunt, 382.  
 Tripp v. Curtenius, 27.  
 Trotter v. Curtis, 238.  
 Trow v. Glen Cove Starch Co., 253.  
 Troy City Bank v. Lanman, 84, 356.  
 True v. Collins, 388.  
     v. Fuller, 132.  
 Trueman v. Fenton, 272.  
     v. Hurst, 220.  
 Trustees of Union College v. Wheeler, 13.  
 Tryon v. Oxley, 65.  
 Tunno v. League, 398.  
 Turnbull v. Bowyer, 164, 331.  
 Turner v. Brown, 244.  
     v. Keller, 164.  
     v. Leach, 398.  
     v. Leech, 381, 392.  
     v. Mead, 348.  
     v. Mining Co., 346.  
     v. Samson, 395.  
     v. Treadway, 313.  
 Tuttle v. Bartholomew, 109.  
     v. Catlin, 81.  
     v. Standish, 339.  
 Tye v. Gwynne, 278.  
 Tyler v. Carlisle, 293.  
     v. Gardiner, 269.

Tyler v. Gould, 79, 419.  
     v. Young, 209.  
 Tyson v. Rickard, 237.

## U

Ulster County Bank v. McFarlan, 99.  
 Underhill v. Phillips, 74.  
 Union Bank v. Fowlkes, 353.  
     v. Hyde, 24, 342, 370, 416.  
     v. Middlebrook, 256.  
     v. Willis, 142.  
 Union Foundry & P. C. W. Works v. New York L. D. Co., 280.  
 Union Nat. Bank v. Hunt, 226.  
     v. Oceana Co. Bank, 418.  
 United States v. Grossmayer, 398.  
     v. National Park Bank, 257.  
     v. White, 16, 202.  
 Upham v. Prince, 110.

## V

Valle v. Cerre, 99.  
 Vallett v. Parker, 71, 235, 267, 283-285.  
 Valley Nat. Bank v. Crowell, 49.  
 Vanauken v. Hornbeck, 248.  
 Vanbibber v. Louisiana Bank, 426.  
 Van Brunt v. Eoff, 248.  
 Van Buskirk v. Insurance Co., 11.  
 Vance v. Collins, 387.  
 Van Deusen v. Sweet, 227, 229.  
 Vandewall v. Tyrrell, 154.  
 Van Duzer v. Howe, 178, 238, 253.  
 Van Heath v. Turner, 2.  
 Van Keuren v. Corkins, 12.  
 Vanliew v. Second Nat. Bank, 195.  
 Van Patten v. Beals, 227, 228.  
 Van Schaack v. Stafford, 241.  
 Van Staphorst v. Pearce, 90.  
 Van Vechten v. Pryn, 387.  
 Van Vleet v. Sledge, 115.  
 Van Wart v. Woolley, 80.  
 Vanwickle v. Downing, 367.  
 Vanzant v. Arnold, 110.  
 Vathir v. Zane, 194.  
 Veazle Bank v. Paulk, 242.  
 Veeder v. Mudgett, 226.  
 Verbeck v. Scott, 327.  
 Vere v. Lewis, 406.  
 Viale v. Michael, 383.  
 Vilet v. Camp, 185.  
 Vinton v. King, 209.

[The figures refer to pages.]

Vinton v. Peck, 68, 285.  
Violet v. Patton, 187, 259.  
Vogle v. Ripper, 255.  
Voorhees v. Voorhees, 269.  
Vosburgh v. Diefendorf, 264, 324, 334.  
Vyse v. Clarke, 56.

## W

Wackerbarth, Ex parte, 103, 156, 301.  
Wade v. Creighton, 141.  
Wadlington v. Covert, 37.  
Wadsworth v. Sharpsteen, 230.  
Wait v. Pomeroy, 246, 253, 254.  
Wakefield v. Greenhood, 100.  
Waldo Bank v. Lumbert, 183.  
Walker v. Atwood, 84.  
    v. Bank of Missouri, 86, 88, 336.  
    v. Bank of State of New York, 86.  
    v. Clay, 329.  
    v. Ebert, 265.  
    v. Hamilton, 173.  
    v. Macdonald, 118.  
    v. Roberts, 40.  
    v. Stetson, 157, 341, 343.  
    v. Turner, 370.  
    v. Woollen, 36.  
Wall v. Hill, 230.  
Wallace v. Agry, 341, 343, 347, 365.  
    v. Crilley, 351.  
    v. McConnell, 80, 359.  
Walmsley v. Child, 4.  
Walrad v. Petrie, 59.  
Walsh v. Dart, 187, 352.  
    v. Hunt, 254.  
Walter v. Haynes, 338.  
    v. Kirk, 120.  
Walters v. Brown, 387.  
Walton v. Hastings, 249.  
    v. Williams, 87.  
Walton Plow Co. v. Campbell, 243.  
Walwyn v. St. Quintin, 395.  
Walz v. Alback, 141.  
Ward v. Allen, 91.  
    v. Churn, 68.  
    v. Evans, 20, 21.  
    v. Howard, 314.  
    v. Perrin, 389.  
    v. Sugg, 241.  
Wardell v. Howell, 181.  
Wardens & Vestrymen of St. James' Church v. Moore, 145.  
Warder v. Gibbs, 177.  
    v. Tucker, 130, 395.

Warder, Bushnell & Glessner Co. v. Gibbs, 201.  
    v. Willyard, 248.  
Waring v. Betts, 399.  
    v. Smyth, 247.  
Warner v. Whittaker, 13, 197.  
Warren v. Durfee, 278.  
    v. Gilman, 378, 387.  
Warren Bank v. Parker, 354.  
Warren Deposit Bank v. Robinson, 239.  
Warrington v. Early, 252.  
Washington Bank v. Lewis, 312.  
    v. Triplett, 187.  
Washington Co. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 42.  
Wasson v. Lamb, 125.  
Waterman v. Vose, 251.  
Watervliet Bank v. White, 118, 119.  
Watkins v. Bowers, 71.  
    v. Crouch, 359.  
    v. Maule, 203.  
Watrous v. Halbrook, 58.  
Watson v. Evans, 60, 61.  
    v. Loring, 342.  
    v. New England Bank, 213.  
    v. Randall, 282, 315.  
    v. Russell, 282.  
Watt v. Riddle, 173.  
Way v. Butterworth, 142.  
    v. Richardson, 12.  
    v. Smith, 33.  
    v. Towle, 406.  
Wayland University v. Boorman, 223.  
Waynam v. Bend, 329.  
Weaver v. Barden, 309, 313, 325.  
Webb v. Morgan, 215.  
Webster v. Calden, 330.  
    v. Cobb, 113, 132, 133.  
Weckler v. First Nat. Bank, 223.  
Weeks v. Esler, 25.  
Wegersloffe v. Keene, 82, 366.  
Weidler v. Kauffman, 11.  
Weldman v. Symes, 258.  
Well, Succession of, 165.  
Weinstock v. Bellwood, 418.  
Welch v. Carter, 281.  
    v. Goodwin, 257.  
    v. Lindo, 120.  
    v. Sage, 321.  
Weldon v. Buck, 160, 161, 342.  
Welford v. Beazely, 56.  
Wellington v. Jackson, 55, 256.  
Wells v. Brigham, 1, 7, 81.  
    v. Hopkins, 280.

[The figures refer to pages.]

- Wells v. Schoonover**, 12.  
     v. Whitehead, 25.  
**Wentworth v. Clap**, 76.  
**West v. Brown**, 391.  
     v. Russell, 230.  
**West Boston Sav. Bank v. Thompson**, 298.  
**Westerfield v. Jackson**, 231.  
**Western Cottage Organ Co. v. Reddish**, 223.  
**Westminster Bank v. Wheaton**, 406.  
**Weston v. Hight**, 278.  
**West River Bank v. Taylor**, 380, 382.  
**West St. Louis Sav. Bank v. Bank**, 322.  
**Wethey v. Andrews**, 345.  
**Whaley v. Houston**, 363.  
**Wheatley v. Strobe**, 28.  
**Wheeler v. Barret**, 209.  
     v. Field, 358, 400.  
     v. Guild, 297.  
     v. Warner, 366.  
**Wheelock v. Freeman**, 253.  
**Whigham v. Pickett**, 245.  
**Whistler v. Forster**, 106, 134, 203, 204, 408, 410.  
**Whitaker v. Bank of England**, 427, 429.  
**Whitbeck v. Van Ness**, 21.  
**White, Ex parte**, 252.  
     v. Continental Nat. Bank, 125, 151, 152, 257.  
     v. Cushing, 32.  
     v. Haas, 250.  
     v. Kuntz, 288.  
     v. Madison, 66.  
     v. Miners' Nat. Bank, 125.  
     v. Stoddard, 349.  
**Whitehead v. Walker**, 342.  
**Whitehouse v. Hanson**, 142.  
**White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Dakin**, 247.  
**Whitfield v. Savage**, 402.  
**Whitmer v. Frye**, 251.  
**Whitney v. Dutch**, 219.  
     v. Snyder, 265.  
**Whittaker v. Edmunds**, 333.  
     v. Howe, 291.  
**Whittier v. Graffam**, 357.  
**Whitwell v. Bennett**, 329.  
     v. Winslow, 16.  
**Whitworth v. Adams**, 242, 243.  
**Wickes v. Caulk**, 247.  
**Wiffen v. Roberts**, 175, 239, 352.  
**Wiggin v. Bush**, 235.  
**Wigglesworth v. Steers**, 232.  
**Wilde v. Sheridan**, 88.  
**Wilders v. Stevens**, 135.  
**Wilkie v. Roosevelt**, 243.  
**Wilkinson v. Adam**, 376.  
     v. Johnson, 147, 156.  
     v. Lutwidge, 147.  
**Willcox v. Jackson**, 234.  
**Willets v. Bank**, 59, 60, 406, 410, 421, 422.  
**Williams v. Baker**, 172.  
     v. Bank of United States, 388, 389, 416.  
     v. Cameron, 229.  
     v. Germaine, 102, 153, 154.  
     v. Matthews, 210.  
     v. Potter, 125.  
     v. Robbins, 66.  
     v. Smith, 315, 316, 349.  
     v. Teshomingo Sav. Inst., 164.  
     v. Wade, 187.  
     v. Waring, 353.  
     v. Williams, 4.  
     v. Winans, 100.  
**Williamson v. Brown**, 319.  
     v. Watts, 218, 220.  
**Willis v. Green**, 364, 383.  
     v. Sharp, 64, 65.  
     v. Trambly, 197.  
**Willmarth v. Crawford**, 176.  
**Willoughby v. Comstock**, 50.  
**Willoughby's Case**, 28.  
**Willse v. Whitaker**, 123.  
**Wilmarth v. Crawford**, 285.  
**Wilson v. Campbell**, 42.  
     v. Clements, 100.  
     v. Ellsworth, 194.  
     v. Lazier, 333.  
     v. Nisbet, 233.  
     v. Rocke, 334.  
     v. Senier, 397.  
     v. Swabey, 382.  
     v. Tolson, 125.  
**Wilson Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Spears**, 12.  
**Wilton v. Eaton**, 272.  
**Winberry v. Koonce**, 11.  
**Winchell v. Carey**, 287.  
**Windham Bank v. Norton**, 398, 399.  
**Windsor Sav. Bank v. McMahon**, 53.  
**Wing, In re**, 229.  
     v. Terry, 160.  
**Winsted Bank v. Webb**, 240.  
**Winter v. Drury**, 79.  
     v. Livingston, 278.

[The figures refer to pages.]

Wintermute v. Post, 85.  
 Winthrop v. Pepoon, 342.  
 Wisdom v. Becker, 65.  
 Wise v. Charlton, 48.  
 Wiseman v. Chiapella, 353.  
 Wolcott v. Van Santvoord, 80, 144,  
     250, 367.  
 Wolfe v. Jewett, 353.  
 Wolford v. Andrews, 369.  
 Wood v. Callaghan, 388.  
     v. Corl, 75.  
     v. Gibbs, 184, 187.  
     v. McKean, 209.  
     v. Mullen, 340.  
     v. Pugh, 155.  
     v. Sheldon, 169.  
     v. Steele, 246, 249.  
     v. Watson, 374.  
 Woodbury v. Woodbury, 134.  
 Woodcock v. Bennet, 368.  
 Woodford v. Dorwin, 68.  
 Woodhull v. Holmes, 181.  
 Woodin v. Foster, 356, 373, 384, 385.  
 Woodland v. Fear, 427.  
 Woodman v. Thurston, 401.  
 Woodruff v. Merchants' Bank, 406,  
     409.  
 Woods v. Armstrong, 235.  
     v. Ridley, 186.  
     v. Woods, 21, 296.  
 Woodthorpe v. Lawes, 377, 380.  
 Woodward v. Foster, 115.  
     v. Rowe, 3.  
 Woodworth v. Bank of America, 250,  
     358.  
     v. Huntoon, 134, 326, 327.  
 Wooley v. Lyon, 388, 403.  
 Worcester Bank v. Wells, 97.  
 Worcester County Bank v. Dorches-  
     ter & M. Bank, 268, 321.  
 Worden v. Dodge, 88.

Workman v. Wright, 256.  
 Works v. Hershey, 36, 40.  
 Wormley v. Lowry, 314.  
 Worth v. Case, 69, 70, 277.  
 Worthington v. Cowles, 170.  
 Wright v. Crabbs, 293.  
     v. Hart, 44.  
     v. Irwin, 194, 333.  
     v. Pipe Line Co., 226.  
 Wyatt v. Wallace, 235.  
 Wyld, Ex parte, 154.  
 Wynne v. Raikes, 98.

## Y

Yale v. Ward's Ex'r, 24.  
 Yates, Ex parte, 108.  
 Yeaton v. Bank of Alexandria, 177.  
 Yellow Medicine Co. Bank v. Tagley,  
     265, 267.  
 Yingling v. Kohlhass, 16.  
 Yocum v. Smith, 254.  
 York Co. M. F. Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 164.  
 Young v. Adams, 43.  
     v. Bryan, 24, 416.  
     v. Glover, 108.  
     v. Grote, 151, 251, 253, 254, 268.  
     v. Hill, 240.  
     v. Hockley, 178.  
     v. Lehman, 257.  
     v. Shriner, 208.  
     v. Stevens, 230, 231.  
 Youngs v. Lee, 314, 315.

## Z

Zalbriskie v. Cleveland, C. & C. R. Co.,  
     165.  
 Zeller v. German Sav. Inst., 418.  
 Zimmerman v. Anderson, 51.





# INDEX.

---

[THE FIGURES REFER TO PAGES.]

---

## A

### **ACCEPTANCE,**

defined, 24, 78.

effect, 79.

classification of acceptances, 80.

may be express, constructive, oral, or written, 81.

in what name, 81.

while bill is incomplete, 81.

must be according to tenor of bill, 80, 82.

immaterial departures from tenor of bill, 82, 84.

qualified acceptance, 82, 84.

conditional acceptance, 82, 84.

who may accept, 81, 86, 101.

necessity for delivery of acceptance, 88.

forms and varieties of, as verbal, written, and implied from conduct, 89.

evidence of, 89, 90.

written acceptance, 89, 90.

verbal or parol acceptance, 89, 91, 99.

implied from conduct, 89, 93.

detention of bill, 94.

destruction of bill, 94.

on separate paper, 95.

promise to accept, 95.

parol promise to accept, 99.

time allowed for acceptance, 103.

accommodation acceptor, see "Accommodation."

liability of acceptor, 144, 146, 151.

facts which acceptor admits, or warranties, 146, 151.

see "Estoppel."

damages against acceptor, 170.

for honor or supra protest, 101.

liability of acceptor supra protest, 152.

steps necessary to consummate liability of, 152.

presentment to drawee at maturity, 152.

protest on nonpayment by drawee, 152.

presentment to acceptor supra protest, 152.

protest on nonpayment by acceptor supra protest, 152.

[The figures refer to pages.]

**ACCEPTANCE—Cont'd.**

notice on nonpayment by acceptor supra protest, 153.  
undertaking by drawer, that drawee has capacity to accept, 159.  
that drawee will accept, 159.  
of check, 419.  
see "Presentment."

**ACCEPTOR,**

of bill, defined, 23.  
relation to bill, 79.  
liability of, 144, 146, 151.  
see "Acceptance."  
facts which he admits, or warranties, 146, 151  
see "Estoppel."  
capacity of, warranty by, or estoppel of indorser, 162.  
damages against, 170.  
accommodation acceptor, see "Accommodation."  
supra protest, liability of, 152.  
steps necessary to consummate liability of, 152.  
presentment to drawee at maturity, 152.  
protest on nonpayment by drawee, 152.  
presentment to acceptor supra protest, 152.  
protest on nonpayment by acceptor supra protest, 152.  
notice on nonpayment by acceptor supra protest, 153.  
by what law contract determined, 183.

**ACCOMMODATION,**

accommodation party defined, 176.  
liability of, 176.  
persons accommodated, 176.  
liability of, 176.  
diversion, 180.  
overdue accommodation paper, 211.  
when accommodation paper has inception, as against defense of usury, 241.  
payment by accommodated party a discharge, 296.  
payment by accommodation acceptor or maker a discharge, 296.  
see "Corporations."

**ACCORD AND SATISFACTION,**

see "Defenses."

**ACTION,**

who may sue, 10-12, 212.  
form of, what law determines, 190.

**ADMINISTRATORS,**

see "Executors and Administrators."

**AGENTS,**

see "Principal and Agent."

**ALLONGE,**

defined, 105.

[The figures refer to pages.]

**ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENT,**

- as a defense, 246, 248.
- negligence facilitating, 253.
- blanks, when may be filled, 258.
- writing contract over indorsement in blank, 112, 113.
- warranty by, or estoppel of, indorser, 162.

**AMOUNT,**

- see "Bill of Exchange"; "Promissory Note."

**ANOMALOUS INDORSEMENT,**

- see "Indorsement."

**ANTECEDENT DEBT,**

- whether value, 310.
- see "Purchaser for Value without Notice."

**ASSIGNMENT,**

- assignability distinguished from negotiability, 9.
- whether writing an indorsement or assignment, 109.
- of non-negotiable instruments, 8-14.
  - action by assignee, 10.
  - notice of assignment, 11.
  - consideration, 12.
  - subject to equities between prior parties, 13.

**ATTORNEY'S FEES.**

- stipulation in bill or note for payment of, effect, 50.

**B**

**BANKRUPTCY,**

- of holder, transfer by operation of law, 198.
- of party to be notified of dishonor, notice to whom, 384.

**BILL OF EXCHANGE,**

- defined, 22.
  - foreign bill, 22.
  - inland bill, 22.
- origin of bills, 1.
- parties defined, 23.
- form, 23.
- essentials, in general, 26.
- indicia of negotiability, 14.
- negotiability not necessary to form or substance of, 1.
- origin of negotiability of, 1.
- date, 72.
- place of date, 72.
- necessity for and meaning of "value received," 73.
- days of grace, 75.
- order contained in bill, 27.
  - certainty as to terms, 31.
  - uncertainty as to event, 31, 33.

**NEG.BILLS.—34**

[The figures refer to pages.]

**BILL OF EXCHANGE—Cont'd.**

- uncertainty as to time, 31, 35.
- payment out of particular fund, 32, 37.
- additional condition or agreement not of essence of order, 42, 48.
- giving holder option between payment in money or some other thing, 42, 50.
- payable on demand or at sight, etc., 32, 40.
- no time of payment expressed, 32, 41.
- payable in installments, 32, 41.
- must be for payment of money only, 42.
- payment in property other than money, 42, 45.
  - option given holder, 42, 50.
- performance of other acts in addition to payment of money, 42, 48.
- definition of money, 43.
- amount must be certain, 42, 52.
  - interest, 42, 52.
  - exchange, 42, 52.
- payable in foreign money, 48.
- specification of parties, 54.
  - signature of parties, 54, 55.
  - certainty as to parties, 58.
  - designation of drawee, 54, 57.
  - designation of payee, 54, 59.
  - payable to order of maker, 54, 61.
  - payable to fictitious person, 54, 61.
- delivery, 67.
  - in escrow, 67.
  - upon condition, 70.
- discount of bill by drawee before acceptance, 79.
- relation of drawee to bill before acceptance, 79.
- acceptance, see "Acceptance."
- accommodation parties, see "Accommodation."
- payment by, 19-21.
- non-negotiable bill, 7.
- liability of drawer, 156.
- undertaking of drawer, 159.
- liability of acceptor, 144, 146, 151.
  - see "Acceptance."
- facts which acceptor admits, 146, 151.
  - see "Estoppel"; "Warranties."
- liability of indorser, see "Indorsement."

**BLANK.**

- indorsement in blank, 110.
- indorsement written on blank note, 111, 112.

**BLANKS,**

- when may be filled, 258.

**BONA FIDE HOLDER,**

- see "Purchaser for Value without Notice."

[The figures refer to pages.]

**BURDEN OF PROOF,**

as to whether one is a purchaser for value without notice, 327.

**C****CANCELLATION,**

discharge of instrument by, 302.

**CAPACITY,**

of parties to contract, 63.

see "Defenses."

of drawer, admission by acceptor, 146.

of drawee to accept, undertaking of drawer, 159

of prior parties, warranty by or estoppel of indorser, 162.

**CERTAINTY,**

as to order in bill or promise in note, 31.

as to amount to be paid, 42.

as to parties, 54.

**CERTIFIED CHECK,**

in general, 419.

see "Check."

**CHECK,**

defined, 404.

distinguished from bill of exchange, 404, 405, 408.

date, 405, 408, 409.

must be payable on demand, 406.

memorandum checks, 407.

drafts on bank in another state, 408.

checks as negotiable instruments, 408.

when overdue, 410.

presentment, protest, and notice of dishonor, effect of delay, 412.

when must be presented, 413.

delay in presentment, when discharges drawer, 413.

failure to give notice of dishonor, when discharges drawer, 415.

protest not essential, 416.

excuses for failure to present, 416.

status of stale check 417.

rights of holder against bank, 418.

certification and acceptance, 419.

meaning of certification, 420.

effect of certification, 421.

discharge of drawer and indorsers by certification or acceptance, 422.

certification at instance of drawer, 424.

parol acceptance by bank, effect, 424.

payment on unauthorized indorsement, 426.

failure of bank to honor check, 427.

payment by, 19-21.

**CHOSE IN ACTION,**

see "Assignment"; "Nonnegotiable Instruments."

[The figures refer to pages.]

**COLLATERAL SECURITY,**

transfer of bill or note as, whether for value, 310.

bills transferred as, presentment, 364.

see "Purchaser for Value without Notice."

**COMMON COUNTS,**

when available in action on bill or note, 328, note, 57.

**CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE,**

in general, 82, 84.

see "Acceptance."

**CONDITIONAL INDORSEMENT,**

in general, 119, 121.

see "Indorsement."

**CONFLICT OF LAWS,**

validity and execution of contract, by what law determined, 183, 184.

interpretation and obligation of contract, by what law determined, 183, 185.

damages, by what law determined, 188.

remedy, by what law determined, 190.

presentment, protest, and notice of dishonor, by what law determined, 402.

**CONSIDERATION,**

defined, sufficiency, 276.

necessity for and meaning of "value received," 73.

bill or note imports a consideration, 5-7, 73, 274.

want or failure of, as a defense, 270, 276.

for assignment of nonnegotiable instrument, 12.

illegality of, 234, 283.

statutory prohibition, 234, 283.

violation of the Sunday laws, 285.

other statutes, 287.

common-law prohibition, 288.

contravention of public policy, 289.

in general, 289.

restraint of trade, 290.

effect of illegality, 291.

illegality as being total or partial, 291.

knowledge of illegality, intention, 292.

accommodation paper, see "Accommodation."

**CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE,**

see "Notice."

**CORPORATIONS,**

ultra vires acts, instruments executed by, 63, 222.

indorsement and transfer by, 63, 222.

accommodation paper made by, bona fide purchaser, 183.

instrument payable to "cashier" or other officer, who may indorse, 133,  
note 96.

**COUNTERCLAIM,**

paper transferred after maturity, not subject to, 207, note 53.

[The figures refer to pages.]

**COVERTURE,**

see "Married Women."

**CURRENT FUNDS,**

instrument payable in, effect, 44.

**CUSTOM OF MERCHANTS,**

defined and explained, 2.

**D****DAMAGES,**

against acceptor, maker, drawer, and indorsers, upon the bill or note, and upon the warranties, 160, 170-176.

re-exchange, when an item, 170, 171, 173.

when drawee refuses to accept, 170, 173.

for breach of warranty, 170, 174.

rate of interest payable as, by what law determined, 188.

payable in lieu of re-exchange, by what law determined, 189.

measure of, recoverable by indorsee of accommodation paper who has paid less than face value, 243.

**DATE,**

of bill or note, 72.

day of, excluded in calculating date of payment, 76.

place of, prima facie place of issue, 188.

see "Blanks."

**DAYS OF GRACE,**

defined, 75, 349.

how computed, 76.

by what law determined, 186.

what instruments entitled to, 344.

**DEATH,**

of holder, transfer by operation of law, 198.

of joint payee or indorsee, rights of survivor, 198.

of maker or acceptor, presentment to whom, 364.

of party to be notified of dishonor, notice to whom, 383.

**DEFENSES,**

as against immediate party, and as against purchaser for value without notice, 216-308.

as real or personal, 216.

real defenses, 218.

coverture, 221.

instruments executed by married woman, 221.

indorsement by married woman, 221.

infants, 220.

instruments executed by, 220.

indorsements by, 220.

corporations, ultra vires, 222.

instruments executed by, 222.

indorsements by, 222.

[The figures refer to pages.]

**DEFENSES—Cont'd.**

- persons non compos mentis, 226.
  - instruments executed by, 226.
  - indorsements by, 226.
- drunken persons, 226.
  - instruments executed by, 226.
  - indorsements by, 226.
- instruments avoided by statute, 234.
- usury, 236.
- failure to affix revenue stamps, 244.
- alterations, 246, 248.
- forgery, 246-254.
- personal defenses, 260.
- fraud, 262.
- duress, 268.
- want or failure of consideration, 270, 276.
- illegality of consideration, 234, 283.
  - statutory prohibition, 234, 283.
    - violation of the Sunday laws, 286.
    - other statutes, 287.
  - common-law prohibition, 288.
  - contravention of public policy, 289.
    - in general, 289.
    - restraint of trade, 290.
  - effect of illegality, 291.
    - illegality as being total or partial, 291.
    - knowledge of illegality, intention, 292.
- discharge of instrument, 294.
  - payment, 295.
  - payment or purchase, 299.
  - payment supra protest, 300.
  - discharge by act of holder, 302.
    - renunciation, 302.
    - cancellation, 302.
  - discharge by operation of law, 303.
  - discharge of parties secondarily liable, 304.
  - summary of real and personal defenses, 308.

**DEFINITIONS,**

- acceptance, 24, 78.
- acceptor, 23.
- accommodation parties, 176.
- bill of exchange, 22.
  - foreign bill, 22.
  - inland bill, 22.
- custom of merchants or law merchant, 2.
- check, 404.
- days of grace, 75.
- dishonor, 340.



[The figures refer to pages.]

**DEFINITIONS—Cont'd.**

draft, 24.  
drawer, 23.  
drawee, 23.  
holder, of bill, 23.  
    of note, 26.  
immediate parties, 192.  
indorsement, 105.  
indorser, of bill, 23.  
    of note, 26.  
indorsee, of bill, 24.  
    of note, 26.  
maker, 26.  
money, 43.  
payee, of bill, 23.  
    of note, 26.  
promissory note, 26.  
remote parties, 192.  
value received, 73.

**DELIVERY,**

of bill or note, 67.  
escrow, 67.  
upon condition, 71.  
of acceptance, 88.  
of indorsement, 136.  
transfer by, 204.  
    see "Transfer."

**DEMAND,**

instrument payable on, 32, 40.  
    when demand to be made, 40.  
    when to be presented, 337, 343-348.

**DESTRUCTION OF BILL,**

whether an acceptance, 94.

**DISCHARGE OF INSTRUMENT,**

as a defense, 260, 294.  
payment, 294, 295.  
by act of holder, 302.  
by operation of law, 303.  
discharge of parties secondarily liable, 304.

**DISCOUNT,**

of bill by drawee before acceptance, 79.

**DISHONOR,**

see "Notice of Dishonor."

**DIVERSION,**

of accommodation paper, 180.

**DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA,**

see "Gift."

[The figures refer to pages.]

**DRAFT,**

defined, 24.

**DRAWEE,**

of bill, defined, 23.

designation of, 57.

relation to bill before acceptance, 79.

discount of bill by drawee before acceptance, 79.

relation of, to bill after acceptance, 79.

existence of, undertaking of drawer, 159.

capacity to accept, estoppel of drawer to deny, 159.

**DRAWER,**

of bill, defined, 23.

signature of, 54, 55.

rights and liabilities, before acceptance, 79.

after acceptance, 80.

liability of, 156.

undertaking of drawer, 159.

existence of drawee, 159.

capacity of drawee to accept, 159.

that the drawee will accept, 159.

discharge from liability by acts or neglect of holder, 804.

existence of, admission by acceptor, 146.

signature of, admission by acceptor, 146.

authority to draw, admission by acceptor, 146.

capacity of, admission by acceptor, 146.

accommodation drawer, see "Accommodation."

damages against, 160, 170.

capacity of, warranty by, or estoppel of, indorser, 162.

by what law contract determined, 183.

payment by, not a discharge, 297.

presentment for acceptance or payment, to charge drawer, 336.

see "Presentment."

notice of dishonor, to charge drawer, 336.

see "Notice of Dishonor."

**DRUNKENNESS,**

as a defense, 218, 226.

instruments executed by drunken persons, 226.

indorsement and transfer by drunken persons, 226.

**DUEBILL,**

not a note, 29, 31.

**DURESS,**

as a defense, 268.

**E****EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT,**

see "Assignment."

[The figures refer to pages.]

**EQUITY,**

- equitable assignment, 10.
- relief against inadvertent failure to indorse, 200, 202.

**EQUITIES,**

- title of bona fide holder for value not subject to, 12.
  - see "Defenses."
- assignee of nonnegotiable instrument takes subject to, 13, 197.
  - see "Defenses."
- effect of failure to indorse, 200.
- transfer of overdue paper subject to, 207.

**ESCROW,**

- delivery in, 67.

**ESTOPPEL,**

- facts which acceptor admits, 146.
  - genuineness of drawer's signature, 146.
  - existence of drawer, 146.
  - capacity of drawer, 146.
  - authority to make draft, 146.
  - competency of payee to indorse, 146.
- facts which acceptor does not admit, 151.
  - genuineness of payee's or subsequent indorsements, 151.
  - genuineness of terms contained in bill, 151.
- undertaking or estoppel of drawer, 159.
  - existence of drawee, 159.
  - capacity of drawee to accept, 159.
  - that the drawee will accept, 159.
- facts which the indorser is estopped to deny, 162.
  - genuineness of instrument, 162.
  - that the instrument is a valid and subsisting obligation, 162.
  - that the obligations of all prior parties are valid, 162.
  - capacity of prior parties, 162.
  - that he, as indorser, has title, and the right to transfer, 162.
- facts which the indorser without recourse is estopped to deny, 167.
- facts which the transferee by delivery is estopped to deny, 167.
  - by negligence facilitating alteration, 253.

**EXCHANGE,**

- stipulation for, does not invalidate bill or note, 42, 52.
  - see "Damages."

**EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS,**

- power to transfer instrument, 63.
- whether they incur liability, 63.
- transfer to, on death of holder, 198.
- presentment to, on death of maker or acceptor, 364.
- notice of dishonor to, on death of party to be notified, 383.

**EXEMPTIONS,**

- waiver of, in bill or note, effect, 50.

[The figures refer to pages.]

**EXPENSES,**  
see "Damages."

## F

**FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION,**  
see "Consideration."

**FEES,**  
notarial fees, see "Damages."

**FEME COVERT,**  
see "Married Women."

**FICTITIOUS PAYEE,**  
instrument payable to, effect, 54, 61.

**FOREIGN BILL,**  
see "Bill of Exchange"; "Protest."

**FOREIGN LAW,**  
see "Conflict of Laws."

**FORGERY,**  
as a defense, 246, 254.  
estoppel of, or warranty by, indorser, 162.  
of bill in respect of terms, acceptor not estopped, 101.  
of indorsements, estoppel of acceptor, 151.  
of drawer's signature, admission by acceptor, 146.

**FORM,**  
of bill of exchange, 22.  
of promissory note, 26.  
indicia of negotiability, 14.  
see "Bill of Exchange"; "Check"; "Promissory Note."

**FRAUD,**  
as a defense, 262.

**FRAUDS, STATUTE OF,**  
parol acceptance or promise to accept, 89, 91, 101.

## G

**GAMING,**  
note given for gaming consideration, 334, note 56.

**GIFT,**  
of donor's note, invalid as gift inter vivos or donatio mortis causa, 278,  
note, 211.  
of note of third person, 278, note 211.

**GRACE,**  
see "Days of Grace."

**GUARANTY,**  
whether writing an indorsement or guaranty, 109, 132.

[The figures refer to pages.]

**GUARDIANS,**

power to transfer instrument, 63.  
whether they incur liability, 63.

**H**

**HOLDER,**

of note, defined, 26.  
of bill, defined, 23.

**HOLDER IN DUE COURSE,**

see "Purchaser for Value without Notice."

**HONOR,**

acceptance for honor, 101.  
payment for honor, 300.

**HUSBAND AND WIFE,**

see "Married Women."

**I**

**ILLEGAL AGREEMENTS,**

illegality as a defense, 234, 283.  
by what law validity determined, 183.  
see "Consideration."

**IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE,**

see "Acceptance."

**INDICIA,**

of negotiability, 14.  
see "Bill of Exchange"; "Promissory Note."

**INDORSEE,**

of bill or note, defined, 24-26.  
see "Indorsement"; "Purchaser for Value without Notice."

**INDORSER,**

of bill or note, defined, 23, 26.  
damages against, 170.  
accommodation indorser, see "Accommodation."  
capacity of, warranty by or estoppel of subsequent indorser, 162.  
liability of, 156, 162.  
see "Indorsement."  
by what law contract of determined, 183.  
payment by, not a discharge, 297.  
discharge of, 304.  
presentment for acceptance or payment, to charge indorser, 336.  
see "Presentment."  
notice of dishonor, to charge drawer, 336.  
see "Notice of Dishonor."

**INDORSEMENT,**

defined, 105.  
formal requisites, 105.

[The figures refer to pages.]

**INDORSEMENT—Cont'd.**

indorsement or assignment, 108.

indorsement or guaranty, 109, 132.

in blank, 110.

writing contract over indorsement in blank, 112.

indorsement written on blank bill or note, 112, 113.

parol evidence, whether admissible to vary blank indorsement, 114.

special or in full, 116.

instrument originally payable to bearer, 116.

combination of indorsements in full and in blank, 118.

without recourse, 119, 120.

conditional indorsement, 119, 121.

restrictive indorsement, 119, 124.

nature of indorsement, 128.

as a contract, 128.

as a transfer, 128, 130.

requisites of indorsement, 131.

following tenor of instrument, 131.

who may indorse, 133.

instrument payable to "cashier," 133, note 96.

necessity for delivery, 136.

anomalous or irregular indorsements, 138.

by person whose name does not otherwise appear, 138.

indorsement before indorsement and transfer by payee, 138.

in name of partnership, notice, 322.

title of indorsee, 12.

not subject to equities between original parties, 13.

see "Defenses."

forgery of indorsement, 246, 254.

accommodation indorser, see "Accommodation."

liability of indorser, 156.

warranties or facts which indorser is estopped to deny, 162.

genuineness of instrument, 162.

that the instrument is a valid and subsisting obligation, 162.

that the obligations of all prior parties are valid, 162.

capacity of prior parties, 162.

that he, as indorser, has title and the right to transfer, 162.

indorser without recourse, 169.

damages against indorser, 170.

genuineness of, no admission by acceptor, 151.

discharge of indorser, 304.

payment to another than the holder, 13.

competency of payee to indorse, admission by acceptor, 146.

necessity for, to transfer instrument, 200.

effect of failure to indorse by mistake or otherwise, 200.

effect of, by what law determined, 183, 187.

[The figures refer to pages.]

**INFANCY,**

as a defense, 220.

instruments executed by infants, 63, 218.

indorsement and transfer by infant, 218.

**INLAND BILL,**

see "Bill of Exchange."

**INNOCENT HOLDER,**

see "Purchaser for Value without Notice."

**INSANITY,**

see "Lunacy."

**INSTALLMENTS,**

instrument payable in, 32, 41.

**INTEREST,**

reservation of, does not invalidate bill or note, 42, 52.

payable as damages, rate of, by what law determined, 188.

taken in advance on face value of paper, not usurious, 239.

compounding, whether usurious, 240.

see "Usury."

**INTOXICATION,**

see "Drunkenness."

**I O U,**

not a note, 29, 31.

**IRREGULAR INDORSEMENT,**

see "Indorsement."

**J**

**JUDGMENT,**

power in note to confess, effect, 50.

**K**

**KNOWLEDGE,**

see "Notice."

**L**

**LARCENY,**

see "Stolen Instrument."

**LAW MERCHANT,**

defined and explained, 2.

**LEGAL TENDER,**

how determined, 43.

**LEX FORI,**

when governs, 183, 184, 190.

see "Conflict of Laws."

[The figures refer to pages.]

**LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS,**

when governs, 183.

see "Conflict of Laws."

**LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS,**

when governs, 183.

see "Conflict of Laws."

**LOST INSTRUMENT,**

rights of bona fide holder, 111.

**LUNACY,**

as a defense, 226.

instruments executed by persons non compos mentis, 63, 218, 226.

indorsement and transfer by person non compos mentis, 63, 218, 226.

**M****MAKER,**

of note, defined, 26.

signature of, 54, 55.

liability of, 144.

damages against, 170.

capacity of, warranty by, or estoppel of indorser, 162.

contract of, by what law determined, 183.

accommodation maker, see "Accommodation."

**MARRIED WOMEN,**

marriage of holder, rights of husband, 198.

transfer to married woman, rights of husband, 198.

coverture as a defense, 218, 221.

instruments executed by, 63, 218, 221.

indorsement and transfer by, 63, 218, 221.

**MEASURE OF DAMAGES,**

see "Damages."

**MEDIUM OF PAYMENT,**

in general, 42.

**MEMORANDUM CHECKS,**

in general, 407.

**MERCHANTS,**

see "Custom of Merchants."

**MONEY,**

defined, 43.

instrument must be payable in, 42-47.

**MONTHS,**

how reckoned, 76.

**N****NEGLIGENCE,**

facilitating alteration of instrument, 253.



[The figures refer to pages.]

**NEGOTIABILITY,**

origin of, 1-8.

purpose of, 17, 18.

indicia of, 14-17.

see "Bill of Exchange"; "Promissory Note."

distinguished from assignability, 9-14.

see "Assignment"; "Indorsement"; "Transfer."

the statute of Anne, 2, 4.

construction of, 5.

other statutes regulating, 15.

by what law determined, 183, 186.

the custom of merchants, or law merchant, defined and explained, 2.

see "Bill of Exchange"; "Checks"; "Defenses"; "Indorsement"; "Purchaser for Value without Notice"; "Transfer."

**NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,**

see "Bill of Exchange"; "Check"; "Promissory Note."

**NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW,**

history, 430.

in what states adopted, 432.

text, 433-489.

**NEGOTIATION,**

see "Transfer."

**NOTARY PUBLIC,**

may make presentment, 361.

certificate of protest, 362.

fees, when an item of damages, 170, 172, 173.

whether presentment by clerk sufficient foundation for protest, 362, note \*.

**NON COMPOS MENTIS,**

see "Drunkenness"; "Lunacy."

**NON-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,**

distinguished from negotiable instruments, 1, 5-8.

assignment of, 9-14.

see "Assignment."

distinguished from negotiation, 9-14.

presumption of consideration, 5-7.

**NON-NEGOTIABLE NOTES,**

within statute of Anne, 6.

whether consideration presumed, 6.

distinguished from negotiable notes, 7.

**NOTE,**

see "Promissory Note."

**NOTICE,**

of assignment of non-negotiable instrument, 11.

of equities, 317.

actual notice, 317, 319.

constructive notice, 317, 321.

see "Purchaser for Value without Notice."

[The figures refer to pages.]

**NOTICE OF DISHONOR,**

- an implied condition, 32.
- necessity for, 336, 367.
- defined, 372.
- how, when, and where it must be given, 372.
- sufficiency of notice, 373.
- identification of instrument, 374.
- statement of presentment, etc., 376.
- by whom notice should be given, 379.
- to whose benefit notice accrues, 381.
- to whom notice should be given, 383.
- method of giving notice, 384.
- time of giving notice, 390.
- effect of failure to give notice of dishonor, 367.
- excuses for failure to give notice, 394.
- reasonable diligence, 397.
- waiver of notice, 401.
- by what law determined, 402.
- of non-payment by acceptor supra protest, 152.
- of check, 412.
- not necessary to charge accommodated indorser, 183.

**NOTARIAL FEES,**

- see "Damages."

**NUDUM PACTUM.**

- see "Consideration."

**O****OPERATION OF LAW,**

- transfer by, 198.

**ORDER,**

- contained in bill, 27.
- see "Bill of Exchange."

**ORDER OF PROOF,**

- on trial, 327.

**ORIGIN,**

- of negotiability, 1.

**OVERDUE PAPER,**

- may be transferred, 207.
- rights of transferee, 207.

**P****PAROL ACCEPTANCE,**

- see "Acceptance."

**PAROL EVIDENCE,**

- whether admissible to vary blank indorsement, 114.

[The figures refer to pages.]

**PARTIES,**

to bill, 23.

to note, 26.

specification, 54.

who may indorse, 133.

immediate parties, 192.

remote parties, 192.

who may sue on instrument, 212.

who may accept bill, 81, 86.

see "Acceptance."

accommodation parties, see "Accommodation."

certainty as to, 56.

specification of, 54.

capacity of parties, 63.

see "Acceptor"; "Corporations"; "Drawee"; "Drawer"; "Drunkenness"; "Holder"; "Infancy"; "Indorsee"; "Indorser"; "Lunacy"; "Maker"; "Married Women"; "Payee."

**PARTNERSHIP,**

accommodation paper made in name of, bona fide purchaser, 183.

irregular indorsement in name of, effect of as notice, 322.

where persons primarily liable are, presentment, to whom made, 364.

notice of dishonor, to whom given, 383.

**PAYEE,**

of bill, defined, 23.

of note, defined, 26.

designation of, 54, 59.

payable to order of maker or drawer, 54, 61.

payable to fictitious person, 54, 61.

competency to indorse, admission by acceptor, 146.

**PAYMENT,**

medium of, 42.

time of payment, days of grace, 75.

discount of bill by drawee before acceptance, 79.

by negotiable instrument, effect, 19-21.

when a discharge and defense, 12, 260, 294, 295.

payment or purchase, 299.

payment supra protest or for honor, 300.

of non-negotiable instrument to assignor, rights of assignee, 10-13.

by accommodated party a discharge, 183.

time of, by what law governed, 186.

of forged instrument, recovery by payor, 256.

see "Presentment."

**PAYMENT FOR HONOR,**

see "Payment Supra Protest."

**PAYMENT SUPRA PROTEST,**

see "Payment."

[The figures refer to pages.]

**PERSONAL DEFENSES,**

see "Defenses."

**PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES,**

see "Executors and Administrators."

**PLEADING,**

in action on bill or note, 328, note 57.

**PLEDGE,**

see "Collateral Security."

**PRE-EXISTING DEBT.**

see "Antecedent Debt."

**PRESENTMENT,**

an implied condition, 32.

necessity for, 336.

purposes of, 337.

manner of, 337, 338.

time of, 40, 337, 344.

days of grace, 75.

place of, 337, 338, 353.

by whom and to whom, 360-362.

effect of failure to present, 360, 364.

excuses for failure to present, 394.

reasonable diligence, 397.

waiver of presentment, 401.

by what law determined, 402.

to acceptor supra protest, 152.

to drawee to fix liability of acceptor supra protest, 152.

for payment, not necessary to charge accommodated indorser, 183.

of check, 412.

**PRESUMPTION,**

of consideration for non-negotiable instrument, 5-7.

of title in holder, 12.

as to payment by bill or note, whether absolute or conditional, 19-21.

as to whether party is a purchaser for value without notice, 327.

**PRINCIPAL AND AGENT,**

power of agent to transfer instrument, 65.

whether he incurs liability, 65.

undisclosed principal, 65.

**PROMISE,**

contained in note, 29.

see "Promissory Note."

**PROMISSORY NOTE,**

defined, 25.

the statute of Anne, 2, 4.

construction of, 5.

non-negotiable note, 5-7.

payment by, 19-21.

[The figures refer to pages.]

**PROMISSORY NOTE—Cont'd.**

- parties to note, 26.
- origin of negotiability of, 1.
- form, 26.
- negotiability not necessary to form or substance of, 1.
- essentials of note, in general, 26.
- indicia of negotiability, 14.
- days of grace, 75.
- delivery, 67.
  - in escrow, 67.
  - upon condition, 71.
- date, 72, 73.
- place of date, 27.
- the promise contained in note, 29.
  - certainty as to terms, 31.
  - uncertainty as to event, 31, 33.
  - uncertainty as to time, 31, 35.
  - payment out of particular fund, 32, 37.
  - additional condition or agreement not of essence of promise, 42, 48.
  - giving holder option of payment in money or some other thing, 42, 50.
  - payable on demand or at sight, etc., 32, 40.
  - no time of payment expressed, 32, 41.
  - payable in installments, 32, 41.
  - must be for payment of money only, 42.
  - payment in property other than money, 42, 50.
    - option given holder, 42, 50.
  - performance of other acts in addition to payment of money, 42, 48.
  - definition of money, 43.
  - amount must be certain, 42, 52.
    - interest, 42, 52.
    - exchange, 42, 52.
  - payable in foreign money, 46.
- specification of parties, 54.
  - signature of maker, 54, 55.
  - certainty as to parties, 56.
  - designation of payee, 54, 59.
    - payable to order of maker, 54, 61.
    - payable to fictitious person, 54, 61.
- necessity for and meaning of "value received," 73.
- accommodation parties, see "Accommodation."
- liability of maker, 144.
  - see "Maker."
- liability of indorser, see "Indorsement."

**PROTEST,**

- an implied condition, 32.
- necessity for, effect of failure to protest, 360, 368.
- acceptance supra protest, 101.
- in order to hold acceptor supra protest, 152.

[The figures refer to pages.]

**PROTEST—Cont'd.**

on non-payment by acceptor supra protest, 152.  
fees, when an item of damages, 170, 172, 173.  
waiver of, 401.  
by what law determined, 402.  
of check, 412.

**PUBLIC POLICY,**

agreements in contravention of, 289.

**PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE,**

what constitutes, 309.  
value, what is, 310.  
    whether antecedent or pre-existing debt is value, 310.  
    transfer as collateral security, whether for value, 310.  
    where purchaser pays less than face, amount of recovery, 316.  
notice, 317.  
    actual notice, 317, 319.  
    constructive notice, 317, 321.  
bona fides, or good faith, 323.  
when notice must exist, 325.  
notice immaterial if transferee a purchaser for value without notice, 325.  
overdue paper, 207.  
presumption and burden of proof, and order of proof, 327.  
defenses as against, 216.  
    defenses as real or personal, 216.  
    real defenses, 218.  
    personal defenses, 260.  
    coverture, 221.  
    infancy, 218.  
    corporations, ultra vires, 222.  
    persons non compos mentis, 226.  
    drunken persons, 226.  
    statutes avoiding instrument, 234.  
        usury, 236.  
        failure to stamp, 244.  
    alterations, 246, 248.  
    forgery, 246, 254.  
    common personal defenses, 260.  
    fraud, 262.  
    duress, 268.  
    want or failure of consideration, 270, 276.  
    illegality of consideration, 234, 283.  
        statutory prohibition, 234, 283.  
            violation of the Sunday laws, 286.  
            other statutes, 287.  
        common-law prohibition, 288.  
        contravention of public policy, 289.  
            in general, 289.  
            restraint of trade, 290.

[The figures refer to pages.]

**PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE—Cont'd.**

- effect of illegality, 291.
  - illegality as being total or partial, 291.
  - knowledge of illegality, intention, 292.
- discharge of the instrument, 294.
  - payment, 295.
  - discharge by act of holder, 302.
  - discharge by operation of law, 303.
  - discharge of parties secondarily liable, 304.
- stolen instruments, 111.
- lost instruments, 112.

**PURPOSE,**

- of negotiability, 17.

**Q**

**QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE,**

- in general, 82, 84.
- see "Acceptance."

**QUALIFIED INDORSEMENT,**

- identical with indorsement without recourse, 119.
- see "Indorsement."

**R**

**REAL DEFENSES,**

- see "Defenses."

**RE-EXCHANGE,**

- when an item of damages, 170.
- damages payable in lieu of, 171.
- by what law determined, 189.
- see "Damages."

**RELEASE,**

- discharge of instrument by, 302.
- when a personal defense, 260.

**REMEDY,**

- what law determines, 190.

**RENUNCIATION,**

- discharge of instrument by, 302.
- when a personal defense, 260.

**RESTRAINT OF TRADE,**

- agreement in, 290.

**RESTRICTIVE INDORSEMENT,**

- in general, 119, 124.
- as notice, 322.
- see "Indorsement"; "Purchaser for Value without Notice."

**RETENTION,**

- of bill, whether an acceptance, 94.

[The figures refer to pages.]

## S

### **SATISFACTION,**

see "Discharge of Instrument."

### **SET-OFF,**

paper transferred after maturity, not subject to, 207, note 58.  
see "Defenses."

### **SIGHT,**

instrument payable at, 32, 40.  
when to be presented, 337, 343-348.  
effect of failure to present, 364.

### **SIGNATURE,**

sufficiency, 54, 55.  
of indorser, 108.  
of drawer, admission by acceptor, 146.

### **SPECIAL INDORSEMENT,**

identical with indorsement in full, 116.  
see "Indorsement."

### **STAMPS,**

failure to affix revenue stamps, effect, 244.  
"War Revenue Act," 245.

### **STATUTE OF ANNE,**

establishing negotiability of notes,  
text of, 4.  
construction, 5.

### **STATUTE OF FRAUDS,**

parol acceptance or promise to accept, 89, 91, 99.

### **STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,**

by what law determined, 190.

### **STATUTES,**

statutory avoidance of instrument, 234.  
see "Defenses"; "Purchaser for Value Without Notice."

### **STOLEN INSTRUMENT,**

transfer of, 12.  
rights of bona fide holder, 111.

### **SUNDAY,**

violation of the Sunday laws, 286.

### **SUPRA PROTEST,**

acceptance supra protest, 101.  
payment supra protest, 300.

### **SURETIES,**

discharge of drawer or indorser, 304.

### **SURVIVORSHIP,**

of joint payee or indorsee, 198.



[The figures refer to pages.]

## T

### TENDER,

readiness of debtor at place of payment, when equivalent to tender, 367.

### TENOR,

of bill, 81, 82.

indorsement must follow, 131.

### TIME,

of payment, days of grace, 75.

### TITLE,

of indorsee or holder, see "Indorsement"; "Transfer."

presumed to be in holder, 12.

warranty of, by indorser, 162.

### TRADE, RESTRAINT OF,

unlawful agreements, 290.

### TRANSFER,

indorsement as a transfer, 125, 128.

effect of indorsement as, by what law determined, 187.

in general, 191-215.

defined, 191.

validity as between immediate parties, 192.

methods of transfer, 196.

by assignment, 196.

rights of assignee, 197.

by operation of law, 198.

death of holder, 198.

bankruptcy of holder, 198.

marriage of feme sole, 198.

husband and wife, 198.

death of joint payee or indorsee, 198.

by negotiation, 200.

negotiation by indorsement, 200.

negotiation by delivery, 204.

overdue paper, 207.

rights of transferee, 207.

of nonnegotiable instrument, see "Assignment."

of lost instrument, 112.

of stolen instrument, 12, 111.

title of holder, 12.

presumption of title in holder, 12.

not subject to equities between original parties, 13.

### TRANSFER BY DELIVERY,

negotiation by, 204.

see "Transfer."

### TRANSFERROR BY DELIVERY,

warranties of, 167.

see "Warranties."

[The figures refer to pages.]

**TRUSTEES,**

- power to transfer instrument, 63.
- whether they incur liability, 63.

**U****ULTRA VIRES,**

- see "Corporations."

**UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL,**

- see "Principal and Agent."

**UNLAWFUL AGREEMENTS,**

- in general, 234, 283.
- see "Consideration."

**UNCERTAINTY,**

- as to parties, 54.
- as to amount to be paid, 42.
- as to order in bill or promise in note, 31.

**USUAL COURSE OF BUSINESS,**

- meaning of term, 324.
- see "Purchaser for Value without Notice."

**USURY,**

- as a defense, 236.
- by what law determined, 183, 185.

**V****VALUE,**

- what constitutes, 310.
- see "Purchaser for Value without Notice."

**VALUE RECEIVED,**

- necessity for and meaning of expression, 73.

**VERBAL ACCEPTANCE,**

- see "Acceptance."

**W****WAIVER,**

- of exemptions, in bill or note, effect, 50.
- of presentment, protest, and notice of dishonor, 394, 401.

**WAR REVENUE ACT,**

- see "Stamps."

**WARRANTIES,**

- by acceptor, 146.
- genuineness of drawer's signature, 146.
- existence of drawer, 146.
- capacity of drawer, 146.

[The figures refer to pages.]

**WARRANTIES—Cont'd.**

- authority to make draft, 146.
- payee's competency to indorse, 146.
- facts which acceptor does not admit, 151.
  - genuineness of payee's and subsequent indorsements, 151.
  - genuineness of terms contained in bill, 151.
- by drawer, 159.
  - existence of drawee, 159.
  - capacity of drawee to accept, 159.
  - that the drawee will accept, 159.
- by indorser, 162.
  - genuineness of instrument, 162.
  - that the instrument is a valid and subsisting obligation, 162.
  - that the obligations of all prior parties are valid, 162.
  - capacity of prior parties, 162.
  - that he, as indorser, has title, and the right to transfer, 162.
- by indorser without recourse, 167.
- by transferror by delivery, 167.
- damages for breach, 170.

**WITHOUT RECOURSE,**

see "Indorsement."

















# The Hornbook Series

Comprises elementary treatises on all the principal subjects of the law. The books are made on the same general plan, in which certain special and original features are made prominent.

## The "Hornbook Plan."

Is to set forth the leading principles in black-letter (like this)

And to give the necessary amplification, explanation, application, etc., under the principles, in type like this. The authorities are grouped in footnotes at the bottom of the page.\*

This shows why these books are found so serviceable as practitioners' handbooks. A lawyer may want to be reminded of the law; in that case he wants it presented in such a way that he can pick out what he needs with the least trouble.

\*The Hornbook Series now includes treatises on Agency, Admiralty, Bailments, Bills and Notes, Common-Law Pleading, Constitutional Law, Contracts, Corporations, Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Damages, Elementary Law, Equity Jurisprudence, Equity Pleading, Evidence, Executors and Administrators, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, Insurance, International Law, Interpretation of Laws, Mining Law, Negligence, Partnership, Persons and Domestic Relations, Public Corporations, Real Property, Sales, Torts (2 vols.) and Wills.

---

Uniform price, \$3.75 a volume, delivered.

Bound in American Law Buckram.

---

## West Publishing Co.

St. Paul, Minn.

100 William St.  
New York.

225 Dearborn St.  
Chicago.

# Barrows on Negligence.

1899. 634 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By MORTON BARROWS, A. B., LL. B.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. Definition and Essential Elements.
2. Contributory Negligence.
3. Liability of Master to Servant.
4. Liability of Master to Third Persons.
5. Common Carriers of Passengers.
6. Carriers of Goods.
7. Occupation and Use of Land and Water.
8. Dangerous Instrumentalities.
9. Negligence of Attorneys, Physicians, and Public Officers.
10. Death by Wrongful Act.
11. Negligence of Municipal Corporations.

# Black on Construction and Interpretation of Laws.

1896. 509 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By H. CAMPBELL BLACK,

Author of Black's Law Dictionary, and Treatises on Constitutional Law, Judgments, etc.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. Nature and Office of Interpretation.
2. Construction of Constitutions.
3. General Principles of Statutory Construction.
4. Statutory Construction; Presumptions.
5. Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases.
6. Intrinsic Aids in Statutory Construction.
7. Extrinsic Aids in Statutory Construction.
8. Interpretation with Reference to Common Law.
9. Retrospective Interpretation.
10. Construction of Provisos, Exceptions, and Saving Clauses.
11. Strict and Liberal Construction.
12. Mandatory and Directory Provisions.
13. Amendatory and Amended Acts.
14. Construction of Codes and Revised Statutes.
15. Declaratory Statutes.
16. The Rule of Stare Decisis as Applied to Statutory Construction.
17. Interpretation of Judicial Decisions and the Doctrine of Precedents.

# Black's Constitutional Law.

1910. 868 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

**By H. CAMPBELL BLACK,**

Author of Black's Law Dictionary, Treatises on Judgments,  
Tax Titles, Bankruptcy, etc.

**Third Edition.**

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. Definitions and General Principles.
2. The United States and the States.
3. Establishment and Amendment of Constitutions.
4. Construction and Interpretation of Constitutions.
5. The Three Departments of Government.
6. The Federal Executive.
7. Federal Jurisdiction.
8. The Powers of Congress.
9. Interstate Law as Determined by the Constitution.
10. The Establishment of Republican Government.
11. Executive Power in the States.
12. Judicial Powers in the States.
13. Legislative Power in the States.
14. The Police Power.
15. The Power of Taxation.
16. The Right of Eminent Domain.
17. Municipal Corporations.
18. Civil Rights, and Their Protection by the Constitution.
19. Political and Public Rights.
20. Constitutional Guaranties in Criminal Cases.
21. Laws Impairing the Obligation of Contracts.
22. Retroactive Laws.

# Childs on Suretyship and Guaranty.

1907. 572 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By **FRANK HALL CHILDS,**  
of the Chicago Bar.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. Definitions, Parties, Distinctions, and Classifications.
2. Formation of the Contract.
3. The Statute of Frauds.
4. Construction of the Contract.
5. Rights and Liabilities as Between the Creditor and the Surety.
6. Rights and Liabilities of the Surety and of the Principal as to each other.
7. Rights and Liabilities of Co-Sureties as to each other.
8. Parties to Negotiable Instruments Occupying the Relation of Sureties.
9. Official Bonds.
10. Judicial Bonds.
11. Bail Bonds and Recognizances.

# **Clark on Contracts.**

1904. 693 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

**By WM. L. CLARK, Jr.**

**Second Edition: By FRANCIS B. TIFFANY.**

---

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

### **Chap.**

1. Contract in General.
2. Offer and Acceptance.
3. Classification of Contracts.
4. Requirement of Writing.
5. Consideration.
6. Capacity of Parties.
7. Reality of Consent.
8. Legality of Object.
9. Operation of Contract.
10. Interpretation of Contract.
11. Discharge of Contract.
12. Agency.
13. Quasi Contract.



# Clark on Corporations.

1907. 721 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By WM. L. CLARK, Jr.,

Author of "Criminal Law," "Criminal Procedure," and "Contracts."

Second Edition: By FRANCIS B. TIFFANY.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. Of the Nature of a Corporation.
2. Creation and Citizenship of Corporations.
3. Effect of Irregular Incorporation.
4. Relation between Corporation and its Promoters.
5. Powers and Liabilities of Corporations.
6. Powers and Liabilities of Corporations.
7. Powers and Liabilities of Corporations.
8. The Corporation and the State.
9. Dissolution of Corporations.
10. Membership in Corporations.
11. Membership in Corporations.
12. Membership in Corporations.
13. Management of Corporations—Officers and Agents.
14. Rights and Remedies of Creditors.
15. Foreign Corporations.

Appendix.

# Clark's Criminal Law.

1902. 517 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By WM. L. CLARK, Jr.,

Author of a "Handbook of the Law of Contracts."

Second Edition: By FRANCIS B. TIFFANY.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. Definition of Crime.
2. Criminal Law.
3. Classification of Crimes.
4. The Mental Element in Crime.
5. Persons Capable of Committing Crime.
6. Parties Concerned.
7. The Overt Act.
8. Offenses against the Person.
9. Offenses against the Person.
10. Offenses against the Habitation.
11. Offenses against Property.
12. Offenses against the Public Health, Morals, etc.
13. Offenses against Public Justice and Authority.
14. Offenses against the Public Peace.
15. Offenses against the Government.
16. Offenses against the Law of Nations.
17. Jurisdiction.
18. Former Jeopardy.

# Clark's Criminal Procedure.

1895. 665 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By WM. L. CLARK, Jr.,

Author of a "Handbook of Criminal Law," and a "Handbook of Contracts."

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. Jurisdiction.
2. Apprehension of Persons and Property.
3. Preliminary Examination, Bail, and Commitment.
4. Mode of Accusation.
5. Pleading—The Accusation.
6. Pleading—The Accusation.
7. Pleading—The Accusation.
8. Pleading—The Accusation.
9. Pleading—The Accusation.
10. Pleading and Proof.
11. Motion to Quash.
12. Trial and Verdict.
13. Proceedings after Verdict.
14. Evidence.
15. Habeas Corpus.

# Croswell on Executors and Administrators.

1897. 696 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By **SIMON GREENLEAF CROSWELL,**

Author of "Electricity," "Patent Cases," etc.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Chap.

### Part 1.—DEFINITIONS AND DIVISION OF SUBJECT.

1. Definitions and Division of subject.

### Part 2.—APPOINTMENT AND QUALIFICATIONS.

2. Appointment in Court.
3. Place and Time of Appointment and Requisites Therefor.
4. Who may Claim Appointment as Executor.
5. Who may Claim the Right to Administer.
6. Disqualifications for the Office of Executor or Administrator.
7. Acceptance or Renunciation.
8. Proceedings for Appointment of Executors and Administrators.
9. Special Kinds of Administrations.
10. Foreign and Interstate Administration.
11. Joint Executors and Administrators.
12. Administration Bonds.

### Part 3.—POWERS AND DUTIES.

13. Inventory—Appraisement—Notice of Appointment.
14. Assets of the Estate.
15. Management of the Estate.
16. Sales and Conveyances of Personal or Real Assets.
17. Payment of Debts and Allowances—Insolvent Estates.
18. Payment of Legacies.
19. Distribution of Intestate Estates.
20. Administration Accounts.

### Part 4.—TERMINATION OF OFFICE.

21. Revocation of Letters—Removal—Resignation.

### Part 5.—REMEDIES.

22. Actions by Executors and Administrators.
23. Actions against Executors and Administrators.
24. Statute of Limitations—Set-off.
25. Evidence and Costs.

# Costigan on Mining Law.

1908. 765 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By **GEORGE P. COSTIGAN, Jr.**

Dean of the College of Law of the University of Nebraska.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. The Origin and History of American Mining Law.
  2. The Mining Law Status of the States, Territories, and Possessions of the United States.
  3. The Land Department and the Public Surveys.
  4. The Relation Between Mineral Lands and the Public Land Grants.
  5. The Relation Between Mineral Lands and Homestead, Timber and Desert Entries.
  6. The Relation Between Mineral Lands and the Various Public Land Reservations.
  7. The Relation Between Mineral Lands and Townsites.
  8. Definitions of Practical Mining Terms.
  9. Definitions of Mining Law Terms.
  10. The Discovery of Lode and Placer Claims.
  11. Who May and Who May not Locate Mining Claims.
  12. The Location of Lode Claims.
  13. The Location of Mill Sites.
  14. The Location of Tunnel Sites and of Blind Lodes Cut by Tunnels.
  15. The Location of Placers and of Lodes within Placers.
  16. The Annual Labor or Improvements Requirements.
  17. The Abandonment, Forfeiture, and Relocation of Lode and Placer Mining Claims.
  18. Uncontested Application to Patent Mining Claims.
  19. Adverse Proceedings and Protests Against Patent Applications.
  20. Patents.
  21. Subsurface Rights.
  22. Coal Land and Timber and Stone Land Entries and Patents.
  23. Oil and Gas Leases.
  24. Other Mining Contracts and Leases.
  25. Mining Partnerships and Tenancies in Common.
  26. Conveyances and Liens.
  27. Mining Remedies.
  28. Water Rights and Drainage.
- Appendices.

# **Eaton on Equity.**

1901. 734 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

**By JAMES W. EATON,**

**Editor 3d Edition Collier on Bankruptcy, Co-Editor American  
Bankruptcy Reports, Eaton and Greene's Negotiable  
Instruments Law, etc.**

---

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

**Origin and History.**

**General Principles Governing the Exercise of Equity Jurisdiction.**

**Maxims.**

**Penalties and Forfeitures.**

**Priorities and Notice.**

**Bona Fide Purchasers Without Notice.**

**Equitable Estoppel.**

**Election.**

**Satisfaction and Performance.**

**Conversion and Reconversion.**

**Accident.**

**Mistake.**

**Fraud.**

**Equitable Property.**

**Implied Trusts.**

**Powers, Duties, and Liabilities of Trustees.**

**Mortgages.**

**Equitable Liens.**

**Assignments.**

**Remedies Seeking Pecuniary Relief.**

**Specific Performance.**

**Injunction.**

**Partition, Dower, and Establishment of Boundaries.**

**Reformation, Cancellation, and Cloud on Title.**

**Ancillary Remedies.**

# Gardner on Wills.

1903. 726 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By **GEORGE E. GARDNER,**

Professor in the Boston University Law School.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. History of Wills—Introduction.
2. Form of Wills.
3. Nuncupative, Holographic, Conditional Wills.
4. Agreements to Make Wills, and Wills Resulting from Agreement.
5. Who may be a Testator.
6. Restraint upon Power of Testamentary Disposition—Who may be Beneficiaries—What may be Disposed of by Will.
7. Mistake, Fraud, and Undue Influence.
8. Execution of Wills.
9. Revocation and Republication of Wills.
10. Conflict of Laws.
11. Probate of Wills.
12. Actions for the Construction of Wills.
13. Construction of Wills—Controlling Principles.
14. Construction—Description of Subject-Matter.
15. Construction—Description of Beneficiary.
16. Construction—Nature and Duration of Interests.
17. Construction—Vested and Contingent Interests—Remainders—Executory Devises.
18. Construction—Conditions.
19. Construction—Testamentary Trusts and Powers.
20. Legacies — General — Specific — Demonstrative — Cumulative — Lapsed and Vold — Abatement — Ademption — Advancements.
21. Legacies Charged upon Land or Other Property.
22. Payment of the Testator's Debts.
23. Election.
24. Rights of Beneficiaries Not Previously Discussed.

# George on Partnership.

1897. 616 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By WILLIAM GEORGE.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. Definition and Establishment of Relation.
2. Kinds of Partnerships and Partners.
3. Characteristic Features of Partnerships.
4. Implied Rights and Liabilities Inter Se.
5. Articles of Partnership.
6. Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons.
7. Actions Between Partners.
8. Actions Between Partners and Third Persons.
9. Dissolution.
10. Limited Partnerships.
11. Joint-Stock Companies.



# Hale on Bailments and Carriers.

1896. 675 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By WM. B. HALE.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. In General.
2. Bailments for Sole Benefit of Bailor.
3. Bailments for Bailee's Sole Benefit.
4. Bailments for Mutual Benefit—Pledges.
5. Bailments for Mutual Benefit—Hiring.
6. Innkeepers.
7. Carriers of Goods.
8. Carriers of Passengers.
9. Actions against Carriers.

# Hale on Damages.

1896. 476 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By WM. B. HALE,

Author of "Bailments and Carriers."

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. Definitions and General Principles.
2. Nominal Damages.
3. Compensatory Damages.
4. Bonds, Liquidated Damages and Alternative Contracts.
5. Interest.
6. Value.
7. Exemplary Damages.
8. Pleading and Practice.
9. Breach of Contracts for Sale of Goods.
10. Damages in Actions against Carrier.
11. Damages in Actions against Telegraph Companies.
12. Damages for Death by Wrongful Act.
13. Wrongs Affecting Real Property.
14. Breach of Marriage Promise.

# Hale on Torts.

1896. 636 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By WM. B. HALE.

Author of "Bailments and Carriers," etc.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. General Nature of Torts.
2. Variations in Normal Right to Sue.
3. Liability for Torts Committed by or with Others.
4. Discharge and Limitation of Liability for Torts.
5. Remedies for Torts—Damages.
6. Wrongs Affecting Freedom and Safety of Person.
7. Injuries in Family Relations.
8. Wrongs Affecting Reputation.
9. Malicious Wrongs.
10. Wrongs to Possession and Property.
11. Nuisance.
12. Negligence.
13. Master and Servant.

# Hopkins on Real Property.

1896. 589 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By EARL P. HOPKINS, A. B. LL. M.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. What is Real Property.
2. Tenure and Selsin.
3. Estates as to Quantity—Fee Simple
4. Estates as to Quantity—Estates Tail.
5. Estates as to Quantity—Conventional Life Estates.
6. Estates as to Quantity—Legal Life Estates.
7. Estates as to Quantity—Less than Freehold.
8. Estates as to Quality on Condition—on Limitation.
9. Estates as to Quality—Mortgages.
10. Equitable Estates.
11. Estates as to Time of Enjoyment—Future Estates.
12. Estates as to Number of Owners—Joint Estates.
13. Incorporeal Hereditaments.
14. Legal Capacity to Hold and Convey Realty.
15. Restraints on Alienation.
16. Title.

# Hughes on Admiralty.

1901. 504 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By **ROBERT M. HUGHES, M. A.**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

The Origin and History of the Admiralty, and its Extent in the United States.  
Admiralty Jurisdiction as Governed by the Subject-Matter.  
General Average and Marine Insurance.  
Bottomry and Respondentia; and Liens for Supplies, Repairs, and Other Necessaries.  
Stevedores' Contracts, Canal Tolls, and Towage Contracts.  
Salvage.  
Contracts of Affreightment and Charter Parties.  
Water Carriage as Affected by the Harter Act of February 13, 1893.  
Admiralty Jurisdiction in Matters of Tort.  
The Right of Action in Admiralty for Injuries Resulting Fatally.  
Torts to the Property, and Herein of Collision.  
The Steering and Sailing Rules.  
Rules as to Narrow Channels, Special Circumstances, and General Precautions.  
Damages in Collision Cases.  
Vessel Ownership Independent of the Limited Liability Act.  
Rights and Liabilities of Owners as Affected by the Limited Liability Act.  
The Relative Priorities of Maritime Claims.  
A Summary of Pleading and Practice.

## APPENDIX.

1. The Mariner's Compass.
2. Statutes Regulating Navigation, Including:
  - (1) The International Rules.
  - (2) The Rules for Coast and Connecting Inland Waters.
  - (3) The Dividing Lines between the High Seas and Coast Waters.
  - (4) The Lake Rules.
  - (5) The Mississippi Valley Rules.
  - (6) The Act of March 3, 1899, as to Obstructing Channels.
3. The Limited Liability Acts, Including:
  - (1) The Act of March 3, 1851, as Amended.
  - (2) The Act of June 26, 1884.
4. Section 941, Rev. St., as Amended, Regulating Bonding of Vessels.
5. Statutes Regulating Evidence in the Federal Courts.
6. Suits in Forma Pauperis.
7. The Admiralty Rules of Practice.

# Hughes on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure.

1904. 634 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By **ROBERT M. HUGHES**, of the Norfolk Bar,

Author of "Hughes on Admiralty," and Lecturer at the George  
Washington University Law School.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. Introduction—What it Comprehends.
2. The District Court—Its Criminal Jurisdiction and Practice.
3. Same—Continued.
4. The District Court—Criminal Jurisdiction—Miscellaneous Jurisdiction.
5. The District Court—Bankruptcy.
- 6-8. Same—Continued.
9. The District Court—Miscellaneous Jurisdiction.
10. The Circuit Court—Original Jurisdiction.
- 11-12. Same—Continued.
13. The Circuit Court—Jurisdiction by Removal.
- 14-15. Same—Continued.
16. The Circuit Court—Jurisdiction by Removal—Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court—Other Minor Courts of Original Jurisdiction.
17. Procedure in the Ordinary Federal Courts of Original Jurisdiction—Courts of Law.
18. Procedure in the Ordinary Federal Courts of Original Jurisdiction—Courts of Equity.
19. Same—Continued.
20. Appellate Jurisdiction—The Circuit Court of Appeals.
21. Appellate Jurisdiction—The Supreme Court.
22. Procedure on Error and Appeal.

The U. S. Supreme Court Rules and the Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States are given in an appendix.

# Ingersoll on Public Corporations.

1904. 738 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By **HENRY H. INGERSOLL, LL. D.,**

Dean of the University of Tennessee School of Law.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Part 1.—QUASI CORPORATIONS.

**Chap.**

1. Nature, Creation, Classification.
2. Quasi Corporations—Liabilities, Elements, Counties, Property, etc.
3. Same—Continued.
4. Same—Continued.

### Part 2.—MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

5. Municipal Corporations.
6. Their Creation—How—By What Bodies—Subject to What Restrictions, etc.
7. Their Alteration and Dissolution.
8. The Charter.
9. Legislative Control.
10. Proceedings and Ordinances.
11. Officers, Agents, and Employés.
12. Contracts.
13. Improvements.
14. Police Powers and Regulations.
15. Streets, Sewers, Parks, and Public Buildings.
16. Torts.
17. Debts, Funds, Expenses, and Administration.
18. Taxation.
19. Actions.

### Part 3.—QUASI PUBLIC CORPORATIONS.

20. Quasi Public Corporations.
21. Railroads.
22. Electric Companies.
23. Water and Gas Companies.
24. Other Quasi Public Corporations.

# Jaggard on Torts.

1895. 2 vols. 1307 pages. \$7.50 delivered.

By **EDWIN A. JAGGARD, A. M., LL. B.,**  
Professor of the Law of Torts in Minnesota University Law School.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Part 1.—IN GENERAL

#### Chap.

1. General Nature of Torts.
2. Variations in the Normal Right to Sue.
3. Liability for Torts Committed by or with Others.
4. Discharge and Limitation of Liability for Torts.
5. Remedies.

### Part 2.—SPECIFIC WRONGS.

6. Wrongs Affecting Safety and Freedom of Persons.
7. Injuries in Family Relations.
8. Wrongs Affecting Reputation.
9. Malicious Wrongs.
10. Wrongs to Possession and Property.
11. Nuisance.
12. Negligence.
13. Master and Servant.
14. Common Carriers.



# McKelvey on Evidence.

1907. 540 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By JOHN JAY McKELVEY, A. M., LL. B.,

Author of "Common-Law Pleading," etc.

Second Edition.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. Introductory.
2. Judicial Notice.
3. Questions of Law and Questions of Fact.
4. Burden of Proof.
5. Presumptions.
6. Admissions.
7. Confessions.
8. Matters Excluded as Unimportant, or as Misleading, though Logically Relevant.
9. Character.
10. Opinion Evidence.
11. Hearsay.
12. Witnesses.
13. Examination of Witnesses.
14. Writings.
15. Demurrers to Evidence.

# Norton on Bills and Notes.

1900. 600 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By PROF. CHARLES P. NORTON.

Third Edition: By Francis B. Tiffany.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. Of Negotiability so far as it Relates to Bills and Notes.
2. Of Negotiable Bills and Notes, and their Formal and Essential Requisites.
3. Acceptance of Bills of Exchange.
4. Indorsement.
5. Of the Nature of the Liabilities of the Parties.
6. Transfer.
7. Defenses as against Purchaser for Value without Notice.
8. The Purchaser for Value without Notice.
9. Of Presentment and Notice of Dishonor.
10. Checks.

Appendix.

# Shipman on Common-Law Pleading.

1895. 615 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, LL. B.

Second Edition.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. Forms of Action.
2. Forms of Action.
3. The Parties to Actions.
4. The Proceedings in an Action.
5. The Declaration.
6. The Production of the Issue.
7. Materialty in Pleading.
8. Singleness or Unity in Pleading.
9. Certainty in Pleading.
10. Consistency and Simplicity in Pleading.
11. Directness and Brevity in Pleading.
12. Miscellaneous Rules.  
Appendix.

# Shipman on Equity Pleading.

1897. 644 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By BENJ. J. SHIPMAN, LL. B.,

Author of "Shipman's Common-Law Pleading."

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

### Chap.

1. Equity Pleading in General.
2. Parties.
3. Proceedings in an Equitable Suit.
4. Bills in Equity.
5. The Disclaimer.
6. Demurrer.
7. The Plea.
8. The Answer.
9. The Replication.

# Smith's Elementary Law.

1896. 367 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

**BY WALTER DENTON SMITH,**

Instructor in the Law Department of the University of Michigan.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Chap.

### Part 1.—ELEMENTARY JURISPRUDENCE.

1. Nature of Law and the Various Systems.
2. Government and its Functions.
3. Government in the United States.
4. The Unwritten Law.
5. Equity.
6. The Written Law.
7. The Authorities and their Interpretation.
8. Persons and Personal Rights.
9. Property.
10. Classification of the Law.

### Part 2.—THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW.

11. Constitutional and Administrative Law.
12. Criminal Law.
13. The Law of Domestic Relations.
14. Corporeal and Incorporeal Hereditaments.
15. Estates in Real Property.
16. Title to Real Property.
17. Personal Property.
18. Succession After Death.
19. Contracts.
20. Special Contracts.
21. Agency.
22. Commercial Associations.
23. Torts.

### Part 3.—THE ADJECTIVE LAW.

24. Remedies.
25. Courts and their Jurisdiction.
26. Procedure.
27. Trials.

# Tiffany on Agency.

1903. 609 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By FRANCIS B. TIFFANY,

Author of "Death by Wrongful Act," "Law of Sales," etc.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Chap.

### Part 1.—IN GENERAL.

1. Introductory—Definitions.
2. Creation of the Relation of Principal and Agent—Appointment.
3. Same (continued)—Ratification.
4. What Acts Can be Done by Agent—Illegality—Capacity of Parties—Joint Principals and Agents.
5. Delegation by Agent—Subagents.
6. Termination of the Relation.
7. Construction of Authority.

### Part 2.—RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND THIRD PERSON.

8. Liability of Principal to Third Person—Contract.
9. Same (continued).
10. Admissions by Agent—Notice to Agent.
11. Liability of Principal to Third Person—Torts and Crimes.
12. Liability of Third Person to Principal.

### Part 3.—RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES BETWEEN AGENT AND THIRD PERSON.

13. Liability of Agent to Third Person (including parties to contracts).
14. Liability of Third Person to Agent.

### Part 4.—RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

15. Duties of Agent to Principal.
16. Duties of Principal to Agent.
- Appendix.

# Tiffany on Persons and Domestic Relations.

1909. 656 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

By WALTER C. TIFFANY.

Second Edition: Edited by Roger W. Cooley.

---

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Chap.

### Part 1.—HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. Marriage.
2. Persons of the Spouses as Affected by Coverture.
3. Rights in Property as affected by Coverture.
4. Contracts, Conveyances, etc., and Quasi-Contractual Obligations.
5. Wife's Equitable and Statutory Separate Estate.
6. Antenuptial and Postnuptial Settlements.
7. Separation and Divorce.

### Part 2.—PARENT AND CHILD.

8. Legitimacy, Illegitimacy, and Adoption.
9. Duties and Liabilities of Parents.
10. Rights of Parents and of Children.

### Part 3.—GUARDIAN AND WARD.

11. Guardians Defined—Selection and Appointment.
12. Rights, Duties, and Liabilities of Guardians.
13. Termination of Guardianship—Enforcing Guardian's Liability.

### Part 4.—INFANTS, PERSONS NON COMPOTES MENTIS, AND ALIENS.

14. Infants.
15. Persons Non Compotes Mentis and Aliens.

### Part 5.—MASTER AND SERVANT.

16. Creation and Termination of Relation.

# **Tiffany on Sales.**

1908. 534 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

**By FRANCIS B. TIFFANY, A. B., LL. B.**

Author of "Tiffany on Death by Wrongful Act."

**Second Edition.**

---

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

### **Chap.**

1. Formation of the Contract.
2. Formation of the Contract—Under the Statute of Frauds.
3. Effect of the Contract in Passing the Property—Sale of Specific Goods.
4. Effect of the Contract in Passing the Property—Sale of Goods not Specific.
5. Fraud, and Retention of Possession.
6. Illegality.
7. Conditions and Warranties.
8. Performance.
9. Rights of Unpaid Seller against the Goods.
10. Action for Breach of the Contract.

**Appendix: Sales Act—English Sale of Goods Act.**



# **Vance on Insurance.**

1896. 683 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

**By WILLIAM REYNOLDS VANCE,**

Professor of Law in the George Washington University.

---

The principal object of this treatise is to give a consistent statement of logically developed principles that underlie all contracts of insurance, with subsidiary chapters treating of the rules peculiar to the several different kinds of insurance. Special attention has been given to the construction of the standard fire policy.

This treatment will help to bring about, we believe, the much desired clarification of this branch of the law.

The chapters cover,—

Historical and Introductory.

Nature and Requisites of Contract.

Parties.

Insurable Interest.

Making the Contract.

The Consideration.

Consent of the Parties—Concealment.

Consent of the Parties—Warranties.

Agents and their Powers.

Waiver and Estoppel.

The Standard Fire Policy.

Terms of the Life Policy.

Marine Insurance.

Accident Insurance.

Guaranty, Credit, and Liability Insurance.

Appendix.

# **Wilson on International Law.**

1910. 623 pages. \$3.75 delivered.

**By GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON.**

---

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

### **Chap.**

1. Persons in International Law.
2. Existence, Independence and Equality.
3. Property and Domain.
4. Jurisdiction.
5. Diplomatic Relations.
6. Consular and Other Relations.
7. Treaties and Other International Agreements.
8. Amicable Means of Settlement of International Differences.
9. Non-Amicable Measures of Redress Short of War.
10. Nature and Commencement.
11. Area and General Effect of Belligerent Operations.
12. Rights and Obligations During War.
13. Persons During War.
14. Property on Land.
15. Property on Water.
16. Maritime Capture.
17. Rules of War.
18. Military Occupation and Government.
19. Prisoners, Disabled and Shipwrecked.
20. Non-Hostile Relations between Belligerents.
21. Termination of War.
22. Nature of Neutrality.
23. Visit and Search.
24. Contraband.
25. Blockade.
26. Continuous Voyage.
27. Unneutral Service.
28. Prize.










216

STANFORD UNIVERSITY LAW LIBRARY

DB ANX NCh3  
Hand-book of the law of bills  
Stanford Law Library



3 6105 044 211 972